POLICY MAY NOW REFLECT TOUGH TALK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000404560002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 5, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

.STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000404560002-2
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Herald Washington Bureau.
`['Q J ASHINGTON - President
W -Reagan and his inner-circle
of advisers have taken di-
rect control of--US.:.policy.on Cen=
tral America in a move that may
toughen the administration's role in
the turbulent region. - -
A hardened position would be
clearly in tune with recent Reagan
rhetoric about the priority he places
on stopping Marxist subversion. in
Central America. Since March, the
President has made six major
speeches that touched on the issue,
including an exceptional appear-
ance before a joint session of Con-
gress April 27 in which he warned
that the region's violence could
threaten "the safety of our home-
land.
Speculation that the tough Rea-
gan position will get tougher gained
currency May 27 with the ouster of
Thomas 0. Enders as the State De-
ministration officials announced-a
specialist. Administration officials
said Reagan personally ordered En-
ders' dismissal. ?
Reagan has since stressed that
Enders' dismissal as assistant secre-
tar~ of state for inter-American af-
fairs did not mean a change in
poli- cy. "Contrary to some reports ... .
we are not changing the policy I
outlined to the Congress," he said
Wednesday.
But lntervlew3 with half a dozen
State Department and White House
officials indicate that Enders' re-
moval could result in any or all of
these developments:
? More active and overt support
for pro-American governments in
Guatemala. El Salvador, Honduras
and Costa Rica. as well as the CIA-
backed rebels fighting Nicaragua's'
leftist regime.
olicy may 11
the dispatch of U.S. combat troops.
? An _-end to the interagency
feuds-on Central American policy
that sometimes .created the impres-
sion -both here and abroad that the
United States was confused on how
to deal with Central America.
? New tactics in dealing with
Congress, which has failed to enact
Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative,
cut part of his requests for military
assistance to El Salvador and tried
to curtail CIA assistance for anti-
Sandinista guerrillas.
-? More personnel changes.
The.-day -Enders'. departure was
announced. the Pentagon and State
Department released a strongly
worded background paper on Sovi-
et-Cuban-Nicaraguan - meddling in
.Central America. 'Enders was said
to have opposed it as "warmed-up.
leftovers." At the same time, ad-
decision to send 100 additional U.S.
military advisers to Honduras and
leaked a proposal to send 20 or 30
-others to Guatemala.
Some State Department officials
said these developments could re-
flect a desire on the part of some
White House officials to prepare
public opinion for an escalation of
U.S. involvement in the region.
Hard-line White House and Pen- -
tagon officials contend that only an
increased and more active U.S. mili-
tary presence in Central America
would check.the advance of leftist
guerrillas in El Salvador and the
growing military buildup in Nicara-
gua.
Privately, these officials say they
believe that only a, dramatic in-
crease in the number of US..mili-
tary advisers in El Salvador --from
the present 55 to 100 or 200 - will
bring about victory. .
combat operations in guerrilla-con-
trolled areas.
This differs sharply with Enders'
formula for El Salvador. He sought
not a military victory, but only
enough U.S. military aid to help the
local government hold off the rebels
while it pressed for social, political
and economic reforms to eliminate
the roots of the conflict.
Although some of Enders' friends
believe his removal does not spell
any major change in policy - "It
can't go any further to the right
than it already has," quipped one of
them - many say that his depar-
ture clears the decks for harder
U.S. initiatives.
. A State Department source sym-
pathetic'-to Enders said that "cir-
cumstantial evidence" suggests that
Reagan may be considering deploy-
ing U.S. combat units in Central
America - not necessarily in the
actual conflicts of El Salvador or
Nicaragua but on the periphery, -
perhaps Honduras - to act as a de-
terrent force.
-.Pentagon sources said that such a
deployment would only be likely in
the event of war between Nicara-
gua,and Honduras or a dramatic in-
,crease in the number of Cuban mili-
_ Lary personnel in Nicaragua.
A legislative aide to an influential
Democrat on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee commented
that Enders'. removal and a Reagan
statement May 27 "clearly indicat-
ed" to him that the White House
was considering deploying U.S.
troops. I S
Although Reagan had steadfastly
ruled out the possibility of sending
combat troops to Central America,
he seemed to change his stance in a
chat with reporters just before the
Williamsburg summit at the end of
May.
T'. f3'}1V7-77vTn-n
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000404560002-2
MIAMI HERALD
5 June 1983
to
gh ilk
American public for-increased U.S. also argue that a limited-number of
-military involvement in Central advisers should be given permission