THE LESSONS OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000606320001-5
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 20, 2010
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 27, 1982
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OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000606320001-5.pdf170.6 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606320001-5 TIME 27 SEPTEMBER 19 the Cuban Missile Crisis For 13 chilling days in October 1962, it seemed that John F Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev Wright be playing out the open- ing scenes of World War III. The Cuban missile crisis was a uniquely compact moment of history. For the first time in the nu- clear age, the two superpowers found themselves in a sort of moral road test of their apocalyptic powers. The crisis blew up suddenly. The US. discovered that the Sovi- et Union, despite repeated and solemn denials, was installing nu- clear missiles in Cuba. An American U-2 spy plane came back with photographs of the bases and their support facilities under construction: clear, irrefutable evidence. Kennedy assembled a task force of advisers. Some of them wanted to invade Cuba. In the end, Kennedy chose a course of artful restraint; he laid down a na- val quarantine. After six days, Khrushchev announced that the So- viet missiles would be dismantled. The crisis served some purposes. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have had no comparable collision since then. On the other hand, the humilia- tion that Khrushchev suffered may have hastened his fall. The experience may be partly responsible for both the Soviet mili- tary buildup in the past two decades and whatever enthusiasm the Soviets have dis- played for nuclear disarmament. Now, on the 20th anniversary of the cri- sis, six of Kennedy's men have collaborated on a remarkable joint statement on the les- sons of that October. It contains some new in- formation, particularly in Point Eight, and at least one of their conclusions is startling and controversial: their thought that, con- trary to the widespread assumption of the past two decades, the American nuclear su- periority over the Soviets in 1962 had no cru- cial influence with Washington or Moscow at the time-and that in general, nuclear su- periority is insignificant. ognition of the need for thorough overflight, not without its haz- ards, that produced the decisive photographs. The usefulness and scope of inspection from above, also employed in monitoring the Soviet missile withdrawal, should never be underestimated. When the importance of accurate information for a crucial policy decision is high enough, risks not otherwise acceptable in collecting intelligence can become profoundly prudent. THIRD: The President wisely took his time in choosing a course of action. A quick decision would certainly have been less carefully designed and could well have produced a much higher risk of catastrophe. The fact that the crisis did not become public in its first week obviously made it easier for President Kennedy to consider his options with a maximum of care and a minimum of outside pressure. Not every future crisis will be so quiet in its first phase, but Americans should always respect the need for a pe- The authors are Dean Rusk. then Secretary of State; Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense; George W. Ball, Under Secre- tary of State; Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Theodore Sorensen, special counsel to the President; and McGeorge Bundy. special assistant to the President for national security affairs. Their analysis: In the years since the Cuban missile crisis, many commenta- tors have examined the affair and offered a wide variety of con- clusions. It seems fitting now that some of us who worked partic- ularly closely with President Kennedy during that crisis should offer a few comments, with the advantages both of participation and of hindsight. FIRST: The crisis could and should have been avoided. If we had done an earlier, stronger and clearer job of explaining our position on Soviet nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere, or if the Soviet government had more carefully assessed the evi- dence that did exist on this point, it is likely that the missiles would never have been sent to Cuba. The importance of accurate mutual assessment of interests between the two superpowers is evi- dent and continuous. SECOND: Reliable intelligence permitting an effective choice of response was obtained only just in time. It was primari- ly a mistake by policymakers, not by professionals, that made such intelligence unavailable sooner. But it was also a timely rec- in dealing with a major international crisis. FOURTH: The decisive military element in the resolution of the crisis was our clearly available and applicable superiority in con- ventional weapons within the area of the crisis. U.S. naval forces, quickly deployable for the blockade of offensive weapons that was sensibly termed a quarantine, and the availability of U.S. ground and air forces sufficient to execute an invasion if neces- sary, made the difference. American nucle- ar superiority was not in our view a critical factor, for the fundamental and controlling reason that nuclear war, already in 1962, would have been an unexampled catastro- phe for both sides; the balance of terror so eloquently described by Winston Churchill seven years earlier was in full operation. No one of us ever reviewed the nuclear balance for comfort in those hard weeks. The Cuban missile crisis illustrates not the signifi- cance but the insignificance of nuclear superiority in the face of survivable thermonuclear retaliatory forces. It also shows the cru- cial role of rapidly available conventional strength. FIFTH: The political and military pressure created by the quarantine was matched by a diplomatic effort that ignored no relevant means of communication with both our friends and our adversary. Communication to and from our allies in Europe was intense, and their support sturdy. The Organization of American States gave the moral and legal authority of its regional backing to the quarantine, making it plain that Soviet nuclear weapons were profoundly unwelcome in the Americas. In the U.N., Am- bassador Adlai Stevenson drove home with angry eloquence and unanswerable photographic evidence the facts of the Soviet de- ployment and deception. Still more important, communication was established and maintained, once our basic course was set, with the government of the Soviet Union. If the crisis itself showed the cost of mutual incomprehension. its resolution showed the value of serious and sustained communication, and in particular of direct exchanges between the two heads of government. When great states come anywhere near the brink in the nu- clear age, there is no room for games of blindman's buff. Nor can friends be led by silence. They must know what we are doing and why. Effective communication is never more important than when there is a military confrontation. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606320001-5 Ti T?'