WHY CAN'T WE ACT AGAINST TERRORISM?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000302440001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000302440001-9 STAT
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WASHINGTON POST
1 July 1985
Alexander JI. Haig Jr.
Why 't We Act Against Terrorism?
Can
Three fallacies cloud our thinking.
It is urgent to develop a more effective
American policy against terrorism. Americans
in particular are increasingly the victims of this
ugly phenomenon. From the hostages in Iran
five years ago to the most recent ordeal in Bei-
rut. a lengthening shadow has been cast over
the U.S. presence abroad.
Why are we so often the targets? Surely not
because we are weak. Since World War U, our
nuclear and conventional forces have been
largely successful in deterring outright aggres-
sion. Paradoxically, precisely because we are
strong, the terrorists and their allies seek to
chip away at our morale, our domestic order
and our international prestige-the shadow of
our power, as Dean Acheson put it.
Precisely because we are democratic, be-
cause we believe in individual rights, the terror-
ist method is to pit our reverence for innocent
life against our natural instinct to defend our-
selves. And it is precisely because we believe in
an international order, in which necessary
change can take place peacefully, that terrorists
find their natural allies among those who wish
to remake the world forcibly in their own totali-
tarian image.
Why have we been unable to act more effec-
tively against terrorism? Three important falla-
cies cloud our thinking.
First is the fallacy that terrorism lives on its
own organic resources, independent of state
aid. We must be able to discriminate, of course;
among the acts of deranged individuals, obscure
groups possessed by violent political doctrines
and the full-fledged agents of government.
Yet difficult as this may be, one thing is easy
to discern: terrorism's success breeds growing
support. Libya, Iran and Syria employ terror
because they believe it works. The Soviet
Union, sometimes through East Germany and
Bulgaria, bears a heavy responsibility. All of
these states want political change by force; they
want to turn the balance of power against the
democracies.
State-sponsored terrorism is but one element
along a spectrum of violence intended to trans-
form the international brder. If we forget this,
then we are bound to miss the larger issue-
the difference between democratic and totali-
tarian regimes with respect to international
change.
Second comes the moral fallacy that some-
how counterterrorist action, which may risk in-
nocent fives, "dirties" our hands. This fallacy
condemns us to paralysis and puts the terrorist
and his victims-and the United States is a vic-
tim-on the same moral plane.
The use of force may miscarry. Military
operations do go awry. But the alternative to
risking a few precious lives today may be to risk
many more no less precious lives tomorrow, as
terrorists and the governments that support
them become convinced that we lack the moral
strength to defend our values.
This fallacy has just about crippled our de-
bate over terrorism. We see senior U.S. off i-
cials threatening preemption when we have yet
to succeed at retaliation, and setting forth
conditions for the use of our military forces so
ideal that they have rarely been met even in
wartime, All this talk only increases the pres-
sure for ill-considered action in the hope of re-
covering a self-damaged sense of virility.
The third fallacy is the fear that concerted
action against terrorism or its state sponsors
somehow sacrifices more important issues. A
case in point: the fear that a full expose of the
plot to kill the pope may complicate efforts to
reduce tensions with the U.S.S.R. Another case
in point: our curious silence over the Syrian role
in terrorism after our departure from Lebanon.
Obviously, we must be prudent in dealing with
such states sponsoring terrorism, but prudence
can never be an excuse to avoid the truth.
We must deter terrorism by lowering the re-
wards and raisins the penalties for those who en-
courage it. This includes both improved intelli-
.
im roved human sources of intelligence
The most important initiative, however, is to
rally concerted international action: political, eco-
nomic, diplomatic and military. It works. Libya's
Muammar Qaddafi was forced onto the defen-
sive in 1981-82 by such measures until nearly
everyone resumed business as usual. But we
are under no obligation to adhere to a multilat-
eral suicide pact if international action is not
forthcoming. Then we must act alone.
In the final analysis, our character as a free
people is being tested. Are we too irresolute,
too concerned with the ebb and flow of public
opinion, too "short of breath" as the Syrians
boasted following the Marine withdrawal? I
think not.
The writer was secretary of state from 1981 to June
1982.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000302440001-9