KISSINGER SHOULD TALK TO BOLANOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000303320012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 22, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/29: CIA-RDP90-00552R000303320012-9
WASHINGTON ': i"iES
22 Jule 19E3
cRC-
CORD MEYER
E'singer should
Bolanos
Henvy Kissinger and the In effect, Nicaragua under San-
presidentially appointed dinista rule has become the
bipartisan commission of training base, the communication
which he is chairman center and the supply depot for the
should spend a few hours early in Salvado-ran guerrillas. Cuban
their deliberations listening to the experts in Managua run the encry-
most recent defector from the pted radio network that reaches
Nicaraguan government, Miguel into every Salvadoran province,
Bolanos Hunter. and the logistical mix of trucks,
A
th
s
e young, courageous leader
of a60-man guerrilla unit in the rev-
olution against Somoza, Bolanos
won a high position in the Sandin-
ista security apparatus. The one
published interview with him since
his defection only scratched the
surface of his knowledge. Most
instructive is his insider's advice on
how the U.S. should deal with Cen-
tral America.
Having hijacked a small plane to
escape to Costa Rica two months
ago, Bolanos was quickly flown to
the U.S. where he has impressed the
State Department with the accu-
racy of his information. Warning
that the American media and public
gravely underestimate the Cuban-
Soviet role in Central America,
Bolanos describes how much more
difficult it was for Castro to help the
Sandinistas than it is for him now to
support the Salvadoran guerrillas.
Back in 1978, the Cubans had no
?secure base on the mainland, and
Bolanos remembers how he and the
other Sandinista cadres had to be
transported by circuitous routes to
Cuba for training. Lines of commu-
nication and transport were con-
tinuously subject to hostile inter.
diction, and it was only by bribery
that some supply routes were kept
open.
Bolanos describes the
transformation that has already
taken place in the geopolitics of
Central America as the result of the
establishment on the mainland of a
Cuban ally. He explains in vivid
detail how the entire governing
apparatus of his country has co-
operated with the Cubans in their
effort to score a second guerrilla
triumph in El Salvador.
boats and planes that supplies the
guerrillas is directed by Cubans.
Behind the more than 6,000
Cuban advisers in Nicaragua stand
hundreds of Soviet and East Ger-
man experts, and the whole expen-
sive enterprise is made possible by
the -more than $4 billion annual
Soviet subsidy to Havana.
Bolanos specifically warns that
many of the 2,000 Cuban teachers in
Nicaragua are also trained as tank
crewssnd are capable of operating
the T-SSSoviet tanks which the San-
dinistas are still learning to drive.
The feared escalation of a dis-
guised Cuban troop presence has
already begun.
In his counterintelligence role in
the Department of State Security,
Bolanos not only participated in
attempts to compromise American
diplomats but also saw at first hand
how the Sandinistas used every
trick in the book to demoralize all
competing social organizations
from the democratic political par-
ties to the free trade unions and the
Catholic Church. Feeling himself
the privileged beneficiary of an
increasingly repressive system, he
managed to escape with his wife
and son. His advice to Americans is
blunt.
As a first priority, he urges con-
tinued American support to all
three elements of the armed and.
Sandinista resistance, including
the Miskito Indians in the north, the
"contras" in the west and Eden Pas-
tora's guerrillas in the south. He
would like to see the U.S. joined in
this effort by all the moderate
democratic governments in the
region, and believes the internal
popular opposition to Sandinista
misrule is deep and growing
Although Bolanos does not favor
the use of U.S. troops in El Salvador,
he believes the.U.S. has-no choice
but to continue supporting the Sal-
vadoran government with eco-
nomic and military aid against the
Cuban-directed guerrilla offensive.
He cannot understand the logic
behind the congressional limitation
of 55 US. military advisers when
the Cubans seem to have the U.S.
outnumbered by 50-to-I in this cate-
gory of military assistance.
As a believer in the objectives of
the original popular movement to
overthrow Somoza, Bolanos clearly
thinks the 13 S. could do more in its
military training programs to
strengthen the commitment to
democratic institutions. He com-
bines this with a plea for detailed,
informative and powerful radio
broadcasts to his countrymen.
While there is wide agreement
on the need for a long-term U.S. pro-
gram of economic assistance to
Central America, the new presiden-
tial commission cannot avoid a
clear choice between those who
believe with Bolanos that the U.S.
should commit sufficient military
resources to contain the Cuban-
Soviet expansion and those who
believe military aid can be safely
reduced in favor of dialogue and
negotiation.
If Henry Kissinger can use this
opportunity to forge a broad
bipartisan consensus behind the
combination of economic and mili-
tary measures that are now
urgently necessary; he will con-
found his detractors and give
democracy a new lease on life in
Central America.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/29: CIA-RDP90-00552R000303320012-9