REMARKS OF SENATOR DAVE DURENBERGER BEFORE THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 75
• Publication Date: March 26, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
e'AMA ats cave LJUrenDerger
U.S. Senator for Minnesota
REMARKS OF
SENATOR DAVE DURENBERGER
BEFORE
THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
MARCH 26, 1985
Some years ago, a senior United States government official
was reported to have told a South American diplomat that the
"axis of history" ran from Moscow through Berlin and London to
New York, and did not encompass Latin America.
That narrow vision of international politics is no longer
held by most informed people. Today, as never before, people in
this country are following with intense interest developments in.
the nations of Central and South America.
But if we are interested, we are also confused, for we lack
a frame of reference which can tell us what kind of policy to
pursue. Our government appears to be reacting to events, rather
than carrying out a strategy with specific goals and standards
by which to measure progress. When things don't go the way we
expect; we lose patience and try something different. When we
lose confidence, we try something rash. When threatened, we
overreact. When not threatened, we lose interest.
So, today, Americans are numbed by a plethora of proposals
and counterproposals based on the contradictory views of various
experts and witnesses. Americans are confused by the strength
of Administration rhetoric and the absence of Administration
action. They are confused by congressional procrastination,
argument, and lack of consistency. They are looking for
something we have seldom brought to Central American policy --
coherence and a sense of vision.
We largely ignored events in Central American until the
Nicaraguan people overthrew the Somoza regime, and shortly
thereafter the Salvadoran military deposed General Romero in a
reformist coup. Then, when we tried to react, we found that our
policy was defined by a host of after-thoughts posing as
Congressional amendments. Instead of crafting an integrated
policy, we adopted a series of policy fragments. We looked at
the region through a kaleidescope, which offers different views
when turned to the right or the left, and not a telescope.
We adopted the Helms amendment prohibiting the use of
American foreign aid in support of land reform. We adopted the
Dodd amendment which demanded a regular paper exercise on behalf
of human rights. We adopted the Boland amendment which tried to
link tangible assistance to the intangible motives of the
Nicaraguan opposition. And when we found that this was
fruitless, we adopted Section 8066 of the Continuing Resolution,
which holds American action hostage to an ill-timed vote on an
ill-planned program in support of a policy which no one
understands.
I.submit to you today that we can no longer afford. a
kaleidescopic approach to foreign policy.
If Central America is important to this nation's future --
and it is -- then it is time for the public, the Congress, and
the Executive Branch to begin shaping a long-term affirmative
policy. We need to stop confusing instruments with ends;
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
If Central America is important to this nation's future --
and it is -- then it is time for the public, the Congress, and
the Executive Branch to begin shaping a long-term affirmative
policy. We need to stop confusing instruments with ends;
intentions with accomplishments; rhetoric with reality; and
Congressional micromanagement with Congressional oversight. We
need instead to ask ourselves what is happening today in Central
America, what is likely to happen tomorrow, what we would like
to see happen in the future, and what we can do about it.
Perhaps the place to start is with the democratic revolution
which is being carried out every day throughout Latin America by
millions of people who are demanding, and obtaining, the
political and economic rights which they have long been denied.
Today no repressive government can remain in power in
Central America unless it receives outside support. But
equally, no democratic movement can flourish in Central America
unless it receives outside support. Much of that support must
come from the Latin American democracies themselves. They
cannot be detached observers -- critical or non-commital in
public, yet supportive in private. They must participate in the
democratic revolution for they will benefit the most from its
success and suffer the most from its failure.
When I first went to Central America 12 years ago, only
Costa Rica had a functioning democracy and a tradition of social
justice. Today, Costa Rica is not alone. Panama, Honduras, and
El Salvador have democratically-elected civilian governments
that have made major progress in eliminating a legacy of
injustice, economic stagnation, and the arbitrary exercise of
power. Even in Guatemala, a country which for years stood apart
because of its feudal brutality, there are clear signs of
progress, and Presidential elections are scheduled for October.
At the same time, these developments are not irreversible.
El Salvador's respected President, Jose Napolean Duarte, must
contend with the remnants of yesterday's rightist dictatorship,
while fighting the insurgency of the left. President Suazo of
Honduras, though not significantly threatened by the left, is
facing deteriorating economic conditions which may create
uncontrollable pressure on his government. The Hondurans must
also resolve the dilemma of strengthening a military which
offers protection against the Marxists to the south but which
poses a threat to democracy in its own right. Costa Rica's
economy has been ravaged by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, by
a decline in the terms of trade, by the burden of harboring
thousands of refugees from Nicaragua, and by the government's
historic generosity. In Panama, economic conditions are
precarious and democracy is threatened by a nascent Marxist
movement waiting on stage left and the prospect of a reactionary
military waiting on stage right.
The question facing the American people today is whether we
ignore these realities or act concert with others to help the
emerging democracies strengthen themselves. In the past, we
fought change; now we must decide whether to ignore it or to
bolster it. The old style military governments are evolving
into democracy. The Marxist insurgencies are losing.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
In every country but one, the democratic revolution is being
carried out, however precariously. That country is Nicaragua.
The Sandinista National Directorate has stolen a democratic
revolution from the citizens of Nicaragua as surely as the
Bolsheviks stole the Russian revolution against the Czar. It
has set out on a course of subversion abroad and repression at
home which has disturbed and frightened democratic leaders
throughout the region.
Nicaragua is a throwback to the old pattern. Today, as in
1979, the government faces international hostility, economic
disaster, a population grown restive, and an increasing threat
from a military insurgency supported by a democratic
opposition. So if we are consistent in our support for a
democratic revolution, we should see Nicaragua for what it is --
another Central American dictatorship or which is doomed to
failure unless it is kept alive by outside help.
The fundamental question, therefore, is whether we believe
that the democratic revolution should move forward throughout
Central America. If so, we must ask ourselves where the
obstacles to this movement are found. One place is Managua,
where a government is bent on throttling the democratic
revolution at home and reversing it in the neighboring states.
Inside Nicaragua, the Sandinista National Directorate is
resorting to ever greater forms of control and repression. Food
is rationed by FSLN block committees. The behavior and beliefs
of every citizen are subject to close monitoring to ensure that
there is no deviation from the party line. Censorship, forced
relocation, and orchestrated mob behavior are further divorcing
the people from the Sandinistas. The list of exiles therefore
grows bigger very day.
Nicaragua's behavior toward others is no better. Nicaragua
is providing material, financial, and political support to
insurgents in El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.
This support takes the form of arms, ammunition, communications
coordination, logistics, training, propaganda, medical
assistance, and advice. In addition, Nicaragua poses a direct
military threat to her neighbors in'Central America with an
arsenal which exceeds those of all the other Central American
countries combined. Finally, the emerging client relationship
between Nicaragua and the Soviet-Cuban axis represents a
potential strategic and tactical threat to the United States.
That's why the United States has persistently raised four
points with the Sandinistas in its bilateral talks at
Manzanillo. These are the same points which lie at the heart of
the multi-lateral Contadora negotiations.
First, we want Nicaragua to cease its support for
insurgencies in other countries.
Second, we want the National Directorate to adhere to the
principles of the. OAS Charter, and to honor the promises they
made in 1979 in return for OAS recognition as a transitional
government.
Third, we want Nicaragua to reduce the size of its military
to parity with that of its neighbors, and to refrain altogether
from obtaining or seeking advanced military technology. The
economies in Central America cannot afford an arms race spurred
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
-4-
by a Nicaraguan bid for hegemony. But the democracies in
Central America cannot thrive in the face of a military threat
from a state which, unlike Cuba, is located in the heart of
their small isthmus.
Finally, we want to see a reduction in Nicaraguan dependence
on the Soviets, the Cubans, and clients like the PLO or Libya.
Neither this nation nor any other nation in the hemisphere can
tolerate another Soviet military outpost.
As important as these four points are, they do not comprise
a genuine foreign policy. Instead, they represent problems
which need an immediate solution. In other words, we find
ourselves once again reacting after the fact to events which
appear beyond our control. What we need is a comprehensive
policy which can provide a road map for the future.
Thus far, the Administration has failed to provide such a
road map. True, it has repeatedly announced three concrete
goals which lie at the heart of its monetary requests to
Congress: support for democracy against insurgency; economic
assistance to help stabilize declining economies; and military
assistance to contain the Nicaraguan threat. But these are only
short-term reactions to immediate and visible threats. They do
not tell us what we want the future to look like and because of
that, programs and proposals which should be evaluated in terms
of their contribution to progress become debated as ends in
themselves.
We are not demonstrably undertaking a significant, long-term
and supportable policy which will define the Untied States role
in Central America for the future. And the role played by
President Reagan in this issue only contributes to the
difficulty.
The President has spoken to the public a number of times
about Central America. Until recently, however, he has done so
only in terms of such issues as the so called "feet people". He
has not made clear the affirmative policy which we should adopt,
but instead has spoken only in terms of what we should oppose.
As a result, the President himself has to some degree become
the issue. The President is usually seen as the source of
foreign policy. Congress, therefore, debates, supports or
refutes a man, not a policy. But the true issue here is a
long-term strategy and higher-order goals, not the elections in
1986 or 1988.
Clearly, it is not the obligation of Congress to develop
such a policy. That is the responsibility of the Executive
Branch, and it is the Executive Branch which is far better
prepared to undertake such detailed work. But unless a genuine
policy is developed -- soon and well -- the Executive will leave
itself open to defeat by a Congress which will begin to impose
artificial restraints on this country. We cannot afford
kaleidescopic micro-management of the sort that gave us the
Clark Amendment, the artificial box-checking exercise of human
rights certification, or the fencing of funding which was
appropriated for the CIA.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
The vacuum created by the failure to elaborate an
affirmative policy has led to the ridiculous spectacle of
alternative visits to our Congress and our communities by the
FSLN and the FDN in a protracted morality play designed to gain
short-term propaganda advantages. In Nicaragua, they know there
is no, real US policy, and all sides are therefore are engaged in
a form of ritualized theatrics designed to create one by
default.
It is time for this government to take charge of its own
policy. What we must begin to do is to establish some guiding
principles. These principles can provide a context for debate,
and establish standards by which we can measure success. It is
vital that such a policy be directed uniformly toward all of
Central America, and not just the country which attracts our
attention at the moment. Central America is a tightly
interdependent region, and the democratic revolution cannot
succeed if it is hampered in any country, whether because of
leftist or rightist repression. We must build into our policy
the elements of consistency, accountability, credibility, and
consonance with law which we demand of a foreign policy
elsewhere. And above all else, we should not confuse the
instruments of policy with policy itself.
I believe that our policy should be shaped by six general
principles.
The first principle: We must recognize that a long-term
commitment to policy requires the active support of the public
and its Congress. This means that a policy must be built on an
affirmative vision of the future, and must avoid senseless
confrontation over peripheral issues like the paramilitary
program. If the President makes a $14 million program the
centerpiece of his policy, he will only stoke the fires of
controversy in this country. win or lose, the game will
ultimately be the Sandinistas, not ours.
The previous formula for covert assistance is simply at a
dead end. The disupte between Congress and the Administration
has been over whether money should be appropriated to resume
covert, military support of the Nicaraguan insurgents. Congress
won't be party to the illogical and illegal absurdity of 7-
pretending that we are not providing military assistance when i
is widely and publicly known that we are.
The insistence on covert aid convinces the Central Americans
that we are not openly committed to our objectives and,
therefore, not steadfast. Moreover, the American people `don't
understand why we have to act in an underhanded way if our
policy objectives are right. Finally , it is not clear why
covert aid is the critical action upon which our policy must
stand or fall. The controversy is joined on the wrong issue --
the method rather than the goal of supporting the FDN--and a
negative vote on that issue implies, incorrectly, that Congress
and the Administration are not in agreement on the need to
oppose the Sandanistas and all they stand for. Confrontation
should be in Managua, not in Washington.
The second principles Our policy must have the element of
credibility which comes from an evident willingness to undertake
difficult, and potentially expensive actions. Without
credibility, our actions raise doubts and questions.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
-6-
There is considerable hand-wringing about the arms buildup
in Nicaragua, but it continues. Why, people must ask, do we
permit it? Surely, $14 million in covert aid to the FDN is not
going to make any difference. We assert that MG-21s will not be
permitted, yet the construction of Puenta Huete Airfield
continues, and we permit the deployment of sophisticated MI-24
helicopters. Have we drawn a line on military equipment? if
so, where? If not, why not?
Equally, we claim to support the democratic opposition in
Nicaragua. If so, people must ask, where is the tangible sign
of that suport? If we oppose the regime in Managua,, why do we
buy Nicaraguan beef and bananas when Honduras could use our
trade? And if we truly feel that the Sandinistas have lost
their legitimacy because of their failure to adhere to the
conditions for their recognition by the OAS, why do we continue
diplomatic relations?
Thus far, our rhetoric has vastly exceeded our actions. The
longer this continues, the more certain that nobody--democratic
ally or Sandinista ideologue--will believe that the U.S. is
serious about defending its interest in the short-term or
advancing them in the long.
The third principle: We should make greater use of the
economic tools at our disposal. Our greatest resource is not
our ability to arm people, but to feed them, and to help them
develop sound and growing economies.
To this day, we continue to let protectionism dominate our
dealings with the Central American economies. We continue to
parcel out humanitarian and development assistance in small and
infrequent doses. We continue to focus on the short-term gain,
not the long-term good.
Economic stability goes hand in hand with political
stability. The sounder a nation's economy, the more it can
resist aggression or subversion. It is in our own national
interest to make a significant commitment to economic
development in Central America. -.
We have the economic capacity, the strategic interest, and
the plan of action to do so. But rather than moving ahead with
the urgently-needed Jackson Plan, Congress has wasted its time
and undercut our credibility by engaging in kaleildescopic
policy--making with a string of haphazard amendments. It is
time to move forward on the Jackson Plan, and to quit
distracting ourselves wtih targets of political opportunity.
The fourth principle:: We must make clear that our support
for the democratic revolution means that we are willing to live
with diversity so long as a nation's core values involve a
commitment to the democratic process.
Policy disagreements among democracies are ultimately less
important than their adherence to common values. Our relations
with many genuine democracies have ocassionally been strained.
But at no time have we had a fundamental disagreement over vital
and core issues with a true democracy.-- All_ democracies have a
strong community of interst against tyranny, and it is tyranny
in its most naked form that we spend billions each year to
deter.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
-7-
Governments do not have to look like ours to be democratic,
nor do they have to sign off on the U.S. policy line. Yet too
often in the past, we have signalled that by "democratic," we
mean only pro-U.S. and anti-communist. Too often, we have
failed to support social justice when the basic choice has been
between reform and tyranny.
If the Sandinistas adjust their policies in the ways we have
outlined at Manzanillo and elsewhere, and manifest a commitment
to the democratic process, we should be willing to develop close
and supportive ties with Nicaragua. But we should also be
prepared to isolate Nicaragua if the Sandinistas continue on a
collision course wtih their neighbors. Recently, the UNIR
offered to lay down its arms and undertake unconditional talks
on national reconciliation, with the Church acting as mediator.
This could be the Nicaraguan couterpart to President Duarte's
dramatic meeting at La Palma, and could represent the start of a
process of democratization. The response of the Sandinista
National Directorate should shape our policy decisions.
The fifth rinci le: Any policy which we undertake must be
predicated on Centra American unity and leadership. This is
not our struggle alone, and if we attempt to make it so we are
due for frustration.
It is time for those who have undertaken the democratic
revolution to stand up for the principles of democracy
throughout the region. If the nations of Central America do not
act together, they risk collapsing one by one. The region is
tightly interdependent, and it cannot continue the democratic
revolution, unless it acts in a united way.
It is understandable, given the long history of US neglect,
that the democracies would be reluctant to take the lead in a
policy designed to bring to Nicaragua the processes which have
taken root in Costa Rica and elsewhere. Nobody would want to
risk further intimidation by Nicaragua in a hopeless quest. So
it is vital that the United States make clear that, if the
nations of the region undertake collective action, we will meet
our obligations under the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty.
Regional collective action is a tool we have simply
overlooked thus far, preferring to rely on unilateral programs
and declarations. Article 25 of the OAS Charter, and Articles 6
and 8 of the Rio Pact, provide a sound legal and diplomatic
basis for individual and collective action against a country
which engages in either direct military incursion or in
agression by indirect means. A reliance on these principles and
provisions will make clear that the problem is real, and not
simply an ideological difference between Republicans and
Sandinistas.
Moreover, a declaration of collective action makes clear
that it is Latins themselves, and not the Yanquis, who are
concerned. We cannot afford to revive the image of the
collossus to the north. And I am certain that political leaders
like Presidents Duarte and Monge are far more effective in
obtaining US support than the parade of FDN military commanders
who have recently come through Washington,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
 a Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5
The sixth, and last, principle: We should be cautious about
reliance on tools that can only support a political goal, not
define one. Two such tools are military action and
negotiations.
We should demonstrate that our commitment to the region is
political and durable. As part of that commitment, we should
make clear our willingness to provide military assistance in
accordance with our Rio Pact obligations, but only as requested
by the Rio Pact members themselves. We should avoid the
unilateral impulse to push until somebody yells "uncle"
Military action should never be ruled out. But no such action.
can be undertaken without a clear consensus in this country and
in the region.
Equally, we must keep open the door to negotiations with the
government of Nicaragua, but we must realize that in every case
bil
ll
atera
y and unilaterally, they have negotiated with a
cynical and unproductive attitude. We can no longer base our
policy on an assumption that the Sandinistas have a motivation
or inclination to willingly cede any of their objectives, inside
or outside their country. We must understand that their
objective remains consolidation of power -- an objective they
will not willingly concede through negotiations unless our
diplomacy is framed in terms of a clear enunciation of our
long-term goals, and backed by sufficient strength to express
our will.
In summary, no element of policy -- whether economic
assistance or covert action -- can be intelligently discusses
unless we have first decided upon the broad principles we are
seeking to advance. Only then can our debate about Central
America cease to be artificial and artificially narrow.
It is unusual that the Chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, should address these points, for customarily
intelligence is supposed to inform the policy-maker, not shape
policy. But the means chosen by the Administration to pursue
policy in Central America have thrust both the CIA and the
oversight committees with the public debate. We can return to
our traditional roles when we are offered a policy to support.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670075-5