NBC MEETS THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000404230008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 31, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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NBC MEET THE PRESS
31 July 1983
KALB: Good day from Washington. I am Marvin Kalb, inviting you to Meet the Press
with Congressman Bob Michel of Illinois, the number one Republican in the House of
Representatives.
ANNOUNCER: Meet the Press, an unrehearsed press conference, is a public affairs
presentation of NBC News.
lALB: Our guest today on Meet the Press is Congressman Bob Michel of Illinois,
Republican leader of the House of Representatives. A member of the house for 26
years, Mr. Michel has been serving recently as chief spokesman in the House for
administration policies in Central America. Our reporters today are James Risser of
The Des Moines Register; Paul "Luvsdorf of The Dallas Morning News; Don *Oberdorfer of
The Washington Post; and to open the questioning, our regular panelist Bill Monroe,
with NBC News. MONROE: Congressman Michel, the House voted Thursday night to cut off
secret aid to the rebels fighting the government of Nicaragua using bases in Honduras.
Now, that vote does not now have the effect of law, but do you expect President Reagan
to take note of that vote and to modify his policies? MICHEL: Well, I think it's
quite obvious that we knew we had trouble with that vote earlier on when the whole
discussion began. I would suspect, however, that the resolution that we passed in the
House would not, would die'of warning in the Senate. If per chance it did pass the
Senate, obviously the president would veto it. And with the kind of vote we had in
the house of Representatives, his will would be sustained. But that isn't. to say the
issue has gone away. I think when we have to authorize for the Intelligence Committee
and all the rest later on, after tbey recess, the issue may very well have to be
enjoined again.
MONROE: Some Democrats are saying when that issue is joined again, as you have
sketched, and they have to put up money for the CIA and other organizations, that if
the house deletes money, deletes money for this secret war against Nicaragua, then the
administration will have to stop covert aid to those rebels. Is that correct?
MICHEL: Well, there's no question about it. The. uh, the president, you know, can
only spend that which is authorized by the Congress. So that'll be a very key
decision at that time.
MONROE: Congressman, the administration says that the whole purpose of its secret aid
to these rebels in Nicaragua was to interdict the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El
Salvador. The Democrats in the house are now saying, 'Fine. We will put up the same
amcunt of money to do that in an open way.' What's the matter with that? MICHEL:
Well, the problem is it's gonna cost considerably more. And I'm talking about
hundreds of millions of dollars. The estimates are, for example, overt action simply
to seal off the borders, I guess, of El Salvador would be in the neighborhood of $300
zillion the first year, a hundred million dollars for the next succeeding years.
Actually what we've been doing up to this point, we're getting done for a lot fewer
dollars actually being appropriated, and I think it's been fairly successful. Now,
Democrats have been critical because rather than simply interdicting, the interdiction
of arms, there have been those who have been rallying to the cause to interdict those
arms, who've been making statements to the effect that they have some other things in
mind, possibly, with the unsettling of things in Nicaragua. Now, admittedly. we have
no control over the individual statements of those individuals, but I think it's kind
of an ancilliary effect, a side effect that takes place when you've once rallied them
to your cause to do your bidding. But that is a bone of contention.
K.LB: Our guest on Meet the Press, the House Republican Leader Bob Michel. Mr.
STAT oerdor f er?
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OBERDORFER: Congressman, I would like to follow up on a couple of things you said a
moment ago. As I understand you, you're saying that if the house doesn't vote the
money for the counterrevolutionary activity in Nicaragua, there's no question but what
the administration can't spend it. What is your estimate of the likelihood that the
House, having voted to cut off the money, will reverse itself now and vote the money
later on? MICHEL: Well, I think that's always a possibility. When members realize
that the option here is one of overt versus covert assistance and the overt assistance
would be so much more expensive at a time of budget restraints and monumental funds
for defense, some members might have some second thoughts about it. And frankly,
there'll be an interval of time between now and that time in which the folks out there
in the country can speak to their individually elected members of Congress. And my
personal feeling is that this whole issue is one that ought to be talked about more
informatively by our constituencies out there, who, frankly, up to this point, have
not, I don't think, recognized fully what the problem is, number one, and number two,
what the administration policy is to deal with that problem.
OBERDORFER: Well, of course, as I heard the debate in these last several days, in the
House, the real question wasn't the money or how much money was to be spent. The
question was the Democratic leadership and a lot of other people felt it was wrong for
the United States to be financing an invasion of another country. And their covert
money was for the purpose of not going into Nicaragua, but helping these other
countries. Do you think that they're gonna change their mind about the idea of
financing an invasion of Nicargua between now and the fall, and if so, why? MICHEL:
Well, I have a problem with calling it an invasion of Nicaragua. And you'll have to
look at the geographics of that region to recognize what you're doing by way of
interdicting arms going from Nicaragua to El Salvador. And unless you're going to
have the kind of force.... You know, in Vietnam we spent probably upwards of $3
billion trying to seal off a particular area or sanctuary. When you get to this very
complicated business of actually sealing off a border, it gets to be very expensive.
I'm not sure whether or not our opponents in this thing would like to commit American
troops to part of that effort. I certainly do not want to. And I would rather use
those indigenous forces that are there to do some of our bidding if they're inclined
to do so rather than having the prospect of the American troops actually engaged.
OBERDORFER: Well, let me follow up. MICHEL: But that's the furthest thing we want
to have happen down there.
OBERDORFER: Let me follow up on this question about interdicition. You and others
have said that's the purpose, to interdict arms... MICHEL: Yes.
OBEF.DORFER: ...going into El Salvador. Now, this morning, Charlie Moore of The New
York Times, who many of us know as a very fine reporter with' a lot of experience, is
down there in El Salvador, and he reports the flow of military supplies to the
Salvadoran rebels from outside the countries has been only a trickle for many months,
according to officials here in Washington. And he quotes a senior administration
official as saying that's true and that the Salvadoran rebels have little need of such
aid. He is saying basically, as I understand it, that this is a phony issue, that the
arms are not coming in from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Do you think this is so, or do
you think you've been had about what you've been told? MICHEL: Well, I think we've
been making some progress. You know, you just can't discount what we've been doing
down there and what effect it has had up to this point, even though it's rather a
limited period of time. And so our, 1 think, there's no question in my mind, but
administration is-one of stabilizing the situation in El Salvador so that we can cool
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that whole matter down, that eventually we can have another election there. I
understand maybe it won't take place now in December, but there's been a request made
to move it up into the first part of next year. But that's our primary goal. I
think, frankly. if we c6n stabilize that situation in E1 Salvador and make absolutely
sure that honduras is secure, that Costa Rica, without any armed forces whatsoever, is
not threatened by the forces in Nicaragua, then I think we've made some progress.
Then it seems to me you've got kind of a situation where Nicaragua is somewhat
isolated from the rest of their neighboring countries. And let's not forget that the
president, you know, on the economic with his Caribbean initiative and all, the
initiative on the part of the administration to try and do something beyond what we've
ever done before, economically, in humanitarian assistance and aid, this can not be
discounted. And it's three times the amount that we're doing militarily, but all the
emphasis gets placed on the military action and, I think, tends to distort what the
administration is really about to do and wants to do in that area.
LUVSDORF: Congressman, you said that our, primary goal is to stabilize El Salvador.
MICHEL: For a moment.
LUVSDORF: A lot of critics believe that a very important goal, also, is aimed at
Nicaragua. The president has said several times that we don't try, want to overthrow
the government. But he's also said he doesn't think there can be peace in the region
as long as that government is there. is this administration trying to overthrow the
Sandinista government? MICHEL: Well, no, it is not, and it's one of their fomenting
and exporting revolution to their neighboring countries. That's the problem. Now the
Carter administration before us, you know, thought that they could with infusions of
money and assistance down there in Nicaragua, after disposition of Somozoa, that all
would be well. And we'd poured a hundred and twenty million dollars of our own
assistance into Nicaragua, the Interdevelepment American Bank, a quarter of a billion
dollars in that period of time. And what have we seen, Not the free elections or
free institutions being pushed and advanced, but rather an authorian government that
runs counter to what we really thought this revolution was all about and for the
purposes for which there was a revolution. So to say we want to definitely see the
government overthrown, that's going too far. We'd like to see them reform their ways
a little bit and live up to what the Sandinistas originally came to power for. And
for that, if we can help them do that. I think were making some progress now. If you
see around the edges, some of the efforts that we are talking about this thing more
realistically. And of course, our policy is one of negotiation along with military
and economic assistance, and the three have all got to be taken together. One without
the other, the whole policy, in my judgment, blows.
LUVSDORF: You also said you think there's some misunderstanding among the public
about what the danger is from the situation down there. But there've been some polls
that have shown that the public understands that the Nicaraguans and Cubans are
stirring up the trouble down there, but they just don't want to get the United States
more involved. isn't that part of the problem with all of this? MICHEL: Well, I
think that's true. In my own poll that I took in my district, you know, the idea,
what kind of marks do you give the president for his overall conduct of foreign
L e-
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affairs, and they're cui.te high. And then I get to the specific question, do you
think the, would you support the administration's policy toward Central America, and
it's 2 to I opposed to it. And I have to think in my own mind do they really
recognize what our-problem is and what we ought to be doing about it. And I .ould
think there isn't all that good a knowledge out there, that it is an educational
process that has to unfold.
LUVSDORF: Isn't part of it, though, a fear of getting involved in another bottomless
pit? I mean, the word Vietnam is turned around a lot. But that, it started small
there, and then there we were. MICHEL: Well, I think there's some danger to that. I
think there's no question that whenever there's the possibility of involvement of
American troops, even when we talk about 55 military advisers, my view is to hold that
number at that level. And i've made it quite clear to the administration. Now
there's some apprehension and fear out there on the part of the American public. We
don't want to get too far out in front. Any commander leading, whether it's a
platoon, company or an army, you've got to have the troops supporting you, and I'm
talking about the American public supporting the overall policy in addition to having
a majority of the Congress.
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