AGAINST ARMS FOR THE 'CONTRAS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000403940023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 5, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000403940023-8
ARTICLE AP NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE 5 February 1986
Against Arms for the `Contras'
By Dave McCurdy
WASHINGTON - Last July, Con-
gress voted to give $27 million in hu-
manitarian aid to the "contra" forces
fighting the Government of Nicara.
gua. I was an author of the amend-
ment that provided these funds but I
A political
solution is
still sounder
am nevertheless dismayed by reports
that President Reagan has already
decided to request some $100 million Government is undemocratic and re-
in new aid for weapons, ammunition pressive. To the extent that they ex-
and other military supplies. Port revolution and subversion, and
This Is the wrong time to make such provide bases for Soviet and Cuban
a request. If a vote were held today, military operations, they pose a se-
military aid to the
c
t
on
ras would be
defeated on both political and fiscal
grounds.
Somme skeptic wonder if there
really is a significant difference be-
tw~en "hum nitarian" and "mili-
tarv ' aid I believe there is 'nth
humanitarian aid we allotted was
c ear y assistance to a fighting force
but the law stenificantly restricted its
use and prohibited distribution by the
Defense Department or the Central
Intelligence Agency.
More important, the package
passed because some three dozen
members of the House who had sup.
Ported the earlier ban on any aid
hoped that this might be a stop to-
ward implementing the bipartisan
policy recommended in January 1984
by the Kissinger Commission on Cen-
tral America. This policy - it was
named the Jackson plan, after the
curity threat to their neighbors and to
the United States.
Second, the contras have not be-
come a unified and credible demo-
cratic alternative to the Sandinistas.
They have no political identity in
Nicaragua and no meaningful contact
with the internal opposition. Nor are
the contras an effective fighting
force. They are the largest guerrilla
movement in recent Latin American
history - larger than the Sandinistas
were when they seized power - but
their 15,000 troops are badly trained,
uneducated youths, serving under
fragmented leadership.
Third, support for the contras must
be seen as an instrument, not a goal,
of United States policy. If there is a
military component of an aid request,
it should be aimed at providing pro-
fessional training for contra troops,
late Senator Henry M. Jackson - has w
tat er -an at eapons into the regionucing more
been endorsed by President Reagan Fourth, although the Sandinistas
and enthusiastically welcomed profess to support a negotiated solu-
throughout Latin America. I believe tion to the Central American conflict,
it still provides our best hope for a it is now clear that they will not ne-
lasting peace in the region. gotiate unless they are forced to do so
Why? Because the complexities of by a combination of diplomatic, eco-
the conflict demand a complex and nomic and military pressure. The
carefully balanced solution. contras cannot overthrow the Sandin-
We know, for a start, that the San- istas, but they can help make such
dinistas are Marxists, and that their pressure effective.
Dave McCurdy, Democrat of Oklaho- more tmoney orethe contras asprinclud-
ma, is a member of the House Armed ing humanitarian aid - hinges on the
Services Committee and Intelligence President's ability to persuade mod-
Committee. erate members of the House that he
stands by his pledge, made in an open
letter to me in June, that his Adminis-
tration "is determined to pursue
political, not military, solutions in
Central America." Both Congress
and the public must be convinced that
the President has exhausted all diplo-
matic possibilities for a regionally
based political solution.
I believe there should be two com-
ponents to such a solution.
To begin with, the United States
should propose and sign a peace
agreement based on the aims of the
Contadora countries - Mexico, Vene-
zuela, Colombia and Panama - but
bolstered by appropriate procedures
for verification and enforcement. The
proposal should be so reasonable, in
Latin American terms, that the San-
dinistas cannot reject it without de-
stroying whatever legitimacy they
have in the eyes of the world.
Such an agreement must, however,
be accompanied by more tangible
help - in particular, the full $1.2 bil-
lion in economic assistance suggested
by the Jackson plan for fiscal 1987.
This is especially important now,
since the aid allotted for 1985 and
1986, the first two years of the pro-
posed five-year plan, was 20 percent
below the recommended amounts.
There is no sense in setting the stage
for democracy in the region if we can-
not produce an alternative to decades
of oppression.
Where will the money come from?
The price tag on the 13th Trident sub-
marine is $1.2 billion. Surely democ-
racy in Central America is more im-
portant to our national security than
yet another nuclear-powered subma-
rine. El.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000403940023-8