THE DIA IS AS GOOD AS THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000606640001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 22, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606640001-0
WASHINGTON POST
22 February 1986
The DIA Is as Good as the CIA
Adm. Stansfield Turner tried to rewrite histo in his
art entagon s to aence Mess" lOutlook,
an.
12 .
He suggests, as thel subhead states, that "a weak [De-
fense Intelligence Agency] can't cope with the parochial-
ism of the military." As director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Turner sbotild have become more famil-
iar with the o ratios the and mifitary intelli-
gence. His incorrect and opinions need correcting
ore insult they bringte
munitl and the American pogde
The truth is, the DIA continues to make major contri-
butions to the national security of the United States by
providing objective intelligence analysis to the secretary
of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. military
forces, the White House and Congress.
Turner errs when he claims that the DIA is dominated
by military service parochialism There are two factors
that sustain DIA's ability to provide objective intelligence
to senior policy makers. First, the DIA's staff is on the
leading analytical edge of most military intelligence issues.
While this may not have been true in the early years of the
agency, its civilian staff is now mature and, joined with out-
standing intelligence officers with broad field experience,
the DIA's defense analysis is unsurpassed.
Second, the DIA works because all its directors have
demanded uncompromising, objective intelligence re-
porting on all issues. The secretary of defense and the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs not only support this DIA
policy, they insist on it.
One major U.S. intelligence product is the "National
Estimate on Soviet Strategic Offensive and Defense
Capabilities." During Turner's tenure at the CIA, the
DIA did disagree with most of the intelligence communi-
ty; it offered alternative positions on the subject of
Soviet nuclear war doctrine and its strategic force pos-
ture objectives. DIA positions from 1975 to 1979 on the
objectives of Soviet strategic force expansions, exten-
sive leadership survivability programs and enormous
strategic defense investments have proved correct and
are now accepted by the intelligence community.
Turner attributes the DIA position on "net assess-
ments" to a "parochial motive." The simple attempts at
net assessments which Turner pushed at the time were,
in fact, not useful to furthering policy makers' under-
standing of the true U.S. and Soviet strategic balance
and represented the classic MAD position that has been
rejected by every U.S. administration since 1961.
Turner's account of the DIA-CIA oil controversy is rid-
dled with errors. In April 1977, the CIA predicted that
Soviet oil production would peak as early as 1978 and then
fall sharply, forcing the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe to
become net oil importers by 1985. This assessment was
leading some to believe that the U.S.S.R. would take mili-
tary action to gain access to Persian Gulf oil resources.
DIA's reason for challenging the CIA was not, as
Turner suggests, merely to assert its independence. We
disagreed with the CIA's judgment that Soviet recoverable
reserves were inadequate and that the Soviets would be
unable to acquire the necessary equipment and technology.
The DIA took into consideration Soviet resources in natu-
ral gas, coal, nuclear power, as well as Soviet oil reserves,
and concluded that the Soviets had no energy crisis, nor'
was there likely to be one in the future. An April 1982 re-
view of the differing views, entitled "Report on Intelli-
gence Performance on Soviet Oil Production," concluded
that the DIA's large data base on the subject and its so-
phisticated analysis had led it to the correct conclusion-
The Soviets would not be a net importer of oil by the
1980s. The DIA, not the CIA, was correct.
Turner fails to describe accurately the DIA's working
relationship with the CIA and the military intelligence
staffs. There is not an adversarial relationship with ei-
ther, only healthy checks and balances.
Turner implies that the services do not assign their
best officers to DIAL There may have been some truth
to this observation early in the agency's existence, but
no longer. DIA employees have gone on to senior posi-
tions. For example, three have become deputy directors
of the CIA, three to direct the National Security Agen-
cy, three to serve as chiefs of staff for intelligence and
numerous flag officers have risen to two- , three- and
four-star ranks within their services.
Today the DIA is the recognized expert in critical
military intelligence. With its partners in the CIA, State
Department and the military services, it provides the
best intelligence in the world.
-Lt. Gen. Eugene F. MIM Jr.
The writer was director of the DIA from 1977 to 1981.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606640001-0