THE U.S. BUNGLES ITS EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN SUBVERSION IN EL SALVADOR

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000302860004-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 29, 2010
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 22, 1982
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000302860004-0.pdf236.98 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/29 :CIA-RDP90-005528000302860004-0 AR11CL~ ~.P.PF~~D Q?`t PAGE ~~ TIt~lE 22 r~axch 1982 The U.S. bungles its evidence offoYeign subveYSion in E~ There were briefings and consultations, complete with spy-plane pictures and closed-door revela- tions of secret intercep[.s. It may have been the most. intense national security information campaign since President Kennedy went public with graphic docu- mentation of the Cuban missile threat 20 years ago. The purpose of the blitz was to convince skeptics of the correctness of the Administration's approach to the critical problems of El Salvador and its neigh- bors-namely, that the struggles in Cen- tralAmerica are not si mply indigenous re- volts bat rather are crucial battlegrounds in a broad East-`Vest confrontation. Facing a credibility gap at home and abroad, the Reagan Administration sought to prove that the fire raging in El Salvador is primarily fueled by Soviet- sponsored subversion spread by Cuban surrogates and the Sandinista govern- ment of Nicaragua. In that extreme and simple form, their case is as yet unproved, and indeed-by the very nature of these ~ conflicts-may never be. In a lesser form-that there is significant involve- ment by Cuba and Nicaragua-the case is almost self-evident. The campaign, to say the least, had its problems. In fact,'the inability of the Ad- ministration to line up convincing wit- nesses would have seemed farcical were the matter not so serious. First there was the so-called "smoking Sandinista," grandly touted as a captured Nicaraguan commando who had helped lead the insur- rection in EI Salvador. But when police let .him loose to show the way to one of his pur- ported contacts, he disappeared into San Salvador's Mexican embassy, which said he was only a student and granted him asylum. Then there were two Nicaraguan air force defectors who were scheduled to bear witness to their country's involve- ment in El Salvador but by week's end were judged "not ready" to face the press. Finally, there was a young Nicaraguan soldier who was produced by the State De-_- partment but then promptly repudiated his previous statements about being trained in Cuba and Ethiopia and having been sent into EI Salvador by his govern- ment.The U.S. did have solid evidence of a major military buildup in Nicaragua, and former high national security officials were persuaded by still secret intelligence that the Sandinistas were helping the El Salvador rebels. Nonetheless, the blundert j and bad luck over the live witnesses to that subversion greatly undermined the Ad- ministration's plausibility. Presiding over this curious series of public presentations was the prime propo- nent of the Administration's us-vs.-them world view, Secretary of State Alexander Haig. "This situation is global in charac- ter," he told a Senate Appropriations Sub- committee last week. "The problem is worldwide Soviet interventionism that poses an unprecedented challenge to the free world. Anyone attempting to debate the prospects for a successful outcome in EI Saly et rnen the tru l:ia vadori ministr Defens that it stake s rain ba_______ _.__ advisers who were reluctant to detract na- tional attention from the President's eco- nomic program. Convinced that this bat- tle would be cleanly and quickly won, the _CO1~~J!~NUEl~'~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/29 :CIA-RDP90-005528000302860004-0