SECRET LETTER TO SHULTZ ASKS ARMS FOR SAVIMBI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201590002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 13, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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1,17-ASHTNGTON POST
13 February 1986
administration would lend only"mor-
al. suppovt or-eeeie-form of :military
assistance' that fell short,, of
Savimbi's critical needs: antitank
and antiaircraft weapons to fight
Soviet armor.
At a private lunch with Savimbi
STAT
Senators Seeking Commitment on- An,
B m f'ates' ler - . ?'
Late last week, Senate Majority
Leader Robert J. Dole (R-(an.)
wrote a classified letter to Secre-
tary of State George P. Shultz at
tempting.to secretly clarify one of
those nuances of foreign policy that
leaders are often loath to put in
writ n
The letter, a copy of which was
made available to The Washington
Post, demonstrates the intricate
pulling and.- tugging between the
Senate's conservative wing and the
Reagan, administration over the
most effective way to support the
anticommunist "freedom fighters"
President Reagan has identified in a
growing list of Third World coun-
tries.:
The administration last. month
notified the House and Senate in-
tel6 ence oversight committees
that it
Pans to give covert assist-
ance to Angolan guerrilla leader
Jonas avim i- who last week com-
pleted a tour of Washington and
New York to seek U.S. support for
his fight against the Marxist
gov-
ernmeni of Angola. The: nptifica fait
was by secret presidential "finding"
under the National Security Act.
In late January, Shultz asked Sen-
ate leaders to give the administra-
tion an expression of support.stt the
Central Intelligence Agency could
proceed with the covert aid. Dote
obliged by drafting a resolution urg-
ing U.S. support for Savimbi.
No such expression of support is
required by law, but shrewd potit-
ical instincts persuaded Reagan
national security advisers of the
need for what some, call " litical .
cover before they involved
United States in another CIA-
backed paramilitary operation
against a foreign cower.
Despite the appearance of sup-
port for Savimbi in the upper
reaches of the administration, a
number of Savimbi's strongest sup-
porters in the Senate suspected
that other members of the admin-
istration would like to derail the
covert operation, and last week
they expressed their doubts to
Dole.
Their chief concern was that the
Feb. 5, Dote and a.group of sena-
tors, most of them conservatives,
. developed , a strategy to lock the
.administration into a commitment
to give: Savimbi~ what he says he
needs.
The following letter, classified
'cret" by Dole's staff because it
implicitly refers to the pending co-
vert operation. according to Repub-
lican Senate sources, is, a a~mbit
that is believed to have paid ~off for
Savimbi.
Republican sources said this
week that the White House . and
State Department are considering
redrafting the president's secret
"finding" for transmission to the
Senate, but this time the presiden-
tial document would specifically call
for providing Savimbi with lethal
weapons to combat Soviet-built
tanks and to shoot down Soviet-
built assault helicopters.
T tter was signed by sena-
to Dol ohn Heinz (R-Pa.), Steve
Symms Idaho), William V. Roth
Jr. (R-Del.), Mitch McConnell (R-
Ky.), Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), Rob-
ert W. Kasten Jr. (R-Wis.), Pete
Wilson (R-Calif.), Jeremiah Denton
(R-Ala.), James A. McClure (R-
Idaho) and Phil Gramm (R-Texas).
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READING
BET
;TIE UNES-`
that the idministration's aeel?s
to use pattn tilitary pressure to
force the Marxist regime to
negotiate the withdrawal of all
Cuban troops and Soviet
advisers from Angola in return
for South Africa's withdrawal of
forces from Namibia.
This paragraph. states the
senators' belief that supplying
arms is t wry to help
Saviigbt and suggests that the
;r&ginistration needs to get
specityb en? this point. rlis ,
was Claesifi46. or U.S.'
penators to openly discuss the
proyieion pt lethal weapons to
rebel 'fofcls in a sovereign
nation might violate not only
Angote's national sensibilities,
but also those of neighboring
Zaire and Zambia, through
which CIA aid would have to
pass;to reach Savimbi,
Finally; the senators make a
subtle, politically artful
proposal. They say they are
willing to provide what has
been called the "political
cover" the administration
wants for the CIA operation,
but only if the administration
states in concrete terms
(through some private channel).
that the assistance will include
antitank and antimissile
weapons. They also raise the
threat that the Senate would
go ahead openly to provide
Savimbi with antiarmor
weapons if assurances are not
forthcoming.
goo 001.E
United states senate
February 6, 1986
The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Departmen.r of State
Was.hingtoer, D.C. 20520
.........,,.,
Dear Mr. Secretary:
With the imminence of a new Communist offensive in
Angola, it is imperative that the United States begin
immediately to provide concrete assistance to the Angolan
democratic resistance forces, under the leadership of UNITA
and Dr'., Jonas Savimbi.
f--~ SucA4ssistancc is needed to achieve the goals we all
see>f ixs,Am ola -- an end to the'massive Soviet and Cuban
troop presence and a negotiated political settlement. We
understand that the President wishes to provide such
assistance, and it would be consistent with your own public
statements of the need to provide "effective" aid to the
democratic resistance.
To meet the threat posed by the Communist offensive,
such assistance must include defensive weaponry effective
against the massive, modern weaponry provided to.the MPLA by
If you believe it would be useful
we are
r
d
,
p
epare
to
introduce and seek speedy passage of a Senate resolution of
support for UNITA. We would do so, though, only on tho firm
assurance that it was part of, and not a substitute for, an
overall strategy to provide vitally needed aid to the
democratic resistance on a timely basis. Absent such an
assurance, we are prepared to press for Congross:onal action
to initiate a program of effective material assistance to
UNITA.
506 COLE
United Senate
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