GOING TOO FAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201650046-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: November 24, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/07/01: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201650046-9
Dave Durenberger
WASHINGTON POST
24 November 1986
Going Too Far
The president needed the Intelligence Oversight Act.
Congress has never really said exactly how
far the president can go in foreign policy. But
given a concrete event, Congress has occa-
sionally said the president went too far.
It is specific events-decisions and actions by
the executive branch, reviewed by the American
people and their representatives in Congress-
that have forced the debate over presidential
authority. And it is the perceived abuse of
presidential authority that has led to a narrower
interpretation of that authority by Congress-not
congressional arrogance or irresponsibility.
Not-too-distant history is ripe with examples of
those abuses: in assaults on the constitutional
rights of Americans by intelligence agencies in
the 1950s and 1960s, covert actions in Angola
and Chile, and the inept and overly secret
preparation for the Iran rescue mission. Presi-
dents have repeatedly gone too far in exercising
their authority to carry out covert operations
with our intelligence agencies-covert
operations that were either ill-conceived or ill-ex-
ecuted-and secret operations that either violat-
ed our laws or contravened the will of Congress
and the American people.
Thus, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980
did not spring whole from the head of Congress.
It grew over time in response to actions by an
executive branch that went too far. But intelli-
gence oversight by Congress does not stand only
on the potential it holds for curbing abuses by the
executive. Equally important are the consultative
values of oversight-to test and improve the
quality of decisions and actions and to broaden
the base of support under these decisions and
actions.
The Intelligence Oversight Act was not writ-
ten, in other words, to prevent the president
from acting covertly. Indeed, it reduced the
number of committees to which such activities
must be reported. What it was written for was to
prevent the president from carrying out a covert
action without informing the oversight commit-
tees. It was to ensure that the committees could
judge independently the necessity, appropriate-
ness, wisdom and legality of the secret operation
being proposed.
This independent judgment by the intelli-
gence committees need not second-guess the
president or expose a secret operation to the
danger of being compromised. It is meant to
improve the opportunity for the success of a
risky operation and share with the president
the burden of taking that risk.
The Intelligence Oversight Act was written
to ensure that the president's ability to act
would not be limited in any way by this
requirement to inform Congress. There is a
provision in the law, for example, for the
president to act first-where time is of the
essence-and inform the committees in a
"timely manner." The law would not be limited
by the need to keep an action secret. There is
a provision in the law for him to inform 'only
the chairmen and vice chairmen of the intelli-
gence committees and the Senate and House
majority and minority leaders-a total of only
eight people in whom the president should be
willing to place his trust.
The Intelligence Oversight Act could not
resolve the question of the limits of constitu-
tional powers of the president. But congres-
sional understanding of that reality is clear in
the legislative history of the act.
"Nevertheless," said Sen. Robert Byrd in de-
bating the,act on the Senate floor in 1980, "the
president bypasses the procedural provision of
this bill and moves into this gray, constitutional
buffer zone at his peril. This is because the
presumption of this bill is that prior notice must
be given to Congress, period."
'So now, with this president's recent initiatives
in Iran, we have a new event in the history of
intelligence oversight. Once again, a president
had chosen to carry out a covert action-howev-
er well motivated-that is considered by a great
majority of Americans to be ill-conceived, ill-exe-
cuted or both. But this time, the president's act is
also in direct contravention of at least the intent
of the Intelligence Oversight Act. And in the
words of Byrd, the president had moved into the
"gray, constitutional buffer zone" and is, indeed,
,yin peg ?
That peril, of course, is that Congress will
move further to restrict the president's latitude
of action in foreign affairs, to narrow the scope of
presidential authority by expanding and tighten-
ing the "what and how" definitions and require-
ments of the Intelligence Oversight Act.
Those of us in the business of intelligence
oversight do not approach this task of considering
further limitations in presidential authority with
relish. In troubled and complex times, we need a
strong, flexible executive with the authority to
act quickly and secretly when the situation re-
quires it. We wish the recent events involving
Iran had not occurred-that the president and
his advisers had trusted the proper members of
Congress and met their obligations to make the
oversight process work. But we also have an
obligation to the American people to make over-
sight work whether the president wants it or not,
and we will exercise our legislative authority-
our constitutional power-to fulfill that obliga-
The writer, a Republican senator from
Minnesota, is outgoing chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee.
Approved For Release 2010/07/01: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201650046-9