OUT TO LUNCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390031-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390031-7
NEW YORK TIMES
1 October 1984
ABROAD AT HOME I Anthony Lewis
Out to Lunch
BOSTON '
resident Reagan's attempt to
blame anyone and everyone
but himself for the security
failure at the American Embassy in
Beirut has discomfited even some of
his admirers. But they have not al-
lowed themselves to see the real point
of the contemptible episode. That is
that Ronald Reagan feels no responsi-
bility - not for the Embassy and not
for anything done by the United
States Government.
Just try to puzzle out his suggestion
last week that weakening of U.S. in-
telligence before he took office led to
the terrorist success in Beirut. The
relevant part of his answer'to a col-
lege student's question about the
bombing was:
"Where we're feeling the effects to-
day of the near destruction of our in-
telligence capability in recent years
- before we came here - the effort
that somehow to say, well,'spying is
somehow dishonest and let's get rid of
our intelligence agents, and we did
that to a large extent."
The first thing to be said about that
comment is that it was factually un-
true. Past and present C.I.A. officials
rushed to deny that the agency had
been brought "near destruction" by
Mr. Reagan's predecessor.
When former President Carter took
offense at what he called Mr. Reagan's
"false" and "insulting" claim, Mr.
Reagan telephoned to explain that he
had not meant to criticize Mr. Carter.
He said he really meant to blame the
Senate committee under the late Frank
Church. But the Church committee in-
vestigated C.I.A. excesses such as
plots to assassinate foreign leaders; it
did not aim to cut intelligence-gather-
ing activities.
The second thing to be said is that
the President's comment was irrele-
vant. For the immediate failure in
Beirut was a physical one: The fail-
ure to install gates and other security
devices that the experts had said
were needed. William Colby, former
Director of Central Intelligence, put
it: "The problem was not a failure of
intelligence but a problem of putting
in proper security."
The President's comment was,
then, a melange of untruths and ir-
relevancies. But I am convinced that
Mr. Reagan fully believed what he
said. That is why the episode is so re-
vealing.
The point is that Mr. Reagan sees
the world through a screen of ideol-
ogy. The beliefs that make it up are
fixed; no reality can dislodge them.
Thus hd believes that the United
States "unilaterally disarmed" in the
years before he took office, and no
facts about the upgrading of our nu-
clear arsenal can change his mind.
One of the items in the Reagan ideo-
logical canon is that critics destroyed
U.S. intelligence capabilities in the
1970's. And that was what came to
mind when the President felt himself
challenged on the Beirut failure. It
was an ideological reflex.
The grip of ideology on his mind
gives Ronald Reagan an extraordi-
nary political advantage. He can
blame whatever goes wrong on things
beyond his control, and he can do so
with perfect sincerity. Failure
abroad must be a product of past
weakness, of insufficient anti-Com-
munist zeal. Trouble at home must be
the result of Big Government, and we
all know he is against that. He is
never an incumbent.
In short, ideology enables Mr. Rea-
gan to escape responsibility. And it is
all genuine, in the skin-deep sense. He
is not a person who is aware of a mis-
take and skillfully covers it up. He
does not feel any responsibility, and
hence he feels no guilt at failure.
George Will, the conservative com-
mentator, wrote a thoughtful column
criticizing the vapid excuses offered
by the President and others for the
Beirut bombing. But his conclusion
missed the point. Mr. Reagan, he
said, needed to make subordinates
fear penalty when there was failure.
But a President who feels no responsi-
bility himself - who sees failure in
ideological terms - cannot provide
such leadership.
The most amazing thing about Ron-
ald Reagan as a politician is his suc-
cess in convincing the electorate that
he is a "strong leader." His postures
may look strong, to others as to him.
But in the concrete terms that really
measure political leadership, he is
just not there. He is the most passive,
the remotest President since Calvin
Coolidge.
Alexander Haig called this White
House "a ghost ship." We have a Gov-
nnment in which the President does-
not decide the most urgent issues of
policy: arms control, the priorities of
negotiation with the Soviet Union,
Middle East policy. We have an unac-
countable President. That is the larg-
er, and the chilling, reality behind
Mr. Reagan's conduct in the Beirut
episode. ^
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390031-7