U.S. USING COVERT AID IN PLACE OF SOUND POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000404640009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 3, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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`"7;^a E APPEARED
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
3 February 1985
S. using covert aid in
lace of sound policy
By James O'Shea
WASHINGTON-Congress will
wrestle once again with whether
the United States should be in the
cloak-and-dagger business of fund-
ing covert wars in faraway places.
The debate will focus in
upcoming weeks on the Central
intelligence Agency's so-called
"secret war" against the Sandinis-
ta government in Nicaragua. Last
year, Congress voted to provide
S14 million in "covert aid" to 12,000
to 15,000 rebels trying to topple the
leftist Sandinistas. The money
can't be released, though, unless
the Senate and House approve it in
votes expected soon.
But that Congress is openly de-
bating the U.S. role in the not-so-
secret war against Nicaragua ex-
poses a major gaffe in American
national security and foreign poli-
cy.
They range from left-wing views
that all covert actions are evil, to
the opinions of conservatives such
as Rep. Henry Hyde [R., Ill.], a
member of the House Intelligence
Committee. Hyde thinks the U.S.
should use covert action, though it
probably means a few innocent
people might be hurt or even
killed.
"Nicaragua is not Iowa. Things
will happen in a guerrilla war that
no one is proud of," Hyde said.
"You can't walk through a bad
neighborhood with a French
poodle. Sometimes you need a
Doberman."
Nevertheless, some experts say
that U.S. covert actions known to
exist seem to flow from ambiguous
and contradictory policies hatched
in secrecy by a handful of people
with few clear objectives.
"Covert action tends to be used
Nicaragua is not the only place _ as a convenient substitute for poli-
supporting covert actions. U.S.
money also is pouring into Afghan-
istan and other nations, some of
which are known only by a handful
of spy masters.
Yet the debate clearly shows
that the Reagan administration
and Congress have not determined
what role, if any, covert action
should play in contemporary
poli-
cies governing national defense
and relations with other countries.
There is no dearth of opinions
about the proper role that covert
actions should play in U.S. foreign
policy.
James O'Shea is a member of
The Tribune's Washington bureau.
U.S. government has been unable
or unwilling to . formulate," said
Sen. Malcolm Wallop [R.,
Wyoming], a former member of
the Senate Intelligence Committee
who wrote recently in the Strategic
Review journal that covert aid
should be one . element of a
coherent foreign policy.
But "in a democracy, no action,
however covert, ought to be under-
taken unless it can be confidently
defended in public," Wallop added.
Nowhere is the nonpolicy on
covert actions more apparent than
in Congress.
On the one hand, many liberal
Democrats wince at stories about
bands of U.S.-financed mercenar-
ies roaming across nations such as
Honduras and Nicaragua on ill-
defined missions, killing friends
and enemies alike,
They demand specific informa-
tion from the CIA on the opera-
tions and they are outraged when
kept in the dark about operations
such as the CIA's role in mining
Nicaraguan harbors last year.
Yet many of these same
lawmakers actively support mil-
lions of dollars more in covert aid
for rebels engaged in similar ac- .
tivities in Afghanistan. In recent
months, newspaper stories have
suggested that enormous amounts 1
of taxpayer money intended for
the Afghan rebels has been
siphoned off in the covert-aid
pipeline. In contrast to the de-
mands for details on Nicaragua,
though, few lawmakers have de-
manded an accounting on Afghani-
stan.
The situation in Nicaragua is the
logical conclusion of the policy
vacuum. U.S. policy-makers think
they have a moral obligation to
oppose what they view as creeping
communism, particularly in places
where the spark of a resistance
movement can be identified.
"After years of guerrilla insur-
gencies led by communists against
pro-Western governments, we now
see dramatic and heartening ex-
amples of popular insurgencies
against communist regimes," Sec-
retary of State George Shultz told
the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee last week.
Incorporating this philosophy
into U.S. foreign policy would be
very difficult, because of the hard
decisions that would have to be
made, and the implications of
those choices around the world.
c4ntinue4
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The easiest way out is the secret
way, a covert operation. That a]-
lows action in the absence of a
clear policy and ideally avoids any
messy public debates.
From its beginning, according to
supporters-and opponents of aid to
the contra fighters, the goals of the
CIA aid have been unclear. When
Congress originally provided
money for the contras, the CIA
said it was needed to interdict
weapons flowing from Nicaragua
to leftists fighting the nearby gov-
ernment of E1 Salvador. As U.S.
money flowed in, the contras grew
in number to their current strength
of about 13,000.
But it subsequently became
clear that the U.S.-supported con-
tras were trying to overthrow the
Sandinista government, particular-
ly after the CIA got caught helping
mine Nicaragua's harbors and pro-
ducing a guerrilla warfare manual
that was a blueprint for toppling
the Managua government, accord-
ing to Rep. Lee Hamilton [D.,
Ind.], chairman of the House Intel-
ligence Committee.
Support in Congress for continu-
ing funding eroded, particularly as
last year's election neared, and
Congress refused to provide the
Reagan administration with $28
million it wanted for the contras.
Instead, lawmakers approved .S14
million for the contras, but said
the money couldn't be spent until
Congress voted to release the
funds.
For the last six months, about
13,000 armed rebels have been
wandering around Nicaragua, a
country with a population of about
2.9 million. That's like having
100,000 armed mercenaries wan-
dering around the U.S.
The results have not been par-
ticularly favorable. U.S. allies in
the region, such as Honduras, are
starting to wonder what will hap-
pen if Congress refuses to release
the money. Most observers expect
the administration to lose the vote
for the money. The contras al-
ready use Honduras as a base, and
Honduran officials fear this rebel-
lious and well-armed group of
migrants.
Even in the best of times, the
CIA apparently has struggled to
maintain control over the contras.
In a letter to lawmakers last year,
CIA director William Casey said
the agency helped produce the
guerrilla warfare manual after
agents heard of contras attacking
common citizens.
Some of the attacks were brutal,
according to statements accompa-
nying a lawsuit challenging U.S.
policy in Nicaragua. For example,
many Nicaraguans recounted at-
tacks on their homes by contras..
One woman, Odili Moncada de
Espinoza, told of a 21.12-hour contra
attack on her village.
After the attack, she emerged
from hiding at her mother's home
to look for her son and husband.
"I came out immediately and
was told that 15 townpeople had
been murdered and among them
was my son, Luis Alberto. They
also told me the counter-revolu-
tionaries had kidnaped my hus-
band. I went looking for my son
and I found him-a corpse over a
barricade. A grenade had killed
him," she said.
Some of the tales are propagan-
da floated as the vote on funding
the contras deaws closer. Even
opponents of more money to the
contras, such as Sen. David Duren-
berger [R., Minn.), chairman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee.
discount some of the stories.
But the indecision, the horror
stories and the lack of a clear goal
have taken a toll. Even supporters
of the aid confess they don't know
what to do about the money. Hyde
said he fa .'ors giving it to the
contras, but he points out that it no
longer is covert aid.
"Covert aid ought to be covert
aid," he said, "and this is the least
covert I've ever experienced."'
Some have suggested that the U.S.
simply aid the contras overtly, es-
pecially because many opponents
to the aid are against it simply
because it is covert.
But as Hyde pointed out, that
presents difficult problems. "We
can't support them overtly because
that is an act of war. We simply
can't do that without bringing in
all sorts of difficulties."
So Congress is wrestling with
other solutions, such as pressuring
U.S. allies in the region to provide
money to the contras in return for
additional U.S. aid.
Though none of these questions
has been resolved, it is clear that
Congress and the CIA have yet to
learn what Rep. Les Aspin [D.,
Wis.], chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee, called
a basic lesson.
Covert actions, he said, are not
like defective automobiles. "Once
sold, they can rarely be recalled."
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