HARSH FACTS, HARD CHOICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400049-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: May 9, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400049-6
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON,PA~r -~o
One congressional commit-
tee voted to cut the military
aid he requested for be-
sieged El Salvador. Another
sought to ban covert U.S.
onerations against the 2D-
Harsh Facts, Hard
Reagan appeals for aid against the menace in Central America
TDE
9 MAY 1983
1i chill specter of Viet Nam. Out of fear
of repeating that colossal misadven-
ture. Americans have seized hold of
its lessons. perhaps inaccurately, per-
haps obsessively. There is a strong
aversion to undertaking any cbmmii-
ment to shore up threatened pro-
American regimes in the Third
World, no matter how strategically
important they are. and a reluctance
to believe that the countries of a re-
gion could topple like dominoes. no
matter how compelling the evidence
of spreading subversion. This is
particularly true of Central America,
where the political vulnerability
clearly also has indigenous causes.
including widespread poverty and
decades of governmental ineptitude
and human rights abuses. "Everyone
in Congress is steeped in Viet
Nam." says Republican Congress-
man James Leach of Iowa. "We in
Congress abdicated responsibility
then, and no one wants to do it again."
n his speech. Reagan confronted
the issue directly, as if trying to
exorcise its paralyzing spell. "Let
me say to those who invoke the
memory of Viet Nam: there is no
thought of sending American combat
troops to Central America." This
that few voters shared his critical concern
over Central America and even fewer
wanted the U.S. to become involved in the
problem. Yet because he fervently be-
lieves his policies are vital to the future of
the hemisphere. Ronald Reagan made a
bold but politically risky appearance last
week before a special joint session of Con-
gress. "A number of times in the past
years. members of Congress and the Pres-
ident have come together in meetings like
this to resolve a crisis," he said. "I have
asked for this meeting in the hope that we
can prevent one.
For such a grand occasion, the finan-
cial commitment sought by Reagan
seemed piddling. As be put it. "The total
amount requested for aid to all of Central
America in 1984 is about $600 million
that is less than one-tenth of what Ameri-
cans will spend this year on coin-operated
video games."' But failing to make such an
investment. he insisted, would have dire
consequences. "The national security of
all the Americas is at stake in Central
America. If we cannot defend ourselves
there. we cannot expect to prevail else-
where. Our credibility would collapse. our
alliances would crumble, and the safety of
our homeland would be put at jeopardy."
Whether Reagan succeeded in head-
ing off a crisis will not be known for
months. perhaps years: 'but his speech
could only have helped. It was one of the
best of his presidency. forceful yet tem-
perate. without the belligerent anti-Soviet
rhetoric that has at times made his foreign
policy pronouncements seem more sim-
plistic and militaristic than in fact they
are. "It was a model of teamwork," exult-
ed National Security Adviser William
Clark at a meeting of Reagan's senior
staff the next morning, reflecting the
White House's jubilation over the speech.
The reaction on Capitol Hill was re-
strained. Congressional critics have been
sullen and uneasy about the possibility of
becoming involved in a no-win commit-
ment in Central America, but most mem-
bers are wary of an outright confrontation
with the Administration.
Hanging over the dispute. as well as al-
most every other discussion of U.S. inter-
vention abroad for the past decade. is the
prompted the night's most thunderous
ovation, one that was sustained on both
sides of the aisle. (It also drew some quer-
ulous editorial fire. The New York Times,
referring to his pledge not to send in com-
bat troops, asked. "If the stakes are as he
says. why on earth not?") In the televised
Democratic response. Senator Christ.o-
pher Dodd of Connecticut invoked Viet
Nam` as an argument against the Admin-
istration's policies in Central America.
"The American people know that we
have been down this road before," he said,
"and that it only leads to a dark tunnel of
endless intervention."
Simply by using a joint session of Con-
tress -to-turn the spotlight once again
ton El Salvador, Reagan may have ele-
Ivated a nagging foreign policy prob-
lem into a prominent campaign issue
:for 1984. Says one of his top political
.advisers: "It's waving a red flag. It's
raising the urgency. It reminds me of
Lyndon Johnson's escalating the Viet
Nam War."
Yet counterbalancing these con-
cerns. both within the Administration
and in Congress, is the fear of being
blamed for losing El Salvador and the
rest _ of . Central America. Explains
Reagan's chief of staff. James Baker:
"We do not want a Central American
country to go Communist on our
watch. We are pointing out to Con-
gress that it shares that responsibil-
ity." Indeed, one reason that Congress
has thus far been willing to give Rea-
gan at least half a loaf in his requests
for Salvadoran aid is the realization
that the fragile regime might other-
wise fall to Communist rebels, an
event that could not only endanger
US. security but also prove a political
liability for those responsible. By tak-
ing his case to Capitol Hill. Reagan
made it clear he would hold members
accountable if they thwarted his
policies. His concluding line: "Who
among us would wish to bear respon-
sibility for failing to meet our shared
obligation?"
Reagan went to great pains to stress
that saving Central America was a bipar-
tisan burden. The only two Presidents
he invoked were Democrats. He read at
length from Harry Truman's 1947 speech
to Congress arguing that international
Communism must be contained
and praised Jimmy Carter because
be "did not hesitate" to send arms
to El Salvador when the rebels
launched their "final offensive" in
the fall of 1980.
One specific bipartisan bow
i was the appointment of a special
envoy to seek a peaceful solution in
Central America. This was the
brainchild of Maryland Congress-
man Clarence Long. chairman of
the Appropriations subcommittee
that bandies foreign aid. Long and
his colleagues, however, were dis-
appointed by Reagan's choice of
former Democratic Senator Rich-
ard Stone ofFlorida (see box). They
feel Stone is too aligned with the
current Administration. for which
he has. undertaken several diplo-
matic missions in Central Ameri-
ca, and with the deposed right-
wing dictatorship of Fernando
Romeo Lucas Garcia in Guatema-
la. for which be served as a paid
lobbyist. The White House held up
the appointment fora day while
aides assessed Stone's chances for
confirmation by the Senate. Many
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400049-6
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