RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND AMERICAN ACADEMICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201660042-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: March 13, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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AIT!P4,1 : Q 13 March 1986
ON FA S 6 97
The CIA has learned from this case; ship. The p
[TRAL they are both changing their rules re- liam L Langer, was recruited as the Direc?
LAIN INBETWEEN TELLIGENCE A G TAGENC NCY garding contracts with academics and for of Research and he in turn, recruited
s in America for
AND AMERICAN ACADEMICS reaching out to the academic commu- some of the finest scholar the OSS, many of them from Harvard, Yale.
pity to exchange views on this issue. and Columbia Universities.
? Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Press- Recently, the CIA's Deputy Director When CIA was established by the Nation
dent ' one an c of 19the great was the the with s ratio the for intelligence, Robert M. Gates, pre- al Security Act of 1947, this pattern was re-
by cacwesented the CIA's latest position in a pealed. Langer returned to establish the
academics, , of U of U.S. intelli- cooperation thoughtful address at Harvard's John Board of National Estimates. Robert Amory
with the analytic F. Kennedy School of Government. of the Harvard Law School faculty was
i' with the
Bence. This country y produces s some o of His discussion may not be the last named CIA's Deputy Director for intelli-
the finest research and writing on for- word, but it is well worth reading. gence in 1952, and served in that capacity
for nearly ten years. Other academicians
eign countries and foreign police that Both the CIA and the Select Commit who joined included: Historians such as
the world has ever seen. American aca? tee on intelligence would be most in- Ludwell Montague. Sherman Kent, Joseph
denies, with their fine traininf and terested in hearing the reactions of Strayer and . DeForrest van Slyck: econo.
years of experience. frequently devel- American scholars, for we are serious mist Max Milliken, who organized the eco-
Op expertise on particular countries when we say that America needs thec nomic intelligence effort: economist Rich.
that no intelligence organization car and Bissell, who later headed the clandes-
match, despitE its weeds: to secret contributions to the intelligence and tine service: and even Willian Sloane coffin
policy proceszes who left the Union Theological Seminary to
sources. Mr. President. I ask, that the text Of join CIA for the duration of the Korean
experts. Mr. Gate's address on "CIA and the War before becoming Chaplain at Yale. He
U.S. d the helpnce of agencies academic want
need the help . University" be printed jr the RECUKL. is quoted a: recallini that he joined th,
They a ex the -reality check" that an The address follows A?enr5 becausf -Steals, mad( Hitler tool:
the CIA err; THE Ur:rvrv.-r?n- hi.e a Bob Scout " it was a common reasoi.
ing Outside their expert Can analyses. . They need ecbey critiqu-
Th n for academicians to join the Agency in th(
fresh ideas that an outsider can inject I welcome this opportunity to conic to for
years
into the intelligence process . Often. Harvard and speak about the relation:,tp Ef lion, betw"r. uhf- srholfirl~ canine
because of personnel turnover, they between the Centea: intelligence Agency. nit' are CIA wee cordia' throe?hout the
need the basic guidance that a sea- especially its analytical/research at-rn, and 195,0a Tnc cold war at its fi hetght and fa.cu!te
provide to get a new the academic community. Recent events or sludenu rarely quezuoned the nations
coned expert can p here have again sparked broad discussion of need for the Agency and It: activities. Some
analyst off to a good start. both the propriety and wisdom` of uniAmen- of the most noted university professors of
Intelligence is a vital part should the scholars cooperating in any way the time served on a regular basis as unpaid
policy process. Academics should be can intelligence on December 3rd of last the time se-. ed on ? CIA Psis iL. paid
proud to help make the policy process year the Boston Globe stated "The scholar mates to probahelp ble trends. in world poitsice
more rational by ensuring that it is who wares for a government intelligence These halcyon days were soon to change.
based upon the best possible informa- agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a There was some criticism on campuses over
Lion and analysis. true scholar." These are strong word`. In CIA's invohement i the Bay of Pigs expe-
American academics. in turn, need my view they are absolutely wrong. None- dinar in 1561. But the real deterioration in
from U.S. intelligence theless, there are real concerns that should relations between CIA and the academe par-
sOrne things be addressed. alleled the wrenching divisions in the coup
agencies. They need the freedom to My remarks tonight center or two simple try over the Vietnam War. despite continu-
state their views without censorship- propositions: in? academic cooperation with the Director-
except as required to delete sensitive First, preserving the liberty of this nation ate of Intelligence. The decline in CIA-aca-
intelligenee sources and methods or Is fundamental to and prerequisite for the dernia ties accelerated with the Februan
magi -ire that
other classified information. They preservation of academic freedom: the uni- 1967 disclosure in Ramparts with
need enough insulation from the oper- versity community cannot prosper and pro- CIA had beer, funds the foreign activities
ational side of U.S. intelligence that sect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the for- of the Natrona: Student Association for a
tunes of the nation. number of year,.
cooperation their with analysts will Second. in defending the nation and our Sensational afiegations of wrongdoin? by
not lessen en their r ability to conduct re- liberties, the Federal Government need- to CIA became more frequent in the media in
search in foreign countries. And they have recourse to the best minds in the coup- the earn 19 (is culminating the establish
need the right and encouragement to tn?, including those in the academic commu- menu of the F, r l .feller Commission and
be forthright with their employers pity. Tensions inevitably accompany the re- subsequently bole. the Church Committee
and the public regarding any financial lationship between defense, intelligence and in the Senate and the Pike Committee in
support received from U.S. agencies. academe, but mutual need and benefit re- the House of Representatives
The recent case of Nadav Safran. a quire reconciliation or elimination of such crLven oleo her l-. CL nm to iow'eever, Sr.
truly distinguished professor at liar- tensions.
yard University who was faulted for TAE HISTORY or ciA"IIN7VEFSrTY RELATIONS ornized that CIA -must have unlettered
access to the Ses: advice and judgment our
not disclosing CIA support for an aca- in discussing the relationship between the acersitie can produce.' The Committee
demic conference, illustrates very well academic community and American intelli- recommended that. academic advice and
both our need for academics to help Bence. and specifically the research and reco lent of academics he openly sought.
analysis side of intelligence. it is important The Committee concluded that the princi-
aga intelligence and the need to guard to go back to antecedents which, coinciden-
tally, have important links to Harvard. In pal responsibile for setting the terms of
against accidental harm to those aca" the relationship between sCIA etting and academe
demics and to free academic enquiry the summer of 1941? William. J. Donovan should rest with college administrators and
everywhere. Professor Safran exempli- persuaded President Roosevelt of the need other academic ffias. "The Committee
fies the type of insightful scholar who to organize a coordinated foreign intelli- believes that o is the responsibility
can really make a difference by apply- Bence service to inform the government Of . ? erican academic community
ing his rigorous analytic approach to about fast moving world events. Ht pro- the Am
of - the professional and ethical standard: . se problems of U.S. intelligence. His res posed that the service "dram on the unites of its the -*s
ignation as director of Harvard's sides for experts with long foreign expert" This paralleled considerable debate within.
ence and specialized knowledge of the hista- anademit llels and numerous erticles about
Center for Middle Eastern Studies is a ry, languages and general conditions of vari- the relationship num. the tides about
good example of the harm that can our countries." President Roosevelt agreed the CIA. In response to a letter from the
come from keeping the service to his and created the Office of the Coordinator of and` CI, of es A -tear tier fromn the
country so secret that it offends schol- Information, later renamed the Office of nnCOe t~ of the om. thee: Cso atio of
any canons or university rules. Special Services, under Dohovan's leader-
C.~J;1 ~'%:1EG+~
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tseorge Buse replied that the Agency
sought "only the voluntary, and willing co-
operation of individuals who can help the
foreign policy processes of the United
States." Tne Director stated that where re-
lationships are confidential they are usually
so at the request of the scholars, rather
than the Agency. and he refused to isolate
the Agency from "the good counsel of the
best scholars in our country.'
Adopting this approach. Director Stars- -
field Turner engaged in a long and eventual-
ly unsuccessful effort to reach agreement
with President Bok of Harvard on relations
between this university and the Agency.
(ironically, at this time. another Harvard
professor, Robert Bowie. was my predeces-
sor as head of the analytical element of the
Agency.) Some academic institutions adopt-
ed guidelines similar to the restrictive regu-
lations established at Harvard: in most cases
less severe guidelines were proposed. In a
great majority of schools where the issue
arose, however, the faculty and administra-
tion rejected any guidelines, usually on the
grounds that existing regulations or prac-
tices were adequate to protect both the in-
stitution and individuals.
The Agency's relations with the academic
would have improved in recent years for a
variety of reasons, including developments
abroad and reco?nition In the scademi:
community that CIA. together with the De.
partments of State and Defense. has been
an important and useful supporter of arei,
and regional studies and foreign langua?,
studies In the United States. Tuc a?encie:
of the American tntelli?enct community a
well as the Department of State have long
been a primary source of employment for
specialists In these areas The academi:
community also consulted closely with
senior officials of the Intelligence com,:.uni-
ty in their successful campaign to win sup,
port for a Congressional-approved endow-
ment of Soviet studies. lntelltgence agencies
informally strongly supported this endeav-
or.
in some areas of research. such as on the
Soviet Union, our cooperation for nearly 40
years has remained both close and constant
This also has been the case often in the
fields of economics and physical sciences.
On the other hand, there have been much
more pronounced ups and downs in our rela-
tionships with political scientists and allied
social sciences, particularly among those
with expertise in the Third World.
WHY CIA NEEDS ACADEME
There is. however, one constant in the his-
tory of this relationship and in its future as
well: our need for your help. and the oppor-
tunity you have to contribute to a better in-
formed policymakin? process by cooperating
with us. Let me describe how and why.
In just the last dozen years. we have beer
confronted with a large number of new
issues and developments and also have had
to pay attention to problems too long ne-
glected. The oil embargo of 193. the subse-
quent skyrocketing of oil prices and now
their plunge; the related dramatic changes
in the international economic system, the
growth of debt in Third World countries
and now repayment problems: revolutions in
Iran, Ethiopia. and Nicaragua: the final pas-
sage of European colonialism from Africa:
new Soviet beachheads and surrogates in
the Third . World: changing patterns in
international trade; and the growth of tech-
nology transfer, international narcotics net-
works and terrorism all have demonstrated
vividly that our national security- is greatly-
affected by developments and events in ad-
dition to the number and capabilities of
Soviet strategic weapons.
Accordingly, the subjects we deal with
today are staggering in their diversity. They
include problems such as the implications of
the enormous indebtedness of key Third
World countries: problem-, of political. eco-
nomic and social instability and how to fore-
cast them: human rights: narcotics: the illic-
it arms market: the implications of immigra-
tion flows in various regions of the world.
population trends and their political and se-
curity implications: the global food supply:
water resources: energy: technology trans-
ten terrorism: proliferation of chemical/bio-
logical and nuclear weapons: changing com-
modity markets and their implications for
Third World countries; and others too nu-
merous to recount.
But nearly all of these problems have
something in common: while CIA has ex-
perts in virtually all subjects of concern.
there is a vast reservoir of expertise. experi-
ence. and insight in the community of uni-
versity scholars that can help us. and
through us, the American government.
better understand these problems and their
implications for us and for international sta-
bility.
With this diversity of issues and problems
in mind, the Directorate of intelligence sev-
eral years ago initiated an intensified effort
to reach out to the academic community,
think tanks of every stripe, and the business
comrrun!ty to- information. IL nalyst: and
ad,, ice
Senior managers in charge of each of our
substantive area., were directed to unoer-
tai.e an expands c program of sponsorsiuIP
of ccne'-r'nces or. subs:antiye issue: of cot.
cent. tc us and is encourage partic',atior. Of
our ara:- s s in such conference- sponsored
b, the D?'vate sector. Since 1982 CIA has
sponsored more than. 300 conference,
nearly all of there involving considerable
participation by the academic community
and touching on many of the issues I noted.
In add:tion? we- have recorded more than
1.500 ins:.ances of our analysts attending
conferences sponsored by the private
sector-and doing so as openly acknowl-
edged CIA employees.
We have increasingly turned U. the aca-
demic community to test our assessments in
ways consistent with protecting intelligence
sources and methods. We have helped schol
ars get security clearances so that the,
could examine the actual drafts of our stud.
ies A `rowing percentage of our work is re
viewed by speciaiuts outside the govern
meat-i. the academic community and vas,
ous think tank: and by retired senior mili-
tary officers. independent specialists. and
other:,
We have established panels of securi:'
elearec specialists from business and the
academ_i- community to meet with us regu-
larly no: only to help improve specific re-
search papers but to het; develop new rt
search methods, review performance. arid
help us test new approaches and hypoth-
eses.
Our analysts are required to refresh their
own substantive credentials and expand
their horizons by obtaining outside training
at leas: every two years. This requirement
can be met through taking university
courses. participating in business or other
outside sponsored seminars and conferences.
attending Military training courses, and so
forth.
Our involvement with the academic.corn-
munity takes several forms
Consulting: This is the most prevalent It
can be formal. under a contractual arrange-
ment in . which the individual is paid a se
government rate. or it can be informal and
unpaid-an exchange of views between in
terested specialists. We are particularly in-
terested in ideas that challenge convention
al wisdom, or orthodoxy. We know what we
thinl_ but we need to know what others
think also.
Sponsorship of conferences: We general`,
Organise our own.. but occastonaily we con
tract wit*, others to organize a conference
for us. And, of course. our analysts attend
conferences
organizations, think
tanks. and universities. in tint
Research: In some areast scholar, expertise
verstties have the experience and exper
to carry out basic research for us.
economic or exan
ple. on demographic
The recent controversy at Harvard and the
media have focused on this area of coopera-
tion. In fact. It presently is a very minor ele-
ment in our overall relationship will. the
academic community. It is hardly F. pro-
gram. as recently alleged. of "covert fees
and fellowships" with which we can "buy
scholastic priorities."
d a
h
a
Scholars in Residence: We have
scholars-in-residence program for a number
of years under which individuals from the
academic world can spend a year or two
working with us, with full security clear-
ances, on topics of interest to them and us.
Information: Finally, we are interested ir.
talking with scholars who are willing to
share with us their impressions after' travel-
ing to places of interest or participating In
event, of interest abroad
A principal factor in our pursuit of con-
tart with scholars Is our perception that
quality analysis on the incredible range of
issue. with which we must cope requires not
only dogged research but also lma?inatioi..
creativity, and insight large- organizations
and particularly government bureaucracies.
arc no. famous for their encouragement of
then' characteristics-although there- is sum-
prisrngly more than you might think. Simi-
larly. to rely solely on information funneled
through government channels inevitably
would constrict the range of views and in
formation needed. We are looking for
people to challenge our views. to argue with
us. to critize our assessments constructively.
to make us think and defend and to go back
to the drawing board when we have missed
something Important. in short. we don't
want scholars to tell us what they think we
want to hear. That would make our entire
effort pointless.
nnaliy. this relationship is not necessarily
a one-way street. Just as we are conscious of
our need for the injection of ideas and infor-
mation from outside government channels. I
believe you should concede that there is at
least the possibility that you might learn
something from discussions with us.
TOCF CONCERN'S
Let me now address some of the major
concerns that have been raised by scholars,
deans and institutions about dealing with
us I would note that certain of these con-
cern reach well beyond just CIA and in-
volve the entire question of relations be
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J
tv een outside sources of funds and the uni.
versity community.
1. Doesn't research or analysis under CIA
auspices of events abroad Inevitably com-
promise academic freedom and the honesty
of academic research?
First of all. when we contract for research.
we insist on honest work. We do not permit
our analysts to cook the books and we would
never consult or contract with a scholar a
second time who did that. Our research and
analysis must stand up to close scrutiny. not
only by other intelligence agencies, but by
other elements of the executive branch, the
oversight committees of the Congress. the
Congress as a whole. the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. and a variety
of other panels and organizations that have
access to our information. While we ac-
knowledge we can be and have been wrong
in the past, our very existence depends on
our reputation for integrity and for reliable
and objective assessments. Any research we
use should have the same qualities.
Second, it seems to me that academic free-
dom depends on a scholar not being behold-
en to any outside influence or rigid ideologi-
cal conceptions but only to the pursuit of
truth. The scholar should be free to search
where he or she wishes and should not be
constrained by any improper influences, in-
cluding the preferences of colleagues or pre-
vailing cultural winds. Actually, improper
influence potentially can be exerted on a
scholar in a number of ways: funding from
contracts and consultantships with business.
foundations and foreign. governments-or
even the threw of withholding tenure.
American academics have long consulted
with officials of foreign governments of all
stripes. In light of this, singling out a US
government agency as a particular threat to
honest inquiry represents a double standard
if not outright hypocrisy. If a university re-
quires public exposure of any relationship
with CIA, then surely logic and equity re-
quire a similar practice for relationships
with foreign governments and. in fact, all
other outside relationships. And, indeed, if
our funding should be openly acknowledged,
should not all outside funding, of whatever
source, be openly acknowledged? You are
rightly proud of your ability to do objective
research. CIA does not threaten it
Third. I agree with the proposition that it
IF the responsibility of the university itself
to establish and monitor the rules governing
aI: these relationships It is both foolish and
irresponsible to do so by isolating the schol
at from any outside contact under the guise
of protecting academic freedom
2. Won't publicly acknowledged contacts
with CIA hinder a scholar's access and free-
dom of Inquiry overseas? I acknowledge this
might be a problem for some individuals.
Indeed. In some places around the world, all
Americans are suspected of working for
CIA. However, many who have worked with
us for years have not had any difficulty.
3. Can't a colleague's contacts even with
CIA analysts compromise an entire depart-
ment? 1 have been asked before about the
danger of one scholar's association with us
involving his or her faculty colleagues
through some sort of guilt by association. I
would simply offer two observations First.
the university community is a remarkably
diverse one and I am sure that In many de-
partments there are scholars who are in-
volved in some sort of activity with which
their colleagues disagree or which they do
not support. So main. this problem is not
limited just to CIA. Some form of reporting
to the university on such relationships that
could be kept confidential would seem to me
an appropriate way to minimize this prob-
lem. My second observation, however, is
that at some point some courage is called
for. The freedom of those who do wish to
consult with us can be infringed upon by
the fears of their colleagues. We do not be-
lieve that working with your government to
help bring about better informed policy is
shameful; indeed. it should be a source of
pride and satisfaction. Contributing to a
better understanding of some of the most
difficult and occasionally dangerous prob-
lems of the world. in my view, is responsive
to the scholar's highest calling.
4. Isn't prepublication review tantamount
to CIA censorship of independent ideas.
opinions and judgments? No. Our review is
only to ensure that no classified informa-
tion is included in a book or article and that
the text does not reveal intelligence sources
and methods. We have no interest in alter-
ing the substance or conclusions of writings
we review and take great care to avoid
asking for such changes. And the fact is: we
don't. Where a consultant has no access to
classified information, there is no prepubli.
cation review.
5. What about the view that CIA engages
in covert action as well as collection and
analysis and a variety of "immoral" acts and
therefore association with any part of CIA
is unacceptable? Activities at CIA are car-
ried out within the law with the approval of
appropriate authorities. and with the over-
sight of the Congress. They are activities
mandated by the decisions of elected offi-
cials in both the Executive and Legislative
branches. As we have seen recently Con-
gress car, and does deny funds for legal in-
telligence activities with which they dis-
agree. thereby terminating such activities.
The Central Intelligence Agency is a for-
eign policy instrument of the elected repre-
sentatives of the American people, just like
the military, USIA or the Department of
State. If you find some element of the gov-
ernment's foreign policy or activity incon-
sistent with your professional judgment, I
would encourage you first to do all you can
to test the validity of your position. You
also can decline to have any association
with us at all. But in the latter case, the de-
cision whether to associate with us should
be left to the individual One individual e,
freedom of association should not be denied
because of another 's persona, point of view.
A university steps on precarious ground and
itself endangers academic freedom if it
starts making arbitrary rules about which
organizations a scholar may participatI IT,
or talk with-and. I would add especial',, if
one of those organization, I a branch, of
our society's own democratically chosen
government.
ocr Rtit.rss
Before I close, let me review the rules and
policies of the analytical arm of CIA for
dealing with the university community. We
continually review our regulations and poli-
cies in the light of new opportunities, new
problems and new issues. For example, well
before the recent controversy here at Har-
vard, we revised our contract language with
respect to prepublication review, narrowing
that review-which again, is simply to avoid
the compromise of classified information-
to the specific subject area in which a schol-
ar had access to classified information For
example, if a scholar consults with us about
nuclear proliferation and has access to clas-
sified information, writings on unrelated
subjects need not be submitted.
We have again looked at our rules and
policies as a result of the controversy her(
at Harvard. and this too has produced some
modifications. For example. the Directorate
of Intelligence now explicitly tells any orga-
nization or individual organizing a confer-
ence on our behalf that the participant: in
the conference should be informed in ad-
vance of our sponsoring role. Quite frankly.
because we organize the overwhelming ma-
jority of our conferences ourselves, this
problem had not arisen before.
Let me review three key policies of par-
ticular interest to the university communi-
ty:
First, while the Directorate of Intelligence
presently has no contracts for classified re-
search at any academic institution, we can
and will let contracts for classified research
where university rules permit. where apprc?-
priate facilities and circumstances allow.
and when a genuine need exists
Second, when we contract for unclas.'.f?ied
research, we spell out explicitly for the
scholar the conditions governing use of that
research. In some cases the research will Of
done strictly for us, and we will be the only
recipient. In other cases once we have re
ceived the research and assured ourselves
that the terms of the contract have been
carried out, we will acquiesce in a scholars
request to publish a book or article drawing
on that research. We do not commission or
contract for books or articles. We are reali_--
tic about pressures on scholars to publish.
however, and, in order to attract some of
the best people to work with us. we try to
accommodate their desire to draw or. un.
classified research they have done for us for
publication for their own purposes. And fi-
nally, there are cases where we alloy re-
search done for us later to be published
under the scholar's name without any pre.
publication review on our part
But In any of these circumstances. our
review is simply to ensure that the wort. we
contracted to be done has been done. meets
appropriate standards of quality and ones
not contain classified information Taxpay-
ers justifiably would be displeased If we
were not to ensure that we had received
true value for their money.
Third. we also have looked again at the
question of whether our funding of research
that is subsequently used in a publication
by a scholar should be openly acknowl-
eo;ed Tnert are sevens: good reasons that
ars'u' arains: such ar, app roacl.. including
tht Wss:ouity of difficulty with a foreigr.
goverr.men1 by virtue of acknowledged CIA
interest ii. its internal affairs the possibility
that acknowledged CIA interest in a specific
s::bit -such as the financial stability of a
particuiar country-eoulc affect the situa
Lion itself, arty:, finally. concern that reader.-
n',ight assume the scholars conclusion:
were. in fact. CIA s
As a result of the controversy here at liar
yard and expressions of concern about this
policy, we reexamined this issue with con-
siderable car(. In the first place, there are
certain circumstances under which disclo-
sure of our funding of research may be re-
quired. and we of course oompl_v Beyond
this. we have decided that our interest in
obtaining the cooperation of this country's
scholars and allaying the misunderstandings
and suspicions that have grown out of our
earlier approach warrants at least some
change In our policy. Accordingly, CIA will
henceforth permit acknowledgement of our
funding of research that is later independ-
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ently published by a scholar unless (1) the
scholar requests privacy or (2) we determine
that formal, public association of CIA with
a specific topic or subject would prove darn-
aging to the United States Any acknowl.
edgement of CIA funding would be accorn-
panied by a statement to the effect that the
views expressed are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of CIA
or of the US government. I assume. of
course, that universities also will press hard
for public disclosure of other sources of
funding for research.
Fourth. we expect any scholar or individ-
ual who consults or works with us to abide
fully by the rules of his or her home institu-
tion in terms of reporting the relationship
with us. But, in our view, it is, in the first in-
stance, the responsibility of the institution
to set such rules and to enforce them, and
the responsibility of the scholar to comply.
CONCLUSIONS
The world is increasingly complex. The
challenges to the security and well being of
the American people are increasingly di-
verse and subtle. Director Casey and 1, and
others in the Executive Branch and our
Congressional oversight committees believe
that contacts with universities and others in
the private sector are imperative if we are
properly and effectively to tarry out our
mission of informing. improving under-
standing, and warning the government
about developments around the world-the
same mission identified by General Dono-
van and President Roosevelt. Our ability to
carry out our mission, as in the days of
Langer and Donovan, depends on voluntary
cooperation between those of us who carry
this responsibility in intelligence, and those
in the university, business, retired military.
and others who can help us understand
these challenges better and forecast them
more accurately. Our country is the ulti-
mate beneficiary.
Consultation and cooperation with CIA on
the problems this nation faces abroad do
not threaten academic freedom. However, I
believe that freedom of inquiry is limited. a
desire to render public service sometimes
tragically thwarted, and our nation disad-
vantaged, by those who would deny a schol-
ar's willingness to work with the American
intelligence service in assessing the world
around us.
The government cannot coerce any schol-
ar to cooperate or work with the Depart-
ment of Defense, Department of State, or
CIA. By the same token. no scholar should
be prevented by acedernic institutions or col-
leagues from doing so. And none should
have to worry that ht_ or her reputatior wil',
suffer because of a public-sprrited. patriotic
willingnt?si to help us better understand and
forecast development abroad affectini; our
national well-being and the force-- that
threaten our freedom.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/16: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201660042-2