RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYA ND AMERICAN ACADEMICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201660039-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: March 13, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ARTICLE PirNir\ vVl\VL\LUV IV198L\C11.., a~++V V1W .++-+L\L1
PEATi~6 13 March 6
ON PAGE 5 24 97
The CIA has learned from this case; ship. The
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CEN they are both changing their rules re- liam L. Langer, was recruited as the Direc-
TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY garding contracts with academics and tor of Research and he in turn, recruited
reaching out to the academic commu- some of the finest scholars in America for
AND AMERICAN ACADEMICS the OSS, many of them from Harvard, Yale,
? Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi- nity to exchange views on this issue. and Columbia Universities.
dent, one of the great tragedies of the Recently, the CIA's Deputy Director When CIA was established by the Nation.
1960's and 1970's was the withdrawal, for Intelligence, Robert M. Gates, pre- al Security Act of 1947, this pattern was re-
by American academics, of cooperation sented the CIA's latest position in a peated. Langer retuined to establish the
with the analytic arms of U.S. intelli- thoughtful address at Harvard's John Board of National Estimates. Robert Amory
F. Kennedy School of Government. of the Harvard Law School faculty was
genre. This country produces some of His discussion may not be the last named CIA's Deputy Director for Intelli-
the finest research and writing on for- word, but it is well worth reading. genre in 1952, and served in that capacity
eign countries and foreign policy that Both the CIA and the Select Commit- for nearly ten years. Other academicians
the world has ever seen. American aca- tee on Intelligence would be most in- Ludwewho Joined included: Mont ague, Historians such as
, Sherman Kent, Joseph
demics, with their fine training and terested in. hearing the reactions of Strayer and DeForrest Van Slyck; econo-
years of experience, frequently devel? American scholars, for we are serious mist Max Millikan, who organized the eco-
op expertise on particular countries when we say that America needs their nomic intelligence effort; economist Rich-
that no intelligence organization can contributions to the intelligence and and Bissell, who later headed the clandes-
match, despite its access to secret . tine service; and even Willian Sloane Coffin
sources. policy processes who left the Union Theological Seminary to
U.S. intelligence agencies want and Mr. President. I ask that the text of loin CIA for the duration of the Korean
need the help of academic experts. Mr. Gate's address on "CIA and the War r before becoming Chaplain at Yale. He
a recallgnc that he Joined the
They need the "reality check" that an University" be printed in the RECORD. is Quowd before
outside expert can provide by critiqu- The address follows. Agency because .'Stalin made Hitler look
ing their analyses. They need the CIA AND THL UNryrs:SITS' like a Boy Scout." It was a common reason
for academicians to Join the Agency' in the
fresh ideas that an outsider can inject I welcome this opportunity to come to early years
into the intelligence process. Often, Harvard and speak about the relation ip kelationc between the scholarly commu-
because of personnel turnover, they between the Central Intelligence Agency, nits and CIA were cordm! s throughout the
need the basic guidance that a sea- especially its analytical/research arnt, and 1950s. The cold war at its height and faculty
soned expert can provide to get a new the academic community. Recent events or students rarely questioned the nation's
analyst off to a good start. here have again sparked broad discussion of need for the Agency and its activities. Some
Intelligence is a vital part of the both the propriety and wisdom of university of the most noted university professors of
scholars cooperating in any way with Amen- the time served on a regular basis as unpaid
policy process. Academics should be can intelligence On December 3rd of last the time
to se helping CIA to form its esti-
more to help make the policy process year the Boston Globe stated "The scholar mneu to probable trends in to for politics.
more rational by ensuring that it is who works for a government intelligence were soon to change.
based upon the best possible informs- agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a T Thesheree e h h somealcyon days were
campuses over was criticism on
lion and analysis, true scholar." These are strong words. In CIA's involvement in the Bay of Pigs expe.
American academics, in turn, need my view they are absolutely wrong. None- dition in 1961. But the real deterioration in
some things from U.S. intelligence theless, there are real concerns that should relations between CIA and the academe par.
be addressed. alleled the wrenching divisions to the eoun-
agencies. state their eir views yews without need the the freedom censorship- to My. remarks tonight center on two simple try over the Vietnam War. despite the continu-
First, preserving the liberty of this nation trig academic cooperation with the Director-
except tate as required to delete sensitive e propositions:
intelligence sources and methods or is fundamental to and prerequisite for the ate of Intelligence. The decline in Bemis ties accelerated with the February
other classified information. They preservation of academic freedom: the uni- 1967 disclosure in Ramparts magazine that
need enough insulation from the oper- versity community cannot prosper and pro- CIA had been funding the foreign activities
ational side of U.S. intelligence that tect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the for- Of the Nations; Student Association for a
their cooperation with analysts will tunes of the nation. number of year.
not lessen their ability to conduct re- Second, in defending the nation and our Sensational Negations of wrongdoing by
search in foreign countries. And they liberties, the Federal Government needs to CIA became more frequent in the media in
have recourse to the best minds in the coun- the early 1970s. culminating the establish
need the right and encouragement to try, including those in the academic commu- menu of the Rockefeller Commission and
be forthright with their employers nity. Tensions inevitably accompany the re- subsequently bott the Church Committee
and the public regarding any financial lationship between defense. intelligence and in the Senate and the Pike Committee in
support received from U.S. agencies. academe, but mutual need and benefit re- the House of Representatives
The recent case of Nadav Saf ran, a quire reconciliation or elimination of such Even the Church Committee, however, so
truly distinguished professor at Har- tensions. critical of other intelligence activities, rec-
vard University who was faulted for THE HISTORY Or m? ?werVERSrrY RELATIONS ognized that CIA "must have unfettered
not disclosing CIA support for an aca- In discussing the relationship between the access to the best advice and Judgment our
universities can produce." The Committee
demic conference, illustrates very well academic community and American intelh- universities recommendec that cademic advice and
both our need for academics to help gence, and specifically the research and edgment a academies as he openly souh
D.S. intelligence and the need to guard analysis side of intelligence. it is important TJ of
he Committee concluded that the princi.
against accidental harm to those aca to go back to antecedents which. coinciden- pal responsibility for setting the terms of
demics and to free academic enquiry tally, have important links to Harvard. In the relationship between CIA and academe
everywhere. Professor Safran exempli- the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan persuaded President Roosevelt of the need should rest with college administrators and
her academic college
fies the type of insightful scholar who to organize a coordinated foreign intelli- other that o fficia is ls. "theThe responsibility
can really make a difference by apply- gence service to inform the government of i . . the Ammerican academic community
nity
ing his rigorous analytic approach to about fast moving world events. He pro- of set the proProfessional and ethical standards
problems of U.S. intelligence. His res- posed that the service "draw on the untie. - to it, member< "
ignation as director of Harvard's shies for experts with long foreign experi- considerable debate within
Center for Middle Eastern Studies is a ence and specialized knowledge of the histo- This academic ranks paralleled and con id numerous debate within
t
ry. languages and general conditions of van- the relationship between the uarticles about
good example of the harm that can ous countries." President Roosevelt agreed . In Jepsona to a letter from the
come from keeping the service to his and created the Office of the Coordinator of and
President CIA. In the American tte Association of
country so secret that it offends schol- Information. later renamed the Office of > niversity Professors. then CIA Director
any canons or university rules. Special Services, under Donovan's leader-
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a
tseorge Bush replied that the Agency
sought "only the voluntary and willing co-
operation of individuals who can help the
foreign policy processes of the United
States." The Director stated that where re-
lationships are confidential they are usually
so at the request of the scholars. rather
than the Agency, and he refused to isolate
the Agency from "the good counsel of the
best scholars in our country-.-
Adopting this approach. Director Stan-
field Turner engaged in a long and eventual-
ly unsuccessful effort to reach agreement
with President Bok of Harvard on relations
between this university and the Agency.
(Ironically, at this time, another Harvard
professor, Robert Bowie, was my predeces-
sor as head of the analytical element of the
Agency.) Some academic institutions adopt-
ed guidelines similar to the restrictive regu-
lations established at Harvard: In most cases
less severe guidelines were proposed. In a
great majority of schools where the issue
arose, however, the faculty and administra-
tion rejected any guidelines, usually on the
grounds that existing regulations or prac-
tices were adequate to protect both the in-
stitution and individuals.
The Agency's relations with the academic
would have improved in recent years for a
variety of reasons, including developments
abroad and recognition In the academic
community that CIA. together with the De-
partments of State and Defense. has been
an important and useful supporter of area
and regional studies and foreign language
studies In the United States. Tne agencies
of the American intelligence community as
well as the Department of State have long
been a primary source of employment for
specialists In these areas. The academic
community also consulted closely' with
senior officials of the intelligence communi-
ty in their successful campaign to win sup-
port for a Congressional-approved endow-
ment of Soviet studies. Intelligence agencies
informally strongly supported this endeav-
or.
In some areas of research, such as on the
Soviet Union, our cooperation for nearly 40
years has remained both close and constant.
This also has been the Case often in the
fields of economics and physical sciences.
On the other hand. there have been much
more pronounced ups and downs in our rela-
tionships with political scientists and allied
social sciences, particularly among those
with expertise in the Third World.
WHY CIA NEEDS ACADEME
There is, however, one constant in the his-
tory of this relationship and in its future as
well: our need for your help. and the oppor-
tunity you have to contribute to a better in-
formed policymaking process by cooperating
with us. Let me describe how and why.
In just the last dozen years. we have been
confronted with a large number of new
Issues and developments and also have had
to pay attention to problems too long ne-
glected. The oil embargo of 1973, the subse-
quent skyrocketing of oil prices and now
their plunge; the related dramatic changes
in the international economic system, the
growth of debt in Third World countries
and now repayment problems: revolutions in
Iran, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua: the final pas-
sage of European colonialism from Africa;
new Soviet beachheads and surrogates in
the Third World; changing patterns in
international trade: and the growth of tech.
nology transfer, international narcotics net-
works and terrorism all have demonstrated outside sponsored seminars and conferences.
vividly that our national security is greatly- attending military training courses, and so
affected by developments and events in ad- forth.
dition to the number and capabilities of our involvement with the academic com-
Soviet strategic weapons. munity takes several forms:
Accordingly, the subjects we deal with Consulting: This is the most prevalent It
today are staggering in their diversity. They can be formal, under a contractual arrange-
include problems such as the implications of went in which the individual is paid a set
the enormous indebtedness of key Third government rate. or it can be informal and
World countries: problems of political. eco- unpaid-an exchange of views between in-
nomic and social instability and how to fore- terested specialists. We are particularly in-
cast them: human rights: narcotics: the illic- terested in ideas that Challenge convention-
it arms market: the implications of immigra- al wisdom or orthodoxy. We know what we
tion flows in various regions of the world: think. but we need to know what others
population trends and their political and se- think also. f conference' We generally
o
h
curity Implications: the global food supply;
water resources: energy: technology trans-
fer. terrorism: proliferation of chemical/bio-
logical and nuclear weapons: changing com-
modity markets and their implications for
Third World countries; and others too nu-
merous to recount.
But nearly all of these problems have
something in common: while CIA has ex-
perts in virtually all subjects of concern.
there is a vast reservoir of expertise, experi-
ence, and insight in the community of uni-
versity scholars that can help us, and
through us, the American government,
better understand these problems and their
implications for us and for international sta-
bility.
With this diversity of issues and problems
in mind, the Directorate of intelligence sev-
eral years ago initiated an intensified effort
to reach out to the academic community,
think tanks of every stripe, and the business
community for information, analysir and
advice
Senior managers in charge of each of our
substantive area. were directed to under-
take ar. expanded program of sponsorship
of coif"rences on substantive issues of con-
cern tc us and to encourage participation of
our ana:ysts in such conferences sponsored
by the private sector. Since 1982, CIA has
sponsored more than 300 conference:`.
nearly all of them involving considerable
participation by the academic community
and touching on many of the issues I noted.
In addition, we have recorded more than
1.500 instances of our analysts attending
conferences sponsored by the private
sector-and doing so as openly acknowl-
edged CiA employees.
We have increasingly turned to the aca-
demic community to test our assessments in
ways consistent with protecting intelligence'
sources and methods. We have helped schol-
ars get security clearances so that they
could examine the actual.drafts of our stud-
les. A growing percentage of our work is re-
viewed by specialists outside the govern
menu-in the academic community and var;-
ous think tanks. and by retired senior mili-
tary officers. independent specialists. and
others.
We have established panels of security
cleared specialists from business and the
academic community to meet with us re?u-
larly not only to help improve specific re-
search papers but to help develop new re-
search methods, review performance, and
help us test new approaches and hypoth-
eses.
Our analysts are required to refresh their
own substantive credentials and expand
their horizons by obtaining outside training
at least every two years. This requirement
can be met through taking university
courses, participating in business or other
tp
Sponsors
organize our own. but occasionally we con-
tract with others to organize a conference
for us. And, of course. our analysts attend
conferences sponsored by business, academ-
ic and professional organizations, think
tanks, and universities.
Research: in some areas, scholars in uni-
versities have the experience and expertise
to carry out basic research for us, for exam.
ple. on demographic and economic subjects.
The recent controversy at Harvard and the
media have focused on this area of coopera-
tion. In fact, it presently is a very minor ele-
ment in our overall relationship with the
academic community. It is hardly a pro-
gram. as recently alleged, of "covert fees
and fellowships" with which we can "buy-
scholastic priorities."
Scholars in Residence: We have had a
scholars-in-residence program for a number
of years under which individuals from the
academic world can spend a year or two
working with us, with full security clear-
ances. on topics of interest to them and us.
Information: Finally, we are interested in
talking with scholars who are willing to
share with us their impressions after travel-
ing to places of interest or participating In
events of interest abroad.
A principal factor in our pursuit of con-
tact with scholars Is our perception that
quality analysis on the incredible range of
Issues with which we must cope requires not
only dogged research but also Imagination.
creativity, and insight. Large organizations,
and particularly government bureaucracies.
are not famous for their encouragement of
these characteristics-although there is sur-
prisingly more than you might think. Simi-
larly. to rely solely on information funneled
through government channels inevitably
would constrict the range of views and in-
formation needed. We are looking for
people to challenge our views, to argue with
us, to critize our assessments constructively.
to make us think and defend and to go back
to the drawing board when we have missed
something important. In short, we don't
want scholars to tell us what they think we
want to hear. That would make our entire
effort pointless.
Finally, this relationship is not necessarily
a one-way street. Just as we are conscious of
our need for the injection of ideas and tnfor-
mation from outside government channels. I
believe you should concede that there is at
least the possibility that you might learn
something from discussions with us.
YOUR CONCERNS
Let me now address some of the major
concerns that have been raised by scholars,
deans- and institutions about dealing with
us. I would note that certain of these con-
cerns reach well beyond just CIA and in-
volve the entire question of relations be-
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tween outside sources of funds and the uni-
versity community.
1. Doesn't research or analysis under CIA
auspices of events abroad inevitably com-
promise academic freedom and the honesty
of academic research?
First of all, when we contract for research,
we insist on honest work. We do not permit
our analysts to cook the books and we would
never consult or contract with a scholar a
second time who did that. Our research and
analysis must stand up to close scrutiny. not
only by other intelligence agencies, but by
other elements of the executive branch, the
oversight committees of the Congress. the
Congress as a whole. the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. and a variety
of other panels and organizations that have
access to our information. While we ac-
knowledge we can be and have been wrong
in the past, our very existence depends on
our reputation for integrity and for reliable
and objective assessments. Any research we
use should have the same qualities.
Second. it seems to me that academic free-
dom depends on a scholar not being behold-
en to any outside influence or rigid ideologi-
cal conceptions but only to the pursuit of
truth. The scholar should be free to search
where he or she wishes and should not be
constrained by any improper influences, in-
cluding the preferences of colleagues or pre-
vailing cultural winds. Actually, improper
influence potentially can be exerted on a
scholar in a number of ways: funding from
contracts and consultantships with business.
foundations and foreign governments-or
even the threat of withholding tenure.
American academics have long consulted
with officials of foreign governmerts of all
stripes. In light of this, singling out a US
government agency as a particular threat to
honest inquiry represents a double standard
if not outright hypocrisy. If a university re-
quires public exposure of any relationship
with CIA, then surely logic and equity re-
quire a similar practice for relationships
with foreign governments and, in fact, all
other outside relationships. And, indeed, If
our funding should be openly acknowledged.
should not alt outside funding, of whatever
source, be openly acknowledged? You are
rightly proud of your ability to do objective
research. CIA does not threaten it.
Third, I agree with the proposition that it
IF the responsibility of the university Itself
to establish and monitor the rules governing
all these relationships. It is both foolish and
irresponsible to do so by isolating the schol-
ar from any outside contact under the guise
of protecting academic freedom.
2. Won't publicly acknowledged contacts
with CIA hinder a scholar's access and free-
dom of Inquiry overseas? I acknowledge this
might be a problem for some individuals.
Indeed, in some places around the world, all
Americans are suspected of working for
CIA. However, many who have worked with
us for years have not had any difficulty.
3. Can't a colleague's contacts even with
CIA analysts compromise an entire depart-
ment? 1 have been asked before about the
danger of one scholar's association with us
involving his or her faculty colleagues
through some sort of guilt by association. I
would simply offer two observations. First.
the university community is a remarkably
diverse one and I am sure that In many de-
partments there are scholars who are In-
volved in some sort of activity with which
their colleagues disagree or which they do
not support. So again, this problem is not
limited just to CIA. Some form of reporting
to the university on such relationships that
could be kept confidential would seem to me
an appropriate way to minimize this prob-
lem. My second obsei-v tion, however, is
that at some point some courage is called
for. The freedom of those who do wish to
consult with us can be infringed upon by
the fears of their colleagues. We do not be-
lieve that working with your government to
help bring about better informed policy is
shameful; indeed, it should be a source of
pride and satisfaction. Contributing to a
better understanding of some of the most
difficult and occasionally dangerous-prob-
lems of the world, in my view, is responsive
to the scholar's highest calling.
4. Isn't prepublication review tantamount
to CIA censorship of independent ideas,
opinions and judgments? No. Our review is
only to ensure that no classified informs-
tion is included in a book or article and that
the text does not reveal intelligence sources
and methods. We have no interest in alter-
ing the substance or conclusions of writings
we review and take great care to avoid
asking for such changes. And the fact is: we
don't. Where a consultant has no access to
classified information, there is no prepubli-
cation review.
5. What about the view that CIA engages
In covert action as well as collection and
analysis and a variety of "immoral" acts and
therefore association with any part of CIA
is unacceptable? Activities at CIA are car-
ried out within the law with the approval of
appropriate authorities, and with the over-
sight of the Congress. They are activities
mandated by the decisions of elected offi-
cials in both the Executive and Legislative
branches. As we have seen recently Con-
gress can and does deny funds for legal in-
telligence activities with which they dis-
agree, thereby terminating such activities.
The Central Intelligence Agency is a for-
eign policy instrument of the elected repre-
sentatives of the American people, Just like
the military, USIA or the Department of
State. If you find some element of the gov-
ernment's foreign policy or activity incon-
sistent with your professional Judgment, I
would encourage you first to do all you can
to test the validity of your position. You
also can decline to have any association
with us at all. But in the latter case, the de-
cision whether to associate with us should
be left to the individual One individuals
freedom of association should not be denied
because of another's personal point of view.
A university steps on precarious ground and
itself endangers academic freedom If it
starts making arbitrary rules about which
organizations a scholar may participate it
or talk with-and, I would add. especially if
one of those organizations IF a branch of
our society's own democratically chosen
government.
OUR suars
Before I close, let me review the rules and
policies of the analytical arm of CIA for
dealing with the university community. We
continually review our regulations and poli-
cies in the light of new opportunities. new
problems and new issues. For example. well
before the recent controversy here at Har-
vard, we revised our contract language with
respect to prepublication review, narrowing
that review-which again, is simply to avoid
the compromise of classified information-
to the specific subject area in which a schol-
ar had access to classified information. For
example, if a scholar consults with us about
nuclear proliferation and hcs access to clas-
sified information, writings on unrelated
subjects need not be submitted.
We have again looked at our rules and
policies as a result of the controversy here
at Harvard. and this too has produced some
modifications. For example. the Directorate
of intelligence now explicitly tells any orga-
nization or individual organizing a confer-
ence on our behalf that the participants in
the conference should be informed in ad-
vance of our sponsoring role. Quite frankly.
because we organize the overwhelming ma-
jority of our conferences ourselves, this
problem had not arisen before.
Let me review three key, policies of par-
ticular interest to the university communi-
ty:
First. while the Directorate of Intelligence
presently has no contracts for classified re-
search at any academic institution. we can
and will let contracts for classified research
where university rules permit, where apprc
priate facilities and circumstances alloF.
and when a genuine need exists.
Second, when we contract for unclassified
research, we spell out explicitly for the
scholar the conditions governing use of that
research. In some cases, the research will be
done strictly for us, and we will be the only
recipient. In other cases once we have re-
ceived the research and assured ourselves
that the terms of the contract have beer
carried out, we will acquiesce in a scholar's
request to publish a book or article drawing
on that research. We do not commission or
contract for books or articles. We are realis-
tic about pressures on scholars to publish.
however, and, in order to attract some of
the best people to work with us, we try to
accommodate their desire to draw on un-
classified research they have done for us for
publication for their own purposes. And. fi-
nally, there are cases where we alloy re-
search done for us later to be published
under the scholar's name without any pre-
publication review on our part.
But In any of these circumstances, our
review is simply to ensure that the work we
contracted to be done has been done. meets
appropriate standards of quality and does
not contain classified information. Taxpay-
ers Justifiably would be displeased if we
were not to ensure that we had received
true value for their money.
Third. we also have looked again at the
question of whether our funding of research
that is subsequently used in a publication
by a scholar should be openly acknowl-
edged Thera are several good reasons that
argu! a?ains; such an ap proact;. includint
the possibility of difficulty with a foreign
government by virtue of acknowledged CIA
Interest in its internal affairs, the possibilit?
that acknowledged CIA interest in a specific
subject-such as the financial stability of a
particular country-could affect the situa-
tion itself, and, finally. concern that readers
might assume the scholar's conclusions
were. in fact.. CIA s
As a result of the controversy here at Har-
vard and expressions of concern about this
policy, we reexamined this issue with con-
siderable cars:. In the first place, there are
certain circumstances under which disclo-
sure of our funding of research may be re-
quired. and we of course comply. Beyond
this, we have decided that our interest in
obtaining the cooperation of this country's
scholars and allaying the misunderstandings
and suspicions that have grown out of our
earlier approach warrants at least some
change in our policy. Accordingly, CIA will
henceforth permit acknowledgement of our
funding of research that is later Independ-
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ently published by a scholar unless (1) the
scholar requests privacy or (2) we determine
that formal, public association of CIA with
S. specific topic or subject would prove dam-
aging to the United States. Any acknowl-
edgement of CIA funding would be accom-
panied by a statement to the effect that the
views expressed are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of CIA
or of the US government. I assume. of
course, that universities also will press hard
for public disclosure of other sources of
funding for research.
Fourth, we expect any scholar or individ-
ual who consults or works with us to abide
fully by the rules of his or her home institu-
tion in terms of reporting the relationship
with us. But, in our view, it is, in the first in-
stance, the responsibility of the institution
to set such rules and to enforce them, and
the responsibility of the scholar to comply.
CONCLUSIONS
The world is increasingly complex. The
challenges to the security and well being of
the American people are increasingly di-
verse and subtle. Director Casey and 1. and
others in the Executive Branch and our
Congressional oversight committees believe
that contacts with universities and others in
the private sector are imperative if we are
properly and effectively to carry out our
mission of informing. improving under-
standing, and warning the government
about developments around the world-the
same mission identified by General Dono-
van and President Roosevelt. Our ability to
carry out our mission, as in the days of
Langer and Donovan, depends on voluntary
cooperation between those of us who carry
this responsibility in intelligence, and those
in the university, business, retired military,
and others who can help us understand
these challenges better and forecast them
more accurately. Our country is the ulti-
mate beneficiary.
Consultation and cooperation with CIA on
the problems this nation faces abroad do
not threaten academic freedom. However, 1,
believe that freedom of inquiry is limited. a
desire to render public service sometimes
tragically thwarted, and our nation disad-
vantaged, by those who would deny a schol-
ar's willingness to work with the American
intelligence service in assessing the world
around us.
The government cannot coerce any schol-
ar to cooperate or work with the Depart-
ment of Defense, Department of State, or
CIA. By the same token, no scholar should
be prevented by academic institutions or col-
leagues from doing so. And none should
have to worry that hi< or her reput.atior wil
suffer because of a public-sprrited. Patriotic
willingni'st to help us better understand and
forecast developments abroad affecting our
national well-being and the forces that
threaten our freedom
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/16: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201660039-6