THE CIA'S NEW BAY OF BUCKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000404440168-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 168
• Publication Date: September 23, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/29: CIA-RDP90-00552R000404440168-2
r t, 2 3 S E P 1074
The' United States Government ad-
hered to a policy of nonintervention in
Chile's internal affairs during the Allen-
de period.
-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Harry Schlaudeman
We bought no cotes, we funded no
candidates, we promoted no coups.
-Fourier Assistant Secretary of State
Charles Meyer
to1 try. to induce the Chilean Congress-
sitting as an electoral college-to pass
over Allende. After this scheme crum-
bled, the CIA was given $5 million to
spend over the next three years to "de-
stabilize" the the the Marxist regime August t 19733,
ready in deep trouble, the 40 Committee
decided to throw in S1 million more.
Kissinger was accurate
"Technically
,
The CIA had nothing to do with the when he said that the CIA didn't pull
the coup, remarked one expert. "But
COUP ...
-Secretary, of State Henry Kissinger how All can Allende e work for three years to up-
set and then claim you didn't
Month after month, Nixon Administra- have anything to do with the coup?"
tion officials had come before Con- The fact that the Nixon Administra-
gress and testified that the United States tion managed to keep its war against
was free of any involvement in the Allende secret indicated anew how lit-
events leading up to last September's Ad leverage Congress has over the CIA.
Chilean coup. Then last week those same The agency, an arm of the executive
lawmakers learned that the White House branch, reports in theory to four Con-
had, in fact, authorized CIA expendi- i.gressional subcommittees. But there is
tures of SS million in Chile from 1970 to a reluctance among veteran members of
1973 in a clandestine effort to undermine these panels to ask too many questions.
the Marxist government of Salvador The clandestine services, give them a
Allende. "I couldn't believe my eyes," peek under the rug and .their eyes pop,"
said Massachusetts Congressman Mi- one CIA source said. "it-doesn't take
chacl Harrin long before the Congressional overseers
gton after reacting a top- >
secret briefing to a House subcommittee acquire that old-school feeLng."
by CIA director William Colby. "Here While there seemed little inclination
everyone from to to bottom in the Ad- to go after the CIA, which was only
ministration had been insisting we had carrying out White House orders, feel-
nothing to do with it-and the it was, ings were running stronger about the
10 pa es in black and white ... telling in testimony of Administration ofncials. And
clinical detail how we were engaged up a number of lawmakers felt any effort to
to our eyebrow's." get to the bottom of the Chilean story
The revelations about the CIA's activi- should start with the testimony of Henry'
ties in Chile broke in the press just as the Kissinger. Nz\ys-,vEES's Bruce van Voorst
_. .. __ _ __..__-.__-. - -__ reported that it appeared that Kissinger
fire storm over the Nixon pardon put an
abrupt end to Congress's honeymoon
with Gerald Ford. And in the revived
mood of anguish and acrimony, Washing-
ton reacted to the CIA story with deep
dismay. Although there was no proof
that the CIA had any direct role in the
actual coup that toppled Allende, it was
clear that Congress was deliberately mis-
led about the scope and degree of U.S.
meddling in internal Chilean affairs. Sev-
eral lawmakers started an investigation to
determine whether. State Department
officials who testified before them on
Chile could be prosecuted for perjury.
And the controversy loomed as a serious
political challenge to-Henn, Kissinger,
who apparently was the motive force be-
hind the anti-Allende campaign in his
role as head of the supersecret CIA
board of overseers known a the "40
Committed" (page 52) sec rtcK
Bribe: At the very least, last week's
revelations embarrassed the CLA more
than anything since details of the Bay
of Pigs fiasco became public. As the lat-
est story was pieced together, the CIA
first distributed Si milbo:i among Allen-
de's opponents in hope of defeating him
pushed the covert operations against Al-
lende even though the State Depart-
ment and the CIA were not too enthusi-
astic about the idea. "Henry had a tick
about Chile," one 40 Committee staffer
told van Voorst. At a meeting of the
panel that took place in June 1970, an-
other source said, Kissinger declared:
"'I don't see why we need to stand by
and watch a country go Communist due
to the irresponsibility of its own people."
Disclosure of the U.S. campaign against
Allende caused scarcely a ripple last
week in Santiago, where most politicians
have correctly believed for years that
the CIA was deeply involved in Chilean
politics. But the news created a sensa-
tion in many foreign capitals, and revived
all the old doubts and suspicions about
CIA activities in far comers of the world.
The U.S. ambassador to India, Daniel
Patrick Moynilhan, cabled Kissinger that
the reports had confirmed Prime Min-
ister Indira Candhi?s "worst suspicions
and genuine fears" about American pol-
4 . C. S
U i0041410 k
Kissinger, "but that we wvould be content tl
to see others-like her-overthrown.'
Political considerations aside, there
was also the question of morality. Kissin-
ger himself is known to believe that ,
there is a valid philosophical question
whether democracies such as the U.S.
should engage in such clandestine activi-
ties-and if so, how Congress should be
kept informed. Many congressmen-even
some of those who were most critical of
the Chilean revelations-would probably
agree with CIA director Colby that in
the harsh world of big-power politics
the U.S. is left with little choice but to
engage in some covert activities. As
Colby said last week during a two-day
Washington conference on the CIA's ac-
tivities: ' I think it would be mistaken to
deprive our nation of the possibility of
some moderate covert-action response to
a foreign problem and leave us with
nothing between a diplomatic protest and
sending in the marines. At the same time,
however, the Administration officials who
send secret agents into action cannot.?x-
pect much public support in a demo-
cracy if they lie to the people's repre-
sentatives in Congress.
Despite official denials. Washing-
ton learned last week that the CL4 had
secretly campaigned to` undermine.
Chile's Marxist government. With files
from Bruce van --ourst, --Milton Ben-
jamin assesses the controversy.
STAT
STAT
in they 19 0 Prpciclpntial election. \Vhen Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/29: CIA-RDP90-00552R000404440168-2