PROXMIRE RELEASES CIA TESTIMONY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505230001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 15, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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HOLD FOR RELEASE: 6:00 P.M.', MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1986
PROXMIRE RELEASES CIA TESTIMONY
Washington, D.C. -- Senator William Proxmire
PRESS RELEASE
99th Congress
David R. Obey, Wis.
Chairman
James Abdnor, S. Dak.
Vice Chairman
Lee H. Hamilton, Ind.
Parren J. Mitchell, Md.
Augustus F. Hawkins, Calif.
James H. Scheuer, N.Y.
Fortney H. (Pete) Stark, Calif.
Chalmers P. Wylie, Ohio
Daniel E. Lungren, Calif.
Olympia J. Snowe, Maine
Bobbi Fiedler, Calif.
William V. Roth, Jr., Del.
Steven D. Symms, Idaho
Mack Mattingly, Georgia
Alfonse M. D'Amato, N.Y.
Pete Wilson, Calif.
Lloyd Bentsen, Texas
William Proxmire, Wis.
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.
Paul S. Sarbanes, Md.
Scott Lilly
Executive Director
Neil Strawser
(202) 224-0367
1986-72
HFR 6:00 p.m.
9/15/86
Nonetheless, under most scenarios, Western grain
will still be needed to achieve the ambitious 1990
meat production goals. The amount of required
grain will, as always, depend in large measure on
weather conditions:
--Our most likely scenario is for average weather
-- conditions approximating those of 1980-1984 --
and continuation of the recent trend in fertilizer
deliveries. Achieving 1990 meat production targets
under these conditions would require some 40
million tons of grain imports -- equal to the
average annual quantity imported during 1981-1984
-- even with increased quantities of feed per
animal. A qualitative improvement in the
composition of feed rations, however, could lower
feed conversion ratios and reduce import demand to
some 30-35 million tons.
"The CIA goes on to say that Moscow views the
United States as a residual grain supplier, and
that we will continue to be the supplier of last
resort.
Joint Economic Committee
SD-G01 Dirksen
Washington, D.C. 20510
[phone]
(D-Wis.) said on Tuesday that "according to a
Central Intelligence Agency analysis, it is
possible that the United States will be virtually
eliminated as a source of grain imports to the
Soviet Union, subsidies or no subsidies."
"It is my view," Proxmire said, "that the
growing Soviet independence from U.S. grain partly
demonstrates the fallacy of assuming that they are
being pressured into an arms agreement by economic
difficulties."
Proxmire made his remarks as he released
previously classified testimony. of the CIA.
Joint Economic Committee
Proxmire said from his Washington office:
"I asked the CIA to provide projections of
future Soviet grain import requirements worldwide
and from the United States. Here is what the CIA
says:
"Further, the CIA states that increased
production by other countries,suggests they could
easily supply 20-25 million tons of grain
annually, and larger quantities in good years.
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"Simple arithmetic shows the vanishing role of the United
States as a grain exporter to the Soviet Union.
"If Soviet demand for grain drops to 30 million tons, and
they can get 25 million tons from other countries, whether they
will buy small amounts or anything from the United States becomes
questionable.
"So far this year, the Soviets have purchased only about 6.5
million tons of grain from the United States, and the year is
officially over at the end of September.
"A. year ago, the Soviets imported about 20 million tons of
U.S. grain.
"The CIA also concludes that very good weather and other
favorable conditions in the Soviet Union could totally obviate
the need for Western grain imports."
Other highlights of the CIA testimony:
* In 1985, for the first time since 1971, the dollar cost of
Soviet defense activities did not substantially exceed U.S.
outlays.
* Despite almost no growth in procurement since 1975, the
Soviets produced significantly more weapons than the United
States in almost every category. Part of the reason is that
the United States emphasized purchasing fewer but more
capable and costly weapons, and that we devote a greater
share of procurement outlays to improving combat readiness
and sustainability.
* Although comprehensive U.S. estimates of how much it would
cost the Soviets to build an SDI have not been developed, the
addition of new programs in direct response to SDI would
almost certainly conflict with planned military programs and
with Gor'bachev's industrial modernization program.
* In 1985, Soviet military deliveries to foreign countries
totaled almost $9 billion, about 20 percent less than the
value for 1984. The drop was caused mostly by financial
constraints in the global arms market and the completion of
military modernization programs among some of Moscow's
clients.
Copies of the hearings, "Allocation of Resources in the
Soviet Union and China," may be obtained from the Joint Economic
Committee, Room G-01, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington,
D.C. 20510, telephone: (202) 224-5321.
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