AN INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505410049-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: June 7, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Nation
An Interview with President Reagan
Reflections on summitry and the Soviet challenge
I
A long day of combat over
the budget was behind
him, and Ronald Reagan
was headingfor his retreat,
Rancho del Cielo, near
Santa Barbara, Calif, to mix the woodsy
labor he loves with cramming for his forth-
coming summit meetings in Western Eu-
rope. Before he left Washington, the Presi-
dent discussed his trip with TIME White
House Correspondent Laurence I. Barrett
and Senior Correspondent John F.
Stacks. The President's voice was
raspy-the result, he said, of a mal-
functioning fireplace that had filled
his den with smoke the night before-
hut he seemed relaxed as he talked
about foreign policy. Highlights of the
interview:
Q. This double summit is certainly your
biggest and most important foreign
journey so far. Besides the general
good-will aspects of it, what problems
with the Western alliance, in your view,
most need attention?
A. We have had some ups and downs
in the relationship in NATO in the
past, and when I say the past, I mean
before our Administration was here.
I think there is now a far better rela-
tionship than we have had for some
time, and this visit will give us an op-
portunity to further cement that.
I think all of us have economic
and trade problems that we need to
talk about, because we can't separate
ourselves out from the others and
think that our problems and our eco-
nomic situation don't have some-
thing to do with theirs. If there are
any things that need clarification with re-
gard to our relationship as allies, when we
get to the Bonn meeting we will take
those up. I think the very fact of our pro-
posals recently for arms-reduction talks
means that we need to see each other face
to face so they can feel comfortable with
any problems they may have about our
intentions.
Q. How have things changed since your meet-
ings with Western leaders at Ottawa last
July?
A. We're all on a first-name basis now.
We all know each other. There were sev-
eral of us who were brand new [in office)
then. I was meeting some of them for the
first time. But now we have met, we have
worked out issues we brought up there, as
well as worked on things that we can fur-
ther develop.
Q. William Clark, your National Security Ad-
viser, in a speech the other day describing the
Administration's approach to the Soviets,
said that Moscow must be made to pay the
price of its economic failures. Just how would
that be done and to what extent would the
U.S. depend on cooperation from the allies?
A. I think that what he really was talking
about was the economic situation of the
Soviet Union, which is very desperate to-
A. I don't have anything specifically in
mind right now, but I would think that
that would have to be a consideration if
they are, as we have speculated about,
now in the situation of looking at the line
of succession.
We are aware of their expansionism
policy. We know that it goes with Marx-
ism-Leninism. From the very beginning,
every Soviet leader down the line, includ-
ing the present one, has stressed the
day. I don't see this as a confrontational
problem. I see this as an opportunity once
again to see if the Soviets cannot be per-
suaded to give more consideration to re-
joining the family of nations. Obviously,
their obsession with the military at the ex-
pense of their people's standard of living
has not paid off for them, other than in
having the greatest military buildup in
world history. But we are offering an op-
portunity-by way of these arms-reduc-
tion talks-to indicate to them that there
is another road, that there is a road of co-
operation. But it is going to take deeds,
not words, to convince us of their sincerity
if they choose to take that road.
Q. It has been suggested that by pursuing
certain policies we can influence the post-
Brezhnev succession in the direction of some
accommodation on Moscow's part. Is there a
set of policies that could influence that?
coupled with that is the belief on the
part of many people, and with some
evidence maybe to support it, that
the Soviets also have a kind of para-
noia, a fear that they may be the tar-
get for aggression. I don't think that
has ever been true. There isn't any-
one in the Western world that has ag-
gressive intent toward the Soviet
Union, that thinks in terms of inva-
sion or conquest or anything of that
kind.
And maybe-this is what I mean
by opportunity-maybe this could
have some bearing on the succession
if they could be convinced that our
concern for their expansion is not
only as great as whatever fear they
may have, but is based more on reali-
ty than their fear. And if they would
by some deeds show us that they were
willing to give up the one, I think we
could convince them that they have
no reason to fear aggression against
them.
Q. Many observers inferred from
Clark's speech that you would like to
tighten the screws on the Soviets, at
least in the short term, on economic
matters. Are you going to be discussing that
with your counterparts at Versailles and
Bonn?
A. This is very obviously one of the things
we are going to talk about. The Western
world went into the business of sanctions
with Poland, and we still have the un-
solved Afghanistan problem. We have
been openly negotiating with our friends
and allies with regard to limiting credit,
and in the present Soviet economic situa-
tion, that should be very effective. It
doesn't seem to make much sense that we
should be subsidizing their continued mil-
itary buildup with low-interest credit.
Q. Are you satisfied that the allies have given
the U.S. sufficient support in this regard?
A. That is again one of the reasons for
meeting, to talk about these things and to
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appointment that there were few conces-
sions on agricultural imports.
Technology. Partly to inject an upbeat
and forward-looking note, Mitterrand
plans to stress the importance of high-
technology manufacturing as a way to
help lift the West out of its stagnation. The
French President feels that investment in
advanced technology has been allowed to
languish, and last week he said he would
propose that industrial nations pool their
research efforts. In preliminary discus-
sions, American officials have insisted
that the role of private industry in making
such investments must be emphasized.
East-West Relations. The U.S. has
backed off from attempts to scuttle the
first phase of the European-financed So-
viet pipeline that will pump natural gas
from Siberia to Western Europe. But
Washington is still putting strong pressure
on its allies to tighten credit and end the
preferential interest rates offered to East-
ern bloc nations. The Soviets and their cli-
ents are now $80 billion in debt to the
West. Warned Secretary Regan last week:
"We are trying to tell [the allies] that it is
not in anyone's interest to be dependent
on the Soviets. If a debtor runs up enough
debt, he has the creditor where he wants
him." Europeans will counter that the
U.S. is in no position to lecture, since it
was unwilling to sustain a grain trade em-
bargo against the Soviets. Admits Regan:
"We don't come with clean hands. True,
the grain sales are cash and carry. But it is
trade. How can we ask the allies to cut
back on trade if we're not going to?"
The military and diplomatic aspects
of East-West relations will be the subject
when NATO leaders meet in Bonn three
days later.* A few strains within the alli-
ance were eased by Reagan's "zero op-
tion" proposal of last November to re-
move intermediate-range nuclear missiles
from Europe, and by the resumption in
Geneva of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the
reduction of nuclear forces in Europe.
Some NATO members, West Germany in
particular, expressed concern last year
that the Administration was not fully
committed to NATO's "double track" poli-
cy of linking the deployment of new Per-
shing II and cruise missiles in Western
Europe with a genuine pursuit of arms
control. The President's Eureka College
proposal to begin START with the Soviets
was also heartily welcomed by NATO. So
will be Reagan's announcement this week
that the U.S. has decided to continue hon-
oring important parts of previous arms
agreements-such as the expired SALT I
and the unratified SALT 11-as long as the
U.S.S.R. does the same.
But basic differences remain within
NATO on how best to deal with the Soviet
*In attendance will be government leaders from the
U.S.. Britain, Canada. West Germany, Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, Iceland, Luxembourg, The Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Spain.
Since France's formal withdrawal from NATO's
military command in 1966, its President does not
attend summit meetings. Mitterrand, however, will
be at the opening dinner. Premier Pierre Mauroy
will represent France at the summit.
Union. Reagan and Haig will stress the
need for increased defense spending to
counter the Soviet military threat. The
West Germans will attempt to couple any
such declaration with one that empha-
sizes the need to reduce East-West ten-
sions. The final result may be a statement
similar to one worked out last month by
NATO foreign ministers at a meeting in
Luxembourg: "The allies will persevere in
their efforts to establish a more construc-
tive East-West relationship aiming at
genuine detente ... Arms control and dis-
armament, together with deterrence and
defense, are integral parts of alliance se-
curity and policy." This compromise, first
proposed by Denmark, was pleasing to
Bonn because it explicitly mentioned
detente, while Washington could argue
that the stress was on "genuine."
Although the U.S. would prefer what
Haig calls a more "robust" affirmation of
the need for a military buildup, any varia-
tion of this formula will satisfy Washing-
ton. The Administration had considered
the leaders of his host countries. His re-
ception in all four capitals should be cor-
dial. Prime Minister Margaret Thatch,Pr
will surely express her gratitude that
Washington has come down firmly on
Britain's side in the war with Argentina.
Mitterrand will restate his support for
NATO's plan to modernize its nuclear
forces. His enthusiasm has pleased the
Reagan Administration, which initially
had been wary of the Socialist President.
West German Chancellor Schmidt finds
himself more sympathetic to the Reagan
Administration now that it has suspended
its efforts to block the Siberian natural gas
pipeline and begun to pursue arms control
negotiations. Italian President Pertini,
whose country is constructing NATO's first
cruise missile base, has no substantial
problems to raise with Reagan and is ea-
ger to repay the warm welcome he re-
ceived in Washington last March.
Homer said of Odysseus: "He saw the
cities of many men and knew their man-
ners." Reagan's pilgrimage to modern cit-
calling on its allies to renew a collective
pledge, first made in 1979, to increase de-
fense spending by 3% per year. Haig,
however, opposed such a numerical target
because he believed it would be an unfair
way to gauge the relative contributions of
member nations, and over the past three
years has led only to fruitless finger point-
ing. Washington dropped the idea. Be-
sides, noted one high State Department
official, "an attempt to reaffirm the 3%
would have failed."
There will be virtually no debate on
these issues at the Bonn summit,
which is largely ceremonial. Each
head of state will have about
twelve minutes to present a speech before
the four-hour meeting recesses. The final
communique, which may be split into two
sections to accommodate France's reluc-
tance to agree to any military statement,
is being worked out in advance.
In addition to the two summits, Rea-
gan will hold bilateral discussions with
ies of other men will help him better under-
stand European attitudes. "I have never
found him closed to talking about any giv-
en question," Mitterrand said last week of
Reagan. The allies hope that he will return
home with a better appreciation of the
need to frame economic and strategic poli-
cies with greater attention to their effects
on America's Atlantic partners.
The summits should put the much dis-
cussed strains within the Western alliance
in proper perspective. The grandiose dis-
plays of unity at Versailles and Bonn will
remind all of the participants, as well as
the rest of the world, that the allies
still share a good deal of common ground.
While the Soviets have found it necessary
to quash dissent within the Warsaw Pact
by brute force and intimidation, dis-
putes within the Western alliance, how-
ever deep they may seem, are testaments
to what is clearly a more genuine
cohesion. -By Walter Isaacson. Reported by
Laurence L Barrett/Washington and Lawrence
Malkin/Paris, with European bureaus
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,point out the long-term gains versus possi-
hi" shc,rt-term hardships of our moving
and working together.
Q. They will throw back at you the U.S.
grain sales.
A. Yes, it is true we withdrew that sanc-
tion. imposed when they invaded Afghan-
istan, simply because it was having a
worse effect on our own farmers than it
was on the Soviet Union because there
were so many other places where those
grains were available. Now, I still would
use agriculture as a weapon, but only as
part of an overall sanction. To ask the
farmers to hear the brunt of our national
security problems. and no one else was
asked to, doesn't seem to me very fair.
Q. You will get an earful about interest rates.
Will you have an earful for them about wheth-
er the allies are really pulling their own
weight in other areas?
A. Yes, I am kind of looking forward
to that discussion. We have made
some headway in making them real-
ize that high interest rates were
not a part of our economic program,
that they were as disastrous for us
as they say they are to them. I look
forward to the opportunity once and
for all to reveal to them that we
are doing everything we can, partic-
ularly with what we have done with
regard to inflation. No one can
match that record.
Q. What can you tell us about Soviet
President Leonid Brezhnev's written re-
sponse to your latest proposals on stra-
tegic arms negotiations. Overall, was it
encouraging?
A. Well, yes, he has agreed to the
idea that we should get together on
this. I cannot go into any details be-
yond that. There is no date set. But
he has agreed that such talks would
be desirable.
history. We are saying: "Well, look, join
us. We do not want an advantage over
you. We want to bring the arms level
down to where the whole world can
breathe easier." Well, if they really mean
peace, I would think that they would jump
at that.
Let me just say that I think it would be
good to sit down and eyeball each other,
and say these things face to face. I do not
think exchanging letters really gets at
those problems.
Q. Do you feel that we can reach a START
agreement with the Soviets before the end of
this presidential term?
A. I hope that we will reach an agreement
as soon as possible. I recognize that it will
be challenging. We are calling for major
reductions, but if they approach the talks
with the same sincerity and good faith
"We are offering an opportunity-
by way of, arms reductions talks-
to indicate to them that there is
another road. "
"The Soviets also have a kind of
paranoia, a fear that they may be
the target for aggression. "
"It doesn't make sense that we
should be subsidizing their
continued military buildup with
low-interest credit. "
Q. When you get together with him, do
you plan to bring up all the problems in U.S.-
Soviet relations, or have you a more restrict-
ed agenda in mind, concentrating on arms
reduction?
A. I would think that would be a time for
putting on the table various things that
have caused tensions between us. And to
point out the wisdom of Demosthenes
2,000 years ago in the Athenian market-
place when he asked: "What sane man
would let another man's words, rather
than his deeds, prove who was at peace
and who was at war with him'?"
For the Soviet Union, it is time for
some demonstration on their part that
their utterances about peace are not just
talk. You know, it is a little hard to accept
someone iterating and reiterating, over
and over again, that they are the peace
seekers in the world while they sit there
behind the greatest military buildup in all
that we have, we should be able to make
faster progress than many people expect.
We won't set a deadline. That could cre-
ate harmful pressure on our negotiators.
Q. Does the conflict in the South Atlantic
cast a pall over the summit meetings?
A. Oh, I think all of us would hope that it
was not there. And I think all of us hope
for an end to the bloodshed and a peaceful
settlement. But I do not see why that
should really be coloring these meetings
all that much.
Q. You will be seeing Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem Begin shortly after your return
from Europe. The autonomy talks are stalled.
Do you plan to ask Begin to change his policies
regarding Jewish settlements in the West
Bank and his insistence on meeting Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak in Jerusalem?
A. I'm looking forward to meeting Prime
Minister Begin and discussing ways to ad-
vance the peace process under the Camp
David framework. Both he and President
Mubarak have pledged their countries'
commitment to that framework, and we
are prepared to work closely with them.
Camp David is clear on the future of au-
tonomy [for the Palestinian Arabs of the
West Bank and Gaza], and we will pro-
ceed based on that understanding. As for
the location of the talks, we're working on
that now. But they will be resumed. I have
no doubt of that.
Q. What changes do you see in American re-
lationships in the Middle East as a result of
the recent developments in Iran's war with
Iraq?
A. We have long hoped for a conclusion to
that conflict. The U.S. believes, along
with many others in the region, that
the territorial integrity and sover-
eignty of both nations should be
maintained. We are in contact with
others about how this tragic and cost-
ly war could soon be ended.
Q. You came to office without a lot of
practical foreign policy experience. Af-
ter 16 months at the helm, has your view
of the world changed in any way and has
anything in this realm surprised you in
one way or another?
A. Well, not really too much. I have
been interested in and studied the
world situation for a long time. I have
confirmed for myself, however, one
thing that I always clung to before. I
said that until you are where a Presi-
dent sits and have access to all the in-
formation he has, you can't really
criticize. You can't know the reason
for some of the moves that have been
made. And I still feel that way.
But what I have come to learn
has not changed in any way how I
felt about the Soviet Union, how I felt
about relations with our NATO allies.
I have always subscribed to the belief
that the North Atlantic Alliance was
not merely us generously helping our al-
lies. It's mutual-as much of a defense
line for us as it is for them.
Q. Some Presidents have found that foreign
affairs is in many ways more challenging,
more pleasant and more exciting than domes-
tic policy because there is a greater freedom
of action. Has that happened to you?
A. No, that can hardly be true with the
economic mess that we came into office
with. And what we are trying to resolve
here-and, as a matter of fact, they do
kind of dovetail-are mutual problems in
the field of economics and our trade prob-
lems and so forth. I think the United
States plays a very important role in the
world economy. One of the most helpful
things we can do for our allies is to put our
country on a sound economic footing.
And that's pretty exciting too. ^
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Nation
Polite-but Insistent-Questions
Five distinguished Europeans outline their priorities for President Reagan
'UI
Although every President
since Herbert Hoover has
visited Europe during his
term of office, Ronald
Reagan's trip is in many
ways unprecedented. No U.S. President
has ever addressed either the assembled
members of the British Parliament or the
West German Bundestag. Few Presidents
have had to prepare for quite so many
questions about their foreign, defense and
economic policies. Western Europeans
are of many minds as to the ideas the
President should stress during his visit.
TIME asked five Western European lead-
ers, four of them former Prime Ministers
and one a former Finance Minister, to
write their views of what President Rea-
gan's priorities should be.
The views of politicians who no
"The West Has Lost Its Dynamism"
James Callaghan, 70, Prime Minister of Britain from 1976 to
1979 and a Labor Member of Parliament since his defeat by Mar-
garet Thatcher:
P resident Reagan will be given a genuinely cordial welcome
by his six fellow heads of state and government when he
greets them at the annual economic summit meeting in
Versailles. They warm to his friendly manner and they like the
great country he represents, but when the greetings are over
they will not allow him as much latitude as they did at last year's
meeting. He had then been in office for only six months: his new
Administration needed time to play itself in. Some of the West-
ern leaders deliberately muted their doubts,
and the theme music throughout the summit
was Getting to Know You. Not so this year.
The President is now a full-fledged member of
the club, and he can expect some firm, insis-
tent, but always polite questioning and
discussion.
The reason is that the world is in a
worse state than it was twelve months ago.
The West has lost its drive and dynamism.
Our economies are locked in deep recession.
Weak demand leads to a decline in capital
investment. Our capital stock gets older and
less efficient. The number of men and wom-
en out of work grows worse. Interest rates
remain high.
So the questions President Reagan will be
asked are: Can the West stop things from get-
ting worse? How long before they begin to im-
prove? When will American interest rates come down? Is not
the time overdue for the U.S. to ensure harmony between its
monetary and fiscal policies? Is the Administration ready to sta-
bilize the value of the dollar? How can the West increase de-
mand and output without setting off inflation again? The Presi-
dent may think it unfair to be faced with such an inquisition, but
he will be assured that no one is trying merely to vex him.
The simple reality is that the performance of the American
economy has, even today, a larger effect on the rest of the coun-
tries gathered at Versailles than any other single factor, with the
possible exception of OPEC. If President Reagan convinces the
other leaders that he understands that the American economy is
not insulated from the rest of the Western world, that the size of
the mortgage payments made by the man on a London omnibus is
heavily influenced by New York and Washington, that he will
take into account the implications of America's economic deci-
sions on other countries and that he recognizes an obligation to
coordinate policy as far as possible so that we do not
harm one another, then by the modest standards of results
longer hold national office were sought
because they would be able to speak
more forthrightly about the issues at
stake and about the reception the Presi-
dent is likely to receive from his peers.
Although the assessments differ in ac-
cent and tone, they are united by two
strong, recurring themes: the need to
control the arms race and to cope with
a global economic crisis.
expected from these annual summits, Versailles will be counted
a success.
The President's visit provides another chance for Western
Europe and the U.S. to bridge the differences in their analysis of
Soviet policy and aims. This is a necessity if we are not to fall out
every time a crisis blows up. Western Europe understands that the
state of America's relations with the U.S.S.R. is central to the suc-
cess or failure of U.S. foreign policy. The President should demon-
strate that he understands that Western Europe's relations with
the U.S.S.R. are different and more complex. Even though the
hand of the Soviet Union lies heavy on Warsaw, Prague and Leip-
zig, the historic feeling that regards Europe as a whole lives on
and will never be absent from the policy of West Germany as long
as it is a divided country.
SUTTON GAMMA/LIAISON Western Europe seeks detente despite
-111 - -I
much American skepticism because detente is
a way to curb and check East-West differences
and a means of supplementing, not replacing,
the security provided by the Atlantic Alliance.
Detente is a dialogue, a network of mutual in-
terests and arms-control agreements. Western
Europe wants Polish freedom and the Poles
want reform, but this will not come in one great
leap. Whether it ever happens depends on the
Communist system's showing that it is capable
of evolution, and this has still to be proved. If
the system remains rigid and unyielding, then
the Soviet Union's relations with its Eastern
European allies will be increasingly unstable.
Today a growing number of Third World coun-
tries regard the Soviet Union through increas-
ingly disillusioned eyes, and it would be a great
mistake to act on the belief that the Soviet
Union initiates all the troubles of the developing countries: pover-
ty and hunger are her allies too.
Coming to Western Europe so soon after his speech in Illi-
nois [in which he set out the details of his proposals to the Soviet
Union on the reduction of nuclear arsenals] affords the Presi-
dent the best possible opportunity to convince the people of
Western Europe that when he talks peace, he means business.
The European peace movement has been fueled by the decision
not to ratify SALT II, by talk of fighting a limited nuclear war in
Europe and by [U.S.] rhetoric about achieving nuclear arms su-
periority. There is no more appropriate place than the blood-
stained battlefields of Europe for the President to make clear his
conviction that nuclear war is unthinkable in any form and to
spell out his commitment to arms control and disarmament.
Western Europe regards America as an essential security factor
in its pursuit of an active policy for peace. Both sides of the At-
lantic are united by a common set of values, and Western Eu-
rope remains fully committed to maintaining and strengthening
the alliance. 0
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