THE CHOICE IS INTELLIGENCE OR PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000403680011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 27, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27 :CIA-RDP90-005528000403680011-0
~T I CITE A~~~4F~SD
Oti PAGE ~.'SS~ '
6 I~?ret.~.irt:xce professionals v, ere
shucked ;ecentl~? ~ti?hen the Huuse ht-
te;ligence Committee released a Left?
slanted attack on U.S. polic}? in Cen-
tra; .Americ?a. The Report. written by
memhc~rs of thc~ staf7 of Intellig~ncc
Oversight and Evaluation Subcommit-
tee Chairman Charles R~>se (D.-?north
Carolina, w?as immediately con-
demned by other members of the
Committee and the intel;igence cnnm-
munit}. ;,1 the same time. the Cuban,
propaganda network began circulating
{elected excerpts of the Rrpnn as a
part of its anti-t'.S. camp.~i;;n ir, (;an-
tral Americ?u.
The House Intelligence Committee.
chaired by Representative Edk~ard
Boland (D.??\lassac?husetts), had de?
ye;oped a ~ul~stantial rFputation dur-
ing its five years of existence as a
balanced. moderate, bipartisan con?
gressional participant in intelligence
r..atters. The Report by the Rose Sub-
committee staff raised images of the
discredited Frank Church hysteria of
the Seventies. One signal of the seri-
ousness with which the release of the
Report is regarded in intelligence cir-
cles was the fact that Admiral Bobb}?
Ra}? Inman, former deputy director of
the C.LA. and previously director of
the lational Security Agency, re?
signed his position as an unpaid con-
sultant to the House Intelligence Com-
mittee. Inman, ~~?ho had been appointed
to the post with much fanfare by
Chairman Boland, left because of the
slanted nature of the Staff Report
and the partisan manner in which it.
~ys~ released.
Leading the congressional protest is
Kepre~entstiye G1't'. "Bill" ~'oung (R.-
F;caida), who cslled the Staff N,eport
"extremely biased, ror.taining over
st~terner,t~, rnisststen~ents and sub-
iectiye genera;ities." l~oong pointed
THE REVD' OF TfiE NE`W'S
27 oCTO~FR 1982
~~~~,.~i~ 1~e~g~es?~
ment packed ~c?ith assumptions, opin-
ions, and conclusions of e political
nature. Staffers are supposed to stick
t.o assembling facts.
The Staff Report finds fault pri-
marily with the "presentation." of
U.S. intelligence information, v~?hich
it contends is given to "suggestion of
greater certainty than is warranted b}?
the evidence." To justify this claim,
the Report attacks a C.I.A. secret
briefing on international Communist
suppor ; of the Salvadoran terrorists
given in ]arch of this }-ear. But Intel?
ligence 'Committee Chairman Boland
ssid after the briefing that the evi-
dence ~t~es "com?incing" that the Sal-
vadoran terrorists "rely on the use of
sites in \icaragua for command and
control and for logistical support."
The Chairman continued by stating
there was "further persuasive evi-
dence" that the Sandinistas were help-
ing to train the Sah?adoran terrorists,
transferring arms and financial sup-
port to them, and were providing them
with bases of operation on'~icaraguan
territory. And. said the Chairman.
"Cuban involvement -especially in
pro~?iding arms - is also evident.."
The Rose Staff Report seeks to
discredit this briefing, and by im-
plication Chairman Boland's response,
by declaring that "only a ver}? fe~?"
ships hsd been traced from the Soviet
onion to Cuba anc':\'icaroeue currying
arms for the terrorist:. \eyer mind
that arms for the Communist terrorist
movement are flowing from the Sovi-
et L'ni~~n through other Communist
countries to \icaragua where they are
giyert to the terrorists of the Farabun-
dc~ AQarti \ationsl Liberation \]oye-
ment iF.1].L.\,i.
The Staff Report's second major
criticism is that our inteIligenc?e places
fault}? "reliance on some unquestioned
and sometimes contradictor~~ assump-
tions.'' But the onh? "contradictory
assumptions" cited are those on
whether increased American pressure
on the Communist Cuban regime would
motivate it So "reduce tensions"_ or
whether it would cause Fic1e1 Castro
"to step up his troublemaking activ-
ities." The Staff Report ignored the
facts that the result depends on hoa?
much pressure is applied and at what
point Castro decides the pleasure of
exporting terrorism and subversion in
this hemisphere is not worth the psin
of vastly tightened economic embar-
goes, internal unrest encouraged by the
proposed new L'.S. Radio T4arti broad-
caets, and so forth.
The third major unfair criticism of
U.S. intelligence was its alleged "ac-
ceptance of descriptions given by the
Sahadoran government when intelli-
gence analysts recognize grounds for
skepticism." This boils down to the
fact that the Rose Subcommittee
staffers do not believe that the Gov-
ernment of E) Sale-ador is attempting
t~ maintain discipline over its troops,
and that the only evidence that mem?
bens of the Salvadoran armed forces
im~olyed in abuses are being punished
comes from the Government of El
Salvador. layer mind that the Staff
Report itself cites a cable from the
l'.S. I?;mhacsy in San Sah?ad~r which
corroborates the ststemer,ts of the
~alyadoran Government.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27 :CIA-RDP90-005528000403680011-0