ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505090012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 10, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ARTICLE APPEARED
10 March 1986
STAT
The Philip ines
STAT
Anatomy o'?Ua Revolution
Forbearance, diplomatic skill and some luck led to the end of the Marcos era
It was the second time
that Paul Laxalt, the Nevada
Republican and personal
"Senator, what do you think?
Should I step down?"
versation with Reagan and Secretary of
State George Shultz. The President re-
peated his desire for a peaceful, negotiat-
ed settlement in the Philippines and said
once more that Marcos would be welcome
if he decided to seek sanctuary in the U.S.
But Reagan said he thought the idea of
power sharing was impractical and that it
would be undignified for Marcos to stay
on as a "consultant."
At 4:15 p.m. Laxalt called Marcos,
who immediately asked whether Reagan
wanted him to step down. Laxalt said the
President was not in a position to make
that kind of demand. Then Marcos put the
question directly to Laxalt: What should he
do? Replied the Senator: "Mr. President,
I'm not bound by diplomatic restraint. I'm
talking only for myself. I think you should
cut and cut cleanly. The time has come."
There was a long pause that to Laxalt
seemed interminable. Finally he asked,
"Mr. President, are you still there?" Mar-
cos replied, in a subdued voice. "Yes, I'm
still here. I am so very, very disappointed."
In Manila it was after 5 o'clock in the
morning of the longest day of Ferdinand
Marcos' life. Before it was over, he would
attend his final inauguration ceremony, a
foolish charade carried out in the sanctu-
ary of his Malacanang Palace. That eve-
ning, a ruler no more, he would flee with
his family and retainers aboard four
American helicopters to Clark Air Base
on the first leg of a flight that would take
him to Guam, Hawaii and exile.
That same night, to mark the end of
his increasingly authoritarian 20-year
rule, millions of his countrymen would
stage one of the biggest celebrations in the
Philippines since its deliverance from the
Japanese in 1945 and its independence
from the U.S. in 1946. At the Malacanang
Palace, giddy with excitement, hundreds
of Filipinos would scale fences and storm
their way through locked doors in order to
glimpse-and in some cases to loot-the
ornate Spanish-style palace that had
served as Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos'
seat of almost absolute power.
If there was something inexplicable
about the mass phenomenon that rescued
the island nation from a failing dictator-
ship, enabling thousands of unarmed
civilians to protect one faction of the
armed forces from the other, there was no
doubt when the process began. It was
Aug. 21, 1983, on the tarmac at Manila in-
ternational airport. On that day, Opposi-
tion Politician Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino
Jr., 50, returning from three years of self-
imposed exile in the U.S., was slain by a
single bullet as he stepped off a jetliner
into a crowd of soldiers and well-wishers.
Though Marcos tried to put the blame on
Communist agitators, one Filipino civil-
friend of Ronald Reagan's, had spoken
that day with Ferdinand Marcos, the be-
leaguered President of the Philippines. At
2 o'clock (EST) last Monday afternoon,
Marcos telephoned Laxalt, who had visit-
ed Manila in October as a special emis-
sary, with an urgent question: Was it true,
as U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth
had told him, that President Reagan was
calling for a "peaceful transition to a new
gov rnment" in the Philippines? While
th two men talked, Laxalt said later, it be-
came apparent that Marcos was "hanging
on, looking for a life preserver. He was a
desperate man clutching at straws." He
asked whether the reference to a "peaceful
transition" meant he should stay on until
1987, when his current term was originally
supposed to end, and he wondered wheth-
er some sort of power-sharing arrange-
ment with the Philippine opposition could
be worked out.
Marcos spoke of his fear that his pal-
ace was about to be attacked, but seemed
determined to stay on as President. At
Marcos' request, Laxalt then went to the
White House, where he discussed the con-
MURDER ON
THE TARMAC
Returning home after three
years in exile, former Senator
Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino Jr.
hoped to resume his opposition
to the rule of President
Ferdinand Marcos. As he was
led down the stairway from the
plane, he was struck and killed
by a single shot. His body lies
on the right. Aquino had a
statement he intended to read
at the airport: "It is now time
for the regime to decide. Order
my immediate execution or set
me free."
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ian and 25 members of the military, in-
cluding General Fabian Ver, the armed
forces Chief of Staff and Marcos stalwart,
were indicted on charges of conspiracy to
commit murder. The defendants were ac-
quitted in December after a yearlong trial,
but few Filipinos doubted their guilt.
The Aquino murder shocked and an-
gered the country, sparking popular demon-
strations and intensifying the disaffection
with Marcos. It infuriated thousands of pro-
fessional military men, who bitterly resent-
ed the politicization that the armed forces
were undergoing and the hatred that this
process was engendering. Of the assassina-
tion, Colonel Gregorio Honosan says today,
"From a military viewpoint, it is technically
impossible to get inside a cordon of 2,000
men, so this reinforced our belief that no-
body in government could be safe."
The assassination produced a sharp
increase in the size and intensity of Com-
munist guerrilla activity by the military
organization called the New People's
Army. Though the insurgency is concen-
trated on Mindanao and some other
southern islands, it spread after the
Aquino assassination to 60 of the coun-
try's 74 provinces. In addition, the killing
of Aquino created a nationwide crisis of
confidence that caused the already stag-
nant economy to spiral downward, even
as most other Southeast Asian nations
were prospering. After the assassination,
says an American official, "all these con-
cerns took a quantum leap."
Two of the most important elements
of Philippine society, the church and the
military, began quickly turning against
Marcos. The Archbishop of Manila,
Jaime Cardinal Sin, is a powerful figure in
a country nominally 85% Roman Catho-
lic, and his opposition to Marcos was
clear. He increasingly and openly encour-
aged opposition political figures.
A UNITED
OPPOSITION
"Cory! Cory! Cory!" her
supporters cried as Corazon
Aquino, widow of the slain
Benigno, entered the race for
the presidency. After a few days
of confusion, former Senator
Salvador Laurel abandoned his
own plans to run for the top
spot and agreed to be the
candidate for Vice President on
a unity ticket. Jaime Cardinal
Sin, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, played
an important role in getting the
two together.
A wistful, defeated ruler near the end
"I am so very, very disappointed. "
The revolt in the armed forces began
to take shape as long ago as 1977, when a
power struggle within the Marcos govern-
ment eroded the influence of the Presi-
dent's longtime political ally Defense Min-
ister Juan Ponce Enrile. "It began as a self-
defense action," recalls Navy Captain Rex
Robles, a spokesman for the Reform the
Armed Forces Movement, which Enrile
now confirms he clandestinely helped es-
tablish. Realizing that he was being
pushed aside in a power struggle with
General Ver, Enrile, a Harvard-trained
lawyer, began to work secretly to protect
himself and lay the groundwork for the in-
evitable post-Marcos period.
Late last fall events began to move
a.
rapidly. In November, Marcos declared
that he would hold a special presidential
election to convince the Reagan Adminis-
tration that he still enjoyed popular sup-
port. A month later, immediately follow-
ing the acquittal of Ver, Corazon Aquino
announced that she would challenge Mar-
cos for the presidency. Cardinal Sin then
helped persuade former Senator Salvador
Laurel to join the Aquino ticket. In the
meantime Enrile had been building his
reform-movement, a highly visible band
of about 100 well-trained soldiers whose
aim was not to topple Marcos but to pres-
sure him to reorganize the military.
Throughout the election campaign, while
Enrile publicly supported Marcos, his re-
formers conducted a crusade for honest
voting that angered the President and the
Ver faction in the military. The reformers
in turn were enraged by the strong-arm
methods used by the pro-Marcos forces in
the vote counting, and even more by the
assassination of Evelio Javier, a leading
opposition figure. Nonetheless they re-
mained inactive because they wanted to
appear impartial. The military men had
already established links with Corazon
Aquino, and before the campaign had
helped train her security detail.
Once the voting was over, the reform-
ers prepared to take a more active part in
the efforts to topple Marcos. By this
time they had won the support of some of
the Marcos family's closest security
forces. Says one reformist: "I don't think
the President thought that so many of his
praetorian guards would turn against
him. He thought money could buy loyalty.
He underestimated the basic decency of
Filipinos." The group tested palace
security by smuggling cars filled with
empty boxes into the palace grounds.
Since nobody bothered to stop them, they
realized they would be able to bring in ex-
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plosives if they should choose to do so.
Two weeks ago the reformers learned
that they were in imminent danger. As the
first step in a byzantine crackdown, Mar-
cos arrested a group of soldiers. Though
these troops were not members of the re-
form movement, the reformers theorized
that the men would be used to incriminate
them. The rebels suspected that the threat-
ened crackdown was a maneuver by Ver
and his supporters to reinforce their links
with Marcos. At the same time, however,
there were reports that some sort of coup
might actually be in the making.
Immediately the reformers decided to
accelerate their plans. They reached En-
rile, who was sitting in the coffeehouse in
the Atrium building in Makati, and in-
formed him of what was happening. On
Saturday. Feb. 22. Enrile resigned from
the government and announced that he
was joining the opposition forces. Some of
Enrile's reformist colleagues tried to con-
vince him that such a move would merely
forewarn Marcos of the group's inten-
to the President otherwise."
General Fidel Ramos' help. "I called Ed
die. I had never discussed anything with
him over the years, except in terms of the
reform movement's general lack of ag-
gressive intentions and its interest in insti-
tutional change. I told him, 'My boys are
in this predicament, and I will have to be
with them. I would like to find out wheth-
er you will join us or not.' General Ramos
said. 'I am with you all the way.'"
At the moment of showdown, Cardi-
nal Sin again played a crucial role. He
publicly praised Enrile and Ramos, and
called on the Philippine people to take to
the streets in peaceful support of them.
Radio Veritas, the Catholic station, be-
came the unofficial broadcaster of the re-
LE OF THE
01 BOXES
After the election, the results
were immediately contested.
Supporters of the candidates
often clashed as returns were
carried to central locations.
Amid charges of violence, fraud
and tampering, both Marcos
and Aquino claimed victory.
Members of a 20-member
delegation of U.S. observers
noted widespread cheating. Said
Senator Richard Lugar: "The
count is being shaped to what
the President needs."
bellion, reporting on military units that
had joined the opposition and giving in-
structions to crowds.
In the end the ailing Marcos, who is re-
ported to be suffering from a form of sys-
temic lupus erythematosus, a disease in
which human antibodies attack the body's
tissue, especially the kidneys, was woefully
uninformed as to what the reformers were
really up to and how much support they
had gained. Says Enrile: "Evidently the
President was a captive of a group in the
military. That was the sad thing about it."
eagan Administration policy dur-
ing the final hours of the Marcos
reign was set during a meeting
last Sunday morning in the Be-
thesda, Md., home of Secretary of State
George Shultz, at which the President's
special envoy, Philip Habib. who had re-
turned from Manila only hours before.
presented a report on his trip. In atten-
dance were Caspar Weinberger, the Sec-
retary of Defense; Admiral William
Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; Robert Gates, deputy director for
intelligence of the Central Intelligence
Agency: and John oin exter, the a-
tiona urity Adviser. Also present were
three officials who had been preoccupied
with the Philippine crisis for months: Mi-
chael Armacost. Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs; Paul Wolfowitz. As-
sistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs; and Richard Armi-
tage. Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.
The group agreed on four principles.
which were subsequently presented to
President Reagan: Marcos' ability to gov-
ern with the consent of- his people had
ended: any effort by him to crush the re-
form movement would only worsen the
situation; it was of great importance to the
3
U.S. that force not be used; and it would
be damaging to U.S. standing in the world
if Marcos were treated like the Shah of
Iran, who was admitted to the U.S. for
medical treatment but was not permitted
by the Carter Administration to remain.
As it turned out, Marcos was less worried
about the fate of the Shah than about
what happened to Ngo Dinh Diem. the
South Vietnamese President who was as-
sassinated during a 1963 coup. Says one
senior American official: "He wanted to
make sure he did not leave with a bullet."
President Reagan, who had once sol-
idly supported Marcos, quickly accepted
the four-point policy. Reagan's views had
already been shifting during the previous
three weeks. Indeed, in response to Mar-
cos' deteriorating situation, he had moved
rapidly from his dismaying remark after
the election that there had probably been
voting fraud on both sides to a White
House statement condemning the election
as fatally flawed by fraud, most of it on the
part of the Marcos forces.
At a Sunday-afternoon meeting of the
National Security Council, Special Envoy
Habib reported flatly, "The Marcos era
has ended." Shultz summarized the views
of the participants by saying that "not a
person here" believed Marcos could re-
main in power, adding, "He's had it."
President Reagan agreed but remained
concerned about the fate of Marcos. Said
Reagan: "We'll treat this man in retire-
ment with dignity. He is not to wander."
By then the Administration was em-
phasizing as strongly as possible that Mar-
cos should avoid a military showdown. On
Saturday. Reagan sent the Philippine
leader an appeal not to use force to remain I
in power. Next day he dispatched a second
message. advising Marcos that he as well
as his family and close associates was wel-
come to live in the U.S. White House
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Spokesman Larry Speakes announced
that American military aid to the Philip-
pines would be cut off if troops loyal to
Marcos used the army against the Philip-
pine reform movement forces led by En-
rile and Ramos. On Sunday evening,
Shultz and Under Secretary of State Ar-
macost met at the State Department with
Bias Ople, Marcos' Minister of Labor, who
had come to Washington to plead the Phil-
ippine President's case. According to
Ople, the American diplomats gave him a
blunt message: Marcos had lost control of
his army, the troops under General Ver
were ineffectual, and if Marcos did not
step down, the country could be heading
for civil war. A similar statement was sent
to the U.S. Ambassador in Manila, Ste-
phen Bosworth, who took it to Marcos.
It was early Monday morning before
Ople finally managed to talk to Marcos by
telephone. The Philippine President was
angry that while his palace was being
threatened and his television station tak-
en over, the U.S. was telling him not to de-
fend himself. He told Ople that Mrs. Mar-
cos was there beside him and "she doesn't
want to leave." Later that day, at about
the same time Marcos was calling Senator
Laxalt, Imelda Marcos telephoned Nan-
cy Reagan. The message was the same:
Mrs. Reagan urged the Marcoses to avoid
bloodshed, expressed concern for their
family, and assured Mrs. Marcos that
they were welcome to come to the U.S.
The Administration was worried
about General Ver, who on Monday was
still in a position to attempt a last-gasp
military move. There were reports that he
was about to send tanks to attack the re-
formers. Accordingly, the National Secu-
rity Council sent a message to Ver advis-
ing him that it would not be in his
"interest" to make a military move.
Translation: if he called out troops, he
would forfeit his chance of being included
in the Marcos rescue operation. The
warning was heeded.
I n the period following the Aquino as-
sassination, American policymakers
had become increasingly concerned
about the Philippines' rapid political
and economic decline. One particular
concern was the future status of the two
large U.S. military installations in the
Philippines, Clark Air Base and Subic
Bay Naval Base. The leases on those facil-
ities will run out in 1991, but the U.S.
hopes that they can be renegotiated. Fol-
lowing a 1984 policy review by the Na-
tional Security Council, which concluded
that Marcos would "try to remain in pow-
er indefinitely," the Administration be-
gan to work for economic, political and
military reform in the Philippines. Shultz
laid down the overriding principle: the
U.S. must be loyal to the institutions of de-
mocracy, not to Marcos.
In October, Reagan sent Senator Lax-
alt to Manila to tell Marcos that changes
had to be made. Said Laxalt last week:
"He was getting messages through State,
but he just wasn't believing them." Laxalt
told him that the Philippine army had to
spend more time dealing with the Com-
munist insurgents.
Pressure on Marcos was also building
in the U.S. Congress. Senator Richard Lu-
gar, Indiana Republican and chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, who
headed an official American team of poll
watchers that observed the elections. con-
cluded that there had been many in-
stances of fraud, vote tampering, violence
and intimidation by Marcos partisans. In
a telephone conversation with Marcos.) .ist
after the voting, Laxalt observed that cer-
tain aspects of the elections had been
"rather strange," such as reports that
Marcos had carried one province by a
vote of 13,000 to 0. That was not a prov-
ince, it was a precinct, said Marcos, and
"it was family." When Laxalt answered,
"I doubt very much if I ran in my home
district I would get all the votes of my
family," Marcos, who knew that the Sena-
tor's parents were French Basque immi-
grants, replied, "Well, Filipinos are more
clannish than you independent Basques."
Washington's fear of a bloodbath was
not unfounded. Early Monday morning a
crowd of Marcos supporters armed with
batons and tear gas moved toward Camp
Crame, where the reformers were gath-
ered. Over transistor radios, Marcos was
heard vowing, "We'll wipe them out. It is
obvious they are committing a rebellion."
And over Radio Veritas came Enrile's re-
ply, "I am not going to surrender."
Tanks arrived. When helicopters
from the 15th strike wing of the air force
began circling overhead, it looked as if the
reformist rebellion was all over. If the
choppers had fired into the Enrile-Ramos
headquarters, the reformers would have
been helpless. But then the choppers land-
ed, and out came airmen waving white
flags and giving the "L" sign for laban
(fight), a symbol of the opposition. Sud-
denly the crowd, realizing that the air
force was now defecting, went wild.
Perhaps the most ominous moment
came that same morning, shortly after
Marcos announced on a televised news
conference that he was declaring a state of
emergency. At that point his armed forces
Chief of Staff, General Ver, whispered to
Marcos in a voice that was audible to the
REBELLION IN
THE ARMY
Defense Minister Juan Ponce
Enrile had secretly helped
organize a military reform
movement. After hearing news
of a threatened crackdown on
the group, Enrile openly broke
with the dictator and went over
to the opposition. Also joining
the rebellion was Lieut. General
Fidel Ramos. The Enrile-
Ramos defection was the
crucial event in the final
transfer of power.
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whole nation, "Sir, we are ready to anni-
hilate them at your orders ... We are left
with no option but to attack." Marcos did
not respond. Whether he knew it or not,
his failure to move swiftly against Enrile
and Ramos, one of the more honorable
acts of his tarnished presidency, had al-
ready cost him the office he was fighting
so desperately to retain.
Instead he went on with his press con-
ference, but at 8:47 he was interrupted in
mid-sentence as the government-run tele-
vision station, Channel 4, suddenly went
off the air. When it reappeared three
hours later, the newscaster jubilantly de-
clared, "This is the first free broadcast of
Channel 4 ... The people have taken
over." Beside him was Colonel Mariano
Santiago, who until last year had been the
Marcos-appointed chairman of the coun-
try's Board of Transportation. To many
Filipinos, the seizure of Channel 4 was
one of the most remarkable events of an
endlessly astonishing week.
Tuesday was the day of the twin inau-
gurals. Aquino had wanted a daylight cer-
emony because, as she said in her address,
"it is fitting and proper that, as the rights
and liberties of our people were taken
away at midnight 14 years ago [when
martial law was declared), the people
should formally recover those rights and
liberties in the full light of day." An hour
later Ferdinand Marcos stepped onto the
balcony at Malacanang Palace before a
crowd of 4,000 cheering supporters and
took the oath of office. "Whatever we
have before us, we will overcome," he
promised, while Imelda vowed to serve
the people "all my life up to my last
breath," Though she was choked with
emotion, few people outside the palace
sensed that this was to be the Marcoses'
;J:1 "IIJ
EXILE
IN HAWAII
Two and a half years after the
murder of Benigno Aquino, an
obviously ailing Ferdinand
Marcos stepped out of a U.S.
Air Force transport at Hickam
Air Force Base, near Honolulu.
His 20-year presidency was at
an end. Only hours after being
inaugurated for the last time,
Marcos realized he had lost
control of his own military and
accepted an American offer of
sanctuary.
farewell. Then the Marcoses sang favorite
songs, at one point offering a duet to the
cheers of the invited guests. Conspicuous-
ly absent was Marcos' Vice President, Ar-
turo Tolentino, who later said that he had
not wanted to take the oath of office be-
cause he hoped to play an intermediary
role between Marcos and the reformists.
An hour after the ceremony, Mar-
cos telephoned Enrile and de-
manded that he "stop firing at
the palace." Enrile said he had
no troops there. Marcos asked him to call
Ambassador Bosworth to find out if the
U.S. could provide the Marcoses with se-
curity in flying out of the palace. Enrile
promised to do so. Marcos had previously
raised the possibility of retiring to Ilocos
Norte, his home province in the northern
Philippines, but had been discouraged
from doing so by his family and by the
new government. At 9:05 p.m., four
American helicopters picked up the Pres-
ident. Imelda and a contingent of rela-
tives and aides, including General Ver,
and flew them to the U.S. air base.
As the week ended. Reagan Adminis-
tration policymakers breathed a great
sigh of relief that their plans and strate-
gies, so painstakingly worked out over the
past two years. had gone so well. Both Re-
publicans and Democrats praised the
handling of the Philippine crisis. Officials
counted themselves incredibly lucky
Noting that events had passed without
appreciable bloodshed, a senior U.S. rtfi-
cial in Washington ruefully remarked
that the Lord surely looks after "fools.
children, the Philippines and the U.S.A
After its initial concern about how the
inexperienced Corazon Aquino would
fare as President. the Administration was
S,
relieved that she gave important jobs to
Laurel, Enrile, Ramos and other centrists,
and adopted so conciliatory a tone toward
her former opponents. Already there were
hints of trouble ahead over the Marcoses'
relocation, whether they decided to settle
in Hawaii. California, New York or else-
where, and over the legal status of Mar-
cos' properties abroad. Though Marcos'
only known income was his presidential
salary of $5,700 a year, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency has reportedly estimated
the value of his family's worldwide hold-
ings-at Perhaps $2 billion. New York's
Democratic Congressman Stephen Solari
observed mildly last week, "There is a
strong presumption that he had a very
good financial adviser or acquired the
millions of dollars he has through pre-
sumptively improper means." Aboard the
plane that carried Marcos to Hawaii, fed-
eral authorities found $1.2 million in Phil-
ippine currency, and another planeload of
Marcos' personal effects arrived at week's
end. Solarz said that while he thought it
was appropriate for Reagan to offer Mar-
cos sanctuary, the President had certainly
not offered Marcos "immunity against
civil proceedings brought by the govern-
ment of the Philippines to recover a for-
tune stolen from the Philippines."
But for the moment the Administra-
tion was relieved to have passed the cen-
ter of the storm. Even as he praised Mar-
cos for his "difficult and courageous
decision" to step down. Reagan congratu-
lated Aquino on the "democratic out-
come" of the elections and promised to
work closely with her government in re-
building the Philippine economy and
armed forces. -By William E. Snath.
Reported by Sand'a Burton/Mardla, and /oha,na
McGeary and Willem Stewart/Washington
clnntinued
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