RECANTER'S TALE: LESSONS IN HUMILITY FOR THE U.S.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000606260016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 2, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606260016-6
NEW YORK TIMES
2 APRIL 1982
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Lesson ri ~urrulity~or the U.S.
By PHILIP TAUBMANP 4 ..:'
SpeeidmT~siis+YoeltTima~ ?F_'?':: ' r
cials to failure to recognize the cul-
tural and political attitudes embraced
WASHINGTON, April 1 Political
considerations, including a desire to
help the Secretary of State save, face,.
lay behind the Reagan Administra-
tion's ill-fated decision last month to
ask a young Nicaraguan to buttress
United States assertions of outside in-
terference in El Salvador,. according
to senior Administration officials.
In the three weeks since Orlando
Jose Tardencilla Espinosa, embar-
rassed the Government by recanting
his earlier statements about Nicara-
guan and Cuban Involvement in El
Salvador; Administration officials
have looked into how the 19-year-old
revolutionary hoodwinked the State
Department and the Central Intelli-
genceAgency.
The exercise, which officials readily
acknowledge has provided an educa-
tion in humility, has produced a num-.
her of theories, ranging from sheer in-
competence by some American offi
Within days, the Administration
made public aerial reconnaissance
photographs that intelligence officials
said proved that Nicaragua, with
Cuban and Soviet assistance, was as-
sembling the largest military force in
Central America.
As confusion grew about Mr. Haig's
statement on the capture of the "mili-
tary man," the State Department hit
upon the scheme of producing a sec-
ond captured Nicaraguan, Mr. Tar-
-dencilla. He was seized by Salvadoran j
troops in 1981 while fighting with guer-
rillas, and was still in jail.
After his capture,. Mr. Tardencilla
confessed at a new conference that he
had received training in Cuba and
Ethiopia, and had been sent to El Sal-
vador by the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment. -- -:r ;-~
The idea of using him to support the
Reagan Administration's case set off
a series of hurried decisions and mis-
calculations in San Salvador and
Washington that resulted in making
him available to the press in Washing
ton a week later on March 12, accord-.
jog to a reconstruction of events based'.
byMr. Tardencilla. ( on conversations with leading partici-.
The basic problem, however, ap- panbinbothcapitals. - , ,
pears to have been the overeagerness OffldalsDefendThelrActions
of senior officials to produce someone In defense of their actions, officials'
who could prove that Cuba and Nica- said that during a week of interviews:
ragua. were assisting Salvadoran with Government officials before he-
rebels. 7 ~. ! 7, y.... met reporters here, Mt. Tardencilla
ConinsionOverHalg'sRemarks..' 'I never wavered from his previous as-J
ran umscon
mmgsummanesofthe-
discussions with Mr..Tardencilla...
.Embassy officials, including repre-
sentatives of the Central Intelligence ,
Agency, questioned Mr. Tardencilla in
San Salvador on March 6 and 7, the of-
ficials said. They also reviewed a.
`videotape of-Mr. Tardencilla's news'
conference in San Salvador on Feb. 20,
1981. r.....,... :-~ ; , ? . r .
'~?According to: a summary of the
news conference, Mr. Tardencilla said
he and his friends were sent to fight in
El Salvador by the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernfient, which had provided weap.
one, training and help. in:infiltrating~
campaign to dispel public doubts.
about. the American accusations of'.
'.Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan inter
ter+enoein El saivador:;e ;;,;;.,'