DEMOCRATS PLAYING WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000605570005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 15, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/30: CIA-RDP90-00552R000605570005-5
ARTICLE APPEAR D
ON PAGE .A
WithU. S. inteIlig,
i 4i~ ~'-_. _ Tom.
15 OC.O~~~~ 922
Democrats playn
hen retired Adm ;Bobby
Inman. blew the whistle
recently on the House Com-
mittee on Intelligence for playing
partisan politics in its-evaluation of
:American intelligence in Central
America, his reputation as the
quintessential-professional lent
weight to his warning that congres
sional oversight-of the intelligence
agencies "has to bebi-partisan".
The danger that the impartial con-
gressional watchdogs appointed to
insure the integrity of. the intelli-
gence process can be transformed
by partisanship into quarreling pit
terriers at each others' throats is,
dramatized: by the:-incident that'
caused Inman to resign his consul-`
tancy with the House committee and
to go public with his sharp criticism.
By a straight 9-5-party line vote,.
the Democratic majority in the..
House committee forced the public
release of a staff re~oit on mtelli
gence coverage in El Salvador and
Nicaragua.'In the words of Rep.
Charles Rose D-N-C..,.the chairman
of the subcommittee thatprepared
the study, this-publicity was'essen-
tial because of the danger that the
CIA might ,otherwise be."coopted.:
by the policy. makers at the White
House..
Claiming iilyto-be interested in
intelligence -community: against
interferenceby-e Reagan admini-
stration, the anonymous staffers-who
wrote the~?report note -instances-
where the intelligence reporting has
been guiltyin :their judgment. of
"tendentious;rbetoric, : occasional
oversimplification and: misstate.
ment:'-This bitter pill is presuma-:.
bly made easier for the intelligence'
agencies to- swallow by-assu
that in general the intelligence has
been good 'in spite of administra-
tion pressures.'
Appearing just six weeks before
contains useful ammunition for lib-
eral Democrats in districts where
the Reagan administration's policy
in Central America has become a
major issue. There is the clear impli-
cation here that th e administration
has deliberately tried to slant the
intelligence estimates in order to
exaggerate the extent of Castro's
intervention and has played down
right wing terror.
Reacting sharply, the Republican
minority on the House Intelligence
Committee has fired back with "A
Critique of the Staff Study" intro-
duced into the Congressional Record
by.`Rep. C.W. Bill Young R-Fla. In a
point by point refutation, the cri-
tique purports to prove the major-
ity report "to be extremely biased,
containing overstatements, misstate-
ments and subjective generalities."
This exchange of. --veiled insults
`between the Democra tic and Repub-
lican members and staff of the House
committee shows how quickly the
introduction of partisan politics into
the oversight process can destroy
its utility. With no access to the secret
intelligence on which these conflict-
ing views are based, the general pub-
lic can only rely on the apolitical
testimony of someone like Adm.
Inman who has reviewed all the
-evidence. His conclusion is clear that
the 'staff report released. by the
Democratic majority- is,"seriously
'flawed" and politically partisan.
On the chance that both the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees
can learn from this case to avoid
partisan infighting in the future, it
is worth reviewing the extent of real
damage that has already been done.
. - First, Fidel Castro moved quickly -
to exploit a unique opportunity. Radio
Havana's international service of
CORD N0EYER ?.
Oct. 4th carried a gloating l scrip-
tion of how the House Intelligence
Committee had found theCIA guilty
of presenting "a false picture" of
the real situation in El Salvador "in
order to support Reagan's policy."
For months to come, the staff report
will provide invaluable grist for
Castro's propaganda mills, while
disheartening our democratic allies
with the spectacle of an America at
cross purposes with itself.
-Another casualty of this episode
is the relationship of mutual trust
that existed between CIA analysts
and the. congressional committees.
When Senate staffers recently
attempted to set up a briefing on
Central America, they found intelli-
gence officials very reluctant to
engage in frank discussion. These
officials bitterly resented the fact
that information they had given the.
House committee had been selec-
tively misused. They felt they had'.
been "sandbagged" by anonymous.
staffers and had no way of defending
themselves because.of. the highly.
classified nature of the evidence.-
Finally, this politicization of con- i
gressional oversight has led senior
Reagan officials to seriously ques-
tion whether the U.S. government is
any longer capable of responding to
Soviet probes with covert action pro-
grams of any -significance.. Under
present law, both intelligence com-
mittees have to be informed of any
plan to provide secret support to
friends and allies abroad. There is
increasing doubt whether this clear-
ance procedure can be relied on, if
there seems to be any political advan-
tage in leaking the plan in order to
destroy it.
Since there is wide agreement that
some form of congressional over-
sight is essential to keep the intelli-
gence agencies, honest, there.-is
growing interest in replacing.the
two existing.committees with a sin-
gle joint: committee with a highly,
professional staff like the-old Joint .
Atomic .Energy'
, It may-
be the only way to. save' congressi
onal oversight from self-destruction.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/30: CIA-RDP90-00552R000605570005-5