ON COMPANY BUSINESS
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00552R000403950009-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 16, 2010
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 26, 1980
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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CIA-RDP90-00552R000403950009-3.pdf | 357.28 KB |
Body:
STAT
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June 26, ~V80 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-Extensions o emar s MA .5ZZ-.5
STAT,,y yardstick that might be applied
the situation is indefensible.
What- do we ask of a sailor or soldier
Only this; That he serve for a fixed term of
two or three years, during which time he
cannot resign, take another full-time job,
join a union, go on strike or picket in sup-
port of on-the-job complaints. Only that he
be separated from his family for months on
end. Only that he be on call far beyond the
40-hour work week of civilian life. Only that
he accept the responsibility for maintaining
billion-dollar ships and weapons systems.
Only that, finally, he may give up his life
for his country.
And what is his compensation? The enter-
ing recruit would be financially better off if
he went to work slinging hash in a fast-food
drive-in. The experienced petty officer in
the Navy would be better off if he aban-
doned his career and took his skills into the
private sector. The Air Force captain, whose
training represents a $4-million investment,
can command half again as much income by
[lying freight for a commercial airline.
Some specific recent examples: After eight
years in the Navy, an electronics technician
tarns $12,117. His skills are absolutely vital
to the maintenance of a modern-day war-
ship. His counterpart in civilian life, work-
ing 9-to-5, looking after his family, earns
516.515. A boiler technician may earn
S1!,730 as a petty officer in the Navy; in pri-
vate industry his skills command almost
twice as much.
Other reasons, of course, contribute to the
appalling rates of attrition after first or
second terms. Especially in the Navy, men
often must be separated from their families
for long tours of duty at sea. Officers and
non-corns weary of teaching ill-educated re-
cruits who can read at barely a fifth-grade
level. Under today's circumstances, it is
fearfully difficult to maintain the old esprit
de corps that once bound men together In a
fraternity of arms.
But the primary cause for this crisis re-
mains: Money. It is ludicrous-it is grossly
unjust-to pay service personnel so miser-
ily that several hundred thousand service
iaertiiies must resort to food stamps and to
mu-.)light jobs. The disparities in income
and fr!nge benefits are not confined to com-
parisons of public and private employment:
A ;?,.aff sergeant. ordered to move his family
2.000 miles to a new assignment, gets a $950
reimbursement; a CS-9 in the Department
of Agriculture, making the identical move,
qualilhed for reimbursement up to $12,300.
This week the Senate Veterans Cotnmit-
tee ~01I hold hearings on a bill sponsored by
Sc'i. Bill Armstrong of Colorado to restore
oat- incentive that used to mean much: G.I.
i :rational benefits. Armstrong also is
fit;`?ai.^.~ for a truly significant increase In
h:;;.e pay across the board. Other senators
recognize the desperate need. Sam Nunn of
Gt of q!a and John Warner of Virginia have
cosponsored a bill to make selective in-
in the compensation of men with
;;%:-icu.ur skdlls. Every one Of these meas-
urc el 'ad b' pass,d.
Yes, the 1)'C; would cost several billion
us o, er the next few years. It is money
?.,e cane~t. n-tt,,rd not to spend .Al the mar-
.'.u ,. . v vea pons systems, al! the : .s3iles
L .. and high-powered t n:ks will
"'t. :1 in ncrhing without the manpower to
a: n-': :t-,cm. So long as we adhere to the
1),,'0,y of an all-volunteer service, nothing
t:.:.. .nd hold desirable personnel but
a.4-rlvar_ .' and benefits. if Congress fails
ro r..: et t,.., .'asonable demand, but One
re- w`11 rc,again: The draft.*
HON. LARRY McDONALD
OF GEORGIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, June 26, 1980
? Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, in a
letter to the chairman and trustees on
the Public Broadcasting Service, Mr.
Reed Irvine drew their attention to
the -deplorable expenditure of public
funds in an attack by Philip Agee, a
CIA defector of the American intelli-
gence community, aired on prime-time
television by the PBS.
The second and concluding part of
this letter follows..
There is a great deal additional evidence
which supports the view that this film [On
Company Business] is an instrument of po-
litical warfare directed against the basic
tenets of American foreign policy and serv-
ing the goals of Soviet foreign policy. We
are informed that one of its producers,
Howard Francovich. was responsible for an-
other film called "Incitement to Nixonicide
and Praise of the Chilean Revolution,"
which was financed by an organization
called Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH).
NICH has been identified as a support net-
work for the terrorist Movement of the Rev-
olutionary Left (MIR), which has described
itself as "comrades in struggle against a
common enemy." It describes the enemy as
"the system of imperialism which, as the
monopoly stage of capitalism, exploits work-
ers both here and in Chile." NICH cooper-
ates closely with a Cuban-based group called
the "Committee of Solidarity with the Chil-
ean Anti-fascist Resistance." This indicates
that Mr. Francovich Is not the disinterested
scholarly documentary maker that he pre-
tended to be on the PBS program "All
About TV," where he denied that he had
produced "On Company Business" with the
intention of "getting the CIA." Mr. Franco-
vich is clearly on the same wave length as
Mr. Agee. We understand that Mr. Franco-
vich and Mr. Agee were, in fact, business
partners. According to Information Digest,
Francovich owned 30 percent of.Isla Blanca
Films and Agee 20 percent in 1976.
The other producer, Howard Dratch, has
been identified by Information Digest as a_ the licensees that showed the program in
former officer of the Radical Student Union violation of the FCC's fairness doctrine.
at the University of California at Berkeley.
That was the successor organization of the
Berkeley chapter of the Students for Demo-
cratic Society after that far left group frag-
mented. Dratch has long been associated
with Pacific News Service, which is spon-
sored by the Bay Area Institute, which in
turn is affiliated with the leftist Institute
for Policy Studies. His background is hardly
what you would look for if you wanted to
commission a scholarly, objective study on
the CIA and U.S. foreign policy.
Olga Talmonte, said to have been involved
with the terrorists in Argentina; and
Morton Sobell, accomplice of Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg.
The point of all this is that even if PBS
and CPB had not screened "On Company
Business," they could have detected from
the backgrounds of those responsible for
the program, beginning with Agee, that it
was most unlikely that the film would be
the "highly responsible overview of the
CIA's history" that Barry Chase asserted it
to be.
Accuracy in Media has three major com-
plaints.
1. We believe that it is wrong for the Cor-
poration for Public Broadcasting to fund
and for Public Broadcasting Service to air at
public expense films such as "On Company
"Business," which are clearly instruments of
political warfare which serve the purposes
of powers hostile to our country and to the
cause of freedom.
2. Assuming that such films are shown.
however, then it is clearly the duty of PBS
to identify for the viewing audience who the
people are whose views it is disseminating.
In this case, at a minimum, Philip Agee
should have been identified not only in
terms of the years he served with the CIA.
but in terms of his present expressed sym-
pathy for communism and the KGB and in
terms of the activities that he is engaging in
that have resulted in his expulsion from the
U.K. and his being banned by three other
European countries. Producers Francovich
and Dratch should have been identified in
terms of their associations with organiza-
tions such as NICH and the SDS. PBS is
guilty of grossly deceptive labeling In con-
cealing this type of information from the
viewers and in telling the affiliated stations
that this program is "highly responsible"
and implying that the program was bal-
anced.
3. The program was clearly totally lacking
in balance and objectivity and was therefore
in gross violation of Section 396(g)(1)(A) of
the Communications Act, which requires
that programs funded by CPB on controver-
sial topics be produced with stiict adherence
to objectivity and balance.
Moreover, since this program provided
three hours of unremitting attack on A)neri-
ca.n postwar policies of combatting commu-
nist expansion and subversion abroad,
There are several controversial issues of
public importance that were treated in this
film. The most basic is whether or not the
United States is justified In taking measures
short of war to frustrate the efforts of the
USSR and its satellites to expand their con-
trol over other countries. A related issue is
whether or not the United States, under the
guise of fighting communist expansion, is
suppressing the true forces of democracy
and liberation, which would triumph but for
our cruel intervention.
The long list of credits for "On Company 1 Clearly a proper discussion of these issues
I Business" includes many persons with ties '-would require an exposition of what hap-
to Communist Party front groups and far ' pens to countries that fall under communist
left organizations. Here are some listed by I control. Are the people liberated or en-
Information Digest: slaved? Dues freedom flourish or is it
William Schaap and Ellen Ray, Covert
Actiur, Information Bulletin which is dedi-
cated to revealing the names of CIA agents;
Edith Tigar of the National Emergency
Civil Liberties Committee, A CPUSA front;
Sylvia Crane of the National Committee
Against Repressive Legislation, CPUSA
front;
James Larsen, National Lawyers Guild;
Neil Gantscher, National Lawyers Guild;
Robert High, Non-Intervention in Chile;
snuffed out? Are the, iuethocs used by ti, _e
intelligence: forces of o'ir advers4ries t,oud
because, as A+ ee say;, they s,?rve ,o,).l on e-i?
Art' ours tvii because t.. serve evil _cu:::!
We ha?.'e three ho:.:rs t:ori Age, nod his
friends over PBS devoted to the latter prop-
osition and to the theory that the world
would be a far better place if the liberating
forces of Moscow were allowed to operate
unhampered by the obstacles placed in their
way by the United States.
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E 3224 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-Extensions of Remarks
We would like to know when you have
shown the other side of this coin, or if you
intend to do so. If you contend that you
have, please tell us the dates of the pro-
grams and prov!de?us with the transcripts
We would also be interested in obtaining
copies of the documents submitted by the
producers to PBS in justification of obtain-
ing your cooperation in airing this program.
We understand that CPB funded the pro-
gram after having received assurances from
PBS that it met their requirements. We
would be interested in seeing copies of that
correspondence. I think it will be most inter-
esting to compare what the producers said
to PBS in describing this project and what
they said In their 1976 fund-raising prospec-
tus referred to above.*
THE SPIRIT OF HELSINKI, VIGIL
1980
SPEECH OF .
HON. JAMES M. HANLEY
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 23, 1980
? Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Speaker, I am
proud to participate In "The Spirit of
Helsinki, Vigil 1980," which seeks to
draw attention to those Soviet Jewish
families and individuals who wish to
emigrate from the U.S.S.R., but are
unable to do so as a result of the re-
strictive emigration policies of the
Soviet Government.
In last year's "Shatter the Silence,
Vigil 1979," I again brought to your at-
tention the case of Lev Gendin, a
former electronics engineer who was
denied an emigration visa to Israel in
1971 and subsequently was dismissed
from his job. His wife of 3 months,
Aviva Klein-Gendin, alone was grant-
ed a visa. Today she continues to work
from her home in Israel for the free-
dom of her husband.
Lev has been continually harassed
by the Soviet State since his attempt
to emigrate. He has been assaulted by
KGB agents both in public and within
KGB prisons. He has been subjected
to preliminary arrests as well as beat-
ings, and has served over 160 days in
prison. He has been denied employ-
ment befitting his education, and has
been forced to accept menial labor po-
sitions to survive.
In September 1979. Lev and a friend
went to Novgorodskaya Oblast in
order to avoid KGB provocations.
While there, an attempt to arrest
them failed when they fled the city.
Walking between 16 to 17 hours per
day in the cold rain, they slept in
swamps and forests on their way back
to Moscow.
Under the Helsinki Final Act of
1975, the U.S.S.R., as a final signatory,
committed Itself to a policy of respect
for basic human rights, including the
unification of families with members
living in more than one country, reli-
gious freedom, and free travel between
nations.
The Soviet Government has, unfor-
tunately, failed to live up to the terms
of the Final Act. I am calling, there-
fore, for the commemoration of the
fight for freedom by Lev Gendin, and
others like him, so that, in the future,
men may be able to freely enjoy those
basic rights, inalienable to all.*
HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, June 26, 1980
? Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, Fred
Charles Ikle, former Director of the
U.S, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and currently an adviser to
Ronald Reagan on foreign policy, has
written an incisive and thought-pro-
voking article about the chances of
setting off a nuclear war by accident.
As Dr. Ikle shows, the philosophical
assumptions at the heart of the Carter
administration's approach to strategic
nuclear forces creates the risk of caus-
ing a war by accident since it is based
on launch-on-warning, a notoriously
unreliable and dangerous concept.
At this point, I include in the
REcoa "The Growing Risk of War by
Accident" by Fred Charles Ikle, from
the Washington Post, ' Tuesday, June
24, 1980.
The article follows:
THE GROWING RISK OF WAR BY ACCIDENT
Twice within the last two weeks, three
times within seven months, a false alarm
triggered the warning system of our strate-
gic nuclear forces. Judging from published
reports, computers indicated that Soviet
missiles had been launched against the
United States and, in accordance with prear-
ranged procedures, our strategic forces went
through the first stages of an alert.
No one was hurt, no damage was done.
Harmless incidents? Or are we walking on
thin ice and seeing how readily it can crack?
Mankind has suffered from many wars
that were launched without much thought
and purpose-launched as if by accident.
The sequence of rash decisions in 1914, fol-
lowing the assassination of the Austrian
archduke, had obviously not been planned
by any of the powers that it dragged into
World War I. But the nuclear missile age
has burdened mankind with a more acute, a
far more formidable risk of accidental war.
This risk is inherent in the global interlock
of armaments capable of inflicting cataclys-
mic destruction and designed to be commit-
ted to war irrevocably, within minutes.
How can we be sure that, for decades to
come, a technical malfunction or some
human error, or a combination of both, will
never trigger a salvo of nuclear missiles?
Substantial progress has been made during
the last two decades in the design of clever
and redundant safeguards for our nuclear
weapons and missiles. Despite some bureau-
cratic resistance and inexcusable sluggish-
ness, these safeguards have been put Into
effect to an increasing extent. Perhaps
that's why we are still here.
However, in recent years, a combination of
corrosive forces has been at work to in-
crease, In hidden and insidious ways, the
risk of accidental nuclear war. Among them
are the relative decline in our strategic
power, the unimaginative pursuit of arms
control concepts after events have long
June 26, 1.980
overtaken them and-the inevitable accom-
paniment-deceitful political posturing that
tries to conceal fundamental weaknesses.
Beginning in the 1960s, we sought to avert
a nuclear arms race, with its feared instabil-
ities, by hobbling our own strategic forces
through self-restraint and by attempting to
limit the growing Soviet forces through
strategic arms control. The former was
mighty effective; the latter, alas. was not.
Soviet missile forces grew much more than
ours and will continue to do so in the early
1980s, with or without the new SALT II
agreement. As a result, our deterrent forces
will become increasingly vulnerable to a pre-
emptive strike. The balance of terror is be-
coming less stable.
Despite this disappointing failure of the
SALT process, President Carter called the
new SALT treaty (yet unratified) "a major
accomplishment of my administration."
In planning our strategic forces for the
dangerous 1980s, the administration now
uses the SALT agreements and SALT con-
cepts as the map for the future. Yet many
of these concepts, inherited from the 1960s,
have proved to be harmful to strategic sta-
bility. The sad truth is they tend to increase
the risk of nuclear war.
For example, SALT compels the United
States (and perhaps the Soviet Union) to
deploy a smaller number of large missiles
rather than a large number of small ones,
thus concentrating the targets for a surprise
attack. Similarly. SALT now tends to Impair
the mobility of land-base missiles, thus in-
creasing their vulnerability. And SALT gen-
erously tolerates ballistic missiles-the main
cause of strategic instability-but is Intoler-
ant toward cruise missiles even though they
are too slow for a surprise attack.
If we continue on the present course-
without a sustained effort to reverse the
strategic deterioration-the temptation will
grow to reach for desperate remedies. Last
year, in his annual report to Congress, De-
fense Secretary Harold Brown raised the
curtain on such a remedy. He pointed out
that the Soviets "would have to consider
the possibility of our having launched" our
missiles before theirs arrived. And in this
year's report to Congress, the idea is repeat-
ed. Prudently, Secretary Brown adds that
"we would by no means wish to rely on
having to" use such a tactic. But from the
context of this statement it is clear that the
notion of a "launch-on-warning" possibility
is supposed to be reassuring.
"Launch-on-warning," as a remedy for the
growing vulnerability of our land-based de-
terrent forces, is an idea that- attracts
strange bedfellows. Some shallow super-
hawks have liked it as a sign of our quick-
on-the-draw toughness. Equally shallow
arms control advocates (in and out of gov-
ernment) have promoted it as a way of de-
fending SALT against critics who worry
about the deteriorating strategic trends.
And the defense budget cutters find it irre-
sistible; it is the cheapest "fix" for the stra-
tegic vulnerability problem.
But the cure is more deadly than the dis-
ease. The more we rely on "launch?on-warn-
ing" (or, for that matter, the more the Sovi-
ets do), the greater the risk of accidental
nuclear war. Anyone who tries to explain
that this tactic could be implemented in a
totally reliable and safe way is a fool. He
does not even know how little he knows. No
one can understand in sufficient detail all
the possible malfunctions, unanticipated
events and human errors that might inter-
act someday to confound the "redundant"
warning systems or to bypass the "safe-
guards" against an unintended release of
the command to launch a missile salvo.
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