THE GREAT BULGARIAN COVER-UP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505100084-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 84
• Publication Date: May 27, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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' tt~ "'~ ~ ~;~ ~~~ ED 27 May 198
~S 1~ { ~ 4J
Betrayals, false alibis, and bungling by the pope's ~Jva~a~oe ~S~~SSn~
THE GREAT BULGARIAN COVER-UP
BY eL~~RE sTElzl/f~c
ON MAY 27 three Bulgarians and four Turks will stand
Mal in the Italian Court of Assizes for conspiring to
assassinate Pope John Paul Il on May 13, 1981. In the tortu-
ousconfession of Mehmet Ali Agca, the convicted gunman
in the case, one thing became clear. This painstakingly
conceived plot (aimed ultimately at bringing down the Sol-
idarity movement in Poland, and including at one point
the murder of Lech Walesa) came undone by the coward-
ice, stupidity, and mutual betrayals of the accomplices-
an assortment of Bulgarian Embassy and secret service
personnel; Turkish drug- and gun-runners, professional
assassins, Gray Wolves, and Mafia men. In each man's
attempt to save himself, he brought further evidence
against his comrades. The result was a farcical cover-up
attempt scrupulously unveiled by Judge Ilario Martella.
All of the accused lied stoutly to the judge, as did Agca.
But the others' testimony fell to pieces under severe man
isterial scrutiny; the core of Mehmet Ali Agca'sconfession
held up-despite numerous inconsistencies and even sev-
eral retractions along the way. Prying the truth out of
Agca, imprisoned for life at 23, proved to be an arduous
and disconcerting task. To break out of jail by force, he
needed the assistance of his Turkish and Bulgarian accom-
plices. To walk out a free man, he had to betray them: tell.
everything he knew and hope to win a presidential par-
don. He gambled on the pardon, but could not bring
himself fully to renounce the other course.
Agca was arrested on May 13,1981. He held out for a year
before naming his Turkish accomplices, and another six
months before identifying the Bulgarians, in the conviction
that rescue was on the way. During that time, he misled his
Italian interrogators, mixing, he said, "some facts v,~ith a lot
of lies ... to prevent them from getting near the truth." He
later explained that he was keeping a promise made to his
friend and fellow gunman Oral Celik, and to the Bulgarians
in Rome. In return, "They assured me that they would ar-
range my escape if I was arrested, by buying off my prison
guards, or kidnapping a hostage for exchange."
As the months went by with no sign of deliverance,
Agca saw that those he counted on for help were not
omnipotent. By the time of the pope's pardon at Christ-
mas 1983, Agca had taken back same of his ties, and he
Claire Sterling is the author of. The Time of the Assassins
(Holt, ?Rinehart and Winston). This article contains previ-
ously unpublished material from the book's new edition.
began to supply new details about the assassination plot.
Through the Turkish Mafia boss Bekir Celenk-bound to
the Bulgarian secret services after running his arms and
drug traffic out of Sofia for 20-odd years-the Bulgarian
services hired Agca and Celik to be the hit men. Judge
Martella described Agca, who had moved in right-wing
Gray Wolves circles since high school, as a "terrorist with-
outideology," and an "exceptionally gifted killer used for
exceptional assignments and paid accordingly." He was to
lie paid one million deutsche marks (roughly 5400,00(}} for
killing the pope.
Elaborate liaisons were set up between the Bulgarians
and Turks, with the Gray Wolves providing safe houses,
protective cover, storage of weapons, and petty cash out-
lays as needed. ]n July 1980 in Sofia, the plan to kill the
pope was roughed out in meetings between Agca, Celenk,
Celik, and the treasurer of the Bulgarian Embassy, Todor
Aivasov (alias Sotir }:oleo). It was perfected later in Zurich
and Rome. For the next nine months, Agca set up working
contacts across the continent, carefully covering up his
movements as he went_ It was at the moment of the shoot-
ing and in the arrangements for safe flight afterward that
the plan broke down.
The assignments v`~eredearly setupin advance. The Grav
Wolves leader Omer Bagci woui d deliver the-gun. Agca and
Celik would do the shooting. The Bulgarians Aivaso~> and
Zhelvo Vasilev (alias Sotir Petrov) would hire the car (to be
driven be Sergei Antonov-alias Bayi?amic-the deputy di-
rectorof Balkan Air) and would pmcure panicbc>mbs with
which Celik would distract the crowd for the getaway. At a
dinner when these arrangements were discussed, Vasilev
first mentioned a detail with damning implications for Bul-
garia. He said that a TIR truck (Transport International
Routier-a vehicle used to shuttle cargo across borders of
European countries without customs clearance) carrying
diplomats' household goods would be ready to whiskAgca
and Celik out of Italy after the shooting.
On May 13,1981, Agca and Celik took up their positions
at the Vatican in a large 'crowd gathered for the pope's
weekh~ public audience. Agca was to fire five shots, after
which Celik-who could then fire if necessary-would
explode the panic bomb. But Agca managed to fire only
twice before somebody shoved his shooting arm. Onh~
one of the bullets struck the pope. Celik then fired a third
shot, hitting the pope again. But instead of setting off the
panic bomb, he simply ran away. ABC's Lowell Newton, a
Contintsed
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~?
few yards off, snapped his famaus photograph of Celik
fleeing the scene. Celik escaped and has not been heard
from since.
On November 8, 1982, Agca identified his three Bulgari-
an accomplices from mug shots, and told the judge that
they promised to get him out of St. Peter's Square by car,
and out of Italy in a TIR truck carrying diplomats' furnish-
ings. The Italian police found striking evidence to that
effect. Less than two hours after the pope was shot, a
Bulgarian TII{ truck left
the Bulgarian Embassy
in Rome for the Yugo-
slay frontier and Sofia.
The embassy had ur-
gently requested the
TIR's free passage
across Italian borders,
with customs clearance
on the embassy
grounds-a rare and
expensive procedure.
The state prosecutor,
Antonio Albano, con-
. eluded that hidden
among the books.
crockery, and personal
effects listed on the
truJ:ic's manifest ti mt
day was Oral Celik
Agca proved to be
extraordinarily precise
in his descriptions of
his accomplices and
the places and times of
meetings. All those he
named as collaborators
turned out to have
been where he said
they were at the crucial
times between July
1980 and May 1981.
Sergei Antonov was
in Rome in November
and December 1980,
and January, April,
Milan to meet Agca in December 1980, and in Zurich on
March 31, 1981, when he was seen with Agca at the Shera-
ton Hotel. Bekir Celenk was at the Hotel Vitosha in Sofia in
1980 on July 11-Land Julv 24-August 1, as Agca had said.
He was also at the Hotel Piraeus Parkin Athens during the
first days of May 1981, when Agca claimed to have phoned
him there. Omer Mersan stayed in room 911 of the Hotel
Vitosha on July ~l-S, 1980, when Agca said he'd first met ,
him there, and again from Juiy 22 to August 10. _ `
DRAWING BY TAYLOR JONES fOR TtiE NEW REf UBLIC
and. Mav 1961. He spent the New Year in Sofia, but was
back in Italy by January 5, in time for two meetings Agca
spoke of that took place around January I5, in which
Agca, the three Bulgarians, acrd a fourth $ulgarian agent
discussed a subplot, later abandoned, to kill Lech Walesa
while he had his audience with the pope in Rome. Todor
Aivasov was in Sofia from Julv 21 to August 29, 1980-the
dates Agca-said he met with him (though Agca knew him
under his alias, "Kolev")-and in Rome for all the relevant
months thereafter. Zhelyo Vasilev was also in Rome
throughout those months (though he had been commut-
ing between Rome and Sofia until early August 1980).
Among the Turkish plotters, Musa Serdar Celebi was in
teut}~ted to nail Agca as
a., ;n~tnri2ii~ie liar tn-
g;stin~ that he was vart
of an imperial plot
a ainst .Eastern Eu-
rope and that he had
been visited in prison
by the CIA or the Italian
security services, or
both. But their own lies
quickly became evi-
dent. The Bulgarian
magistrates gave Judge
Martella several docu-
rnerrts purportedly
demonstrating that
Agca could not have
met Mersan in-Sofia on
July 4 and 5. One was
a list compiled by But-
garian frontier police
of Mersan's numerous
border crossings
throughout 1980. It
showed him leaving
Bulgaria June 2b and re-
turning July ~?, not July
4 and 5. A letter from
the Hote! Vitosha's di-
rectorlisted every occu-
pant of room 911 from
October 1979 to May
1981. Mersan showed
up for July 22, 1980, but
cwt for Juiy 4 n~id 5:
Judge Martella asked the West German police for a photo-
copy of Mersan's passport. It showed his entry into.Bulgar-
ia on July 4, end exit on July 5. A stamped notation added:
"TK-Balkan Tourist Sofia-Hotel l~itosha-arrived July 4,
1980-departed July 5, 1980." When Judge Martella called
"this grave discrepancy" to the Bulgarians' attention, they
promised "a swift investigation and reply." None arrived.
Agca's descriptions of Antonov were accurate down to
his mastery of English, his eye defect, and his wife's
nickname. Antonov told the judge he could not under-
stand how Agca knew so much about him, yet under inter-
rogation he confirmed every detail. His admission that he
spoke some English shattered a major Bulgarian argument
~i1G?tts~;.S;
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THE ACfCA SAGA
Mehmet Ali Agca, a young Turkish
mercenary, was convicted of shoot-
ing Pope John Paul Il. In his testimo-
ny, Agca implicated five Turks-four
of whom will be tried-and three
Bulgarians. Their alleged roles in the
plot are as follows.
Oral Celik, a boyhood friend of Agca
and his accomplice in the shooting.
He has not been seen since. and ap-
parently escaped from ttal}' in a
sealed Bulgarian Embassy truck. Ce-
Iik had been involved in arms- and
drugs-running for .. .
Bekir Celenk, a Turkish Mafia boss
who worked oui of Bulgaria. After the
shooting he took refuge in Sofia. He
wiU be tried in absentia. Celenk was
the Bulgarian secret services' contact
man for hiring the two Turkish gun-
men, whom he located through .. .
Omer Mersan, aMunich-based busi-
nessman and smuggler. Mersan told
all to Italian authorities in Apri] 1984
and was released. He will not be
tried. In particular, he told of his
ties to the Turkish arms Mafia and to
Celenk, who was coordinating his
own Mafia resources and contacts
wfth tho9e of .. .
Musa Serdar Celebi, aMunich-based
leader of a Turkish terrorist organiza-
tion called the Grav Wolves. Celebi is
now awaiting trial in jail in Italy. He
was the go-between for Celenk and
Agca and gave them access to the re-
sources of the Grav Wolves through-
out Europe, including the services
Omer Bagci, a Gray Wolves leader
based in Switzerland, now awaiting
trial in Italy. He kept the Browning
automatic Agca was to use to shoot
the pope, and had it delivered to him
in Milan.
The following Bulgarians were in-
dicted and are still in jail in Italy:
Zhe}go Vasi}ev (alias Sour Petrov),
secretan~ to the military attache at the
Bulgarian )=mbassv, came up with
the plans for Agca and Celik to he
spirited off in the embassy truck. His
arrest was ordered in November
198?, after he had fled to .Sofia. He
has been silent under interrogation,
but was apparently helped in these
arrangements by .. .
Todor Aivasov (alias Sotir Kolev),
treasurer of the Bulgarian Embassy in
Rome, alleged)}' met with Celenk,
Celik, and Agca in Sofia throughout
the summer of ] 980. His arrest was
ordered after he had fled to Sofia,
and he has stuck ever since to an in-
creasingly complex alibi, as has .. .
Sergei Antonov (alias Bayramic),
deputy director of Balkan Air. An-
tonov was supposed to drive the get-
away car from the assassination site.
He claimed to have been at the air-
line's offices with six other people
throughout the day of the assassina-
tion. The corroborating. testimony of
all su; fell apart under cross-
examination.
in his defense-that Antonov could not have commu>icat-
ed with Agca, since he spoke no English. Judge Marteila
concluded that Antonov was "unable to offer a single ele-
ment giving the lie to his accuser_-" His defense was "de-
void of judicial force, contrived because born late and
therefore suspect, and characterized by irreconcilable
contradicftons."
The rise and fall of Antonov's alibi had its comical-side.
He was arrested on November 5,1982. At the time he said
he remembered nothing about the day of .the shooting.
Three weeks later, he'produced six witnesses to swear that
he was in the Balkan Air office throughout that fateful
afternoon.
All six worked for Balkan Air or Balkan Tourist, in the
next room; and all were "clear]}' reciting a part," said the
judge. Just after Antonov's arrest, his office mate, Svetana
Blagoeva, had testified "that she and she alone" was in the
office with Antonov from I:30 p.m. to 6 p.m. on Ma}~ 13.
Silva Pop~resteva had sworn she'd worked only that
morning, and had no knowledge of the afternoon. Interro-
gated amonth later ("at Antonov's request," the judge not-
ed) Svetana Blagoeva "remembered" that Silva Pop-
kresteva was there in the afternoon after all. Popkresteva
recalled that too. And Blagoeva's 80-year-old mother re-
rrtemberedphoning heratthe office "around 5p.m." to say
she'd seen theshooting of the pope on TV. Blagoeva, Popk-
resteva, Antonov, and four other Balkan Air employees
now distinctly recalled the 5:30 p.m. phone call. Indeed,
they all insisted that Antonov had answered the phone
himself. He concurred. The timing alone made this a wast-
ed effort: -the first TV film on the papal shooting was not
shown until 7 p.m.
Todor Aivasods alibi was four months in the making.
After offering none to speak of on March 3, 19$3, he came
up with a dazzling account the following July 17. Judge
Martella found it to be "amply disavowed, contrived, not
responding to the truth, and wholly unworthy of notice."
The account covered most of Aivasrn~'s waking mo-
ments from Mav 11 to the hour of the shooting on May 13.
On Ma}~ 11, he said, he and an embassy driver named
Tchotov picked up a cargo of bicycles from a shop iri Rome
at 4 p.m. and shipped them from the airport at ~ p.m.
Tchotov proved to be a thorough)}' unreliable witness,
who finally admitted to having been "instructed" or
"helped to remember" in advance. Other witnesses, docu-
ments inhand, established the hours in question as ~ p.m.
and fs-20 p.m., respectively. Thus Aivasov could easily
have inspected St. Peter's with Agca in the early afternoon.
Aivasov maintained that practicaIIy aI] of May I2 was
devoted to clearing customs for a TIR truck. He cited as
witnesses two Italian customs inspectors, a brigadier of
the Financial Police, the TIR's Bulgarian driver, and
Svetana Blagoeva. Aivasov and Blagoeva swore they had
picked up the Italians at the customs house, taken them to
lunch, then watched them clear some wine and spirits
cargo at the Bulgarian Embassy. But the two customs in-
spectors remembered a lunch with a Bulgarian who evi-
dently was not Aivasov: the description offered by one
Gonbtwed_
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bore no resemblance to him, and neither could identify
him from the mug shots. Neither recalled the presence of
Blagoeva or am other woman.
The brigadier of the Financial Police, Maurizio Luchetta,
started by saving he had no recollection of the lunch, or
the lady's presence, or Aivasov's presence. Interrogated
again three days later, he unexpectedh~ recalled seeing
Aivasov at the embassy on May 12, but said Aivasov had
"absented himself from the scene between ~ [p.m.] and 4
p.m., saying he had something else to do." (According to
Agca, Aivasov was in St. Peter's Square from around 2
p.m. to 3 p.m. on May 1~.) Three months later, Luchetta
remembered that he had driven to the embassy on Mav 12
with Aivasov and "a lady," and did lunch with the others.
judge Martella ordered his arrest for false testimony, stat-
ing that his "multiple and contradictory statements" re-
flected a "confused mind" with "an enormous capacity to
contaminate the investigation."
For the crucial afternoon of Mav 13, Aivasov claimed to
have been immersed again in the business of the TIP. truck.
Loaded for departure with 44 cases of books, crockery, and
other items, it had to be cleared on embassy grounds. Once
more Aivasov maintained that he went to the customs
house with his driver, Tchotov, around 11 a.m., picked up
one of the same customs inspectors (Epifanio Scalera), and
stopped for lunch at a restaurant of Scalera's choosing.
Back at the embassy around 3:30 p.m., Aivasov continued,
he had an appointment with an Italian circus impresario.
At 5 p.m. he met with an ltalian theater club director to
settle plans for a Bulgarian t?Yreatricai performance.
The customs inspector testified that Aivasov's account
was "invented out of whole cloth." The inspector had
never heard of the restarzrartt Airoascn~ said he had chosen,
and had not in any case had lunch with am~body there on
May 13 or any other day. The driver Tchotov admitted
that, before coming to see the judge, he had been sum-
moned for a word with Aivasov in Sofia. "In all conscience
I must say ...that Mr. Aivasov showed me a document
dated Mav 13, 1981, and I could have confused the date
and the person who came to lunch with us." The Italian
impresario testified that he had gone to the embassy in the
morning, gone to lunch with the Bulgarian consul, said
good-bye at the embassy gates around 2:30 p.m., and
taken off for home. He said he did not meet 7odor Aivasov
until six months later. The ltalian theater club director
exhibited her diary, with all the details of the Bulgarian
theater performance. It showed that she had settled even-
thing with a "Signor Ivazov,"not on Mav I3 but on May S.
That v`~as her last appointment with him.
Zhelvo Vasilev, unmistakably the highest-ranking of
the three Bulgarians, was the least talkative. He denied
everything and offered no alibis.
HE TURKS' fabrications were no less preposterous.
The Gray Wolves leader based in Munich, Musa Ser-
dar Celebi, imprisoned since early November 1982, had
the dubious distinction of being the first defendant whose
egregious lies gave Agca's stor}' a ring of truth. Martella
wrote, "The reticence, contradictions, and pr~wen falsity
of his declarations, land] his absolute helplessness to put
up a valid line of defense ... prrn?ided the most suitable
corroboration for Agca's story."
Bekir Celenk, protesting that he w?as just a dealer in min-
eral water, claimed he had never met Agca, scarceh~ knew
Omer Mersan; had met Musa Serdar Celebi just once at
lunch with a Turkish movie producer, and had never done.
business with Bulgaria's notorious state enterprise, Kin-
tex. But Mersan finally admitted to knowing Celenk since
1979 and presenting him to Agca. Celebi was close enough
to be going into partnership with him in Munich. The
Turkish movie producer proved to be a fugitive dope traf-
ficker who, together with Celenk, was wanted in Europe
fora huge heroin deal. And Celenk's dealings with linter
were a matter of court record in several countries.
Surveying the ruins of Celenk's alibi; the judge Hated
two significant facts. ]Vo sooner had Celenk learned there
was an Italian arrest vt~arrant out for him than he fled
Munich and headed straight for Bulgaria. And no sooner
'did he get there than the Bulgarian authorities put him
"under control" and took his passport away. He cannot
leave the country, let alone talk finely. He will be tried in
absentia in Rome.
Omer Mersan was arrested in Munich on judge Martel-
Ia's warrant as "a false and reticent witness," and extradit-
ed to Italy in April 1984, where he was confronted with
hard evidence of his gangster connections. Martella had
learned that Mersan was up to his neck in the Turkish
Mafia's contraband traffic, that he carried 50 false pass-
ports, had excellent working relationships with Bulgarian
and Turkish customs police, was on intimate terms with
the director of the Hotel Vitosha in Sofia, and hobnobbed
with high-ranking Bulgarian officials. Faced with such tes-
timonyand along spell in .jail, Mersan confessed to practi-
tally everything Agca had said about him. In the end
Mersan was released and sent back to Germany:
/ALL OF these fallacies helped to verify Agca's story.
~~ This is not to say that in the course of his confession
he made an honest man of himself. As the investigation
drew toward a close in the summer of 1983, Agca retracted
a number of things he had said over the previous year. He
said that he hadn't known where Antonov worked before
his arrest, or visited his home; that he and Antonov had
not, as he had formerly insisted, actually carried explo-
sives to the Hotel Victoria in Rome when Lech 4~'alesa was
there. He claimed to have picked up details of this sort
from ne~~spapers and television, an interpreter who let
him see a phone book (~~here he found Balkan Airs num-
ber), and magistrates talking within earshot or informing
him of something as they were obliged to do by law.
"The Retraction," as it came to be called, caused an
uproar in the press and will doubtless be used b}' the
Bulgarians' lawyers as a dramatic centerpiece in the court-
room. Nevertheless, it did not contradict the body of Ag-
ca's confession. The details he .had found this way were
few and minor, the mass of corroborated evidence was
COAC;AtfB~
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.'~ .
intact-as Agca himself pointed out. "The plot against the
pope as I described it was real, and I want to reaffirm the
complicity of those I named," he declared.
On January 27, 1984, when Agca had gone over every
line of his testimony with judge Martella before swearing
to it, he was given a solemn warning. If he was falsely
accusing innocent people, he could get anywhere from
Eour to 20 more years tacked on to his life sentence. Por "so
grave and infamous a crime of slander," furthermore, he
would lose any trail hope of presidential clemency. "If, on
the other hand, you have committed slander and will re-
dress that before the investigation ends, vflurcondurxmay
be evaluated posuively to obtain the benefit of Article 87 of
the Italian Constitution: a pardon granted by the president
of the Republic. I invite you to reflect before you reply."
Agca answered, "I perfectly understand that if I have
accused innocent people, I would lose all chance of regain-
ing my liberty. On that premise, I repeat that the persons I
have accused-Sergei Antonov, Todor Aivasov, Zhelyo
Vasilev, f3ekir Celenk, Oral Celik, Musa Serdar Celebi,
Omer Bagci-were my accomplices in the attempt to as-
sassinate ['ope John Paul II." Whether that was the whole
truth and nothing but the truth remains for a judge of the
Italian Court of Assizes and six popular jurors to decide.
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