CONSOLIDATING EVERY ADVANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000302490068-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: February 7, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000302490068-1
WASHINGTON TIMES
7 February_ 1986
CORD MEYER
CONSOJIQATI NG
AD EVERY NCE
General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev knows how to
speak softly about the
need for nuclear disarma-
ment and has improved the Soviet
image in the West by a more
civilized tone of voice. But where
Soviet power and prestige are at
stake in the Third World, Mr. Gorba-
chev has proved that he carries a
very big stick and is quite prepared
to use it.
From Afghanistan to South Ye-
men, from Angola to Ethiopia, from
Cuba to Nicaragua, the new Soviet
leader has now demonstrated his de-
termination to consolidate every
geopolitical advance made by his
predecessors and to tolerate no
backsliding from one-party Marxist
regimes, where they have been es-
tablished.
The announced Reagan Doctrine
of providing support to anti-
Communist guerrillas and freedom
fighters in nations temporarily un-
der Marxist rule now confronts a
hard reality. The Kremlin is pre-
pared to raise the ante and to provide
huge additional supplies of modern
armament and expert military ad-
vice to beleaguered Communist re-
gimes in the underdeveloped world.
On the basis of a case-by-case
analysis, Reagan officials have re-
luctantly come to the conclusion that
since the Geneva summit, there is no
evidence that the Soviet general sec-
retary has backed away from any of
the regional confrontations about
which the American president
warned him.
In Afghanistan, the ambiguous
Russian hints at Geneva about a will-
ingness to compromise have proved
totally misleading. A steady im-
provement in Soviet armament and
tactics endangers the Afghan resis-
tance, while Soviet bombing across
the border and bribing of dissident
tribes within Pakistan make the
Pakistani government even less will-
ing to allow the delivery of effective
anti-aircraft weaponry to the guer-
rillas. -
The strategic rewards of victory
and the fear of the consequences of
withdrawal have apparently per-
suaded Mr. Gorbachev to escalate a
war that he did not start.
In the recent bloody infighting
among Communists in South Yemen
that left more than 10,000 dead rot e
ruins of Aden, the Kremlin es-
titat on momentarily be ore in-
tervenin?effectively on the side of
the hard-line Marxist rebels by pro-
viding them with critical intelli-
ence and with technical support to
the air force. Mr. Gorbachev was
prepared to take no chances with a
Communist regime that he judged to
be less than totally reliable.
In Angola, a similar hardening of
the Soviet line and escalation of mili-
tary force is described by Jonas
Savimbi during his current visit to
Washington to obtain U.S. support
for the UNITA guerrillas. American
intelligence confirms Mr. Savimbi's
warning that the Soviets are pre a-
ing or a massive new assault this
s ing on JNITAs main southern
base with a combination of modern
Soviet armament, Cuban troops, and
Portuguese mercenaries.
In Ethiopia, the Soviets have con-
tinued to supply the Marxist regime
of Chairman Mengistu Haile
Mariam with the arms necessary to
contain the tribal revolts, while the
West tries to feed the starving mil-
lions who have fled the drought and
the enforced relocation and collec-
tivization. Through the Ethiopian re-
gime, the Soviets are also sending
arms to support Col. John Garang's
rebellion in the southern Sudan in
order to destabilize the shaky mili-
tary government in Khartoum.
Since Mr. Gorbachev took over the
reins in Moscow, the Soviets in Nica-
ragua have sharply escalated the
quality and quantity of their mili-
tary assistance to the Sandinista re-
gime. Steady encroachments on the
few remaining rights of the Catholic
Church and the internal democratic
opposition have been combined with
the commitment of Cuban-manned
Soviet helicopter gunships in the
fighting against the "contras;' who
now receive only non-lethal aid from
the United States.
In the face of this Gorbachev of-
fensive that depends so heavily on
raw military force, President Ronald
Reagan is faced with serious dilem-
mas in trying to give the freedom
fighters the weapons they desper-
ately need to have a chance of dis-
lodging the radical dictatorships
they oppose.
In agreeing to help freedom
fighters in Angola and Nicaragua,
the neighboring countries through
which the American assistance
would have to pass to reach the guer-
rillas cannot permit the openly ac-
knowledged delivery of U.S. military
aid across their borders. The gov-
ernments of Zaire and Honduras
would both insist upon the protec-
tion of deniability and would require
that any American arms be shipped
secretly.
Since the chairmen of both the
Senate and House intelligence com-
m1ttT ees have pu is y state t ear
0 osition to covert milita fund-
i Presi ent Rea an faces bi
pro ems on t o i i a attempts
t EEanne arms se ilx-t9 alt
Savimbi's guerrillas and to the' con
tras" in Nicaragua.
Moreover, the draconian impact
of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings will
make it even more difficult to per-
suade the Congress to commit the
resources necessary to begin to
match the Soviet effort.
The Reagan Doctrine is in deep
trouble, and only the man who an-
nounced it can now save it by a
strong personal campaign for non-
partisan support.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000302490068-1