MEET THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000606120100-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 100
• Publication Date: August 7, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606120100-7
MEET THE PRESS
7 August 1983
MARVIN KALE, moderator
Guests: Secretary of State George Shultz; Lars-Eric Ne
News; Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post; Hedrick Smit o e New York Times;
and Bill Monroe with NBC News.
DEYOUNG: Secretary, there seems to have been a change i. our policy toward
Nicaragua over the past year. We used to talk about how our principal concern was the
spread of revolution in Central America. Now the president says that he thinks that
any peaceful solution there will be difficult with the current Sandinista government
in place. Ambassador Kirkpatrick says that we need to prove that revolutions are
reversible. Assuming we can stop Nicaraguan interference in E1 Salvador, can we live
with a Marxist government in Nicaragua? SHULTZ: Well, the ouestion is whether the
people of Nicaragua can, and I think the evidence is increasing discontent in that
country. We don't seek to overthrow that government. On the other hand, if they
conduct themselves in such a way that people rise up against them, that's a problem
that can occur in any country. Our chief concern is that they not be able to, as they,
say, export revolution without frontiers. -
DEYOUNG: Well, and if there doesn't seem to be a rising up in the country that's
fighting on the border, and there's some evidence to suggest that the support for the
Sandinistas has, in fact, grown stronger inside the country since the problems began
on the border, do you really see an insurrection coming now? SHULTZ: Well. I'm not
p,- edictin& that, and
we're not trying to bring that about. I'm-- just, was responding
to the speculations in your ouestion. There has been a great deal of um ease in
religious circles about developments there. Certainly. I would imagine that there's
concern in presn circles. There's concern about the censorship that goes on. fin6 in
many other ways 1 think that the situation is quite questionable.
DL?OUNG: Do you think there is a possibility that we can coexist with a harxist
Nicaragua? Assuming that our concern about regional export of revolution can be
(inaudible, both talking simultaneously.) SHULTZ: There is a sense in which one of
the attributes of Marxism is its desire to subvert and overthrow other governments.
That's one of the less attractive aspects of that ideology, And so there's always
that threat. But from the standpoint of our policy, the fundamentals of at are to
seek a broadly based, pluralistic, Democratic form of government where Dec-,)le 1
_e have a
chance to express themselves these countries and to seek economic development
that's widely shared. And under those circumstances I think the surrounding
Democratic countries will have real strength.
KAL?: Mr, Nelson?
NELSON: Sir, there's a force in the field in Nicaragua, on the Honduran border, of
10,000 people under arms called the Contras. Publicly we deny that we're supporting
them, but in fact it's an open secret that we do support them. What's to become of
them if there's a negotiated settlement in Nicaragua? SHULTZ: Well, if there is the
kind of negotiated settlement that we're trying to bring about in ,=1 Salvador
namely, 2 process of Democratic reform in which all comers have a chance to state
their case to the people and stand before them in.an election -- then the people will
have 2 chance to do that.
NELSON: But some of these people under arms -- and there are arms as far as
I can
tell from the press -- have a stated goal of overthrow.''r,g the Managua government_
Will we support them in that goal, or will we try to disarm them? Will we try to
withdraw their support? SHULTZ: Well, I think their ,
? goal (clears throat), excuse
me, their goal is one that, given our opinion of that government, we can hardly turn
away from. But as far as ourselves trying to overthrow another government, we're not
trying to.
COA=YVED
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606120100-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606120100-7
NELSON: Do you see any possibility that their goals will automatically, somehow,
become our goal and they will find themselves in a jam and call on U.S. arms support?
SHULTZ: 1 don't foresee any.armed U.S. effort to overthrow the government of
Nicaragua. Absolutely none.
NELSON: Not to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, nor to save the skins of these
freedom fighters, as the president has called them? SHULTZ: Well, if they seek to
leave someplace and want asylum or something like that, well, then they come here. I
might say that one of the problems that's being created by this effort to stir up
insurgencies and export revolution without frontiers is the actual presence now and
the great threat of a tremendous refugee movement from that area. And while there is
no case of the coming into power of a Soviet-style system that's actually benefitted
the people of that country, there are many. cases in which it has produced a flood of
refugees in various parts of the world. So we have to bear that in mind.
}SALE: *.r. Secretary. a 16t of people in the administration say that what the U.S. is
really trying to do is make certain that the Nicaraguan Marxist regime does not get
consolidated in the same way that the Castro regime got consolidated in Cuba, the
implication, therefore, that somehow or other you can't have long-term stability in
Central America, from the U.S. point of view, if there is a Sandinista regime in
power? Does that .(inaudible)? Does that make sense in diplomatic terms? SHULTZ:
Well, let me just ",deflect a little bit and say this whole mess-?s:tarted with the
Sandinista revolution, which was supported out of the OAS based:on undertakings of
what that revolution sought, including Democratic reforms. Those expectations and
undertakings have been grossly violated, and at the same time Nicaragua has become a
place from which armaments have gone to neighboring countries, E1 Salvador in
particular. to attempt to overthrow that government. And our initial efforts to work
with the Sandinista regime were basically turned aside, and now we find this effort tai
overthrow other countries. And we are trying to interdict that flow of arms and to
distract that government, and in other ways to prevent then, from doing the thing that
they want to do. And they mean to expert this revolution..
}.Lb: Does it follow then that you really can't have the kind of tranquility that the
United States would like to see in Central America so long as that government pursuing
these policies continues in office. SHULTZ: As long as there is a government trying
to overthrow other governments in its region, it presents a real problem, particularly
when they're being armed through the Soviet Union and trying to bring about the
overthrow of other governments. It certainly constitutes a major problem...
SHULTZ: I'd like to say that in the kinds of things talked about in regional
negotiations are such matters as verifiable undertakings mot to ship arms from one
country to another in the region. Now if it's verifiable, that's the kind of thing
you need.
MONROE: The house of Representatives voted 228 to 195 to cut off U.S. covert aid to
the rebels fighting Nicaragua out of Honduran bases. I take it from your answers
here, so far, that the administration intends to'ignore that expression of sentiment
from the house? SHULTZ: Well, you don't ignore it. It's a very important thing when
the house or the Senate votes on an important subject.. So I certainly don't ignore
it. The vote as such doesn't haye any immediate operational meaning in terms of the
legislation. Legislation. as you know, has to pass both houses of Congress and be
1VT fl TUED
V
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606120100-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606120100-7
2.
signed into law in order to take effect. It registers an opinion, in effect, of the
house, and, of course, we take it very seriously.
MONROE: If the Congress should later cut off funds for those rebels, forbid the U.S.
to spend funds through the CIA for those rebels, would that be an end to U.S.
involvement and support for those rebels? SHULTZ: Well have to see what happens.
And I think there is a great deal of sentiment emerging in the Congress and also in
the American people, generally, that Central America is very important to us. What's
going on down there is important. And that we have to see to it, particularly by
virtue of supporting those who want to tight for their country and their principles,
we have to see to it that they're able to do so. So we haven't by any means accepted
the house's verdict as the final verdict.
MONROE: I'm talking about the possibility of the whole Congress cutting off funds,
which would be, which would have a legal effect, an opinion of the entire Congress.
Would you see any way in which the administration could encourage those rebels to help
them in any way to pursue their war against :Nicaragua if the whole Congress cut off
funds? SHULTZ: I'm trying to answer your question by saying that we're going to work
hard to see that that doesn't happen.
Srilir.: jr. ?Secretary, two years ago the administration stepped up the relatively
modest aid the United States was giving at that point to E1 Salvador. Now we have
large military exercises going on. We're building bases in honduras. We've got
fleets off the coast of Nicaragua on both sides. There's talk that the CIA wants to
step up aid to the rebels in Nicaragua. how much involvement is it going to take?
What is the time frame you're talking about here that the Americas. people and Congress
are going to support? Two years? Five years? Ten years? SHULTZ: In terms of time
frame. 1 think the effort in Central America, not so much, necessarily, the Tnilitarv
effort, but our effort in Central America should be seen as 2 long-term one. Because
the basic problems are social and economic problems, and that's what we have to
address. and that's what we're trying to address. The existence of the guerrilla
activity makes it difficult for economic.'deve1opment to take place, and that's
obviously one of the main reasons why you'want to stop it. So yes, we have to have an
approach, but long-term. I hope that the strength that is evident down there will
lead people to see that it's in everyone's interest to have a negotiated solution and
to get on with the process of economic development, but it remains to be seen whether
that will come to pass.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606120100-7