INTERVIEW WITH VALDIMIR SAKHAROV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000605740020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: November 27, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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' RADIO TV REPORTS, IN
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068
PROGRAM The Fred F i s k e Show STATION - to M U F MF
DATE November 27, 1981 8:00 PM CITY Washington, DC
FRED FISKE: We've often spoken about the world of
intelligence, of disinformation, of covert action. This evening
we have with us a man who knows it well. Vladimir Sakharov was
a Soviet diplomat, a KGB agent, and a CIA spy. He tells his
unusual story in a new bock. It's in paperback and it's titled
"High Treason." He wrote it with Umberto Tossi.
Welcome to our program.
VLADIMIR SAKHAROV: It's a pleasure. Good evening.
FISKE: The name Sakharov is a rather common name in
the Soviet Union. Are you any relation to the famous scientist?
SAKHAROV: No, no relationship. And it's not a comoon
name at a l l .
FISKE: Isn't it?
SAKHAROV: It's not like Smith. It's a rather unusual
name. Just a coincidence.
FISKE: I see.
Well, you were born into the Russian elite.
SAKHAROV: Yeah.
FISKE: Your family had been rich and influential even
before the Revolution, and they had been among the priv-i I eged few
in the Soviet Union since the Revolution. How did that happen?
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SAKHAROV: Ply grand-grandfather was a sugar and si l k
manufacturer. And my grandfather was also -- followed the father's
footsteps. When the Revolution came, he was a survivor. He turned
over his property to the state. He knew that the new regime w111
come anyway, so might as well not fight it. And he was given a
rnodest job anc an a l lowance, and he was able to make it without
antagonizing the Soviet power.
So it was a family of survivors. He was a Muscovite,
o l d Russian farm i I y.
FISKE: So they wer members of the bourgeoisie, and not
many of those did survive.
SAKHARUV: Well, my father wrote -- you know, every year
you have to go through a reevaluation, like, and you have to des-
cribe your family background. My father would write about his
family roots, that the parents are from working class. Well, they
worked. They were merchants. So it's a little deceit that you
have to live with.
FISKE: And your father was in the KGB. A colonel in
SAKHAROV: My father, since 1945, became one of the
first IUU aipIomatic couriers in the Soviet Union. They were --
what they did, they carried secret pouches between Soviet embas-
sies around the world.
He told me one day when I was already at my teenage,
he told me that, "Look, I have been working for the KGB a l l
these years, and my rank is a colonel." Now, that's what he told
n,e. I knew everybody revered him and a lot of peop le were afraid
of him. But you don't talk about, really, things like "I'm a KGB"
in the family. Everybody knows it. You know, it's like that.
FISKE: You suspected it before your father tola you
SAKHARUV: Oh, sure, because my -- at school, for ex-
a;np le, stucents at school used to tell me, "0h, come on. Your
father is no diplomatic courier. He is intelligence officer, and
a very high-level one."
I said, "WIel 1," you know, "if you want to think that
way, think that way."
But there is an unwritten and unspoken language in
N;oscow that, "You don't have to say anything, I understand what
you mean .'1
FISKE: Do all KGB officers carry military ranks?
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SAKHARUV: There is a certain leverage that KGB carries
a m i l i tary rank. It's sort of I i ke a parallel to the military
rank. but not necessarily.
1- ISKE: ~,ihat rank did you hold?
SAKI-iAROV: I was a co-opted officer, which is a totally
different story.
FISKE: You were in the diplomatic service, the foreign
service, who was drafted into the KGB.
SAKHAROV: Right. I was a pure [unintelligible] foreign
affairs diplomat. I was sent to Yemen, to my internship, from
the Institute of International Relations. What happened is that
the KGB resident in Hode i da removed the P'i i n i stry of Foreign Affairs
guy from -- because he didn't like him. For other reasons, too.
Ana I was a young guy there in Yemen, and there was no one else
to fill the vacant position. And the KUB resident told me, "You're
going to fill the position of the consul, but you will be working
for us from now on.11
So I became a co-opted KGB while I was working at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
FISKE: Your family lived very well in the Soviet Union.
You had a nice apartment, lots of friends, parties, plenty of
fooa. I say nice apartment. In Russian terms.
SAKHAROV: By Soviet standards.
FISKE: Lescribe what would be a nice apartment that
your family had, by Soviet standards.
SAKHAROV: It would be a two-room apartment. There is
no such thing as a bedroom or a living room. It's two rooms,
kitchen and a corriaor, and in a nice location, in the center of
Moscow. That's considered a very good apartment. That's what
we had.
FISKE: And much larger rooms, I suppose, than you'd
find in some of the poorer apartments.
SAKHAROV: It would be larger rooms. It will be a
nice view, and there'll be nice appliances, and the elevator will
work sometimes.
FISKE: Elevator problems are endemic in the Soviet
Union. I was there some years ago, and we stayed at the Ukra i.na
Hotel.
SAKHAROV: Oh, yes.
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FISKE: A big beautiful hotel, 29 stories. But the
elevators were terrible. They had Six elevators, and they pro-
babl y needed 30. It was worth your l i fe to get on and off that
elevator.
SAKHAKOV: You must have seen our apartment building,
because our building was directly across the river from the
UKra Ina Hotel.
FISKE: Wel I , my window looked right out over the
SAKHAKOV: American Embassy, and then next to it was
our building. Yes.
FISKE: Ana in the wintertime they have a ski lift
right onto that river. It's a very, very pretty part of the
city, by the way.
Now, your family lived very well. You lived very
well. You didn't want for anything. You had great privileges.
Ana still -- and your father was able to provide this because
he was a KGb colonel. But when he learned that you were becoming
involved in it, he warner you against it. Why?
SAKHAKOV: He said, "Over my dead body. You're not
doing there."
FISKE: Now, you would have thought that -- he had a
privileged position. Why did he want you not to go into it?
SAKHAKOV: He thought that a career in the Minstry of
Foreign Affairs would be a pure diplomatic career with the same
privileges and prestige as KGB, only I wouldn't get into any
political upheavals. Because his philosophy was if you work
in the KGB and you are kicked out of the KGB for something --
there is a big changeover, for example -- if you're kicked out,
there is no way you're going to make it in l i fe. You will end
up working somewhere in the boonies. Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, he consiaered our people with more integrity, sort of,
and more debonair, and there is more camaraderie between them.
So he wanted me to work in the Ministry.
FISKE: Was your mother happy with your father's work
in the KGE?
SAKHAROV: Well, she was happy and unhappy. He was
away from home most of the time. He would be home maybe a week
out of one month. The rest of the time, he'll be traveling
abroad. And, of course, it was hard on her to be alone and tend
To the fam i l y. But at the same time, he brought all those mar-
velous things.
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F I SKI=: Wel I , I ask you that question because your
wife was very unhappy with it, wasn't she?
F I SKE: Which may have been one of the factors leading
to your defection?
SAKHAROV: There was that ingredient. I will say it
honestly, that my marriage basically was approved and arranged.
I didn't want to marry that woman. I was in love with somebody
else, and that somebody else was not from my class, was a lower-
class citizen. I was not supposed to marry her. So I had to
marry within my class, within the elite, so to say.
FISKE: Isn't that interesting, Vladimir? You come
from what's supposed to be a classless society, and you're talking
about marrying within your class. And when you went back to
Russia from the Middle East, at one point during your career, you
say you were able to get two 2O-day passes to spend at an elite
resort for upper-level people.
SAKHAROV: Right.
FISKE: Now, that sounds strange when you're discussing
a supposedly classless society.
SAKHAROV: It's classless for the elite. It's defin-
itely not classless for the rest of the people.
FISKE: Who composes the elite?
SAKHAROV: The elite is a unique phenomenon. It's a
society in Moscow which is comprised of Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, party officials, International Department of the Central
Committee, intelligence officers, and their families, who have
access on a permanent basis, or on a from-time-to-time basis, to
foreign travel, who enjoy the privileges of shopping in special
stores, having special parties, enjoying Western goods, which
are not enjoyed by the rest of the Soviet population. And that's
a status of movie stars. They're looked upon, from the rest of
the people, as movie stars. They are stars.
F I SKE: And you look down upon the rest of the people
as of a lower c I ass?
SAKHAROV: Yes, precisely.
FISKE: That's very interesting.
You were a gooc student. But for some reason, you were
enamored, you were hooked on things American from very early on.
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SAKHARUV: Uh-huh.
FISKE: Now, how does that happen to a youngster, you
knew, who is brought up in Moscow, from the kind of family from
which you came? Relatively little reason to be dissatisfied.
You were enjoy enjoying the very best. Your I i fe, as you describe it,
was the good life. It was, you know, the Joe Col Iege kind of
existence.
SAKHAROV: Yes, exactly. Uh-huh.
I -- again, going back to my early childhood, we went
to iome when I was two years old.
FISKE: Your father was assigned there?
SAKHAROV: To Rome. I spent there two or three years.
My first language was Italian, by the way. I had to learn Russian
when we came back.
Then my father was traveling after that for alI the
time. And the culture in my family was Dave Brubeck, Ella Fitz-
Seralc, Charlie Parker, Nat King Cole, J.D. Salinger. That is,
direct connection to all the Western civilization. That didn't
fit with my schooling.
FISKE: Well, how did that happen? Was it in Rome or
was it before that?
SAKHAROV: Well, it happened after. It's after, after
Rome. I came back. I was a regular child who really was out of
place, because I had all those things. I have foreign clothes
on r. ie. I didn't fit in my school. I didn't belong there, because
the rest were dressed in Russian drab type things. And that was
in the '50s.
My father spoke perfectly English. He translated to me
books that he read. He told me stories about America, about Eng-
lanc, Paris. So I felt much above the rest. That was -- maybe
that was dacmdg i ng, in a sense.
FISKE: What was your father's attitude toward the West
and toward America?
SAKHARUV: My father was very little politically in-
clinec. He stayed away from politics. He did his job. He liked
to go to America. He liked America. He liked people. He used
to to l l me when he i s i n Washington he saw a l l those marvelous
houses and people in the streets seemed to be happy and they --
you know, that's what I got when I was young.
FISKE: What would he tell his other Russians about it?
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7
SAKHAROV: He wouldn't say anything to therm But in
the fami I y, he shored.
FISKE: And you, as a child, did you tell your friends?
SAKHAROV: No.
F I SKE: You knew that you weren't supposed to do that.
SAKHAROV: Yeah. You know what the rules are very
early in your childhood.
FISKE: But you had American records, you had -- you
smoked American cigarettes and drank American booze.
SAKHAROV: I was stealing American cigarettes from my
FISKE: Winston? Wasn't that your brand?
SAKHAROV: Winston, yeah. And Chesterfield.
FISKE: And you were a rather good student, right?
SAKHAROV: Yes, I was a good student.
FISKE: You went to music and language.
SAKHAROV: I started music when I was five, and then
I switched to jazz. Later on at the institute, I had my own jazz
combo. Jazz was prohibited, so we had to play clandestinely. We
picked up a l l our stuf f from W i I I i s Conover from the Voice of
America.
FISKE: I worked with Willis Conover when he was in
Washington, by the way.
SAKHAROV: Oh, God, he is something else.
FISKE: Many years ago. Yeah. I've known Wi l l is a
long, long time.
SAKHAROV: He's done more for the United States and to
present American culture to the world, more than any American
political leader.
FISKE: I had hi m on th i s program a couple of years
ago. He's the most I i stened to radio personal i ty in the world,
I suppose. I-see him from time to time.
SAKHAROV: My desire, since I was maybe 13 or 14 years
old, was to meet one day him and just shake his hand.
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SAKhAROV: In Moscow, at the Institute of International
Relations, all the subjects were compulsory. I mean you get in
class in the morning, you take two hours of Arabic, then two
hours of history of Islam, international law, international rela-
tions, economics. I mean everything is specified. And you have
to memorize everything. You have to really drill yourself all
the time. You don't have much time or much need to think, you
know, to do any thinking. You just memorize and you create a
very good background. It's very area-oriented. You're supposed
to work in the Middle East, you study the Middle East very well.
You study the customs, the Arabs' traditions. So it's -- that's
the Soviet education.
In the States, I went to the international relations
graduate school. And what we were studying mostly were theories
and methodologies of international relations, maybe 75 theories
by different theoreticians, comparative government, comparative
politics, comparative this, comparative that.
FISKE: Graduate school is different from undergrad
SAKHAROV: Yeah. But I gave some classes in both
schools too, and I will be doing that fairly soon in another
school.
But the whole thing here is oriented towards more gen-
eral, general education, towards creating a solid background.
FISKE: But there, a specific purpose.
SAKHAROV: A specific purpose. That's the difference.
FISKE: Did you choose the Middle East as your area?
SAKHAROV: The Middle East was the best area to study
at the time because the Soviet foreign political thrust was into
the Middle East. There is a need -- or there was a need for
Middle Eastern experts. More embassies were opening in the M i d-
a l e East, more people went there. So there was more room for
promotion. That's as simple as that.
I mean if you are specializing in the United States
and if you are assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there
is no way you get promoted, because all the positions above you
are occupied by KUB, GRU, Central Committee people. But in a
country like Egypt, with a great number of Soviet diplomats,
there is a lot of room for promotion.
F ISKE: So that's why you chose it.
SAKHAROV: Precisely.
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FISKE: Tell me this. You mentioned the thoroughness
of the study: Arabs and Arab customs and Arab language, and so
on. It makes you woncer why we keep hearing reports that the
Russians assigned in that part of the world are generally not
well Iiked. They're kicked out, for example, of Egypt. They're
resented. You would think that people so well grounded in the
customs of an area, in the traditions of an area would manage to
make themselves better liked.
SAKHAROV: Well, maybe that's what we perceive right
now. We heard the Vladimir Pelakov (?), the Soviet Ambassador,
was kicked out of Egypt. But we look at the gains the Soviets
have made in the Middle East for the past 10 years. They might
have lost Egypt temporarily, but they have acquired Syria. They
have acquired South Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, as far as good
reglationships are going. So they have acquired more ground than
they lost, so far.
FISKE: But the question is, do they -- you say they've
acquired. Do they hold these countries militarily, or have they
established a genuine rapport, a relationship? That's what I'm
talking about. I have no doubt that they can grab a country and
hold it militarily. They've done it. But do the people there
genuinely like them, admire them, respect them? And from what I
hear, that's not the case. And given the kind of training you
have for your positions, I would expect it to be.
SAKHAROV: There is a double standard in the Middle
East. Soviet diplomatic representatives, KGB officers, GRU,
Central Committee functionaries, they are area experts, they can
speak Arabic, they can charm the socks off the Arabs. But then
there is a group of Soviet specialists which comes along, Soviet
military experts and Soviet road construction builders, agricul-
ture experts. They are picked, you know, fresh from the Soviet
Union. They have no exposure, they have no experience. They
think they are in the Soviet Union, actually, when they are wor-
king in Syria or in Egypt. There is no difference for them.
So when the Soviet diplomats are working and establish-
ing good base of operations, usua l l y the specialists and the ex-
perts are the ones that foul it up.
So there is a problem for the Soviets.
FISKE: Now, you were assigned, even in the Foreign
Service, with a commission in GRU, the military intelligence.
SAKHAROV: Yeah. Uh-huh.
FISKE: Is that usual?
SAKHAROV: That's the standard for any graduate of the
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Institute of International Relations. They undergo five years
of special military training, which is basically military intel-
ligence type training. And since GRU is an older organization
and much more, you know, rooted than KGB in international oper-
ations, it was just traditional.
FISKE: Anybody who really knew you shouldn't have been
surprised that you defected, because you were never really a dyed-
in-the-wool Marxist, although you managed to convince your super-
iors and your teachers that you were. In your book you make it
clear that throughout your training and throughout your intern-
sh ip they test you, they check you.
FISKE: Is it so clumsy that you're aware of it, so
that you, really having doubts about the system, really enjoying
so many things American, which would have made you, you know,
verboten as a GNU officer, you were able to conceal?
SAKHAROV: There is a thing that certain people can
become a part of that system. They can become informants. They
can promote their careers by ruining other people's lives, pro-
bably. I aidn't feel I belonged in that kind of environment. I
didn't care for anyone taking my personal inventory at the In-
stitute of International Relations, because I was sort of ince-
penoent. I kept it to myself, but I thought that was nobody's
business, what my views are. You know, as long as I'm doing a
good job, forget it.
FISKE: But you gave the answers that were required.
SAKHAROV: I gave the answers. Sure.
There was an example when we had the party at the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. There was a big function. And my jazz
combo, we say we're going to play some...
FISKE: You play piano.
SAKHAROV: Yeah, I play piano. We say we're going to
play some music by Soviet composers, and instead we play Charlie
Parker's 'Lacy Be Good."
LLaughter7i
SAKHAROV: So stuff like that. That was very exciting.
FISKE: How long did you manage to fool them that way?
SAKHAROV: Until I got to the United States. But it
was getting to me. It was getting to me. When I was in Kuwait,
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I knew I was walking a very thin rope. I knew that another year,
I wouldn't be able to really handle myself.
FISKE: Early on, for some reason, while you managed
to fool your Russian superiors, in some way, the CIA was aware
of the fact that you were a potential defector. You were very
young, very new in the service when George appeared. Now, are
you able to understand how that happened?
SAKHAROV: Maybe now I understand it better than then.
Obviously, at the time -- I don't think now it would be the case.
At the time, the CIA was a rather active organization. They most
likely were aware of various Soviet personalities -- well, like
the KGB is aware of CIA, and CIA Is aware of KGB, and GRU is aware
of CIA. It's sort of typical.
And, well, I took taxis a lot. I lovea American music.
I n Yemen I had a good selection of American records. I had great
parties, for example, for East Germans. I entertained Egyptian
military personnel. I was different. Even when I was working
overseas, and when I was in Moscow, I behaved differently some-
times on the street.
FISKE: What's peculiar, though, is that your behavior
was different enough for the CIA to realize that you were a poten-
tial defector, but not to make the KGB suspicious of you.
SAKHAROV: Well, it's an interesting thing. Well, about
my relationship to the CIA, I sort of touched upon it. I didn't
So into very intimate details about...
FISKE: You mean in the book.
SAKHAROV: Yes, in the book. I skipped over this.
FISKE: Well, can you tell us a little more? Can you
tell us some things that would help us to explain that that are
not in the book?
SAKHAROV: When you are, for example, stand at a diplo-
matic reception, or at any reception -- for example, at the f i l m
festival press conference, and you try to sort of look available,
through your body language, through your behavior. You come
closer to an American, suppose, and you try to get in touch in
a conversation, you might be able to get a feedback. When you
do that long enough, you either will be suspected as a control
agent for the KGB or a possible defector. And that's the answer.
But George presented himself as a German. Why?
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SAKhAROV: That was an initial presentation. And
would think that if he had presented himself as an American,
naturally, I would just run away.
FISKE: It was very tentative, though, right? No pres-
FISKE: How long did he remain in touch with you at
various places? He would show up at various places, leave memen-
tos, leave a book in your car, or something.
FISKE: How long did this go on before your actual
SAKHAROV: I divide it into three periods. One period
of approach, another approach of working through a third party.
That was in Egypt. And a third period of direct twice-a-day --
tw i ce-a-week, rather, meetings. And that was in Kuwait. So the
active, really grinding period of work was in Kuwait, took place
in Kuwait. And that's why I said the psychological pressure was
getting to me, because it was more and more d i f f i cu I t on me to
keep it up.
FISKE: Vladimir, you were taught in school that the
CIA was a much more formidable adversary than you found it to be.
Why?
SAKHAROV: At the school we were taught that the CIA
is the enemy number one, the United States is enemy number one,
and that the CIA spearheads the effort of the United States im-
perialism to destroy the Soviet Union. That was a dogma, you
know. Since, with my all this affection for American culture
and civilization and so forth, if they are spearheading the ef-
fort of that civilized nation, they must be the good guys.
So -- you have to read between the I ines when you are
a citizen of the Soviet Union. So I read between the lines.
The agency -- in the book I made that comment, and that
comment has to do basically with the period after my defection,
after I escaped from Kuwait.
I was debriefed in Washington for about a year. I
thought -- I didn't say anything at the time, and I was rather
confused by the reception, by what happened to me here. Looking
back now, I think that the debriefing was not really that ter-
rific. And later on...
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FISKE: Not terrific, in what way? You mean you could
have actually been a mole?
SAKHARGV: WeI I, no, no. What I mean, the debriefing
of any individual, whether it's a aiplorrat or an immigrant or
anybody who cores to the United States, there is a special skill
of Gebr i of i ng. You have to be a -- a debr i efer has to be an ex-
pert in the area on which he debriefs, not a person, simply like
that.
Over the years, by osmosis, by other means, I found
that the agency Goes not have expert area capabilities at all.
They used to have them. I was fortunate I worked with George.
I f it were somebody else, I might not have been as fortunate.
FISKE: Is George still in the agency?
SAKHAROV: I don't know. I have never seen him...
FISKE: You're not in touch with him.
SAKHARGV: I've never seen him after I -- well, who
quite first the relationship, it's a question. But I have not
has any relationship with him for quite a number of years.
FISKE: Shortly after your defection -- you left Wash-
ington after a year's debriefing. You went to California. You
went to hose I school there.
SAKHAROV: Yeah. They bought me a one-way ticket.
FISKE: Why'd you go to hotel school?
SAKHARGV: That was what you call a resettlement pro-
gram. Obviously, they concluded that I would make a good busboy.
FISKE: But while you were out there in California, you
suspected a plot, an effort on the part of the KGB to do you in.
You saw people stanGing outside your hotel from the window. You
finally jumped 30 feet out the window into a swimming pool, in-
juring yourself.
Are you confident now, as you look back, that in fact
it was such a plot?
SAKHAROV: No, no. That was not -- what happened there
was a rather soap opera situation, is that when I got to Cali-
fornia, I was given a new identity, that I was not a Russian any-
more, I was -- I'm Dutch or Swedish, you know, computer salesman.
FISKE: How many languages do you speak?
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SAKHAROV: Arabic, German, anu English and Russian.
And so I haG to p lay a role of somebody else, and I
hac to go to the hotel -motel school. And there were two hookers,
a coup le of people from -- looked who came from Skid Row, and
somebody on a government assistance program. And the lecturer
at the school said, "Well, you might make busboys and you make
good tips." I said, "God, what am I doing here?" You know.
Anc that was a shock. I f you take someone from a Soviet elite
who was there, you know, and you put him in a dump like that.
Sort of a shock treatment.
And I thought that was the end. I thought -- I was
extremely bitter and I didn't know what to do, where to go. My
cover did not provide for any job background. If I would apply
for a job the employer would usually ask you, "Where did you work
before?" I said, "Well, I worked for a Syrian outfit which is
defunct." You know, now it doesn't work anymore. So, you know,
check it out. You can't.
I couldn't get a job. I didn't have much money. So
what I was doing in California, I was trying to -- and I wanted
to be accepted so badly in American society, because that was my
dream, to come here.
I went around. I would go to around those Holiday Inns
that go around and around and around, buy a round of dr inks for
everybody, you know. I would go and invite an expensive call girl
and would go for a weekend to Palm Springs and I'd blow 500 bucks.
You know, something I i ke that .
Finally, in about six months, I had no way to go anymore.
I was out of money. I was out of everything. I was emotionally
totally out. I was fortunate I met a very good man. He was a
black singer, a jazz singer. And he told me one day that, "Look,
you have to get out of that situation on your own. And you have
to understand you're not the greatest, that there is a higher
power. Ana if you want to make it, the higher power wi l l take
care of you." And I had a very good advice from his friends.
And then I -- I got a lot of friends at that time, all of a sud-
den. And to go to a university and to move out and, under -. new
identity, establish my new American credentials.
So I went on a work study program. I got a professor
at the university -- international journalism professor, by the
way. He a i ed now -- who helped me with government grants for
research. I drove a cab at night, and sort of worked myself out
little by little.
I went through al I of the -- even the f lower- ch i I dren
generation in the United States...
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16
FISKE: You've been here nine years.
SAKHAROV: Yeah.
FISKE: What about the leap out of the window?
SAKHAROV: In Hollywood?
FISKE: Yeah.
SAKHAROV: That was -- I signed for the loan. That
was a collection agent.
FISKE: Really? And you thought it was KGB.
SAKHARUV: Was a KGB. It was a collection agency.
Something was after me because I had co-signed for a loan of
somebody, I didn't know who. The loan was not too big, though.
So I took care of that.
FISKE: You jumped 30 feet into a swimming pool.
SAKHAROV: Something like that.
FISKE: Did you injure yourself?
SAKHAROV: I twisted my ankle.
FISKE: You were lucky.
SAKHAROV: Yeah.
FISKE: Vladimir's story is told in a book by him
titled "High Treason."
Good evening. You're on the air.
MAN: I have read Sakharov's book, and I've read the
John barron (?) book on the KGB. I noticed there were some dis-
crepancies in the Sakharov story, and I was wondering if he wou I d
care to ccm7:ent on that .
way?
FISKE: All right. What are the discrepancies, by the
MAN: For example, the description of his father's
reaction when he announced he had been recruited by the KGB.
SAKHAROV: There are discrepancies, and I'll-tell you
why those discrepancies. I wrote this book on my own. When John
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Barron was writing his book, he interviewed me. He had a set of
questions, obviously, which he had to follow in his writing. I
answered his questions to the best of my ability at the time.
but that was not me writing the book, again. So you can inter-
pret -- you know, when you write about somebody else, you can
really interpret his situation in many different ways. And it's
very difficult to be accurate if you write about somebody else.
If you write it yourself, you can be subjective, in a sense. But
at least it's your own, you know. You put in your own perspec-
tive and your own reactions. And this is firsthanded material.
And I think what I wrote about my past is -- could be
subjective, but at least it's true.
MAN: By the way, I should mention I was very impressed
with your book. I was surprised when I read the Barron book, as
it happened, just a couple of weeks later and noticed the discre-
pancies. And I was very puzzled by that.
One other question. You mentioned Nosenko. And I'm
wondering if you have had any thoughts since. You may have noticed
the Reader's Digest article on him. Have you had any thoughts on...
SAKHAROV: I've heard about this controversy about
Ncsenko for a number of years now. I didn't know anything about
it when I got here, though.
MAN: My impression was that you mentioned Nosenko...
SAKHAROV: He was a legitimate...
MAN: ...kicked out of the institute?
SAKHAROV: Yes. What I d i d , I stated the fact that h i s
brother -- he was a class above me. He was studying the Arabic
language. When Nosenko defected to the United States, his brother
was asked by the Director of the Institute of International Rela-
tions, who was at the time either Rozenko (?) or Pushkov (?) -- I
don't rememter. I think so. He was asked to leave the institute
and transfer himself to the Institute of Oriental Languages, or
to stay at the institute, but there will be no future for him.
So I concluded that his family suffered because his
brother got into trouble, you know, as far as his career was con-
cerned.
MAN: Did your own family suffer when you defected?
SAKHAROV: Well, this is very d i ff icu It for me to say.
I have not kept in touch with my family since I got here.
FISKE: But you really split up with your wife. So
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she shouldn't have suffered.
SAKHAROV: No. From what I know, my ex-wife remarries.
MAN: But your father was in a very trusted position,
and certainly...
FISKE: Did he suffer any?
SAKHAROV: He got grounded.
FISKE: He did.
SAKHAROV: Uh-huh.
FISKE: Have you heard from him at all?
SAKHAROV: He died.
FISKE: I see.
MAN: May I ask one last question? I notice that you've
mentioned your education very generally. And I would guess that
there are enough clues in there that if the KGB were interested
in finding you -- you know, the international journalism profes-
sor who's now dead, that sort of thing -- that they might be able
to track you down.
I am personally very interested in Soviet studies, and
it would be intriguing to be able to somehow get in touch with
you. Is there no way to contact you?
SAKHAROV: You can. You can contact the station. I'm
going to leave my coordinates.
SAKHAROV: And I'm sure KGB knows where I am. They
FISKE: And they're no longer interested in finding you.
SAKHAROV: Why would they make any -- a friend of mine
told me not too long ago -- he said, "Vladimir, as long as you
are out there in public, they're not going to touch you." I hope
so. If you are there somewhere quiet under a new identity, they'll
put you away silently and quietly.
MAN: One last thing, please. When I read the book, I
was personally mortified at the way you were treated when you
came to this country. And, you know, my own apologies obviously
don't...
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SAKHAROV : No apologies needed. I think I was lucky,
in a sense, that I was given a chance. Now I look back and I
see that if I were taken care of, all my needs were taken care
of, I wouldn't be proud of myself now.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: I w o u I d like to ask Mr. S a k h a r o v if he knows
Victor L i l l y ( ? ) and i f he c o u l d t e l l us what Victor L i l l y ' s
position is in the Soviet Union.
SAKHAROV: Victor Lilly, he worked under various names
in the Middle East. He's an expert on the Middle East, and also
in the area of Middle Eastern French speaking countries -- Algeria,
fiorocco and Tunisia. He is an elusive operator. He is an excle-
lent journalist. And he's got a unique position, sort of like
Vladimir Posner in New York City.
MAN: Is he a true journalist or is he a colonel in the
SAKHAROV: Is Vladimir Posner a true journalist? You
can be a journa I i st and you can be a KGB, or you can be a jour-
nalist and you can be GRU. In the Soviet Union the difference
is between journalists, KGB, GRU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Central Committee -- are only task differences. That is, what
man performs what task. Otherwise, the professions very much
intermesh, in many cases.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: One of the things that I'm curious about is, if
you could tell me, Mr. Sakharov, what you did as -- what was dif-
ferent about your l i fe when you were just in the Foreign Ministry
and what additional duties you took on when you became part of
the KGB.
SAKHAROV: I never really had the chance to work just
for the Foreign Ministry. And Soviet intelligence organizations
have a habit of snatching diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on a very consistent basis.
I was working in Alexandria, for example, and I was
supposed to -- the consul general asked me to go somewhere, and
I went there.
MAN: Well, where was that?
SAKHAROV: That was in Alexandria in Egypt.
MAN: Where did he ask you to go? I mean specifically.
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SAKF-IAROV : Well, specifically. Okay. He asked me to
clear some 40 cases of equipment from the port of Alexandria.
And I took a day to do it.
Now, I was absent for one day. And when I came back,
the resident gave me a very hard time because he said, "You
should have told me before you went there. Always report to me
first before you take any assignment from the consul."
It depends on what your assignment is abroad. Basic-
ally, I can characterize it that, number one, is what we perceive
here as the KGB is a cloak-and-dagger organization that runs
around and snoops around the corner, I think it's the wrong per-
ception. The KGB, GRU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and CCID,
their one primary responsibility is to sel I Soviet foreign pol icy
in the country where they are present, by any available means.
So, the character is a bit...
MAN: But really, everybody's on the same team, even
though they're carrying different credentials? Is that what
you're trying to say?
SAKHAROV: Yes. Yes. There is a big, great intermesh.
FISKE: But they're two separate bureaucracies.
SAKHAROV: They can be two separate bureaucracies, but
you can be working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, GRU can
come to you and say, "Hey, you know this individual" -- in my
case, it was Commande Gallel (?), for example, I knew from Yemen.
He was chief of the Egyptian squadron there, naval squadron . I
knew him in Yemen. I met him in Alexandria. And the local GRU
resident says, "How do you know that man?"
I said, "Well, I used to work with him."
And he said, "Would you do me a favor, please?" And
cid him a favor after that, to work with Gal lei, whom we later
recruited.
So you can work on loan to different organizations.
FISKE: It seems to me, from your book, that while you
were assigned there to Alexandria, you spent a considerable amount
of time in the port working with -- covertly, I suppose -- with
KGB agents aboard various ships, Russian and non-Russian ships,
in the harbor. Now, what were you doing with them?
SAKHAROV: I would go twice a week, for example, to
check lists of passengers on Soviet liners that came to the port
of Alexandria. I would go to immigration authorities at the port
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and screen people who are potential candidates for recruitment.
I would go to Soviet military ships, and we'd sit around and
exchange shop talk with Soviet military -- naval command. I
would go and I'd clear military supplies for GKAS. That's State
Committee for Economic Relations.
FISKE: This is strictly intelligence work.
SAKHAROV: It was. Yes. Yes. But you do all those
million duties which every day you have a different task. It
depends on to whom you report. That's all.
FISKE: I was interested that you said that most ships,
or all Soviet ships have an i me l I i gence agent aboard?
SAKHAROV: Yes, that's true. Usually second mate.
FISKE: That's interesting. There must be a lot of
people working for KGB in the Soviet Union.
SAKHAROV: Well, the communications ship, merchant
marine and passenger ships are very important means of communi-
cation because they can serve as drops in foreign countries.
They can collect secret pouches which, for one means or another,
cannot be sent through diplomatic mail, and stuff I i ke that.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: ...calling from the Naval Academy. I'd like to
ask him -- you've mentioned a lot of discrepancies between the
official party dogmatic view of the outside world and between
your actual observations and opinions of that world. How --
given that, how can any wel I-educated member of that elite stay
loyal to the system? Why doesn't everybody defect like you aid?
SAKHAROV: Well, that's the whole thing about it, is
that the elite is so comfortable, they enjoy so much privilege,
power, in order to justify their existence and to develop and
to provide for their families and their children and make them
members of the elite, they have to -- almost to push the same
dogmatic line of, you know, the imperialist aggression and
m i l i tary stick, financial oligarchy, and so on and so forth.
They simply -- it's like czarist times, basically.
You know, some people have courage to leave or can take a risk
and face to the unknown. Some can't. I suppose I could have
stayed, maybe.
FISKE: Are you to I I i ng us that the kind of lack of
be I i of in the system that you had is w i despread?
SAKHAROV: From what I know, because I was in that
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environment, the belief is in a system of Moscow elite, of that
three to four thousand fain i lies and in the prosperity. The Com-
munism arrived for them a long time ago. So that's the system
they believe in, in their elite system. And they preserve it
and they try to do the best. They'll die for that to preserve
it.
They don't believe in a system, in a socialist system
that's going to work for the people. They simply don't care about
it anymore. They don't know what's going on outside Moscow, the
nine-mile (?) limit from Moscow. They don't know what farmers
do. They have very confusing feedback from the periphery in
Moscow, for example, because they are reported, basically -- the
system has said the party committee, for example, of Omsk reports
to Moscow, and they say, "We have such-and-such achievements. We
developed this and that. We are doing so great."
Well, of course, the party organization of Omsk wants
to present to Moscow a good picture in their area. But it's al
lies.
So, Moscow doesn't get a clear picture of what's going
on inside the Soviet Union. They don't care. And they are inter-
ested in themselves so much that they don't give anything about
it.
MAN: Well, sir, you being a member of that elite,
surely you must have had an idea, given your education and your
contacts within the KGB, the international service, the CRU,
surely you must have had an idea, at least, of the situation
inside your own country.
SAKNAROV : Inside? I had an idea. Ana some of them
do have an idea. They forget, you know, with the current of
time. They get involved in their own careers. I had an idea.
Ana maybe that was an additional reason why I didn't want to stay
there.
I went on a potato farm. We worked there for a month
and a half. We lived in a house. There were 12 of us in one
house without electricity, with no john, and with dirt floors.
And we saw maybe five women in the v i I l age, no men, some children,
total destitute, no food except black bread and milk, and a lot
of vodka. And that's what we saw. And I said, "God," you know,
"what am I doing here?"
MAN: Well, sir, you defectec. So obviously you've
done something about i t . But how about a l l those other hundreds
of thousands, or at least thousands of members of that elite?
They must have seen some of it. Are you saying that they just
don't give a damn about their Russia, they just give a damn about
the elite?
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23
SAKHAROV: Do New Yorkers give a damn about America,
sometimes? It's like New -- Moscow is a unique city. It's a
showplace. Everybody wants to live in Moscow. It's not that --
people don't give a damn to live anywhere else. They want to
be in Moscow.
FISKE: I think I'd prefer living in Leningrad if
were living there.
SAKHAROV: Well, you can't become a member of elite if
you are in Leningrad, you see.
So the thing is almost like -- they get entrenched in
their elitist position for many years, and children marry into
children, and families are getting smaller and the circle of
elite is getting smaller. My company counted, for example, there
ought to be 2000 families running the Soviet Union by the year
2000. So it's a very closed society.
SAKHAROV: Yeah. And they hope that, well, one day
we're going to have -- next year, maybe, we'll have a bigger crop.
Next year, maybe, we'll provide better conditions for the people.
It's maybe next year. It's also Russian character that, ah, tom-
orrow, you know.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: Didn't Mr. Sakharov say that he would like to
meet Willis Conover?
MAN: Well,. It seems to me I heard on WETA this morning
that they're having an anniversary celebration this weekend down
at the Mall.
phone?
FISKE: We're losing, sir. Can you speak into the
MAN: I said it seems to me that I heard on WETA this
morning that they're having an anniversary celebration down on
the Mall this weekend, and Willis Conover would be there. So
i f he wants to see -- meet W i l l i s Conover, perhaps he cou Id do
it through WETA this weekend.
SAKHAROV: I'm willing and ready.
FISKE: Hello.
MAN: Mr. Sakharov, I wanted to ask you maybe two or
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three quick pointers.
Speaking of the elite in Russia, are the members of
the mi l itary, ac they have it as well off as the elite? Are
they treatea real well, maybe more so than in this country?
SAKHAROV: Members of the military who live in Moscow,
again. We're talking about Moscow, mostly. That's where. the
elite is. General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces are elite.
They live in Moscow. They have it very well. They pays are
high.
FISKE: That's the officer corps.
I f you are somewhere in the boon i es, even if you are
a colonel in the army and you're working somewhere on the Chinese
border, you probably are not having it as well [as] in Moscow.
It's the city we're talking about, mostly.
MAN: I see. So like the troops that were sent to Af-
ghanistan, once they left the limits of Moscow, then conditions
sort of failed for them, huh? I mean it's not -- they're not as
well off.
SAKHAROV: No, no. Ana a lot of construction battalions
are in Afghanistan, from what I know. And a construction battalion
is a shame to serve in the Soviet Union, even according to Soviet
military stancaros.
MAN: Also, I want to ask you, is the attitude of the
general population over there towards the U.S., is it as adverse
as it is within the party? I mean do most people really have a
bad idea of this country? Or would most of them like to move here
if they had the chance?
SAKHAROV: It's a great deal of double standard. I
wish the Soviets would really understand -- you see, I've been
here for a number of years, and I know America now so well, and
I know Americans are not militaristic, they're not out to destroy
the Soviet Union. I know them well. They mind their own busi-
ness.
They don't perceive Americans that way, espe...
MAN: They don't.
SAKHAROV: They don't. But why? The elite,_although
they enjoy jeans and they enjoy Tom Jones -- not American -- but
in any case. But they -- they justify to their people very often
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that the delay of Communism is because of the militaristic [unin -
telligible] of the United States. You know, that's an internal
justification.
People of the Soviet Union are not that exposed to life
in the United States. They don't know much about it. Sometimes
they buy what they're tola. I wish it can be corrected.
FISKE: I have to interrupt.
FISKE: At our microphones, we're very pleased to have
Vladimir Sakharov. He was a member of the KGB. He worked for
the CIA. He was a defector. He's been in the United States for
some nine years. He tells his very interesting story in his
book, available in paperback, titled "High Treason."
Good evening.
MAN: In 1979, when the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee held hearings into the strategic arms limitation treaty,
a very perceptive, well-grounded young Soviet embassy attached
named Andrei Krutskikh monitored the hearings, and he often used
to sit at the press table. And later on, the television program
20/20 identified him as a KGB agent. And I just wondered it you
knew whether this was true or not.
SAKHAROV: Well, I don't know. You know, you can't
FISKE: There are lots of them.
SAKHAROV: You can estimate 40 to 60, 50 to 70 percent
are working, in one capacity or another, for intelligence ser-
vices. Not necessarily for the KGB. There is Central Com-
mittee's International Department. There is GRU. There is KGB.
There is all kinds of -- there's a whole ba l l of wax.
MAN: I suppose it doesn't really make any difference
anyway, because they have access to the fellow.
SAKHAROV: That's what I said. It's who reports to
whom and what the targets are. It doesn't matter anymore as
much as whether KGB or, let's say, whether CCID -- "0h," they'll
say, "well, CCID. They'll say, "Well, Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. Oh, that's not bad." And that doesn't -- it's not like
that anymore. There is an intermesh.
MAN: Thank you very much.
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MAN: Just a quick thing about the WETA celebration..
The location of it is between the Reflecting Pool and Constitu-
tion Avenue....
NMAN: Mr. Sakharov, tell me about Mr. Vinogradov. In
my studies of the Middle East in particular, I've run into that
gentleman more times, as far as being Ambassador to Egypt at a
crucial time. I'm not sure that he was in Iraq or Yemen, but he
was in one of those two places.
SAKHAROV: Which Vinogradov, Sergei or Vladimir? There
were two Vinogradovs who replaced -- one Vinogradov died in 1971.
MAN: The one that was Ambassador to Egypt about 1968.
SAKHAROV: Okay. That's Sergei Vinogradov. That's
the Vinogradov-[unintelligible]-Kim Philby relationship.
MAN: Oh, really? He's turned up in a lot of places,
SAKHAROV: Vinogradov used to work in Turkey. And I
knew him. I worked for him in Egypt. I knew him very well.
Actually, he was very instrumental in my promotion and sending
me to Kuwait.
MAN: Was he a key political -- I mean did the Soviets
have him in Egypt because of the nature of the relationship with
Nasser, or did they think he could keep things under control
better than some other people, or was it his seniority, or what,
that allowed him to be Ambassador at that time? Or was it just
uck, or whatever?
SAKHAROV: It's really a puzzling situation because
Vinogredov's personality and Nasser's personality did not fit at
all. They were totally different people. Vinogradov was very
reserved, very authoritative, and he was basically to keep the
Soviet colony intact. That aspect, that was his -- and keep the
Soviet [unintelligible] in Egypt running smoothly. And, of
course, he had Middle Eastern experience by working in Turkey
before, when he was Kim Philby's contact there. So he had some
Middle Eastern experience. He was just about to retire and that
was his last and most prestigious position. So all those ingre-
dients taken together, Vinogradov was there.
Actually, Vinogradov ran Egypt much less than other
employees of the embassy were running Egypt. For example, Vla-
cimir Pelakov (?), who was just removed from Egypt, was very
prominent in Egyptian operations. Senyanikov (?), Cen+ral Com-
mittee man, was a topnotch journalist and topnotch public rela-
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tions person. He was doing a good job there.
But, you know.
FISKE: Vladimir, what -- we were talking about Egypt.
What specifically did you provide our CIA? Was it information
about Soviet plans and activities in Egypt, such as the, you
know, plans to prepare Egypt for war against Israel in '73, or
the plans to exacerbate the Arab-Israeli conflict generally, to
use various groups, like the Arab BrotherhooG, for Soviet pur-
poses? Was this the information that you were providing the CIA?
SAKHAROV: Well, the point is that, for instance, that
I was not out there like, you knew, you imagine a James Bond,
running around and stealing secrets, you know. I basically pro-
vided what came to my attention, what information came to my
attention, so I would not cause any suspicion. What came to me,
advanced Soviet annual reports, what the Soviets have achieved
in that country, what the next year's plan is to work for the
embassy, for the Soviet part of the embassy with which I dealt.
And different memos, such as, for example, we had a memo that
said the relationship with PLO and other liberation organizations
must be channeled, thereupon, only through unofficial sources.
The Soviet diplomats are to stay away from PLO and institute --
Afro-Asian solidarity...
FISKE: Why were the Soviet diplomats instructed to
stay away from the PLO?
SAKHAROV: It was a temporary measure. When an agent
is recruited, for example, the relationship -- the agent is re-
cruited when the relationship becomes a clandestine relationship.
The same thing happened to an organization on an organizational
level. At first, their relationship was very official. Then
there was a number of other organizations plugged in into that
relationship, such as Soviet Committee on Women, of all things,
Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, Committee for Friend-
ship with Foreign Countries. They all became in charge of liaison
with PLO. So they can be more -- the would have more room to
operate in, you know, in all kinds of subject. Because it's dif-
ficult on an official diplomat level, sometimes, to...
FISKE: Well, one of the things that we hare in this
country a 1 I the time, and it's d iscounted, is that, in fact,
there is a strong element of Soviet influence in the PLO. Is
that true?
SAKHAROV: Well, the PLO turned to the United States
at one time. They were rejected. They had to go somewhere, and
the Soviets were there to pick up the chips. It happens not to
PLO only, to many other organizations. It happened to Egypt, by
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the way, in 1956, when Gamal Abdel Nasser came to Allen Dulles
asked him for assistance in economic, in arms. We turned him
gown. He went to the Soviets. The Soviets Sot Egypt.
FISKE: It happened to Fidel Castro too, didn't it?
SAKHAROV: It happened to many, many countries and
organizations. We keep turning down our potential clients and
we -- what's going to happen now, in the same respect as that
Reagan declared that we're not going to help any more developing
countries financially, we're going to cut down aid? We're doing
the same thing we did with Gamal Abdel Nasser in '56 now, only
on a mass scale. We're telling the Soviets, "You are welcome."
We're giving them green light to operate freely in the Third
World now.
This is the most ridiculous mistake made by the Admin-
FISKE: You mentioned Nasser. And someplace in your
book you speak about being assigned at one time to arrange a
trip for Sadat's daughters, and that at a time when the Soviet
Union didn't view Sadat as a successor to Nasser.
SAKHAROV: Right.
FISKE: And I woncerea, if that was true, why they
went to the trouble to have you arrange this trip for his daugh-
ters.
SAKHAROV: Well, it was a typical courtesy, you know.
I was in charge of Soviet ships. And ship that came to Alex-
andria, I hao to go. Any dignitary that will go on a Soviet
ship, I had to accompany. The same thing was with regard to
Anwar Sadat's daughters. I was in charge, at one time, one sum-
mer, to see them to the ship, to put them in a good cabin deluxe
and introduce to the captain, that everything will be fine. And,
of course, we made with the Egyptian security all the arrange-
ments.
@ut I didn't do that for Sadat alone. I did that for
other Egyptians. We had, for example, Egyptian chief of Alex-
andria counterintelligence. We got him because we sent his bro-
ther to the Soviet Union. So I was supposed to also take his
brother on the ship and see that he would get a nice cabin and
smooth it out, massage everybody. I'd say, "Th is is a man that
is with us. Take care of him."
FISKE: Now, was part of Anwar Sadat's disenchantment
or coolness to the Soviet Union related to the fact that they
didn't think that he would amount to anything back in those
years?
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SAKHAROV: Well, they were betting heavily on Ali
Sabra (?), the Chairman of Arab Socialist Union. Ali Sabra was
a leading figure. He had a pizzazz, in Soviet view. It was
Vinogradov's misjudgment, by the way, just simply. And they bet
on Ali Sabra, and they made a big mistake.
FISKE: You think there probably was resentment on
Sadat's part.
SAKHAROV: Sadat was antagonized by the Soviet. I knew
it. As far as I remember, Sadat was never aI lowed to go aboard
El Horia (?) -- that was the presidential yacht -- in Alexandria
when the Soviets and Nasser would have negotiations. He was kept
out of the picture. And that was miscalculation.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: Dr. Sakharov, I wonder If you could comment on
two things. First, during the time you were receiving your
training by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what did
they tell you about the activities and the capabilities of the
CIA, if anything? And then, secondly, once you were recruited
by the CIA, what -- how do you rate the abi l ities of the CIA to
understand the actions of the various Soviet intelligence agen-
cies and to counteract them?
SAKHAROV: The first part, what I was told about the
CIA at the Institute of International Relations was that here is
an organization that spearheads the effort of American imperi-
alists -- imperialism to destroy the Soviet Union. And we were
told in our military training about situations, how the CIA would
approach somebody.
For example, a situation like that: You drive on the
highway and you see a car with a flat tire and there is a beau-
tiful woman standing by that car. You can't resist but stop and
help the woman to fix the tire. And she is going to be a CIA
agent and she's going to get you. And I say, "I wish I was so
lucky," you know.
But a c t u a l l y , and they told us there w i l l be blackmail
and stuff Iike that, bad things.
On the other hand, as far as CIA's capabilities of
counterintelligence or CIA's capabilities of monitoring Soviet
operations, I think at the time when I got here or just before
I got there -- here, they existed on a fair level. Otherwise
I wouldn't have been accepted to the United States. Later on,
with the detente and with the new policies and the confusion
and the Watergate and whatnot and the guilt about Vietnam, the
CIA simply stopped rocking the boat, so to speak. Everybody's
covering their rear in that think tank, and it will get somewhere.
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But I really -- I am not qualifies to comment on that, even.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: I'd like to ask you some questions about Soviet
policy towards the country of Turkey, recent KGB activity in that
country...
FISKE: Can you speak up a little, sir?
MAN: Any recent developments in the Caucasus Mountain
SAKHAROV: Turkey has been always prime real estate for
the Soviets because simply of its extreme strategic importance.
For example, one of the people I worked with was a Turkey expert
in Kuwait. He went back to Turkey. And the Soviet intelligence
in Turkey has been a prime -- usually staffed by very prime intel-
ligence officers, maybe with the exception of one I used to know.
Ana general comments, that the Soviets have been, in
Turkey, very instrumental in creating a network of training for
various liberation factions. I'm not talking about just recently,
but as far back as late '50s. I know that a lot of Turkish ex-
perts were in charge of oversight of Turkey nationals in foreign
countries. For example, there was a number of Soviet intelligence
officers in Egypt and in Kuwait who were Turkey experts, who were
in charge of liaison with Turks, who were trained in Turkey.
So, you know, it's a country and it's important to the
Soviet Union.
FISKE: Gooa evening.
WOMAN: I wanted to ask your guest -- you mentioned
Cuba earlier. What -- If he has any knowledge of this, what was
the Soviet inte l l i gence reactions in Cuba at the time of the Bay
of Pigs to the CIA? And also, the second part of my question is
whether there are organized crime links in the KGB, as there are,
or there are known to be in the CIA in this country.
SAKHAROV: Goodness. Well, the Bay of Pigs went sort
of unnoticea in the Soviet Union, except the Soviets made a big
propaganda effort to paint Americans as enemies of national lib-
eration movements, as enemies of the people of the world. That
they got the best mileage out of that. They -- and they also
pa i ntea the C I A one more t i m e . They had been doing that to C I A
for years and years, and they're doing it now, to paint it as a
tool of imperialists, in quotes. So much for the Bay of Pigs.
There is no relationship to organized crime between the
KGB, as far as I know.
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31
WOMAN: How did you find the CIA as different from
working for Soviet intelligence?
SAKHAROV: I was lucky. I had a tremendous, skillful,
marvelous case officer when I was. I would say that the CIA has
totally different character from the KGB. You can't even com-
pare the two organizations.
FISKE: How does the character of the organization
differ? Is it in the people or the, organization itself that the
difference is?
SAKHAROV: In people, as of nowadays, maybe there is a
difference. But the character of organization. The Soviet Union
works according to a long-range foreign policy. It's made public
by -- well, we have a dispute here about that: "No, Soviets don't
plan their policy; they just take advantage." But there is a
long-range policy plan, which is public, by the way, made avail-
able to the population. All you have to do is read Pravda news-
paper, and there is no dispute after that.
So, the KGB fits into that long-range policy plan. The
KGB performs a function. And so there is a planned effort. The
KGB has to get from the Point A to the Point Z in so many years,
and they can use a l l methods in the world ava i l ab le to do it.
WOMAN: So, i t i s not i l l ega l for them to do some of
the things that, in fact, it's illegal for our CIA to do.
SAKHAROV: Precisely. They can do anything they please.
FISKE: Because it doesn't get into the newspapers and...
SAKHAROV: No. It's a closed society. And, again,
we're talking about elite. It's a family business, the KGB is.
F I SKE: Has It been your experience that the people who
work for our CIA are as we l l trained as you were for the KGB?
SAKHAROV: I -- they probably were as well trained, with
a lot of experience, I think. From the period of -- well, after
Vietnam and with, you know, the preoccupation of Americans with
electronic gadgetry and satellites, the CIA lost a very important
ingredient, its human intelligence. The Soviets are prime,
they're best in human intelligence.
I think -- I am experienced, basically, with American
business, how American business operates. So I can draw a paral-
lel. We go to the top. I mean we go to get our feedback on
business Intel I i gence, for example, to the top, who signs the
check, whether it's the head of the government or a head of a
department in government. We never bother with people in the
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streets. We never bothered in Iran to know what the bazaaris in
Teheran felt about the Shah or what they were going to do. So we
go to the top and we get wrong information from the top most of
the time because we're going to get a good picture as to what's
going on in the other country. We're going to get the right --
the KGB gets the right picture because they work on a different
level. They work with the opposition and they work with the
current government and they work in between. So they get a big
human-intelligence coverage.
Why they can do it, because they're area experts. We
are flying satellites.
FISKE: Vladimir, you spoke about the Soviet long-range
plan. One of the things about which they're difference of opinion
is whether, in fact, it is the Soviet plan to spread Marxism-
Leninism throughout the world. What's your impression? Or do
you have any knowledge of...
SAKHAROV: It's less ambitious as spread of Marxism-
Len i n i sm, which was the cause of the Internationale of the '30s
and early '40s.
There are three ingredients to this plan. The United
States is enemy number one of the Soviet Union. It's written in
the Soviet military manuals. It's written everywhere in Pravda,
daily newspapers, Izvestia, you name it. So, therefore, the
policy is to, by economic, political and ideological means,
through working in third countries, to change economic, political
ana ideological structure of the American society, which would
be favorable to the Soviet Union. It's not spread of Communism,
like that, anymore. It's -- as long as it's working towards the
benefit of changing American economy, American -- putting America
socialist, by any means. By, for example, cutting oil supplies
from the Middle East. The Soviets hope that by cutting off Saudi
Arabia from the Un i tea States they would be able to manipulate
Middle Eastern oil supplies. Therefore...
F I SKE: That's part of their plan, to your knowledge.
SAKHAROV: We were taught that. We were taught how to
do it at the Institute.
FISKE: How were you supposed to do it?
SAKHAROV: We were taught in area studies. We were
taught how to work with the Arabs, how to establish broad base
of Soviet penetration in the Middle East. Our primary...
FISKE: Infiltrate the oil workers, oilfield_people?
SAKHAROV: Through third countries. Indian Embassy in
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Sauci Arabia was our base of operations, for example.
So all those fronts were basically arranged in a way
That there w i l l be a broad, some kind of base created for them,
which the Soviets succeecea in doing in Southern Yemen, that
they will be able to -- from outside, to threaten the existing
regime in Saudi Arabia, while the Soviets simultaneously would
conduct a very friendly appeasement towards the ruling family
of Saudi Arabia and try to establish an overt relationship with
the ruling family and try to work it out by peaceful means. And
if it doesn't work, then, by external means, the regime will be
uestabilized. And the policy stands now, too.
MAN: Can you say anything about the recruitment of
ethnic Iranians in the Gulf, and particularly in Bahrain or else-
where?
MAN: Yeah, ethnic Iranians, who are very numerous in
Dubai or Bahrain and other...
SAKHAROV: Well, we had Qatar...
MAN: Because you say almost nothing about Soviet in-
telligence operations vis-a-vis Iran.
SAKHAROV: Well, I knew people who were in Iran. By
the way, I moonlighted at the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences
under Rozenko (?). We had a number of Iranians already in '64-
65 studying in that academy, undergoing political indoctrination.
Most of them were from Tudeh, from Iranian Communist Party, who
were sent back to work as sort of, you know, organizing Soviet
arm among the oilfield workers, who later on toppled the Shah,
by the way. So, so much goes for Iran.
My responsibi l ity was, when I was in Kuwait, to procure
people from Qatar. We didn't have a relationship with Qatar at
the time. But it was just in a stage of being established. But
still, there was about 90 to 100 Qataris going.
MAN: Are you saying in the book that Ahmed al-Hateb (?)
was under Soviet control?
SAKHAROV: Dr. Hateb. Yeah. Yeah.
MAN: You are.
FISKE: Okay. Thank you.
Were you a member of the Communist Party?
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34
SAKHAROV: No, I escaped that.
FISKE: How'd you hold a position Iike that without
being a member of the party?
SAKHAROV: You must become a member of the Communist
Party by the age of 28. I was too young to become a member. I
was delaying. But you can -- it works this way. You can move
up in ranks fairly smoothly. But when you reach 28, you must
become a member of the Communist Party in order to move up fur-
ther in ranks. I escaped that.
FISKE: But why did you resist becoming a member of
the party? You were playing the game.
SAKHAROV: Well, a good thing I resisted, because now
I'm an American citizen. And if I didn't resist, I would be
still some resident alien.
FISKE: You mean you couldn't have become a member you couldn't have gotten citizenship...
FISKE: ... i f you has been a member of the party in
the Soviet Union, even though you defected?
SAKHAROV: No. Bureaucracy is bureaucracy.
FISKE: You're on the air.
MAN: I have a question which I realize may sound, or
may be naive. But I'm puzzled about how a judgment can be made
that a particular defector from Russia is really a defector or
whether that person is a double agent, especially in view of
the Soviets' very long-range plans.
SAKHAROV: Well, it's a good question. I suppose time
shows, really. There will also be a difference of opinions to
that subject. And I say to myself, you know, I have friends. I
don't have many enemies. I was invited to chair a panel or two
with AFIO -- that's Association of Former Intelligence Officers --
ant I believe they know better, and otherwise I wouldn't be in-
vited. Ana other things come to mind. I mind my own business,
and I'm happy and I'm comfortable with myself. And whatever any-
body else thinks, I don't give a damn.
MAN: Well, I'm trying to get in general. I'm not
speaking of you. How can a judgment be made? Is it solely a
matter of feelings? Does it boil down to that in the end, about
what people just feel about the person?
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SAKHAROV: You can check it out. You can usually check
the personal background out. There are indicators that can show
whether he is right. There is information that a person can
supply that can be checked out against the facts that are already
available. And if it's all true, then the person might be legit.
but then, it right be plant again. Ana, you know, you can go on
forever and ever and end up being paranoid about it.
FISKE: You can't be certain.
SAKHAROV: No.
FISKE: There's a certain element of risk.
SAKHAROV: Risk is everywhere.
MAN: I'd like to ask Mr. Sakharov -- you mentioned
previously that the average Russian believes the government charge
that the Americans are an aggressive warlike people and imperi-
alists and so on, and they're trying to take over the world,
especially against the Russians, and so on. But you know that
the Americans are a peace-loving, non-aggressive people who be-
lieve in minding their own business, and so forth.
But if you know our whole history has been one of ag-
gression, invasion, minding other people's business all over the
world, as we are today with 25 major military bases surrounding
the Soviet Union, we are spending half our military budget, 90
to 100 billion dollars a year, ganging up with the Europeans and
others against the Soviet Union -- since the beginning of our
history, we took this land by aggressive means from the Indians,
ana then from the British and the French and the Spanish and the
Mexicans, from whom we took our whole Southwest section, from
Texas to California. We violatea our own Monroe Doctrine and
invaded Europe in World War I and 11, and then the Far East in
Korea and Vietnam.
I admit the average American is for peace and pros-
perity and minding his own business, but are we Americans not
being misled into new adventures abroad by our own ruling elite
and our own military-industrial complex, and so on? Are we Amer-
icans not now being told that the Russians are aggressive mili-
tarists trying to take over the world?
On the other hand, from the Russian history, it has
been the -- the Russians have been trying, from the beginning,
to defend Mother Russia, first from the Mongols and then from
the...
FISKE: Sir, I think we understand your question.
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Let's get the answer.
MAN: The point of my question is, it's not -- it's
not that it's people against people. I'd like to ask Mr. Sak-
harov, does he not believe that its the elite versus the elite
of both countries?
SAKHAROV: Well, I picture Americans as a bunch of
foreigners who came to this country and want to make it so badly,
ane they are making it. And they're a bunch of good cowboys who
are out there minding their interest. And I do believe, because
I'm coming from there, that the Soviet Union -- I'm not talking
about Russia, who has been overrun many times by other people,
by Tatars, by Mongolians, by Swedes, by Germans, by you name it.
The Soviet Union has chosen a doctrine of international revolu-
tion since it's very beginning. Lenin stated, "We are going to
bury capitalism." Soviet leaders have confirmed it many times.
The more detente progressed, the more Soviet leaders tightened
their ideological screws at home and the more militaristic the
Soviet military doctrine became. If you study Soviet military
manuals or Soviet military thought, for example, you see it
clearly from there.
They have been engaging in heavy troop movements in
Syria lately towards Lebanon. They have been engaging in heavy
activities, arms supplies in India. Move toward Pakistan, de-
stabilization of Iran, creating terrorist base in South Yercien,
getting back North Yemen, creating a very broad base of support
with Libya, selling $13 billion to Muammar Qaddafi in Libya,
concluding new trade treaty with Brazil by which they're likely
to supply arms to Braz i l within the next five years, getting
into Cuba, creating submarine servicing facilities in Cuba, and
trying to cause trouble in Salvador, and taking Nicaragua. Okay?
So, so much for the Soviet foreign policy. In the meantime, they
dicntt mind the business of their own people back at home.
So, with this kind of policy, what do you do? Do you
say, "Well, come on over and take it"?
You know, I can judge American freedom because I was
not born in a free society.
FISKE: are you saying that American foreign policy,
the kinds of adventures that our caller was describing, were
largely reactive to the Soviet initiatives?
SAKHAROV: American policy has always been reactive.
And that's one of the problems [unintelligible] with American
policy, we don't plan it.
FISKE: You're on the air.
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MAN: Mr. Sakharov, in following up on your last state-
ment, I'm very curious to get your opinions and assess your opin-
ions on the hopes for arms talks agreements between the United
States and the Soviet Union, given the long-term goals of the
USSR?
SAKHAROV: There would be a good prospect of arms to l ks ,
but there has to be a package that goes on with the arms talks.
We have to be prepared for that. There is a lot of things we
have to do before, such as -- and that might be a subject which
is not related -- such as opening new cultural centers abroad,
such as presentation of good image of America to the rest of the
world, such as increasing American economic aid to foreign coun-
tries and third countries, such as getting American companies
bonded by American government, not to apply contract guarantees
against companies' credit. Take, for example, Japanese experi-
ence.
At the same time, while building economy, you know that
one -- one out of six jobs in America depends on foreign contracts.
We're cutting down now on all those fronts. The Stockman program
is basically nothing.
So, along with that, we have to understand and realize
that the Soviets have a peculiar perspective of their opponents.
They would respect you if you are sophisticated, technologically
superior, strong militarily. They will talk to you. They will
give you concessions. They respect a strong opponent.
If you are appearing a weaker opponent, they will look
down on you. And there is no way that you can negotiate any kind
of American national interest on those terms with the Soviets.
So, what can I say?
MAPS: I get the impression that Mr. Gromyko is standing
back, looking at the current Administration and saying, 0h,
there they go again. We'll wait another four years and things
will turn around again."
SAKHAROV: Well, I think we made the fatal mistake yes-
teroay, you know, with the Third World countries. And I think
that's -- I believed in the programs, but really it was a blast
for me personally, that statement.
FISKE: What's your feeling about what the Russian
action w i l l be, finally, in Poland?
SAKHAROV: There will be probably no action at the
moment because the Soviet Union doesn't know how to hand le that
situation. There will be a continuous pressure.
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FISKE: Do you think they can allow this kind of thing
to go on indefinitely? What will the effects be in other bloc
countries, for example? And can they afford to risk that similar
movements will start in other Communist Bloc countries?
SAKHAROV: That's what they're thinking about right now:
"Can we afford it? But can we afford to take upon ourselves to
pay Polish debts of $24 billion?" If they invade, they will have
to take responsibility of paying to Western banks. So, can they
pay that? I don't think they can afford that.
So there'll probably be a policy of pressure from Warsaw
Pact forces, maneuvers here, maneuvers there. And most of all,
there is a very clear line right now. The Soviet propaganda
effort is distinctly trying to set Polish people against the
Solidarity, against the unions. And if you continue doing that
for four, five, six months, Soviets hope that they will convince
Polish people that Solidarity is a foreign organization. That's
what they think, probably, now.
FISKE: Hello.
MAN: I would like to ask Mr. Sakharov to comment on
the stability of the present regime in Saudi Arabia. And -- well,
relative to the AWACS sale, there have been dire comments as to
it can't last long. And if the Soviets get their way and the
Saudis do fall, who will take over, and what will the then new
regime's policy be toward the United States relative to oil?
SAKHAROV: It's clear if AWACS don't go to Saudi Arabia,
we're going to give green l i ght to the Soviet Union to enter into
a friendly relationship. Prince Sultan, at World Affairs Council
in Los Angeles about 10 days ago, stated just that, that the
Saudis will go to the devil himself to get arms.
F ISKE: Do you think the Saudis would do that? I can
understand that the Saudis might turn to Britain, for example,
or France. But to...
SAKHAROV: They will...
FISKE: Well, he said that, but it's inconceivable to
me. Whatever else we know about the Saudi royal family, we know
that they're not stupid and we know that they regard the Soviet
interest as inimical to their own interests, leading ultimately
to their own destruction.
While there are other alternatives available -- for
example, in Britain and France -- does it make any sense to you
that they would go to the Soviet Union?
SAKHAROV: Well, the Soviet Union has managed so far to
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surround Saudi Arabia pretty well. The Soviet Union has managed
to intimidate Saudi regime by the Soviet military buildup around
Saudi Arabia.
MAN: Given
this situation, do you feel the present
Saudi regime has a chance
of Air Force intelligence
more than two years. How
to survive? I believe the former chief
said categorically they would not last
do you feel about that?
SAKHAROV: They would not last
don't sell AWACS to them. That I can
MAN: And then, who is waiting
more than two years if
say for sure.
in the wings to take
SAKHAROV: Probably -- we say if, we say if. Who is
waiting in the wings? It will be somebody from the royal family.
You know, the King of Saudi Arabia might step back within the
next two months -- who knows? -- because of poor health. And
maybe Prince Faisal , the Minister of Foreign Affairs, will take
charge of Saudi Arabia. Price Fahd would be probably as chief
of the interim government in Saudi Arabia.
MAN: But these people will be pro-American, still.
Or am I wrong in that?
SAKHAROV: They would still be. They would still be
pro-American. You have to remember that about 40 percent of
business agents in Saudi Arabia are from Syria and from other
countries.
FISKE: Let me understand. Doesn't the principal threat
to Saudi Arabia come from within, from, for example, the forces
among the oilfield workers and the foreigners in Saudi Arabia,
and the brotherhoods and the various other groups that you were
working to build up as Soviet fronts in Saudi Arabia?
SAKHAROV: Right.
FISKE: That's their principal threat.
SAKHAROV: Uh-huh.
FISKE: If that's the fact, why is AWACS key to this?
AWACS would reveal an attack against the Soviet Union by air
forces from without, but would be of no value at all if the over-
throw were to be from forces within, in insurrection from within
Saudi Arabia.
SAKHAROV: Let's assume AWACS are sold, everything goes
smoothly. Saudis, and Americans too, will have extra capabilities
to monitor Soviet moves in the Middle East, in Syria. As I men-
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ticnea, the Soviets are pouring troops in Syria in quite large
nur..bers . Ana i t w i l l give advancee warning to the Saudis against
any unfriendly...
FISKE: Which they now have, for example, except that
the planes
are American planes.
SAKHARCV:
Right.
But
there
is also that point that Saudi -- we don't
unaerstand
the
Arab
character very well in America. We try to
apply our
own,
you
know, values. By providing AWACS to Saudi
Arabia, we'll
give
-- it would be a gracious, friendly gesture,
,Just statement
that
yes, we are with you, and we do not support
Soviet moves in the
Mi ad I e East, and we support your pol icy.
FISKE: Well, I can understand that. But let me ask --
c I ear this one other thing up. You say if we do not se I 1 the
AWACS, you feel certain that Saudi Arabia might fall within two
years. Is That what you said?
SAKHARCV: I would feel certain that the Soviet Union
will get involved, with their public, tremendous public relation
capabilities, into courting of present Saudi Arabian ruling family.
Ana the Soviet Union do -- it's done is to establish a very good
re I at i ons, i p . At the first stage, it will be an embassy exchange.
Then, when the Soviet d i p loriats are moved to Saudi Arabia, the
Soviet diplomats will go to work. They will have a capability
right there to monitor and to supervise all those foreign third-
country nationals working in the oilfields.
They will be working with the regime, with the current
regime of Saudi Arabia. But they will be able to dictate the
concitions, by being able to operate that network of oilfield
workers, like they are doing in Kuwait right now.
FISKE: But that, of course -- we would have to assume
that the Saudis are smart enough to know that, as well. And
which, again, would mitigate, in my view, against their turning
to the Soviets, ana more likely to the British or the French.
Now, for example, the prediction that if we don't sell
the AWACS, that they might be overthrown within two years raises
a very serious question in my mind. These AWACS that we're talking
about are not to be delivered till 1985.
SAKHARCV: Right. Right.
FISKE: So those planes can't possibly make the dif-
MAN: I may have misspoke myself here. The Air Force
chief of intelligence said...
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FISKE: Former chief of intelligence. George Keegan
MAN: ...survive even if we sell them the AWACS. They're
just inherently weak, ready to be toppled. And that is one of
the reasons why we shouldn't sell them the AWACS, because the tech-
nology then will fall into the hands of the Soviets.
My concern, or my question was, how do you feel about
the stability of the present regime? Can it last for one year,
two years, or 10 years?
SAKHAROV: The present -- wel l , right now, the present
regime lasts because simply of the involvement of American busi-
ness, because there is HBH in Saudi Arabia, there is Bechtel
there, there is Fluor Corporation, who are doing a good job. And
the Soviet presence -- kept out Soviet. The American Soviet is
kept in Saudi Arabia thanks to American business and American oil
companies, whether we like them or not. Not because of American
wise policy in the Middle East.
MAN: I see. So you feel that if the American business
keeps doing business as usual, the regime will remain stable and,
hopefully, friendly to the United States.
SAKHAROV: However -- however, if we don't sell AWACS,
Saudis are going to have to ask American business to leave Saudi
Arabia in big numbers. They'll say, "British, come on over.
Fine. French, come on over. Fine." But Americans will be out.
As you know, in 1974-75, American business, from the
contracts volume, in Saudi Arabia was on the third or fourth
place. Now we are in the 10th place, behind Pakistanis. We are
slipping back. And we will slip back further.
MAN: So you feel the sale of the AWACS is the key to
the whole thing. And if we sell the AWACS, we can hope for a
long-term lasting friendship with the present regime.
SAKHAROV: I don't believe in long-term lasting friend-
ships with any regimes. I believe in protection of American in-
terests abroad, that we should weigh first what's good for the
United States and what's bad for the United States.
I think, right now, not selling AWACS is bad for the
U n i t e d States because our business w i l l be asked to move from
Saudi Arabia. We'll give green light to other companies, other
entities to get involved. And that will cause destabilization
of Saudi Arabian regime, and that will bring about Soviet further
presence i n the M i dd l e East, and that will bring about-what the
Soviets always wanted -- that is, to deprive the United States
from the oil and energy supplies from the Middle East.
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42
FISKE: Sir, thank you very much.
And Vladimir Sakharov, thank you for coming. I've
found these last two hours very, very interesting.
SAKHAROV: Thank you very much.
FISKE: I think the Soviets lost a very, very bright
agent. And I'm glad you're on our side.
SAKHAROV: I mind my business now.
FISKE: Vladimir Sakharov. His book titled "High
Treason." Well, I've met a lot of very interesting people in
my years here as an interviewer, but very few as interesting as
Vladimir Sakharov.
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