THE C.I.A. A LUMUMBA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000403870003-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 24, 2010
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 2, 1981
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000403870003-8.pdf138.36 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403870003-8 STAT ARIICI:E APPEARED ON PAGE NEW YORK TI IDS MAGAZINE 2 AUGUST 1031 The C.I.A. in the fall of 1960 undertook to assassina Patrice Lumumba. Critics of the agency fear that if since 1975 are loosened, the U.S. may see a return to practices of that kind. EY AMadeieine G. Kalb n Sept. 19, 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency's station chief in Leopold- ville, capital of the newly independent Congo, received a message through a top-secret channel from his superiors in Washington. Someone from headquar- ters calling himself "Joe from Paris" would be arriving with instructions for an urgent mission. No further details were provided. The station chief was cautioned not to discuss the message with anyone. "Joe" arrived a week later. He proved to be the C.I.A.'s top scientist, and he came equipped with a kit con- taining an exotic poison designed to produce a fatal disease indigenous to the area. This lethal substance, he in- formed the station chief, was meant for Patrice Lumumba, the recently ousted pro-Soviet Prime Minister of the Congo, who had a good chance of returning to power. The poison, the scientist said, was somehow to be slipped into Lumumba's food, or perhaps into his toothpaste. Poison was not the only acceptable method; any form of assassination would do, so long as it could not be traced back to the United States Gov- ernment. Pointing out that assassina- tion was not exactly a common C.I.A. tactic, the station chief asked who had Lumumba wound its-way-to an unex--~' and its allies pected denouement in the back regions ! of the Congo and the front'pages of the world, but the issues it was ultimately to raise for the American people re- highly relevant - and more so main today than at any time during the past five years. For reasons it deems vital to national security, the Reagan Adminis- tration wants to remove the restric- tions that were placed on the C.I.A. as a result of the investigation conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelli- gence Activities, under the chairman- ship of Senator Frank Church, in 1975. The committee, after extensive closed hearings, revealed in its report that the C.I.A. had plotted to assassinate Lu- mumba and several other foreign lead- ers and had engaged in a variety of other illegal activities at home and abroad-all this under four Presidents' (two Republicans and two Democrats). Congress, reflecting the public mood, established permanent Intelligence Committees in the House and Senate, which were to be informed in advance of the C.I.A.'s covert overseas opera- tions. President Ford issued an execu- tive order, worked out in consultation with the two new committees and the C.I.A., sharply limiting the agency's activities at home: Under this order, re- newed by President Carter, the C.I.A. could no longer conduct covert opera- tions -- such as wiretaps,'surreptitious entry, opening of mail and infiltration of domestic organizations - within the United States. ls of th Offici R Ad i i t a e eagan m n s ra- authorized the assignment. The scien- tist indicated that the order had come Lion, who are now in the process of from the "highest authority" - from modifying the executive order, argue Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of that these restrictions hamper the the United States. C.I.A.'s ability to monitor and counter Twenty years have passed since this the worldwide upsurge of terrorism, bizarre plot against the life of Patrice which they contend has been financed . They want to let the C.I.A. resume covert operations in the United States, when deemed necessary for carrying out the agency's tasks abroad. They also support the C.I.A.'s efforts to weaken existing Congres- sional controls over its covert opera- tions in foreign countries. Others, including the C.I.A.'s critics, warn that if these restraints are loos- ened, the United States may well find itself slipping back to the situation that prevailed in the 1960's, when the agency was virtually unbridled, when assassi- nation of inconvenient foreign political figures was an acceptable technique, and when top officials cultivated a deliberate fuzziness that obscured the line of command from the President to the Director of Central Intelligence and on down to the operatives in the field. These critics fear that if the C.I.A. is given too much leeway in the means it employs, it may once again be tempted to interpret a President's wishes in a way that will damage the good name and long-range interests of the United States. The plot against Lumumba is a clas- sic example of American policy out of control - an assassination attempt launched by the C.I.A. without any known record of a Presidential order. merely on the assumption, which may or may not have been correct, that this was what the President wanted. The story of the plot, largely baiieu in the voluminous report or the Church com- mittee, and now amplified by many hitherto classified cables. merits a searching examination before the safe- guards now in effect are discarded as no longer necessary. . _C_ONTINUED' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403870003-8