WASHINGTON REAPS WHAT IT SOWED IN ARGENTINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201710007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 19, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201710007-5
ARTICLE APPEARED THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
ON PAGE. _ _ 19 1 1982
STAT
STAT
Washington reaps what it sowed in Argentina,
ByJoseph T. Eldridge
The Reagan administration came into office believiing1
a
that the best way to improve relationswith Latin Americ
was by making strategic alliances-with authoritarian gov-,~
ernments, especially Argentina. Instead, the United States
is on the verge of the worst -deterioration- of hemispheric
After vacillating for weeks, ' Secretary. of 'State,
x Alexander Haig announced on April 30-that the US would
back Britain. in the showdown over, the, Falklands
(Malvinas). The delay derived from the awkward dilemmas
of having to choose between two countries viewed as
friendly and important to US interests. For the-Carter ado
ministration, Argentina's grotesque human- rights. record,
automatically excluded it from preferred ally status.
The Carter human rights policy, more energeticallyap?
plied. in the Western Hemisphere than elsewhere, tilted tot
ward- democratic countries. Therefore the Andean Pact
countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador,.Bolivia, Peru),
being for the most part constitutional governments, were
assiduously cultivated. They were considered generally
stable and more reliable allies. After the Sandinista revolu-1
tion in Nicaragua, the US looked to the Andean countries tai
,moderate the escalating crisis in Central America.
The Reagan administration,- however; placed a higher
priority on mending fences with the Southern Cone's-mili-iI
tary governments. The courtship with Argentina was par-,
ticularly -intense. In a, few. short months Argentina went l
from pariah to strategic hemispheric ally. In the past year
Argentina has been favored with goodwill visits by General,
Edward Charles Meyer, Vice-Admiral Charles Bagley, and
Generals Vernon Walters and Gordon Sumner. The last two l
held special ambassadorial status. Former President Viola
was among the first official guests at the White House. Last 1
fall Genera! Galtieri enjoyed two weeks of administration
'But the Reagan administration's courtship was based on
-the erroneous-assumption that Argentina would be a reli-
able ally. First, Argentina does not have a stable govern-i
ment. Administration officials, predisposed to place confi-I
deuce in authoritarian governments, confuse order with
donsensus. Secondly, the military, accustomed. to absolute
rule, is unpredictable and often arbitrary. Frightened by a;
chaotic economy and rising popular protest, it became even
more adventurous. Desperately seeking to shore up deterio-
rating support, the military, capriciously invaded the
Falklands.
The-Reagan administration and General,Galtieri both
seriously miscalculated the solidarity of the"hew alliance:.
President Reagan's advisers failed to recognize the inher='
ent irrationality and instability of military.-governments.
They failed to see the peril in encouraging Argentine adven.i,
turism in Central America. ' The Reagan administration
made the generals feel that aggressiveness" abroad was
safe. Under the Carter administration, ,Argentina would
have had no illusion about US support and would have been j
much less likely to have seized the Falklands.
The Reagan administration may preside over the most
serious outbreak of popular Latin American antagonism, to-1
,,ward the. US in recent history. In the Argentine military'
view, the Reagan administration is guilty not :only for sid
ing with the British but also for betrayal, a more serious
offense.
'Argentine and Latin American anger has been fueled b)
two other administration errors. First, the administration
has failed to distinguish between the merits of Argentina'0
ceptable use of force. The administration ought to have
publicly recognized Argentina's sovereignty claim, thereby
defusing the charge that the US was backing "colonial4
ism "
The Reagan administration also energetically sought to found itself out of step with other global allies. Then bye
reverse legislative sanctions against Argentina for massive 1 announcing that the US would back Britain the day be! or
human rights violations. The 1977 law prohibiting military! the Royal Navy attacked, Secretary Haig seemed to conj
sales and credits succumbed to a powerful White House done aggression. Perversely, Haig's pro-Britain posture
lobby blitz. Congress did prevail in insisting that the Presi- cane just as the other NATO allies were beginning to moth
y,
n
ra
s
n
o
s
ng was t
rrible.
B
hospitality. not immediately coming down hard on Ar entina the TT
security procedures or phase out active support for the Bo.-]
Falklands. tary Haig's declaration was a body blow to the Latins Inc
The fiercely anticommunist ruling military reveled m shook their faith in the OAS. A prominent OAS ambassador
their-newly acquired respectability, obtained at a remark-s warned me of a"galloping deterioration of,relations with,
ably low cost. Argentina did not have to ease upon internals the US."
dent certify that human rights had unproved before. mi-
tary aid could be restored. This certification was under con-
sideration when. the Argentine military Invaded , the
'made it a key factor in US covert plans. Press 'accoin~ts!
indicate that the CIA enlisted Argentina's help in train g
paramilitary unit for use against Nicaragua, and Argentina
sp#~hetl t~ofonurs.
~nilitary advisers were di
. livian generals' coup or initiate steps. fot a transition to
civilian rule. On the contrary, the Reagan administration.I
encouraged Argentine adventurism in Central America, re=
cruiting Argentina's help in exporting the US's anti-
communist crusade.
Argentina's willingness to carry its own' brutal
counterinsurgency campaign to Central America quickly!
erate their support for Britain and the day after the Organi>
zation of American States voted unanimously to endorse
Argentina's sovereignty- claim over the Falklands.: ecre;
Joseph T. Eldridge-is director of the Washington
Secondl
the admi
i
t
ti
'
timi
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201710007-5