CRISIS MANGLING AND THE CUBAN BRIGADE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201190008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0201190008-2
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
^Tlri h=t' nED Harvard University
=. m Summer 1983
:e t lyw
Crisis Mangling and the
Cuban Brigade
Gloria Duffy
STAT
Gloria Duffy is Eiecutiue Director of Ploughshares Fund, a San Francisco-based public foundation. In
addition to the references cited, this article is based on numerous inleruiews with high-ranking officals in
?t.- r.,..-- as-.:-
1 he furor over a sup-
posed brigade of Soviet combat troops, discovered in the fall of 1979 to be
stationed in Cuba, should have been no more than a minor controversy
within the U.S. intelligence community. Instead, an intense diplomatic storm
ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Revelation of the particular data on Soviet troops in Cuba which surfaced
in 1979 would have stirred little public concern at any other time, but the -
information came to light in the volatile political environment of the Carter i
Administration's third year in office, as the Administration's management of
relations with the Soviet Union came under mounting attack. In this atmos-
phere, a minor and inconclusive piece of intelligence became a political issue.
The crisis which grew from public disclosure of the brigade discovery had
disproportionate effects on the debate over ratification of the SALT II treaty,
the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, and Soviet perceptions of American will
and leadership. As Cyrus Vance recently said of the crisis:
.. I think it clearly hurt the ratification process, without any doubt. There
was an erosion of the support for SALT prior to the Cuban brigade issue,
but clearly it was a real blow that set us back substantially."'
Most contemporary historians date the present chill in U.S.-Soviet relations
from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. But in many
ways, the brigade affair four months earlier was the turning point towards
a higher level of hostility between the superpowers.
Those aware of the brigade crisis universally regard the incident as a low
point in Carter Administration foreign policy, and perhaps even in the .iistory
of U.S.-Soviet relations. Ray Cline, Deputy Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency during the Kennedy years, dubbed the incident at the time an
exercise in "crisis mangling," rather than crisis management. And the Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies even more contemptuously demoted
the episode to a "storm in a teacup" in its annual review of politico-military
events. Beyond the impression that a sequence of events took place which
was confusing and perhaps badly managed by the United States, however,
no one is quite certain exactly what came to pass and why. Earlier incidents
involving the. issue of Soviet forces in Cuba-the 1962 missile crisis, the 1969-
70 controversy over Soviet naval facilities at Cienfuegos, and even a minor
debate in 1978 about Soviet MiG-23 aircraft on the island-have been studied
and mined for their significance. But the brigade incident remains a question
mark fc; many of the individuals who made American foreign policy at the
time, not to mention for the public. What really happened? Was there a
combat brigade in Cuba? Why did the United States negotiate at length with
the Soviets on the issue? What did the Carter Administration ask the Soviets
to do about the brigade, and how did the Russians respond? What were the
effects of the event, and what lessons are to be learned?
A closer look at the incident reveals some aspects contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom. Even those most informed about the brigade affair vilify
former Idaho Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee in 1979, as the main American alarmist about the brigade,
I interview with Rubrrt Scheer in Scheer's With Enough Shovels (New York: Random House,
1982), p. 226.
CQNrll r -D
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0201190008-2