KISSINGER REPORT: INSIDER'S VIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201400024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: January 18, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201400024-0
A-p
ON PAGE
NEW YORK TIMES
18 January 1981+
Kissinger Report: Insider's View
By Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro
No document crafted-by-n people
will be completely satisfactory to
each of them. But the "conditional-
ity" clause and the proposed alliance
for democracy, prosperity and se-
curity made me proud to sign the re-
port of the National Bipartisan Com-
mission on Central America, despite
its occasional lapses into geopolitical
truculence.
Can reasonable people conceive of
a sequence of events in Central Amer-
ica and Mexico-each of which is un-
likely to occur but not impossible -
leading to a serious threat to United
States security? Could reasonable
people in 1958 have imagined a se-
quence of Cuban events and United
States policy blunders leading four
Years later to a serious threat to
the security of the United States?
The Kissinger commission's report
makes the modest point that prudent
Presidents must take into account
such an improbable but highly risky
sequence of possible events. Yet a
fair reading of the report also indi-
cates that the United States still has
many options to avoid Armageddon in
the tropics. Specifically, the report
implies that events in El Salvador do
not present enough of mortal threat to
United States security to justify un-
conditional military aid, much less
sending in the Marines.
My- proudest day as a member of
the commission came in'San Salva-
dor, watching some of my conserva-
tive colleagues become increasingly
outraged by the mounting evidence
that right-wing death squads were not
a liberal fantasy. Perhaps that hectic
day sealed the approval of the finest
part of our report - the conditionality
'clause making military aid contin-
gent on progress toward free elec-
tions and the rule of law.
If such progress is made in El Sal-
vador, a reformed army will have
something to fight for. Under those
circumstances, military aid would
make political and diplomatic solu-
tions possible. Insurgent.; refusing to
negotiate with a reformist Govern-
ment legitimized by free elections
would run the risk of fading from the
scene as Colombian and Venezuelan
guerrillas did in the 1960's.
But what if the Salvadoran regime Publics commit themselves to
ignores the goals of conditionality? greater respect for human rights,
The United States must stand ready genuinely democratic processes and
then to cut off its bilateral aid, seek- verifiable security assurances. .
ing higher ground elsewhere in the re- I did, nevertheless, register two.
gion. This warning must be credible' fundamental disagreements with the
otherwise death squads and electoral report. First, I would argue that the
fraud will not be eliminated. This was most cost-effective policy for promot-
certainly the intention of the condi- ing long-term United States strategic
tionality clause, although it may be interests in Central America would
undercut by a remarkable footnote be to offer complete and unimpeded
signed by Henry A. Kissinger, Nicho- access to the United States market to
las F. Brady and John Silber. exports from Central American coun-
The United States must forcefully. tries joining the development organi-
state conditions for its bilateral aid, zation proposed in our-report.
but it cannot walk away from all of Second- I believe that c; s ,n-
Central America - for reasons other
than security. Decency requires some
concern for our democratic friends in
that region, especially unarmed
Costa Rica. Our day in San Jose was
pers the democratization of Nicara-
gua. How. Covert support; to some in-
as revealing as our day in San Salva- power, eroding the legitimacy of dis-
dor: Most Costa Ricans, who for sent, especially among the nationalis-
years despised the Nicaraguan dicta- tic youth. (I promoting democracy is
_
tor, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, are the aim, overt civilian programs to
disappointed and alarmed by what encourage Central American demo-
has happened in Nicaragua since cracts would be a better alternative.)
1979. More attention to'Costa Rican, a possi i ity of accidental war is
Colombian and Venezuelan opinions also u' sc ed by t ie covert opera-:
would improve the United States de- tions which otherwise show little
bate over Central America. - - prospect of overthrowing the Sandin-
Democrats in the region are also ista regime. Finally, -the>ccovertaid
likely to look with favor on the pro- probably. makes,, successful ne otia
posal that the United States and Cen- tions with M less likel - rais-
tral America enter into a contract in mg _ glleSUons.a ut what
which Washington commits signifi- Washington will d 'f th v fail.
cantly increased aid to underwrite
economic reform and recovery, while Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, who was a
participating Central American re- member of the Kissinger commis-
sion, is visiting professor of econom-
ics at Columbia University.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201400024-0