U.S.-BACKED NICARAGUA ARMY SWELLS TO 7,000

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000202230051-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: May 8, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000202230051-8
ARTICLE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGE.
___:1 8 2 VA Y 19 8 3
[~ U.Sli Nicarag
e. B ac e Army Swells to _
exertion of pressure to force the leftist. Sandinista lead-
By Don Oberdorfer and Patrick E:Tyler ership of Nicaragua to "look inward" rather than export-
.
Wwshingion Poststart Wrkers
In December, 1981, the CIA informed congressional
oversight committees that it had begun building a highly
trained commando'.force of 500 Latins to strike at targets
in Nicaragua. Sixteen months later, this force has swelled
to an army of.7,O00 -Nicaraguan men with ambitious po-
litical goals and-uncertain U.S. control.
Members of the House and Senate -intelligence com-
mittees,said in interviews that-growing -concern about the
size of this CIA-supported army, its objectives and the
question of control over it were major factors in their
decisions last week to put brakes on the "secret war" in
Central America.
Information now available from .a variety of sources,
viewed with the benefit. of hindsight, raises questions
about the candor of the CIA briefings for-members of the
Intelligence committees. Nevertheless, most of the law-
makers interviewed said they still 'believe they were in-
formed accurately about details of the operation at every
step.
The central problem for many of them, they said, was
the growing contradiction between the limited objectives
that Reagan administration officials stated for the covert
operation in a dozen secret briefings on Capitol Hill and
the ceaseless, sometimes startling growth of the insurgent
force and the shifting focus of its activity from one
month to the next.
"There is no question that the numbers increased far
beyond what the committee anticipated," said Rep. Wil-
liam F. Goodling (R-Pa.). "I think as the force increases
and diversifies, controlling it would be an impossibility."
Rep. Lee. H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) said, "The committee
kept track of it pretty well, but it got out,of -hand." Once
-this happened, he said, "there were great restraints on
the capability of the committee to turn it around."
'"What was particularly =dill cult for - Congress," said
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (]D=N.Y.), "was that the .
definition kept changing of what the objectives were, and
when the president proclaimed these people to be 'free-
dom fighters' there was an unmistakable sense that we
were not fully apprised of the purposes."
Initially, administration officials characterized the mis-
sions of the secret army as the interdiction of arms traffic
through Nicaragua to lefist rebels in El Salvador and the
ing revolution, according to participants in the congres-
sional briefings. Additional objectives, added months lat-
er, were topressure the Sandinistas to be more demo-
cratic and to go to the negotiating table.
bespite President Reagan's reference last Wednesday
to the CIA-supported anti-Sandinista -guerrillas as. "free-
dom fighters," his administration did not suggest in brief-
ings for Congress that the secret army's real purpose was
to bring down the Nicaraguan government.
Increasingly, though, the very size of the secret army,
the intensity of its attacks inside Nicaragua and explicit
statements by its leaders appeared to outpace the limited
purposes outlined to Congress.
By the administration's figures, the 1,000 U.S.-backed
Nicaraguan guerrillas now outnumber the 6,000 commu-
nist-backed guerrillas whose threat to the government of
nearby El Salvador was the original justification for the
CIA effort In meetings with congressmen and senators,
CIA Director William J. Casey has refused to set any
limit on the ultimate size of the force, made up of Ni-
caraguan',exiles of various factions and native Miskito
Indians.
In the last week, the House Intelligence Committee
voted to ban covert actions in Nicaragua, the Senate
committee voted to permit continuation of the actions
for a limited time subject to legislative approval, and
Reagan stepped up his appeals for public support of the
Nicaraguan insurgents.
Taken together, time events represent the most se-
rious struggle between the executive branch and the con-
gressional committees overseeing the intelligence agen-
cies since the committees were established as permanent
arms of-the-two houses in 1976 and 1977.
The congressional oversight machinery was created to
establish, under law, the authority of the legislative.
branch-of an,open and democratic government to mon-
itorexecutive activities that are secret, sensitive and have
the potential for major international repercussions. As
pioneers in an area where the legislative bodies of most
other nations do not tread, the congressional committees
operate in a twilight zone, where both sides, are still feel-
ing their way.
Unless a consensus can be formed in the coming weeks
and months, the struggle over undercover action in Cen-
tral America could bring about an even more serious cri- I
uis between Congress and the Reagan White House.
Should the administration persist in backing the insur-
gents, against increasingly explicit opposition in Con-
gress, the stage would'be set for a battle of constitutional
proportions invo vmg war and peace, a-in the -power to
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