AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000606120051-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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THE SECRETARY
I congratulate all of you on your foresight
and commitment to recognizing the impor-
tance of the Pacific to our nation's future and
acting upon it. Your advice and counsel will
be important to our continued effort. Your
group includes four Senators, four Members
of the House, seven members of the ex-
ecutive, in their unofficial capacity, and I
think this demonstrates a bipartisan commit-
ment of both branches. All of us are in your
debt for what you're doing and wish you well.
I would like not only to reiterate the
President's sentiments but also to assure
you of this Administration's encourage-
ment and support. While the committee
must remain a private group, we in the
executive branch look forward to work-
ing with its distinguished members. As
you proceed with your work, I would
urge you to explore the entire range of
possibilities for Pacific cooperation. I
have been encouraged by the commit-
tee's efforts on a number of critical
issues, and I hope that the progress you
have made so far is a harbinger of fu-
ture achievements.
The spirit of Pacific cooperation is
also beginning to attract the attention of
other governments in the region. Last
July, in Jakarta, ASEAN foreign
ministers initiated a multilateral
dialogue with their Pacific part-
ners-Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
Canada, and, of course, the United
States. In that "6 + 5" meeting, we
discussed the prospects for Pacific
cooperation and agreed to make a
review of Pacific-wide developments a
continuing feature of these annual
ministerial deliberations. The eleven of
us also agreed that the governments
would work together on the first
cooperative project-Human Resources
Development, chosen as a focus because
it encompasses all nations in the region,
big and small. This theme was suggested
by Foreign Minister Mochtar of In-
donesia, who has spurred us and his
ASEAN colleagues to think creatively
about the shape of Asia yet to come and
the human resources of the region.
At the time, I expressed the view
that Pacific cooperation should not be an
exclusive process, but that all who are
prepared to contribute to wider
economic cooperation in the region
should be encouraged to do so. The
response of the foreign ministers was
encouraging, and the progress made to
date augurs well for future cooperation
in other areas.
In the 7 months since the Jakarta
meeting, we have worked to draw
together the resources of the U.S.
Government to participate in an interna-
tional inventory of existing human
development and training programs in
the Pacific. Three weeks ago, senior of-
ficials of all the governments met in In-
donesia to review the results of that in-
ventory. Participating governments have
now moved closer to agreeing on the
principles that will guide the Human
Resources Development effort and have
identified areas for both immediate and
long-term cooperative projects. Over the
next 4 months, our representatives will
meet to work out specific steps for con-
sideration at next July's postministerial
Conference on Pacific Cooperation. For
our part, we will make every effort to
contribute to the success of this promis-
ing undertaking.
I am encouraged by the progress
made to date in this field, and I look for-
ward to meeting with the foreign
ministers again in Kuala Lumpur this
July to decide on further actions that all
of the countries can take together.
The Hopeful Prospects
The Pacific cooperative process is still in
its infancy, and it is too early to predict
its ultimate form or direction. Whatever
arrangement ultimately evolves is likel}
to be unique to the Pacific, for the diver
sity, culture, heritage, and traditions of
the Pacific states constitute a unique s4
of challenges.
As we prepare to mark the 40th an
niversary of the end of the Pacific war,
it is appropriate to retlect on what we
have accomplished and to ponder the
future. For if there have been moment:
of darkness in the history of Asia, ther'
is also light in Asia's philosophical,
esthetic, and cultural traditions. The
tragedy that befell Angkor Wat sym-
bolizes the ironic juxtaposition of Asia':,
turbulent history of conflict and its rich
heritage of civilization. When we look
back 40 years from now, I hope we will
see this incipient process of Pacific
cooperation as the beginning of a new
era-an era of reconciliation, progress,
and peace.
America and the Struggle
for Freedom
by Secretary Shultz
Address before the Commonn'ealth
Club of California in San Francisco on
February 22, 1985.1
A revolution is sweeping the world
today-a democratic revolution. This
should not be a surprise. Yet it is
noteworthy because many people in the
West lost faith, for a time, in the
relevance of the idea of democracy. It
was fashionable in some quarters to
argue that democracy was culture
bound; that it was a luxury only in-
dustrial societies could afford; that other
institutional structures were needed to
meet the challenges of development;
that to try to encourage others to adopt
our system was ethnocentric and ar-
rogant.
In fact, what began in the United
States of America over two centuries
ago as a bold new experiment in
representative government has today
captured the imagination and the pas-
sions of peoples on every continent. The
Solidarity movement in Poland;
resistance forces in Afghanistan, in
Cambodia, in Nicaragua, in Ethiopia and
Angola; dissidents in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe; advocates of
peaceful democratic change in South
Africa, Chile, the Republic of Korea, an,
the Philippines-all these brave men am
women have something in common: the
seek independence, freedom, and human
rights-ideals which are at the core of
democracy and which the United States
has always championed.
The American Tradition
All Americans can be proud that the ex-
ample of our Founding Fathers has
helped to inspire millions around the
globe. Throughout our own history, we
have always believed that freedom is the
birthright of all peoples and that we
could not he true to ourselves or our
principles unless we stood for freedom
and democracy not only for ourselves
but for others.
And so, time and again in the last
200 years, we have lent our sup-
port-moral and otherwise-to those
around the world struggling for freedom
and independence. In the 19th century
Americans smuggled guns and powder
to Simon Bolivar, the Great Liberator:
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THE SECRETARY
we supported the Polish patriots and
others seeking freedom. We well
remembered how other nations, like
France, had come to our aid during our
own revolution.
In the 20th century, as our power as
a nation increased, we accepted a
greater role in protecting and promoting
freedom and democracy around the
world. Our commitment to these ideals
has been strong and bipartisan in both
word and deed. During World War I,
the Polish pianist Paderewski and the
Czech statesman Masaryk raised funds
in the United States; then Woodrow
Wilson led the way at war's end in
achieving the independence of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and other states.
At the height of World War II,
Franklin Roosevelt set forth a vision of
democracy for the postwar world in the
Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms.
The United States actively promoted
decolonization. Harry Truman worked
hard and successfully at protecting
democratic institutions in postwar
Western Europe and at helping
democracy take root in West Germany
and Japan. At the United Nations in
1948 we supported the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights-which
declares the right of every nation to a
free press, free assembly and associa-
tion, periodic and genuine elections, and
free trade unions. John F. Kennedy
drew upon the very essence of America
with his call to "pay any price ... to
assure the survival and success of
liberty."
The March of Democracy
The struggle for liberty is not always
successful. But those who once
despaired, who saw democracy on the
decline, and who argued that we must
lower our expectations were, at best,
premature. Civilizations decline when
they stop believing in themselves; ours
has thrived because we have never lost
our conviction that our values are worth
defending.
When Indira Gandhi, the Prime
Minister of the world's largest
democracy, was assassinated, we were
shocked and saddened. But our con-
fidence in the resilience of democracy
was renewed as millions of India's peo-
ple went to the polls freely to elect her
successor. As Rajiv Gandhi leads his na-
tion to new greatness, he demonstrates
more clearly than any words or abstract
scientific models that democracy is
neither outmoded nor is it the exclusive
possession of a few, rich, Western na-
tions. It has worked for decades in coun-
tries as diverse as Costa Rica and
Japan.
In the Western Hemisphere, over
90% of the population of Latin America
and the Caribbean today live under
governments that are either democratic
or clearly on the road to democracy-in
contrast to only one-third in 1979. In
less than 6 years, popularly elected
democrats have replaced dictators in
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and
Grenada. Brazil and Uruguay will in-
augurate civilian presidents in March.
After a long twilight of dictatorship, this
hemispheric trend toward free elections
and representative government is
something to be applauded and sup-
ported.
The Challenge to the
Brezhnev Doctrine
Democracy is an old idea, but today we
witness a new phenomenon. For many
years we saw our adversaries act
without restraint to back insurgencies
around the world to spread communist
dictatorships. The Soviet Union and its
proxies, like Cuba and Vietnam, have
consistently supplied money, arms, and
training in efforts to destabilize or over-
throw noncommunist governments.
"Wars of national liberation" became the
pretext for subverting any noncom-
munist country in the name of so-called
"socialist internationalism."
At the same time, any victory of
communism was held to be irreversible.
This was the infamous Brezhnev doc-
trine, first proclaimed at the time of the
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Its
meaning is simple and chilling: once
you're in the so-called "socialist camp,"
you're not allowed to leave. Thus the
Soviets say to the rest of the world:
"What's mine is mine. What's yours is up
for grabs."
In recent years, Soviet activities and
pretensions have run head on into the
democratic revolution. People are in-
sisting on their right to independence,
on their right to choose their govern-
ment free of outside control. Where
once the Soviets may have thought that
all discontent was ripe for turning into
communist insurgencies, today we see a
new and different kind of struggle: peo-
ple around the world risking their lives
against communist despotism. We see
brave men and women fighting to
challenge the Brezhnev doctrine.
In December 1979, the Soviets in-
vaded Afghanistan to preserve a com-
munist system installed by force a year
and a half earlier. But their invasion met
stiff resistance, and the puppet govern-
ment they installed has proved incapable
of commanding popular support. Today,
the Soviets have expanded their occupa-
tion army and are trying to devastate
the population and the nation they can-
not subdue. They are demolishing entire
Afghan villages and have driven one out
of every four Afghans to flee the coun-
try. They have threatened neighboring
countries like Pakistan and have been
unwilling to negotiate seriously for a
political solution.
In the face of this Soviet invasion,
the Afghans who are fighting and dying
for the liberation of their country have
made a remarkable stand. Their will has
not flagged; indeed, their capacity to
resist has grown. The countryside is
now largely in the hands of the popular
resistance, and not even in the major
cities can the Soviets claim complete
control. Clearly, the Afghans do not
share the belief of some in the West that
fighting back is pointless, that the only
option is to let one's country be "quietly
erased," to use the memorable phrase of
the Czech writer, Milan Kundera.
In Cambodia, the forces open to
democracy, once all but annihilated by
the Khmer Rouge, are now waging a
similar battle against occupation and a
puppet regime imposed by a Soviet ally,
communist Vietnam. Although Vietnam
is too poor to feed, house, or care for
the health of its own population ade-
quately, the Stalinist dictators of Hanoi
are bent on imperial domination of In-
dochina-much as many had predicted
before, during, and after the Vietnam
war. But 6 years after its invasion, Viet-
nam does not control Cambodia.
Resistance forces total over 50,000; of
these, noncommunist forces have grown
from zero to over 20,000. The Viet-
namese still need an occupation army of
170,000 to keep order in the country;
they even had to bring in two new divi-
sions to mount the recent offensive.
That offensive, while more brutal than
previous attacks, will prove no more
conclusive than those before.
In Africa, as well, the Brezhnev doc-
trine is being challenged by the drive for
independence and freedom. In Ethiopia,
a Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist dic-
tatorship has shown indifference to the
desperate poverty and suffering of its
people. The effects of a natural disaster
have been compounded by the regime's
obsession with ideology and power. In
classical Stalinist fashion, it has ruined
agricultural production through forced
collectivization; denied food to starving
people for political reasons; subjected
many thousands to forced resettlement;
and spent vast sums of money on arms
and "revolutionary" spectacles. But the
rulers cannot hide the dimensions of the
tragedy from their people. Armed in-
surgencies continue, while the regime
persists in relying on military solutions
and on expanding the power and scope
of' the police and security apparatus.
In Angola, a Marxist regime came
into power in 1975 hacked and sustained
by 30,000 Cuban troops and substantial
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THE SECRETARY
numbers of Soviet and East European
"advisers." The continuation of this
Soviet/Cuban intervention has been a
major impediment to the achievement of
independence for Namibia under the
terms of UN Security Council Resolution
435; it is also a continuing challenge to
African independence and regional peace
and security-thus our sustained
diplomatic effort to achieve a regional
settlement addressing the issues of both
Angola and Namibia. In Angola, UNITA
[National Union for the Total In- -
dependence of Angola] has waged an
armed struggle against the regime's
monopoly of power and in recent years
has steadily expanded the territory
under its control. Foreign forces,
whether Cuban or South African, must
leave. At some point there will he an in-
ternal political settlement in Angola that
reflects Angolan political reality, not ex-
ternal intervention.
Finally, an important struggle is be-
ing waged today closer to home in Cen-
tral America. Its countries are in transi-
tion, trying to resolve the inequities and
tensions of the past through workable
reforms and democratic institutions. But
violent antidemocratic minorities, tied
ideologically and militarily to the Soviet
Union and Cuba, are trying to prevent
democratic reform and to seize or hold
power by force. The outcome of this
struggle will affect not only the future
of peace and democracy in this
hemisphere but our own vital interests.
In Nicaragua, in 1979 the Sandinista
leaders pledged to the Organization of
American States (OAS) and to their own
people to bring freedom to their country
after decades of tyranny under Somoza.
The Sandinistas have betrayed these
pledges and the hopes of the Nicaraguan
people; instead, they have imposed a
new and brutal tyranny that respects no
frontiers. Basing themselves on strong
military ties to Cuba and the Soviet
Union, the Sandinistas are attempting,
as rapidly as they can, to force
Nicaragua into a totalitarian mold whose
pattern is all too familiar. They are sup-
pressing internal dissent; clamping down
on the press; persecuting the church;
linking up with the terrorists of Iran,
Libya, and the PLO [Palestine Libera-
tion Organization]; and seeking to under-
mine the legitimate and increasingly
democratic governments of their
neighbors.
This betrayal has forced many
Nicaraguans who supported the anti-
Somoza revolution hack into opposition.
And while many resist peacefully,
thousands now see no choice but to take
up arms again, to risk everything so
that their hopes for freedom and
democracy will not once again he denied.
The Sandinistas denounce their op-
ponents as mercenaries or former Na-
tional Guardsmen loyal to the memory
of Somoza. Some in this country seem
all too willing to take these charges at
face value, even though they come from
the same Sandinista leaders whose word
has meant so little up to now. But all
you have to do is count the numbers:
more people have taken up arms against
the Sandinistas than ever belonged to
Somoza's National Guard. In fact, most
of the leaders of the armed resistance
fought in the revolution against Somoza;
and some even served in the new
government until it became clear that
the comandantes were bent on com-
munism, not freedom; terror, not
reform; and aggression, not peace. The
new fighters for freedom include
peasants and farmers, shopkeepers and
vendors, teachers and professionals.
What unites them to each other and to
the other thousands of Nicaraguans who
resist without arms is disillusionment
with Sandinista militarism, corruption,
and fanaticism.
Despite uncertain and sporadic sup-
port from outside, the resistance in
Nicaragua is growing. The Sandinistas
have strengthened their Soviet and
Cuban military ties, but their popularity
at home has declined sharply. The strug-
gle in Nicaragua for democracy and
freedom, and against dictatorship, is far
from over, and right now may well be a
pivotal moment that decides the future.
America's Moral Duty
This new phenomenon we are witnessing
around the world-popular insurgencies
against communist domination-is not
an American creation. In every region,
the people have made their own decision
to stand and fight rather than see their
cultures and freedoms "quietly erased."
They have made clear their readiness to
fight with or without outside support,
using every available means and endur-
ing severe hardships, alone if need be.
But America also has a moral
responsibility. The lesson of the postwar
era is that America must be the leader
of the free world; there is no one else to
take our place. The nature and extent of
our support-whether moral support or
something more-necessarily varies
from case to case. But there should he
no doubt about where our sympathies
lie.
It is more than mere coincidence
that the last 4 years have been a time of
both renewed American strength and
leadership and a resurgence of
democracy and freedom. As we are the
strongest democratic nation on earth,
the actions we take-or do not
take-have both a direct and an indirect
impact on those who share our ideals
and hopes all around the globe. If we
shrink from leadership, we create a
vacuum into which our adversaries can
move. Our national security suffers, our
global interests suffer, and, yes, the
worldwide struggle for democracy suf-
fers.
The Soviets are fond of talking
about the "correlation of forces," and for
a few years it may have seemed that the
correlation of forces favored communist
minorities backed by Soviet military
power. Today, however, the Soviet em-
pire is weakening under the strain of its
own internal problems and external en-
tanglements. And the United States has
shown the will and the strength to de-
fend its interests, to resist the spread of
Soviet influence, and to protect freedom
Our actions, such as the rescue of
Grenada, have again begun to offer in-
spiration and hope to others.
The importance of American power
and leadership to the strength of
democracy has not been the only lesson
of recent history. In many ways, the
reverse has also proven true: the spread
of democracy serves American interests.
Historically, there have been times
when the failure of democracy in certain
parts of the world did not affect our na-
tional security. In the 18th and 19th ceu
turies, the failure of democracy to take
root elsewhere was unfortunate and
even troubling to us, but it did not
necessarily pose a threat to our own
democracy. In the second half of the
20th century, that is less and less true.
In almost every case in the postwar
period, the imposition of communist
tyrannies has led to an increase in
Soviet global power and influence. Pro-
moting insurgencies against noncom-
munist governments in important
strategic areas has become a low-cost
way for the Soviets to extend the reach
of their power and to weaken their
adversaries, whether they be China or
the democracies of the West and Japan.
This is true in Southeast Asia,
Southwest Asia, Africa, and Central
America.
When the United States supports
those resisting totalitarianism,
therefore, we do so not only out of our
historical sympathy for democracy and
freedom but also, in many cases, in the
interests of national security. As Presi-
dent Reagan said in his second inaugura'
address: "America must remain
freedom's staunchest friend, for freedom
is our best ally and it is the world's only
hope to conquer poverty and preserve
peace."
In many parts of the world we have
no choice but to act, on both moral and
strategic grounds.
How To Respond?
The question is: How should we act?
What should America do to further hot!
its security interests and the cause of
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THE SECRETARY
freedom and democracy? A prudent
strategy must combine different
elements, suited to different cir-
cumstances.
First, as a matter of fundamental
principle, the United States supports
human rights and peaceful democratic
change throughout the world, in-
cluding in noncommunist, pro-Western
countries. Democratic institutions are
the best guarantor of stability and
peace, as well as of human rights.
Therefore, we have an interest in seeing
peaceful progress toward democracy in
friendly countries.
Such a transition is often complex
and delicate, and it can only come about
in a way consistent with a country's
history, culture, and political realities.
We will not succeed if we fail to
recognize positive change when it does
occur-whether in South Africa, or the
Republic of Korea, or the Philippines.
Nor will we achieve our goal if we ig-
nore the even greater threat to the
freedom of such countries as South
Korea and the Philippines from external
or internal forces of totalitarianism. We
must heed the cautionary lessons of both
Iran and Nicaragua, in which pressures
against rightwing authoritarian regimes
were not well thought out and helped
lead to even more repressive dictator-
ship.
Our influence with friendly govern-
merits is a precious resource; we use it
for constructive ends. The President has
said that "human rights means working
at problems, not walking away from
them." Therefore, we stay engaged. We
stay in contact with all democratic
political forces, in opposition as well as
in government. The historic number of
transitions from authoritarian regimes
to democracy in the last decade, from
southern Europe to Latin America,
demonstrates the effectiveness of this
approach-as well as the essential dif-
ference between authoritarian and
totalitarian regimes. There are no ex-
amples of a communist system, once
consolidated, evolving into a democracy.
In June 1982, addressing the British
Parliament, President Reagan endorsed
a new effort-including leaders of
business, labor, and both the Democratic
and Republican Parties-to enlist the
energies of American private citizens in
helping to develop the skills, institutions,
and practices of democracy around the
world. Today, the National Endowment
for Democracy, the concrete result of
that initiative, is assisting democratic
l,rroups in a wide variety of countries.
The endowment represents practical
American support for people abroad
working for our c?omnwn ideals.
Second, we have a moral obliga-
tion to support friendly democratic
governments by providing economic
and security assistance against a
variety of threats. When democratic
friends are threatened by externally sup-
ported insurgencies, when hostile
neighbors try to intimidate them by ac-
quiring offensive arms or sponsor ter-
rorism in an effort to topple their
governments, international security is
jeopardized. The more we can lend ap-
propriate help to others to protect
... today we see a new and different kind of strug-
gle: people around the world risking their lives
against communist despotism.
themselves, the less need will there he
for more direct American involvement
to keep the peace.
Americans have always responded
with courage when overwhelming
danger called for an immediate, all-out
national effort. But the harder task is to
recognize and meet challenges before
they erupt into major crises, before they
represent an immediate threat, and
before they require an all-out effort. We
have many possible responses that. fall
heLween the extremes of inaction and
the direct. use of military force-but we
must be willing to use them, or else we
will inevitably face the agonizing choice
between those two extremes.
Economic and security assistance is
one of those crucial means of avoiding
and deterring bigger threats. It is also
vital support to those friendly nations on
the front line-like Pakistan, Thailand,
or Honduras and Costa Rica-whose
security is threatened by Soviet and
proxy efforts to export their system.
Third, we should support the
forces of freedom in communist
totalitarian states. We must not suc-
cumb to the fashionable thinking that
democracy has enemies only on the
right, that pressures and sanctions are
fine against rightwing dictators but not
against leftwing totalitarians. We should
support the aspirations for freedom of
peoples iu communist states just as we
want freedom for people anywhere else.
For example, without raising false
hopes, we have a duty to make it
clear-especially on the anniversary of
the Yalta conference-that the United
States will never accept the artificial
division of Europe into free and not
free. This has nothing to do with houn-
daries and everything to do with ideas
.UUI go vernanee. Our radios will r,,ntiriue
In contrast to the Soviets and their
allies, the United States, is committed to
the principles of international law. The
UN and OAS Charters reaffirm the in-
herent right of individual and collective
self-defense against aggression-aggres-
sion of the kind committed by the
Soviets in Afghanistan, by Nicaragua in
Central America, and by Vietnam in .
Cambodia. Material assistance to those
opposing such aggression can be a
lawful form of collective self-defense.
Moral and political support, of course, is
a longstanding and honorable American
tradition-as is our humanitarian
assistance for civilians and refugees in
war-torn areas.
Most of what we do to promote
freedom is, and should continue to be,
entirely open. Equally, there are efforts
that are most effective when handled
quietly. Our Founding Fathers were
sophisticated men who understood the
necessity for discreet actions; after the
controversies of the 1970s, we now have
a set of procedures agreed between the
President and Congress for overseeing
such special programs. In a democracy,
clearly, the people have a right to know
and to shape the overall framework and
objectives that guide all areas of policy.
Ill those few cases where national
security requires that the details are bet-
ter kept confidential, Congress and the
President can work together to ensure
that what is done remains consistent
with basic American principles.
Do we really have a choice? In the
1970s, a European leader proposed to
Brezhnev that peaceful coexistence
should extend to the ideological sphere.
Brezhnev responded firmly that this was
impossible, that the ideologrical struggle
continued even in an era of detente, and
to broadcast the truth to people in
closed societies.
Fourth, and finally, our moral
principles compel us to support those
struggling against the imposition of
communist tyranny. From the founding
of this nation, Americans have believed
that a people have the right to seek
freedom and independence-and that we
have both a legal right and a moral
obligation to help them.
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THE SECRETARY
that the Soviet Union would forever sup-
port "national liberation" movements.
The practical meaning of that is clear.
When Soviet Politburo member Gor-
bachev was in London recently, he af-
firmed that Nicaragua had gained in-
dependence only with the Sandinista
takeover. The Soviets and their proxies
thus proceed on the theory that any
country not Marxist-Leninist is not truly
independent, and, therefore, the supply
of money, arms, and training to over-
throw its government is legitimate.
Again: "What's mine is mine. What's
yours is up for grabs." This is the
Brezhnev doctrine.
So long as communist dictatorships
feel free to aid and abet insurgencies in
the name of "socialist internationalism,"
why must the democracies, the target of
this threat, be inhibited from defending
their own interests and the cause of
democracy itself?
How can we as a country say to a
young Afghan, Nicaraguan, or Cambo-
dian: "Learn to live with oppression;
only those of us who already have free-
dom deserve to pass it on to our
children." How can we say to those
Salvadorans who stood so bravely in line
to vote: "We may give you some
economic and military aid for self-
defense, but we will also give a free
hand to the Sandinistas who seek to
undermine your new democratic institu-
tions."
Some try to evade this moral issue
by the relativistic notion that "one man's
freedom fighter is another man's ter-
rorist." This is nonsense. There is a self-
evident difference between those
fighting to impose tyranny and those
fighting to resist it. In El Salvador, pro-
communist guerrillas backed by the
Soviet bloc are waging war against a
democratically elected government; in
Nicaragua and elsewhere, groups seek-
ing democracy are resisting the tighten-
ing grip of totalitarians seeking to sup-
press democracy. The essence of
democracy is to offer means for peaceful
change, legitimate political competition,
and redress of grievances. Violence
directed against democracy is, therefore,
fundamentally lacking in legitimacy.
What we should do in each situation
must, of necessity, vary. But it must
always be clear whose side we are
on-the side of those who want to see a
world based on respect for national in-
dependence, for freedom and the rule of
law, and for human rights. Wherever
possible, the path to that world should
be through peaceful and political means;
but where dictatorships use brute power
to oppress their own people and
threaten their neighbors, the forces of
freedom cannot place their trust in
declarations alone.
Central America
Nowhere are both the strategic and the
moral stakes clearer than in Central
America.
The Sandinista leaders in Nicaragua
are moving quickly, with Soviet-bloc and
Cuban help, to consolidate their
totalitarian power. Should they achieve
this primary goal, we could confront a
second Cuba in this hemisphere, this
time on the Central American main-
land-with all the strategic dangers that
this implies. If history is any guide, the
Sandinistas would then intensify their
efforts to undermine neighboring
governments in the name of their
revolutionary principles-principles
which Fidel Castro himself flatly reaf-
firmed on American television a few
weeks ago. Needless to say, the first
casualty of the consolidation of San-
dinista power would be the freedom and
hopes for democracy of the Nicaraguan
people. The second casualty would be
the security of Nicaragua's neighbors
and the security of the entire region.
I do not believe anyone in the
United States wants to see this
dangerous scenario unfold. Yet there are
those who would look the other way, im-
agining that the problem will disappear
by itself. There are those who would
grant the Sandinistas a peculiar kind of
immunity in our legislation-in effect,
enacting the Brezhnev doctrine into
American law.
The logic of the situation in Central
America is inescapable.
? The Sandinistas are committed
Marxist-Leninists; it would be foolish of
us and insulting to them to imagine that
they do not believe in their proclaimed
goals. They will not modify or bargain
away their position unless there is com-
pelling incentive for them to do so.
? The only incentive that has proved
effective thus far comes from the
vigorous armed opposition of the many
Nicaraguans who seek freedom and
democratic government.
? The pressures of the armed
resistance have diverted Sandinista
energies and resources away from ag-
gression against its neighbor El
Salvador, thus helping to disrupt guer-
rilla plans for a major offensive there
last fall.
? If the pressure of the armed
resistance is removed, the Sandinistas
will have no reason to compromise; all
U.S. diplomatic efforts-and those of the
Contadora group-will be undermined.
Central America's hopes for peace,
security, democracy, and economic prog-
ress will not be realized unless there is a
fundamental change in Nicaraguan
behavior in four areas.
First, Nicaragua must stop playing
the role of surrogate for the Soviet
Union and Cuba. As long as there are
large numbers of Soviet and Cuban
security and military personnel in
Nicaragua, Central America will be em-
broiled in the East-West conflict.
Second, Nicaragua must reduce its
armed forces, now in excess of 100,000,
to a level commensurate with its
legitimate security needs-a level com-
parable to those of its neighbors. The
current imbalance is incompatible with
regional stability.
Third, Nicaragua must absolutely
and definitively stop its support for in-
surgents and terrorists in the region. All
of Nicaragua's neighbors, and particular-
ly El Salvador, have felt the brunt of
Sandinista efforts to destabilize their
governments. No country in Central
America will be secure as long as this
continues.
And fourth, the Sandinistas must
live up to their commitments to
democratic pluralism made to the OAS
in 1979. The internal Nicaraguan opposi-
tion groups, armed and unarmed, repre-
sent a genuine political force that is en-
titled to participate in the political proc-
esses of the country. It is up to the
Government of Nicaragua to provide the
political opening that will allow their
participation.
We will note and welcome such a
change in Nicaraguan behavior no mat-
ter how it is obtained. Whether it is
achieved through the multilateral Con-
tadora negotiations, through unilateral
actions taken by the Sandinistas alone
or in concert with their domestic op-
ponents, or through the collapse of the
Sandinista regime is immaterial to us.
But without such a change of behavior,
lasting peace in Central America will be
impossible.
The democratic forces in Nicaragua
are on the front line in the struggle for
progress, security, and freedom in Cen-
tral America. Our active help for them is
the best insurance that their efforts will
be directed consistently and effectively
toward these objectives.
But the bottom line is this: those
who would cut off these freedom
fighters from the rest of the democratic
world are, in effect, consigning
Nicaragua to the endless darkness of
communist tyranny. And they are
leading the United States down a path
of greater danger. For if we do not take
the appropriate steps now to pressure
the Sandinistas to live up to their past
promises-to cease their arms buildup,
to stop exporting tyranny across their
borders, to open Nicaragua to the com-
petition of freedom and democracy-
then we may find later, when we can no
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THE SECRETARY
longer avoid acting, that the stakes will
be higher and the costs greater.
Whatever options we choose, we _
must be true to our principles and our
history. As President Reagan said
recently:
It behooves all of us who believe in
democratic government, in free elections, in
the respect for human rights to stand side by
side with those who share our ideals,
especially in Central America. We must not
permit those heavily armed by a far away
dictatorship to undermine their neighbors and
to stamp out democratic alternatives at
home. We must have the same solidarity with
those who struggle for democracy, as our
adversaries do with those who would impose
communist dictatorship.
We must, in short, stand firmly in
the defense of our interests and prin-
ciples and the rights of peoples to live in
freedom. The forces of democracy
around the world merit our standing
with them, to abandon them would be a
shameful betrayal-a betrayal not only
of brave men and women but of our
highest ideals.
Question-and-Answer Session Following
Commonwealth Club Address
Secretary Shultz held a question-and-
answer session with the audience at the
conclusion of his address before the Com-
monwealth Club ofCalifornia in San
Francisco on February 22, 1985.1
Q. In connection with support for the
contras in Nicaragua. in an effort to
destabilize the Sandinista government
unless it changes its present direction,
how will this plan square with the
Boland amendment prohibiting fund-
ing?
A. Of course, at the present time,
there is no U.S. funding to support the
people fighting for freedom in
Nicaragua. It has been cut off by the
Congress. The Boland amendment ap-
plied to a continuing resolution in 1983,
and the restrictions that presently apply
are of a different sort.
Q. Could you elaborate on the dif-
ference between a freedom fighter and
a terrorist, in the State Department's
view? [Laughter]
A. I tried to do that, and I've tried
to do that on many occasions; and I
recognize that the question tantalizes
people and titillates them as well, I see.
[Laughter]
If you have a country that has a
de?tiocratic form of government, then
those who want to have change, of
whatever sort, have a legitimatized and
proper method of trying to bring it
about. So, an effort through violence to
bring about change in another way is il-
legitimate: it is terrorism.
Terrorism is a method of seeking to
bring about change that employs an ef-
fort to frighten people, to cause them to
feel that the situation is out of control.
It attacks civilian targets. It hits people
who have no connection, necessarily,
with whatever it is that the terrorists
may think is their true objective.
People who are fighting for freedom
are, by definition, in a situation where
freedom doesn't exist, where there is a
dictatorship-a dictatorship in being, or
as in the case of Nicaragua, a dictator-
ship seeking to impose itself more and
more completely. And people are resist-
ing that.
Those are freedom fighters-
whether they are in Afghanistan,
resisting Soviet direct invasion; in Cam-
bodia, where their country has been
decimated by the Vietnamese.
Remember in this counry those people
who exalted Ho Chi Minh? And they can
see what the Vietnamese are doing. The
same in Nicaragua; the same in many
parts of the world.
So I think that the notion of free-
dom fighter should be an exalted one,
and it's a perversion of our language and
a perversion of morality to equate them
in any manner with the sort of terrorism
that we see operating in many parts of
the world. [Applause]
Q. What are the freedom fighters
in racist South Africa? Will this Ad-
ministration ever recognize and aid in
any way the victims of apartheid? [Ap-
plause]
A. This Administration and the
President find apartheid abhorrent. We
say so publicly here; we say so publicly
in South Africa. We say so privately.
We make no ifs, ands, and buts about it.
We also engage with the South
African Government on that basis to try
to persuade them that there must be a
better way, there must be change to a
different system-one which recognizes
people as people, regardless of their- col-
or. We support people in South
Africa-the blacks in South Africa-in
all sorts of ways. Through educational
help, our U.S. firms, businesses, that
operate in South Africa have provided a
model in employment through the
Sullivan principles, among other ways.
And I might say the blacks in South
Africa want American investment to
stay there. They see the positive results
and the jobs that it brings.
I met with the Chief of the Zulu
tribe, Mr. Buthelezi, the other day.
Referring to a Senator who had been
traveling in South Africa, he said, "Who
is this white man who wants to tell us
that we shouldn't have these jobs?"
[Laughter and applause)
So we are trying to help people. We
recognize their plight; we recognize the
justice of their cause. And we feel that
the way to help them is to hang in there
and be engaged and work at it-not to
just throw up our hands and say, "We
don't like the situation" and walk away.
That's not going to do any good.
And, as a matter of fact, over the
past 4 or 5 years, there has been a con-
siderable amount of change. I don't
mean to imply at all that the situation is
remotely satisfactory, but there has
been movement. We welcome it, and we
encourage it. [Applause]
Q. When there is a changing of the
guard at the Kremlin, do you believe it
will remain with the older generation
or be passed on to the next genera-
tion? If the younger, would it be to
our benefit?
A. I don't know. [Laughter and ap-
plause]
Q. Please comment on your rela-
tions with Mr. Gromyko. [Laughter]
A. I've had a great number of
meetings with Mr. Gromyko. He's an
able, experienced person. We've had
some very stormy meetings, particularly
a meeting in Madrid shortly after the
Soviet Union shot down a Korean
airliner-not only shot it down, but Mr.
Gromyko in Madrid said, "We'd do it
again." They showed no remorse. And
we had, I can assure you, one stormy
meeting.
We've also had many meetings that
have been basically nonpolemical,
straightforward, and worthwhile. In
terms of our personal relationship, I
consider it to be perfectly fine.
I can remember the first meeting we
had when I was Secretary of State. I
had known him from the last time I was
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THE SECRETARY
in government. It was in September
1982, and we had two separate meetings
on two separate days. And at the end of
the first meeting, we agreed that we
ought to set ourselves a little agenda for
the second one, try to find a few areas
where we thought it might be possible to
find a common interest and work con-
structively together. And we did that.
One of the areas we picked out was
nonproliferation of nuclear weapon
capability. Both of us felt strongly about
that. And, as it turned out, as a result of
the push that we each gave this subject,
there has been a series of very fruitful
meetings on that subject between the
two governments. I must say that I
noticed this morning that the Soviet
Union agreed to on-site inspection of at
least some of their nonmilitary nuclear
facilities, and I think that's progress.
We have had a lot to argue about,
and we have argued vigorously, and we
have found some points of agreement.
We managed to agree in Geneva on
the resumption of negotiations that will
start on March 12th. I believe that as we
conduct this very important, very dif-
ficult relationship with the U.S.S.R. that
it's important for us to have decency in
our behavior toward our opposite
numbers. But it's also important for us
always to remember this country as our
adversary-always to remember our in-
terests very clearly. When we talk about
arms control, we'd like to have an agree-
ment, but a bad agreement is not in our
interests. We don't want a bad agree-
ment, we want a good agreement. And
also to remember always that our rela-
tionship with them is not simply one in-
volving arms control.
We need to remind them continuous-
ly, as we all do and I do, that their
treatment of many human beings-par-
ticularly, Jews in the Soviet Union-is
entirely unacceptable to us and to keep
probing and asking about that.
We need to keep pointing out to
them how detrimental their behavior in
many parts of the world-and I've
talked about them here today-how
disrpptive it is to world peace and
stability.
And we also need to be working
with them on areas of bilateral in-
terest-in terms of trade and space and
one thing and another that we historical-
ly have been able to work with them
on-and try to develop, to the extent we
can, a constructive relation with them.
But I think underneath it all, we
must remember that the keys are, first,
let's always be realistic-never wish-
ful-and be willing to say, squarely and
frankly, what we believe the truth to be.
And, second, we better be strong. Don't
kid yourself; weakness will not get us
anywhere with the SovietiJnion-not
with Mr. Gromyko, not with Mr.
Gorbachev, not with Mr Romanov, not
with Mr. Chernenko; nor did it with Mr.
Brezhnev nor any of the predecessors.
(Applause)
Q. To what extent are Russia and
its satellites supporting Sandinista
covert action in El Salvador and Hon-
duras?
A. The supplies that flow into
Nicaragua-some of which find their
way into El Salvador and perhaps other
countries-come from the Soviet Union
or the Soviet bloc. We know that, could
take pictures of the ships; we trace them
as they go along. It's public information;
there isn't any question about it what-
ever.
For some time the Soviets seemed
to have the idea that sending these sup-
plies in ships of other countries, such as
Bulgaria, was the way to do it; but late-
ly they've been sending their supplies in
Soviet ships directly. So there isn't any
ambiguity about the answer to the ques-
tion.
Q. Why doesn't the U.S. Govern-
ment withdraw all support from the
Government of Chile until they have
democratic elections?
A. I don't know exactly what sup-
port there is to withdraw. I would say
that Chile is being run by a dictatorship.
It has had periods in which it seemed
that constructive change was underway.
It ran for a while one of the most in-
teresting free market economies around
that was quite successful for a time.
Right now the regime seems to have
slipped back into a disappointingly
repressive phase, with a state of siege
being maintained. But we will stay
engaged with Chile. The Chilean people
are a wonderful people with a demo-
cratic tradition. We can hope that, even
as the present Constitution calls for, at
least eventually they may return to a
democratic form of government. In any
case, we will keep working at that and
trying to help bring it about.
Q. Why are private citizens, who
are not elected officials or appointed
officials and do not represent the
United States, permitted to go to
Beirut, Cuba, et cetera, and bargain
with those respective leaders to let
out hostages, et cetera? And what is
the State Department doing to get
American hostages released in
Lebanon?
A. As far as the problem of
hostages, Americans held
anywhere-and there-ate now stiff fbur"""'
that were seized in Lebanon-we work
tirelessly in an effort to get them re-
leased. And we make it very clear to
those we believe are responsible for
holding them that if harm comes to
them, we will hold those parties respon-
sible, and we will do something about it.
But our efforts, I can assure you,
are tireless-some public, mostly
private, diplomatic efforts-and we
never forget those who have been seized
and want to help them in every way that
we can.
As far as private citizens and their
efforts are concerned, of course private
citizens have a right to go. And I think
Mrs. Levin, for example, did quite a lot,
in collaboration with us, in trying to
work for the release of her husband.
I do think, when it comes to broader
efforts to represent the U.S. Govern-
ment, that it is a bad idea for people not
operating under the authority of the
President to try to represent the United
States, because the President is elected
to do that and you can only have one
President at a time.
It is a problem for us in this coun-
try, because I think all 100 Senators,
and most of the Congressmen, consider
themselves to be candidates for Presi-
dent. [Laughter] And sometimes they
think they already are there. [Laughter]
But, on the whole, I think people do
understand this point. And I notice, par-
ticularly, when it comes, for example, to
our dealings with the Soviet Union that
on both sides of the aisle there is a great
care taken, and when someone is going
to go to Moscow, they generally let us
know. We tell them what we know of
the situation, what we would like to see
represented. They without fail debrief
and tell us what took place in their con-
versations. And I think, on the whole,
Americans are very responsible about
these things.
Q. Do we have a policy that
reflects how we want the Israeli-
Lebanon conflict to be resolved? And,
if so, what is it?
A. We have had clear objectives in
Lebanon. We want to see a sovereign,
independent Lebanon. We'd like to see it
free of all foreign forces. And we would
like to see a Lebanon constituted in such
a way that activities in southern
Lebanon are not a threat to the peace
and security of people living in northern
Israel.
Department of State Bulletin
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THE SECRETARY
Those have been our objectives.
They've been consistent. And, of course,
the condition in Lebanon and the way its
relationships develop are part and parcel
of the whole Middle East puzzle.
We worked very hard, as we all
know here; and we suffered some very
heavy losses that leave us very dis-
tressed. But those have been our objec-
tives all along.
As far as the current situation, we
are glad to see the Israelis withdrawing.
We would like to see that withdrawal
take place through some form of
negotiation, so that a possible role for
UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon(
is defined and the stability that a
designated role could add would be put
there-and that there would be an
orderly process, an understood process,
of turning over strong points as the
Israeli Army leaves and other forces
take up key posts.
Despite a great deal of flexibility on
the part of Israel in trying to work these
matters out, there has been, I think it's
fair to say, great intransigence on the
other side in recent weeks and months.
And so there isn't in prospect right
now-although this may change-any
negotiated outcome. The Israelis are
simply pulling back unilaterally.
And, of course, in the end, as they
draw their forces completely out of the
country, if there are no negotiated ar-
rangements to provide security for their
northern border, they will have to figure
out unilaterally what they will do about
the attacks that have historically come
from southern Lebanon into northern
Israel. That's the reason why we think a
negotiated withdrawal program is better
than a unilateral one, in that arrange-
ments having to do with security would
be put in place. Otherwise I'm afraid
there will be security obtained, accom-
panied by a very great amount of ten-
sion and potential for continual out-
breaks on the border.
Q. In light of the growing opposi-
tion to the Marcos regime in the
Philippines, will the United States
conjinue to support Marcos?
~?A. Yes. Ferdinand Marcos is the
legitimate head of the Philippine Gov-
ernment, and we will deal with him.
We will also be working in every
way that we can to build up and
legitimatize-help the Philippines
legitimatize-all manner of processes
that are the means of selecting leader-
ship in a country.
So we supported very strongly, the
second board that investigated the
Aquino murder, feeling that the first
was not really an expression of a proper
rule of law, and the second was.
We supported the use of arrange-
ments for the elections held some
months ago, so that they would be as
democratic and open and free as possi-
ble. And they turned out to be pretty
good elections.
We support having the army he pro-
fessionalized, not politicized, so that, on
the one hand, it can be an effective force
in countering the communist insurgency
that is gathering in the Philippines, and,
on the other hand, as respectful of the
democratic process and the importance
of civilian rule.
We're working constantly to try to
keep these processes alive and help them
flourish so that whenever a transition
comes, it comes through processes of
this kind, and people retain their con-
fidence that there are democratically
based procedures through which leader-
ship should be chosen.
Q. How does a hard-working Sec-
retary of State, such as yourself, get
such a great tan [laughter and ap-
plause], and why don't you have an
ulcer? [Laughter]
A. I don't know about the answer to
the second, but the answer to the first
is, that you got to goof off once in a
while. (Laughter and standing applause(
The Importance of
the MX Peacekeeper Missile
Secretary Shultz:s statement before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on
February 26, 1985.
I welcome this opportunity to appear
before you to speak in support of the
President's program of strategic mod-
ernization. This subject is of enormous
importance to our diplomacy because of
the direct impact of strategic moderniza-
tion on our national security, our arms
control objectives, and our most fun-
damental foreign policy goals.
Strategic Modernization
and Foreign Policy
As Secretary of State, I am acutely con-
scious of the strength or weakness of
American power because it directly af-
fects our ability to achieve our most fun-
damental goals: the defense of our
values and our interests and the con-
struction of a safer, freer, and more
prosperous world. Power and diplomacy
are not separate dimensions of policy;
they are inextricably linked together.
That is why I am here today to urge
support for strategic modernization and,
in particular, for the MX Peacekeeper
missile program which is a central pillar
of that modernization.
As leader of the democratic nations,
we have an inescapable responsibility to
maintain the strategic balance-and only
we can maintain it. If our determination
flags, we shake the confidence of our
friends and allies around the world; we
weaken the cohesion of our alliances. If
we in America are strong and united in
our commitment to peace and interna-
tional security, then those who rely on
us, and upon whom we rely, have the
confidence to move together with us
toward our shared goals.
Modernization of our strategic forces
is essential. The Soviet strategic buildup
has continued relentlessly. Since we
deployed our most modern type of
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile],
the Minuteman III, the Soviet Union has
deployed three new types of ICBMs-the
SS-17, -18, and -19-including 360
SS-19s roughly comparable in size to
the MX, each with 6 warheads, and 308
of the much larger SS-18, each with 10
warheads. Moreover, within the next 2
years, the Soviets will begin deploying
two additional new types-the SS-X-24
and -25. This means five new Soviet
ICBMs compared to one-the MX-for
the United States.
A credible, flexible American
strategic posture is vital to the stable
balance of power on which peace and
security rest. And the MX is a vital ele-
ment of that stable balance. It repre-
sents the response that four successive
administrations-both Democratic and
Republican-have believed necessary to
offset, at least partially, the formidable
Soviet ICBM arsenal. It was permitted
by the SALT II Treaty, and, indeed, its
contribution to the strategic balance was
one of the premises on which that treaty
was based. The bipartisan Scowcroft
commission concluded, and I am con-
vinced, that the MX remains an essential
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