THE C.I.A. A LUMUMBA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00552R000403870003-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 24, 2010
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 2, 1981
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP90-00552R000403870003-8.pdf | 138.36 KB |
Body:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403870003-8
STAT
ARIICI:E APPEARED
ON PAGE
NEW YORK TI IDS MAGAZINE
2 AUGUST 1031
The C.I.A. in the fall of 1960 undertook to assassina
Patrice Lumumba. Critics of the agency fear that if
since 1975 are loosened, the U.S. may see a return to practices of that kind.
EY AMadeieine G. Kalb
n Sept. 19, 1960, the
Central Intelligence
Agency's station
chief in Leopold-
ville, capital of the
newly independent
Congo, received a
message through a
top-secret channel from his superiors in
Washington. Someone from headquar-
ters calling himself "Joe from Paris"
would be arriving with instructions for
an urgent mission. No further details
were provided. The station chief was
cautioned not to discuss the message
with anyone.
"Joe" arrived a week later. He
proved to be the C.I.A.'s top scientist,
and he came equipped with a kit con-
taining an exotic poison designed to
produce a fatal disease indigenous to
the area. This lethal substance, he in-
formed the station chief, was meant for
Patrice Lumumba, the recently ousted
pro-Soviet Prime Minister of the Congo,
who had a good chance of returning to
power.
The poison, the scientist said, was
somehow to be slipped into Lumumba's
food, or perhaps into his toothpaste.
Poison was not the only acceptable
method; any form of assassination
would do, so long as it could not be
traced back to the United States Gov-
ernment. Pointing out that assassina-
tion was not exactly a common C.I.A.
tactic, the station chief asked who had
Lumumba wound its-way-to an unex--~'
and its allies
pected denouement in the back regions !
of the Congo and the front'pages of the
world, but the issues it was ultimately
to raise for the American people re-
highly relevant - and more so
main
today than at any time during the past
five years. For reasons it deems vital to
national security, the Reagan Adminis-
tration wants to remove the restric-
tions that were placed on the C.I.A. as a
result of the investigation conducted by
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence Activities, under the chairman-
ship of Senator Frank Church, in 1975.
The committee, after extensive closed
hearings, revealed in its report that the
C.I.A. had plotted to assassinate Lu-
mumba and several other foreign lead-
ers and had engaged in a variety of
other illegal activities at home and
abroad-all this under four Presidents'
(two Republicans and two Democrats).
Congress, reflecting the public mood,
established permanent Intelligence
Committees in the House and Senate,
which were to be informed in advance
of the C.I.A.'s covert overseas opera-
tions. President Ford issued an execu-
tive order, worked out in consultation
with the two new committees and the
C.I.A., sharply limiting the agency's
activities at home: Under this order, re-
newed by President Carter, the C.I.A.
could no longer conduct covert opera-
tions -- such as wiretaps,'surreptitious
entry, opening of mail and infiltration
of domestic organizations - within the
United States.
ls of th
Offici
R
Ad
i
i
t
a
e
eagan
m
n
s
ra-
authorized the assignment. The scien-
tist indicated that the order had come Lion, who are now in the process of
from the "highest authority" - from modifying the executive order, argue
Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of that these restrictions hamper the
the United States. C.I.A.'s ability to monitor and counter
Twenty years have passed since this the worldwide upsurge of terrorism,
bizarre plot against the life of Patrice which they contend has been financed
. They want to let the
C.I.A. resume covert operations in the
United States, when deemed necessary
for carrying out the agency's tasks
abroad. They also support the C.I.A.'s
efforts to weaken existing Congres-
sional controls over its covert opera-
tions in foreign countries.
Others, including the C.I.A.'s critics,
warn that if these restraints are loos-
ened, the United States may well find
itself slipping back to the situation that
prevailed in the 1960's, when the agency
was virtually unbridled, when assassi-
nation of inconvenient foreign political
figures was an acceptable technique,
and when top officials cultivated a
deliberate fuzziness that obscured the
line of command from the President to
the Director of Central Intelligence and
on down to the operatives in the field.
These critics fear that if the C.I.A. is
given too much leeway in the means it
employs, it may once again be tempted
to interpret a President's wishes in a
way that will damage the good name
and long-range interests of the United
States.
The plot against Lumumba is a clas-
sic example of American policy out of
control - an assassination attempt
launched by the C.I.A. without any
known record of a Presidential order.
merely on the assumption, which may
or may not have been correct, that this
was what the President wanted. The
story of the plot, largely baiieu in the
voluminous report or the Church com-
mittee, and now amplified by many
hitherto classified cables. merits a
searching examination before the safe-
guards now in effect are discarded as
no longer necessary. .
_C_ONTINUED'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403870003-8