PAKISTAN: CRASH PROGRAM, SECRET BIDS FOR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000706940038-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: November 30, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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A~3:1 C?~:~ APPEARED
ON PAGE__ t
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 November 1981
STAT
articles examining the current dangerous trend. ?~
double in the next decade. Safeguards to stop the spread of
uclear weapons are under attack. This is the first of five ~
Ambitious third-world states are learning to make nu-~
Lear weapons. Today's exclusive "nuclear club" could ,
~'aicis#an:. gash program, s~~re# bids for r~~ciear t~ch~a?iogy
By David R. Willis
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Vienna, Austria, and Raraciri, Pakistan
A military-ruled Muslim country, sandwiched between
powerful rivals, so undeveloped iC cannot manu.'3cture.
etien a television tube or a radio set, has just made several
dramatic, covert bids to buy cabies and computers to help it
build and test a nuclear device. -
This newspaper has learned that the country -Pakistan
- .has secretly tried to get highly sensitive diagnostic co-
axial cable from US and European suppliers.
1'he cable .is used for monitoring underground nuclear
tests. It runs from a test shaft in which a device is exploded
to a monitoring center a safe distance away.; Pakistan has
dug just such a shaft in remote Baluchistan's Chagai Hills
near the Afghan border, intelligence sources confirm.
Hearing about the attempts to buy the cable, alarmed
L';zited States officials jumped into action. They exerted
.enough pressure, direct and indirect, on the US and Euro-
pean firms to stop the sales.
But the very bid itself, reportedly made through "front"
companies, indicates to officials how far toward a nuclear
blast Pakistan has advanced after a clandestine crash pro-
gram over the last decade. _
They believe Pakistan will try again and again, under'
different covers. They estimate that Pakistan could have!
its first device built by the end of next year. I
Islamabad has also tried to buy two big bS computed
systems. The first, it claimed, was for high-altitude atmo-.
spheric research. The second was said to be for analyzing
crop rotation results. j
When the US Commerce Department demanded that the ~
Pakistanis sign a statement promising. not to use the com .
puters for any nuclear purposes whatsoever, peaceful or ~
otherwise, they feltsilent. Curious, US officials asked ques-~
tions. Pakistani officials replied blandly, "What comput-~
ers'? Wei didn't want to buy ary computers..:."
These developments, plus other more successful efforts'
to acquire nuclear technolosry .tree below), are profoundly.
disturbing for diplomats,. officials, and scientists around
the world who oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to of-!,
ten unstable third-wor:d countries.
The developments illustrate the lengths to which pride,;
vulnerability, ambition, fear, and internal struggles cant
push small nondemocratic leadership elites toward acquir-;
ing nuclear devices as a way to gain power and status.
Pakistan is just one of 10 countries on the nuclear thresh,
old. Among the others are India, which exploded a nuclea
device in 1974, Israel, and South Africa. None of these hav
signed the 1970 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) .
Thus only part of their nuclear fuel cycles are subject to
inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in Vienna. Other parts are not. All four have the
know-how, the special skills, and the political incentives,
needed to build nuclear weapons. Right behind them are: i
o Iraq, determined to push on with its nuclear program;
despite Israel's bombing of its nuclear reactor in June.
? Argentina and Brazil, the giants -and rivals - of~
Latin America.
? Taiwan and South Korea, skilled, determined, each
with a fractious relationship with a communist neighbor. ``
? Libya, in a special, dangerous category of its awn.
Undeveloped but oil-rich and. erratic, Libya tried to buy a'
nuclear bomb from China in 1970. It has been selling _ura-
nium to Pakistan and giving it money.
This correspondent set out three mouths ago on the trail.{
of the atom bomb makers. It began in an idyllic open-air
restaurant in a valley outside Geneva, where a top m~clear i
scientist provided a thorough briefing on technical data.
It was to lead through 12 cities in eight countries in the ~~
Middle East, Europe, and Africa, as well as in the US. i
As a result, this newspaper has amassed new evidence ;
to show that atomic devices, and the ability to detonate '
them, are spreading to volatile areas of the world where '.
ambition and insecurities are high but safeguards are low.
Frequently questions put to officials in these nations
about nuclear matters met with closed- doors. But a num-
ber of thoroughly alarmed diplomats, scientists, and offi-
cials were willing in private to share details of the rush to
nuclear weapons. They hoped they might stow it down by
directing public attention to its dangers. '
The nuclear trail leads through some of the deepest
impulses of the human mind -from fear to moral out-
rage, from hope to a passionate commitment to nuclear ;
power as cheap energy for the future. '
This series is an effort to bring to light some of the'.
maneuverings of would-be atom bomb makers. Two of
them, Israel and South Africa, deny any nuclear tests so'
far, but have the diplomatic status that results from an
almost universal belief that they already possess atomic
.weapons, either assembled or in pieces..
The. series looks at the state of inspections, safeguards,
and the IAEA. It looks at the flow of uranium and skilled
technicians, and it looks at ideas for the future.
Should Pakistan or any of the other states on they
threshold actually detonate a bomb. the nuclear club
would expand for the first time since Intita let oK an~
atomic blast in the Rajasthan Desert in 1974..
GU~`'1Ii'~'viD
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The number of hydrogen-bomb powers has remained
at fire since 1964: the US, the Soviet Union, Britain.
France, and China. Neither France nor China has signed J
the NPT. 1
If a state like Pakistan detonates a nuclear device, or if
it becomes widely known that it has an undetonated bomb, {
other threshold states could be emboldened. Prospects for j
a rapid spread of nuclear weapons would grow as this
century nears its end.
Regional rivalries in the 1Vliddie East, in Latin Amer-
ica, in Africa, and in Asia would be more dangerous. i
Other countries well able to build their own nuclear weap-
ons -Italy, Australia, even West Germany and Japan - I
might announce a new willingness to look at their nuclear ~
.,r......... ~.__..-----------
Even now the world must decide just how important
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons actually is. Is it ~,
just one policy objective among others? Or is it a pars-1
mount issue ranking with inflation, oil prices, and foreign
expansionism. Is it the issue of today? !
'Is it urgent now to draw up what is dramatically ~
lacking in today's world: a list of agreed embargoes and I
other punishments to be taken against any country that
makes or explodes a nuclear device?
The most urgent case today is Pakistan. President Zia
ul-Haq could have a nuclear device - at least one - by
the end of next year. He could decide to explode it in a
desperate bid to hang onto personal power, or to defy and
impress India, or to warn the Soviet Union, or to exert
diplomatic blackmail against the United States.
There are four big reasons why Pakistan is in fact a !
crucial test case:
1. Pakistan has 83 million people and aspirations to
lead the IvTuslim world. It has accepted money and bought
uranium from Col. bluammar Qaddafi of Libya. Israel
fears that the rich, unpredictable, terrorist-supporting
Qaddafi could extract nuclear technology from a Pakistan
that needs his cash and political support. ~ t
The US is also deeply concerned. ?Other Arab states
could learn nuclear secrets from Pakistan. So Pakistan is
part of global concern about the Middle East arms race.
2. Pakistan has fought three wars with-its bitter rival;
India. "How can we tell Pakistan to stop building a nu-
clear weapon when India detonated one in 1974?" one US
official asks despairingly. "We can ask -but is Pakistan
listening?" If Pakistan lets off a blast, Indian Prime Min-
ister Indira Gandhi will be under severe pressure to re-
spond in kind. -
American, Israeli, and other experts say the logical l
Indian response -despite Indian denials -would be a
hydrogen bomb. 4t is within India's capacity. It would ex- i
pand the H-bomb club to six nations. It would alarm the i
superpowers. The subcontinent arms race, heating up
again with Pakistan obtaining 40 ultrasophistfcated US F- ~
16 jets and India reported to be going alter 150 French
Mirage 2000s after buying Soviet MIG-23s, would take the {
most ominous of turns: a nuclear turn.
3. Pakistan is closely involved with the three super-
powers. It is allied with the United States, opposed to
Soviet troops next door in Afghanistan, and on fairly good ~
terms with China. Any tilt on the subcontinent affects all
three. A nuclear tilt would alarm all three: Consequences !
would be grave. The superpowers would try to contain a
nuclear arms race. Pressures on them would be intense.
Right now. the clandestine Pakistani rush toward an
atomic device is an embarrassment to the Reagan admin-
istration in Washington. It sees Pakistan as a key ally!
against Moscow. News of the bid to buy diagnostic cable !
and large computers for nuclear. use has been tightly held
in Washington. partly because so many members of the
House and Senate are deeply suspicious of Pakistan:.:. _~
The Senate has agreed to the first stage of a 53.2 billion
economic-aid and military-sates package over the next six
years. The house is considering it.: ~bcommittees in both
chambers gave a green light to the sale of 40 F-16 jets. The
sale is now approved.
The Senate says all aid will be suspended if Pakistan
detonates a nuclear device, without the President being
able to override the cutoff. The House may allow presiden-
tial discretion to remain, subject to two-thirds majority
votes in both House and Senate.
Democrats will be angry if
Pakistan does detonate. Knowl-
edge that the aid may stop may
make him wait until he has such
aid before he pushes the button
in Baluchistan.
4. Pakistan is also vital be-
cause any new nuclear test
would inevitably .weaken the?
framework of precautions
against the spread of nuclear
weapons.
So far, the framework has
worked remazkably well, given the number of countries
(Canada, Japan, and Australia) that could make weapons
if they chose.
But now the framework is under fire. The s stem of
safeguards, insaections, treaties, talks~,' ex rt controls,
and intelligence surveillance was jolted when ~.SraeT~~
it inad uate to prevent aq rom, g a om s-
raeli -16 jets stre o a a une an o e the
Osirak reactor being built by France:
Many Israelis I talked with agreed with Prime Minis-
ter Menachem Begin's basic rationales. To sit in a living
room in Jerusalem, and to be told in quiet, cWtured tones
that India should now bomb Pakistani nuclear installs- i
lions is a chilling experience.
The Israeli raid has set a precedent of one state's tak- i
ing direct action long before another state's nuclear !
capacities grow. The IAEA. along with US and other ex- ~
perts, says Iraq was six to seven years away from making ~~
Israeli officials say Israel would bomb again if neces-
sary to keep nuclear weapons out of Arab hands. They j
don't answer a direct question on whether they would
bomb Pakistani nuclear sites as they did Iraq's. Israeli
intelligence keeps close tabs on Pakistan's progress.
"You're not talking about democracies here," says an
Israeli official in Tel Aviv, on the sunny shore of the blue
Mediterranean.."You're talking about states ruled by im
dividuals. One bullet can change everything. Or a coup." !
Take Iran. If the Shah had lived five more years and ac- j
quired a bomb, what would (Ayatollah) Khomeini have
done with it?"
Said another Israeli source: "We acted. Now it's time;
for other powers to stop this proliferation." j
One of the questions this series will examine is: how?
By 1990 Iraq may be able to explode a small device, since.
France is apparently planning to rebuild Osirak (insisting;
on strict safeguards and- slower-grade uranium fuel) .
Libya is training unusually large numbers of engineers;
in the US (see next article in this series), Western Europe?
and the Soviet Union.
Argentina and Brazil will also be on the verge of nu-
clear weapons ~ in the 1990s. So will South Korea andl
Taiwan. i
Some strategic thinkers, such as Indian government;
adviser K. Subramaniam, see world nuclear proliferation
as a force for stability. They believe that just as the. ,
US and the Soviet Union have a nuclear stalemate, ~'
so subcontinent and Mideast rivals would balance
into a standoff with nuclear weapons. World peace:
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But a far more widespread view is that when one j
side in a regional rivalry obtains nuclear weapons.
its enemies will be under enormous pressure to
stage preemptive strikes, as Israel did against Iraq.
Israeli Prof. Ya'ir Evron told me in Jerusalem,
for instance, that the spread of nuclear weapons in
the Middle East would be highly dangerous.
For many a thoughtful analyst, the ultimate
nightmare is a scenario outlined to me by a veteran
European nucleaz expert in Vienna:
"What worries.me is the unknown, the end of the
road, the system coming apart.
"If Pakistan gets a bomb, or Brazil, or Argen-
tina, well,. that's bad, but it's largely a regional
matter. '
"But it could lead. if world events continue to be
as unstable as they are now, to South Africa being
encouraged to warn black Africa to keep its dis-
tance. Or Israel might quarrel with the US, or vice
versa.
"Then something terribly serious might happen:
Western Europe might see the US as unreliable.
Can you imagine the consequences if the world dis-
covered West Germany was building abomb -
which it could do very quickly indeed?
"Or Japan?"
Experts almost literally shudder as they contemplate
the Soviet reaction to intelligence about any West German
move toward?its own nuclear weapons. Moscow's overrid-
ing concern at the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna, sources report. is maintaining safeguards on the
Germans. ivloscow neither Forgets nor forgives the Hitler
invasion, which cost some 20 million Soviet lives.
Dangers take other forms as well. I
The era of fast-breeder reactors, which produce more
nuclear material (plutonium) than they consume, is be-
ginning. Larger quantities of uranium than ever before
will be ferried between reactors and extraction plants.
They will be targets for hijackers and terrorists.
The US and the Soviet Union have thousands of nuclear ~
warheads in Europe. Experts at the IAEA and elsewhere
worry that aBaader-Meinhof-style gang or a Libyan-fi-
nanced Arab terrorist group might steal one, decipher the
trigger mechanism, and hold a city for ransom.
The paperback thriller, "The Fifth Horseman" by
Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, imagines Libya
has blackmailed H-bomb secrets from French scientists
and threatens to blow up New York City unless the US
forces Israel to yield Palestinians a homeland. So far, it's
only a novel
Israel derides the ultimate effectiveness of inspections
of nuclear plants carried out by the L4EA, the only inter-
national agency responsible for inspections. Two former i
IAEA inspectors, Americans Robert Richter and Eman-
uel Morgan, have issued widely quoted criticisms.
Many believe the IAEA is unique and irreplaceable, for !.
all the faults inherent in a multinational organization.
Israel and South Africa accuse Arab and black states
of playing politics with the IAEA. Developing nations de- j
mand the technical assistance (free nuclear technology) i
promised by the NPT in exchange for inspections. They,
also demand that the US and the Soviets cut their nuclear'
weapons stockpiles.
A growing number of developing countries argue that
the nuclear club just isn't keeping its promises.
IAEA members have censured Israel for the Iraq raid. j
And they have expelled South Atrica. -
Exclusive evidence amassed by this newspaper in-
cludes the Pakistani bid to buy the diagnostic coaxial ca-
ble for underground tests. The cable relays data from the
blast site vital for scientists to know how efficient the fis-
sion process is and how to plan for the next test.
So far, the effort to stop the sale of the cable has suc- y
ceeded. It is just one part in a long series of highly classi-
fied actions officials won't discuss in public. It is aimed at ,
choking the flow of sensitive technology to countries like
Pakistan. But Pakistan has been astonishingly successful ,
in acquiring such technology from a .dozen industrial
countries.
(Officials were amazed and chagrined to discover that, ~
even as they were squelching the sales, full details of an
improved, late-model diagnostic cable, made with fiber
optics, were splashed in full color across lI pages of the
September edition of Energy and Technology Review,
published by the Lawrence Livermore National Labora-
tory inCalifornia.
(Title: "Optical Fibers in Nucleaz Test Diagnostics."
"Government dollars pay the salaries of officials stopping ~
the sale," a source groans, "and tax money also finances
a magazine telling everyone how to make the cable."
(Any embassy could do what I did: telephone Liver-
moreand ask for the publication to be mailed. It was. )
But it is cleaz that President Zia does not intend to stop
assembling a nuclear device and the means to test it.
Pakistan-watchers in `:'ashington see. President Zia
playing a clever game. To 14Ir. Reagan he stresses the threat
from itiToscow. In fact, he has different reasons for wanting
both the nucleaz device and US aid. He wants to shore up
Pakistan against its arch rival, India. and to hold onto power
Other parts of new fvfonitor evidence that zeros in on
Pakistan:
? Confirmation from a variety of intelligence and other
officials that although the Baluchistan tunnel is empty so far,
its size and configuration leave no ou a ou i s u aria e
An underground test would be harderto detect and more
convenient than an atmospheric test, which would scatter
radioactivity into India, Afghanistan, and perhaps China.
a Confirmation that Pakistan is working hard to complete j
a plutonium bomb trigger: a set of curved neutron reflectors '
and explosives to wrap azound a plutonium core and com-
press it - "implode" it - into a detonation.
~ Details of how Pakistan has orchestrated dummy com-
panies, private individuals, and authentic trading corpora-
lions in Canada, Turkey, West Germany, Italy, Britain, the
iJS, and elsewhere to provide parts for enrichment and
The parts include a West German fluoridation plant to
convert uranium into a gas used by an enrichment plant; j
vacuum valves, evaporation and condensation systems, and j
filters from Switzerland; and special electrical inverters that
keep? steel "cascade" vessels spinning at unvarying speeds;
duiing the centrifuge enrichment process from Britain,
Canada, and the US. Also, dissolvers; evaporators, and other
equipment from France.
Clandestine suppliers have gone on trial in Canada and'
1~'est Germany. ~
As recently as Oct. 31, a retired Pakistani Army officer
reportedly tried to smuggle from. New York 5,000 pounds of
zirconium required to make fuel rods in large wooden crates
labeled as mountaineering equipment.
~ The US State Department's stern cables to U5 embas=
sies in Ankara. Rome, Bonn, and a dmen other capitals that
order diplomats to tell their host countries of the grave con-
cern with which the US regards the Pakistani efforts to buy
sensitive items. ~ '. ~
.~~,vrrNU~v
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Turkey replied that it had little power over private com-
panies and their dealings in items such as inverters, which
are also in wide use for textile plants. Other countries an-
swered in the same way. '
? Pakistan's secret agreement with Turkey promising
certain amounts of nuclear technology in return for help in
acquiring the parts Pakistan needs. Pakistan and Turkey are
both Muslim countries. Their respective officer corps have
developed close links.
Thus Turkey, as well as Pakistan, presents a diffic}alt
problem for the US.
? Pakistan's success ip buying the natural uranium it
needs for its Karachi plant. Some is channeled via Libya.
Niger's President Seyni Kountche said in April, "If the devil
asks to sell him uranium today, I'll sell it to him."
This newspaper has learned that the US discounts specu=
lation that China may offer a nuclear test site to Pakistan. ~
Intelligence and other analysts don't believe China would do'
it, since it preaches the doctrine of "self-reliance" to other
countries.
.~ior do they believe President Zia wants to be seen by the
Pakistani military as having to rely on a neighbor to carry
out a test. ?
Igor do analysts think, some press reports notwithstand-
ing, that either Libya or Saudi Arabia has provided Pakistan
with vast sums for its nuclear program.
Intelli ence sources told this newspaper the Pakistanis
are s ndin onl S50 million a year on its nuc ear.weapons
Qro~z'am - soi'ne 5250 m on over a as ive years.
U~ analysts believe Pakistan's decision to make a bomb
was not made dramatically, on the spur of the moment, as
the BBC's 19E0 documentary "'t'he Islamic Bomb"
suggested.
Rather, American experts say thr, decision was almost
certairily a more gradual process - "as irreversible," said
one expert, "as US policy to strengthen its defenses. Zia can
no mcre repudiate it -given Pakistan's inferiority complex
toward India, the Loss of Dacca and Bangladesh, and his own
- need to bang onto power among his own military caste -
than any American president could suddenly stand up today
and proclaim total disarmament " - , - _ ,
' "Will President Zia actually push the nucleaz test button in
the Baluchistan Desert? -
No one yet knows. But experts looking on around the world j
are extremely worried. .. _ 1
"All we have is time," sighed one senior policymaker..i
"We're trying to buy as much time as we can. No one really
believes we can stop him if he is determined. We can slow
him down, and make his job much more expensive. That's
about all." ~ -
Indian sources. highly suspicious of everything Zia does,
nonetheless agree with US intelli ence anal sts on one point:
e er a eci es to us or not to ush will de end on his
own hol on Hower. ~ = ~. -
If he feels that the US F-16s have bolstered his own politi-
cal grip on the Pakistani military and elite, he may continue
to prepare for a nucleaz blast, but hold off. His progress to- ~
ward a blast is itself one key stratagem heuses toimpresshis-
military elite. ~ - - - _ . . :. -. -.... _ ,. _ ..
An Indian diplomat said gloomily, "If he holds off, he will ~
acquire 40 of your F-16 planes over the next five years. Then
he can detonate his device. He'll have had time to make it
into a smaller bomb, and he'll have the F-16s to deliver them. ,~
He will be even more dangerous." - ', ~.., .. ;_- .,
An American official wrestling with the problem com- i
mented, "Yes, but he knows if he detonates, he'll getno more ,
spaze parts for the F-16s. He must have those parts to keep
them ilyinQ."
"iYIaybe so," says another US expertwith a frown, "but if
we give him 40 F-16s, he can fly 20 and use the other 20 for
spares." - . - .
Much depends. of course, on what happens in and around
? Pakistan. . ~ ?
Pakistani officials told this newspaper they needed the F-
16s because they suspected the Soviets would force the Af-
ghans to launch a?limited strike across the?,fghan-Pakistan
border, using Soviet Central Asian troops dressed in Afghan
uniforms, and Soviet 1VIIG-25 jets flown by Soviet-trained At-
ghans or (more likely) Soviet pilots in Afghan uniforms. ~ ?
When pressed, Reagan administration officials say that,
of course, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is impor-
tant. President Reagan announced July 16 it was a "funda-
mental national security and foreign-policy objecti've:" ?But
all he said about a state's detonation of a nuclear device for
the first time was that he would view. it vlth "grave
concern." -
The Reagan administration's idea is to try to remove from
countries the fears and insecurities that lead to the desire for
nuclear weapons. --
_:^- The urgent test case is Pakistan. So far the evidence is
inconclusive. - -
ThePresident also stresses thatcountries will be tempted
to test unless the US and other advanced countries'show
themselves reliable suppliers of technology and material for ~,
peaceful nuclear reactors. That's a sharp break w;th the Car-
ter approach, which tried to deny other countries US know-
. how unless they committed themselves to international in-
spections and safeguards on all their nucleaz facilities.
- "Unless you lay out a clear set of guidelines -breaking
relations, cutting off trade, suspending other links -states
like Pakistan will continue on with their bomb-programs,
figuring no one will really penalize them," complains an
IAEA official in Vienna..- - - _
V
-
So far, no major government has yet done this: ~ ~ ;' ?:
~ Gi '
Terrorism remains a threat. Authors Larry Collins and
Dominique Lapierre claim their researchrevealed President
Gerald Ford had considered clearing Boston in 1974 because
of an alleged Palestinian nuclear threat to the city. _'" "'" '
It is also said that the FBI maintains an around-the-clock
nuclear terrorist alert desk at its headquarters in
Washington.`
According to Paul Leventhak, former staff director of the ~
Senate Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee and founder of the
Nuclear Club, Inc., in Washington, peaceful uses of nuclear
energy already generate enormous amounts of plutonium. It
is a byproduct when natural or low~nriched uranium is
-? A typical plant produces a quarter of a ton of plutonium a
year. This, reprocessed, is enough to make as many as 50
bombs the size of the one dropped on Nagasaki,. Mr.
Leventhal estimates. ?
Reckoning that a bomb can be made with 10 pounds of
.plutonium (the TAEA uses 17.6 pounds, or eight kilograms); ;
itilr. Levanthal says the world's nuclear power plants today
produce enough plutonium to make 7,700 atomic_bombs every
year.
By 1990, he estimates, the world will possess 760 tons of
plutonium (167,200 bombs). By the year 2000, it will be 2,690;
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Nuclear power is like the Chinese .characters for "dan-
ger" and "opportunity" that combine to mean "crisis." It
arouses intense fear, intense hope, an almost religious awe.
The word "uranium" comes from the Greek, meaning. in
par. t, "heaven." The word "plutonium" comes from another
Greek word that can mean "hades" or "hell."
Until 1941, plutonium existed only in traces connected
? with natural uranium deposits. The Manhattan Project in
World War II produced the first manmade quantities. - i
Now hundreds of manmade tons exist. The IAEA in Vi- !
enna in 1980 safeguarded 83 tons ~ that's 83,000 kilograms,
enough for 10,000 bombs. The world's plutonium consists of
traces in the atmosphere from the bombs dropped on Hirer
shima and Nagasaki and from nuclear tests, and of bypro~9-
uctS of the operations of nucleaz reactors. Plutonium is pro-
. duced when uranium fuel rods irradiated in the cores of
nucleaz reactors- Much of it remains locked up in spent
(used) fuel rods in deep storage pools of water. Much of it has '.
been extracted ("reprocessed") to make nuclear weapons in
the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France; and.China.
A large reactor can produce eight kilograms (17.6 pounds?
of plutonium every two weeks or so: Eight l.~ttograms is the
size of a large orange - enoughto make a bomb as big as the
one dropped onNagasaki. -- '`-': `?~ -~.` " , ,
-- Plutonium retains its radioactivity for a quarter of a mil-
J lion years."Writing' in Harvard's Divinity magazine:. profes-
sor of religion and scientist Albert Blacicwelmid of Etgyptt it
tonium had been stored in the Great Pyra
would still pe 90 percent as lethal as it was then. It will re-
- main lethal for 50 times as long as any civilization has yet
endured on earth. ~ ~; : ' ~ . r"' . lutonium,
Scientists like him believe that by producing p
the world is asserting self-interest without regard to future
generations. They conclude that amore universal good is
required. Nuclear disarmament and energy conservation
and efficiency take on for them"'the urgency of religious
obligations"
Not everyone agrees.- Other scientists see nuclear power
as necessary to generate energy and keep the peace. Ti~ey-
dismiss "ban the bomb" marches and antinuclear.
demonstrations.
The debate is intense. Scramble the lett?rs that make up
the word "nuclear" and you get "unclear." Humans grapple
? in search of a higher wisdom. - over the nu- i
_. Neat: Trying to stop countries from edging
clear threshold. ,
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ARTI,LE APPEARE.J
O:I YAGE _t
Second of iYve articles
By David R. W Tills
CHRISTIAN SCIE~dC~ '0:1ITOR
1 Decem'oer 1981
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Paradise Point, Pakistan, and Bombay, India
A crucial. unprecedented battle is being fought out in world cap-
itals to stop an ambitious third-world country from buiidingits own
nuclear weapons -and detonating them-
It is the sternest test yet of whether the world possesses the
means to stop or slow the spread of nuclear weapons into unstable
countries. ~, " ` '`~'"' ~~ `
The technology is no longer secret:. Any determined country
with enough money to spend can acquire it. The battle now being"
waged -mostly in secret. - is to see if a range of international ~
safeguards can be clamped down to prevent plutonium created in a ;
peaceful reactor in Karachi, Pakistan. from :being .secretly di-
verted to fabricate nuclear explosives. ,- - ,;,;;~;, ~ _.;:, ^~
The safeguards include remote-control cameras, sensitive auto-~
matic counting devices, and more frequent visits by international`
inspectors.
Today this newspaper presents many details for the first time.
They illustrate the complexity of stopping a determined country
-with sufficient money and sldlis from acquiring, nuclear weapons.
Pakistan happens to be the most obvious example of such a country
today. ,
The battle is fast approaching a climax.
Some ground has been gained. But victory- is still far from won.
Unless it is won soon, it ? will be too late..Pakistan will. have its
nuclear device -perhaps even within 12 months. It may already
have enough plutonium to explode one. ~ ~ .
The story rivals a paperback thriller in suspense and intrigue: It
has diplomats and scientists around the world sitting.on the edges
of their chairs. , .:. ..
In Pakistan, the battleground itself looks highly nnliketyat first
glance. I have just driven across it - a deserted stretch of coastline
on the eastern edge of the Arabian Sea incongruously called Para-
dice Point. Camels pull carts: Donkeys wander. Women haul water +
from wells in yellow plastic buckets. A hot sun shimmers on a
bright blue sea. Fishing boats hob. th the distance, a cluster of drab
gray concrete buildings rises fxom the~sand,.,e~ciccled:.by ,barri-
cades and barbed wire: ~ ~ ?
As I drove toward the chtster ` i seemed to be utterly
alone - yet a private L'S television film crew which teed
to set u a camera outside the [rant fence the other day
But at this writing. analysts, ofScials, and scientists in
a number of countries greatly fear that the plutonium gen-
erated as a byproduct.in the reactor's fuel rods is being
diverted for use in a nuclear device. - ?: - - -
A number of scientists and offi?ials~are gloomily cer?
fain that President 7Ja nl-Haq will be able to detonate a
device, it 6e wants to,?before the.end of 1982: lie will be
under enormous-temptation to do so _- to impress the
11~ualim world.. ofwhich be is partw to cgnvince,indfa thatl
was surrounded by
uaris and irate
erase agents within
wo minu es. m
~a
away. -
~' The gray buildiugs comprl'se a nuc .reactor -the
only commercial one is ail of Pakistan. Its ostensible pur?
pose: to generate ekectricity for the millions who live in
Karachi. whose skyline is faintly visible around the bay.
~Ol'JTINfTED
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he is a dipiornatic force to be reckoned with; to impressi
his own rivals inside Pakistan; and to warn the Unitedi
States that although Pakistan is an ally against the Sovi-;
ets in Afghanistan, it is an ally with a mind of its own.
Pakistan is by no means the only country in the world i
on the threshold of making nuclear ~+eapons. This series ;
will also look at the others. Israel is widely believed to'
have-20 or 30 already. South Africa is said either to haveII
them or to be able to put them together quickly.. India ~
detonated a nuclear blast in 1974 and could react to a Paki- a
stani detonation by loosing an even more powerful device !
- a hydrogen-bomb type. - . j
There are other countries besides: Libya and Iraq, Ar-
gentina and Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan. Various
methods are being used to keep them out of the nuclear
club. Yet all will probably be able to build nuclear devices.,.
by the ear1y1990s.
Israel took matters into its own hands, shattered. all
precedent, and bombed Iraq last June? to stop its nuclear
prog~ ?.. .._ .p-.
The rest of the world is being more -cautious in its ef-
forts to halt proliferation: President Reagan, for instance,
is trying ,to walls a policy tightrope. Ruling out military
action so far, he has swung away from former President
Jimmy Carter's approach of cutting off nuclear fuel and "
technology to countries that won't accept full interna-
tionalinspection. ~ _
But the American President does want to stop nuclear
weapons from spreading. He wants the US to be a reliable
supplier of nuclear technology. He thinks that will make
countries like Pakistan feel more secure - if combined
with economic and military aid (in Pakistan's case, a plan
for $3.2 billion over the next six years) :.- : _ -
The Reagan experiment, just beginning, is a major
part of a US carrot-and-stick campaign to stop Pakistan
'and other countries from going nuclear. The stick: if Paki-
standetonates, it risks losing any American aid. Congress
must appropriate aid each year. Under current law, no
countrq is eligible for US aid unless the president certifies
that ft is not pushing toward building a nuclear device.
(There is, however, provision for a waiver if the presi-
dent can convince Congress that it is in the national inter
est to continue aid to a country even once it has detonated
a device. In any case, legislation on this issue is still
pending. )
ivleanwhile, the other part of the unprecedented battle!
consists of secret pressure from the US and other member {
countries of the International Atomic Energy Agency ~
(IAEA) in Vienna. Pakistan is a member of the IAEA. Its t
Karachi reactor is already visited by Vienna inspectors. '
because the fuel originally came from Canada -and
Canada insisted on such inspections as a condition of sale. ~
But since September 1980 Vienna has wanted much i
Part of the reason is that Pakistan's rush towadd a
bomb has been an open secret for a decade. This article
also gives details of how it has clandestinely acquired
Alarmingly. Pakistan has two tracks to a bomb, not
just one. ,
The first: using the Karachi reactor to irradiate urn-
nium fuel rods with neutrons and thus produce plutonium,.;
it can then be chemically extracted ("reprocessed")+for~
use in a nuclear weapon: , . ~. , . , . ?,, , ,, ,.._ ~ .:-... >
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The second: enriching natural uranium in a complex
series of ways to turn it into weapons-grade explosive.
This is done by separating out the isotope in uranium that
is most useful for splitting, or fission: uranium 235. In
nature, U-235 makes up only 0.7 percent of uranium. Fora
weapon, scientists need uranium that consists of 90
percent or more of U-235 - though a lesser percentage
could also work.
For some years, Pakistan galloped along the enrich-
ment road, trying to buy a complete plant (from France) .
When that was blocked by pressure from the US and else-
where, it set up dummy companies to buy plant compo-
rents. under cover.
Lately the enrickunent effort has run into trouble. But
Israeli sources in Tel Aviv said that they believe an en-
richment plant at Kahuta is well advanced; that uranium
hexafluoride.gas is being separated into U-235 isotopes in
1,000 spinnirlgmetal "cascades" or cylinders.
The Pakistani aim was 5,000 to 10,000 such cascades
and a very high degree of enrichment.
- US and other sources, however, doubt Pakistani has
nearly that many cascades working. They say Pakistan
has at least a decade of work ahead of it to make the
cascades operate properly. It is a tricky business. requir-
ing constant spinning speeds (achieved by regulating
electric current with devices known as "inverters") and
delicate precision in a dozen other fields. : ;. ? ~ ; ~..:. .
"It took the West Germano 20 years to master it," said
one US source, "the Dutch, 25, and the British, 30." ..
This means that the second route to the bomb is now
the key one -making plutonium in the Karachi reactor
(known as Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, or KANUPP for
short), and reprocessing it.
Scientists and intelligence sources say Pakistan has a
sma3f n?epnroc g p an opera on. sure
has Sot signe'nT`tfie du onpro eraUon sty of
Is7_b. fhe . erns.
What really made V erns rs an o ncia situp
and take notice was as announcement in September 1980
that Pakistan could now make its own fuel rain (from'
natural uranium boughtfrom the Saharan state of Niger,
it is thought, and reportedly from Libya, which also buys
from Niger. (See thenextarticle in thiaseries.)
This seemingly routine announcement was actually a
bombshell for the IAEA. Shipments. of Canadian fuel. to
Karachi could easily be checked: Canada told Vienna how
much it had shipped, and Vienna inspectors counted the
fuel rodsat I{ANUPP to makesare the numbeis agreed.
But if Pakistan makes its own rods, then Vienna de-
pends on Pakistan's own. figures for how many it has.
made and put into KANUPP. Given Pakistan's tsacki
record, and given Vienna's standard procedure of assum-I
ing plutonium has been diverted until it discovers oilier-
wise, the need for more autveiliance on KANUPP became`
plain -and urgent: - . - ,
Canada cut off its own fnel to ISANUPP ire December i
1976. It was suspicious of Pakistani activities. and ~
alarmed that its fuel had helped India detonate a nuclear
Vienna is determined to land out what tine Pakistanis ~
are doing with their own feel rods -and there's another;
crucial reason for urgency. The RANUPP reactor, a
originally supplied by Canada, is a special type. Fuel rods ~
can be loaded kn and takes out wkile the reactor keeps
Winning. (Technically it is called a CANDU reactor, using
deuterium.) Only short "burns" are required for generat-
ingplutonium in the rods. - ..
Pakistan could be loading in its own fuel rods. exposing
them to neutrons in the reactor for short periods,
unloading them, and extracting the plutonium created.
"We Gave evidence of short burns at KANUPP now,".
one well-placed Indian diplomat told the Monitor. , ,.
Indignantly, the head of Pakistan's nuclear program;
Dr. IVIunir Khan denies any such thing. But suspicions are
.widespread.
This newspaper has pieced together exclusive details
of the battle so far to put KANUPP under stricter
safeguards. .. -
Thedetails were provided in part by officials in a num-
ber of countries who felt publicity of the kind provided by
a series like this might be more effective than pressure in
secret.
The l'AEA has already installed its own kind of special }
surveillance cameras at crucial areas in KANUPP. Spe-:
cially adapted Minolta 8mm movie cameras, firing every'
eight to 10 minutes, are mounted in pairs, one wide angle,
one telephoto, in sealed glass-fronted boxes. i
They point down at the storage pond into which spent ,
fuel rods are dumped after being taken from the reactor. !
They also cover a decontamination bay.. . `
Inspectors visit KANUPP, check the seals, unload the~i
film, develop it in a darkroom provided on site, check the;
film, reload the cameras, and reseal them in the boxes. ; !
But the September ~ 1980 announcement about Locally
made fuel rods caused Vienna to come up with a series of
new requests. It wants cameras at the spent-fuel bay
relocated and an extra camera installed: It wants the de-
contaminationbay camera relocated. !
It wants. two new sets of cameras pointed at the main-~
tenance area for the fueling machine (where plutonium;
might be siphoned off.) It wants trays of spent fuel rodsx
stacked a different way in the storage pond. It also wants;
inspectors to be-able to take film from cameras back to;
Vienna for checking if they need to.
Above all,. it wants so-called "bundle counters" in-
stalled to record automatically how many times rods are;
taken in and out. These counters have just been developed;
and are being tested in Canada.
-Vienna has also asked that inspectors visit Paradisei
Point much more often. ~
For months,. Pakistan dug in its heels and refused toy
cooperate. , - - - --;
"Why single us out?" Pakistani officials asked in prig
vote. ' `We have cooperated in the past. We have an agree-?
went with the IAEA. We've abided by that agreement,'
Besides, what are the Indians doing? They make their
own fuel. rods. Are you putting pressure on them?"
Vienna officials replied that India would cooperate'
only in tandem with Pakistan. "Please help us make India
conform," they pleaded.
Privately, officials complained that the agreement be-?
tween Vienna and Pakistan was an old one, signed in 1971.;
Pakistan, they said, ought to agree to extra "containment
and surveillance" (the technical tern) - as other:
nonsignatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty had done. ?
Vienna was-also alarmed at intelligence information'
being sen m y e an a: a s or an un er-
groun nuc ear test dug in the Baluchistan mountains;
secret pure aces o sense ve o ogy rom coup-
`i`nes ? a e u e or nuc ear ac ~ es w ec aki-
stanf delega s to e A on't mention.
n p : o year, a rector general, Dr.
Sigvard Eklund of Sweden, took an unprecedented step.
He told the IAEA board of governors in private (as the ?
Pakistani governor listened imnassively) that he was no
longer able to ensure complete reliability of inspections~?
,for some countries. He did not name them. but sources
present at the meeting told the Monitor everyone knew the
.main target was Pakistan. _ -
Since then, unprecedented 'diplomatic pressure bas}
been exerted on Pakistan. . _ .. ,`,;,;,a..~~. ~1
~oiv~vr~p
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"It is a test of Vienna's effectiveness," commented one
agency source. "Already .the fact the IAEA exists has ~
spotlighted that one country is refusing to comply with i
safeguards. That's something." ..
It has been a time of suspense for Vienna. Israel, and
two former IAEA inspectors, have sharply attacked safe-
guards following the Israeli raid on the Osirak reactor in
Baghdad. But Vienna officials believe safeguards are vi-
tal to dissuade would-be atom bomb makers. Any under-. j
mining of safeguards. they say, endangers the entire
world. i
The IAEA's only remedy. if defied further, is to notify
the United Nations Security Council in New York that a
country is blocking requested surveillance. What would
happen next isn't known: The I:AEA has never gone that
tar. - . .
In fact, Dr. Ekiund's statement of Sept. 17 is said to be
the first time he has even told the board of governors he
had a surveillance problem.. , ,. -
Tension mounted as the months ticked by: The US ex-
erted its own pressure, with. the Reagan administration
warning President Zia that any nuclear detonation would ,
mean a probable cutoff of US economic aid and military
sales. _ -, ,:.
'`KANUPP is.the only part of the plutonium fuel gycle
we Inspect," a senior Vienna agency source told the iVloni-
tor. "It's crucial we inspect it more thoroughly -for our
credibility, for the credibility of nonproliferation."
Accoc'ding to one report. Vienna inspectors: visited
KANUPP Oct. 12 and 13 and asked that two cameras tae
moved. They repeated the request for "bundle counters."
Pakistan refused. ~,~ .
Dr. Eklund referred to the situation again, in veiled
terms, as be opened the UN General Assembly debate on
the agency on Nov.10 in New York. .
In fact, this newspaper- has learoed, Pakistan lead al-
readymade some concessions. _ .
It had accepted silica gel treatment: on surveillance
cameras to prevent thetr breaklaig down in the high heat
and humidity at Paradise Point. It agreed to some extra
cameras. It accepted extra dosimeters. which measure
gamma radiation. Itagreed Comore frequent inspections.
It even installed a closed~circuit video system around the
spent-fuel bay.
But, at this writing it has not fulfilled Vienna's key
demands. It has simply agreed to talk about them: extra 8
mm. cameras and relocated cameras, "bundle counters,"
and even more frequent fnspecttons. _.
Time is running out_.If Pakistan is diverting pluto-
nium. it is doing so now. Pakistan could be stalling, to
allow it to make enough plutonium to make a single device
which President Zia could then detonate at will. Then
Pakistan could accept exlxs safeguards, in the knowledge
that its enrichment plaaL would, be able to.produce: more ~
nuclearexpiosivefuelsoon. ?'' "' =~=~~"~
Pakistan's agreemeatte detailed talks on extra cam
eras, on bundle counters,.. and other nr~astn'es. This has
heartened IAEA officials- -but there's a long way to go
yet. _ - ~ _ . -
Vienna believes eaatra inspection visits vriit be allowed
and bundle counters installed. Some US sources are sleep-~
tical. Cameras remain a particulazproblem.
As made clear by Patdstan's ambassador to the United
.Nations, Niaz A. Naik Nov. 10, Pakistan objects to an ex-
tra camera on the spent-fuel bay and insists that "normal
operations" in the maintenance area for uae fueling ma-
chinecannot beupset byextrasurveillance.
Developed liirn from the cameras will not be allowed
out of Pakistan (official reason: in case it reveals indus-
trIal secrets). Trays of spent rods will not be rearranged
to meet Vieana. demands. Experts * would .discuss
relocating cameras. They, would ~ "consider" bundle
counters "in the lighLot our agreements with.the agency"~
Revealed here for the first time is the fact that Western r
officials in Islamabad suspect Pakistan is using the Fauji
chain of nonprofit import enterprises to buy sensitive nu-
cleaz bits and pieces from abroad under cover.
They are also watching with considerable alarm the
progress of a Spanish company, Server, of Bilbao, which is
designing anew power reactor at biienwali in the
Chashma Barrage, or mountains, south of Islamabad.
Excellent sources told the Monitor that Pakistan had
just asked Server to increase design capacity from an
already large 600 megawatts to a very big 900 megawatts.
"That's far too big tor. I'aklstan'e oWaa` power require-
ments," ogle source said. 'You can'thelp being suspiciou;.tF .
An estimated Sl billion is coming from Saudi'Arabia "toy
. help build the new reactor. The Chastuna location is right;
where the French were to have built a huge reprocessing
plant in.the late 1970s. The plant would have extracted p}~}to-
nium from uranium fuel rods irradiated at KANUP~' < - s '.'
?The French backed out o[ the deal under intense US and
European pressure. But !ts blueprints haq already been de-
livered. They weren't returped for rgany months' enough
time to copy them.' ,- ~~ t ,.. ~ r ~,' ' ' ~{z=~,~
?"So the Pakistanis want a huge electricity generator fight
at the someplace," said another Western source. "It makes
you ask what they are planning to build next to it that`will
need all that electricity ,another reprocessing plant? 'A ;
plant to enrich uranium to weapons grade? Is the electricity ;
to be piped to theirenrichment plant further north?"
Cleverly, Pakistan chose the Bilbao company in bidding
[rom which the US was excluded. The company is so anxious
to keep its men working it has agreed that its planners in
.Pakistan will accept half their salary in Pakistani rupees. x ~~,
`A determined country Can take advantage of competition
and business.conditions in the West to extract sensitive plans'
and technology... , .. ~ :. ;,
~. <
~
.
~The
TechnologyFlow: ~ ' , a ':r~ r ; :`~
~ .: ; ,
How has a country like Pakistan been successful in buying ?~
and abstracting nuclear parts and know-how from the West. '
even as the West has tried to choke off the flow? ~- : :. ~ -
"A determined nonnuclear state can find ways and means:
to' break through the system of embargoes and export con-
, lrols erected since, World War IL ~ : ~ ,:
. ~ This reporter' ryas told time
.and time again white research-
ing this series; ~, ;.~.:: ? s
:; 'Ail tt~ut` Uinlttn~ ~sensltive
exports does is mttko a coulatry
like Pakistan pay more, take
longer, and buy subcomponents
instead qt already-assembled
units, Th~k's Wgrth doing.:: But
we can't stop it cocltpletely."