THE CIA'S SECRET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN PUTS THE AGENCY EXACTLY WHERE IT WANTS TO BE

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CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4
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RIPPUB
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K
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12
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December 22, 2016
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August 9, 2010
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5
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Publication Date: 
October 1, 1986
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 AMLE AM= c arCha 28 propaganda campaz Beck In cam VI by Jacqueline Sharkey How the CIA's secret propa- ganda campaign controls what we know about Nicaragua. September/October 198~ N CAs secret b agmq aac y w a UAW& to &0 ucis only mildly sur- prised when a CIA official in Honduras, a man knout to Chamorro as "George, " came to his home at 2 a. m. one night in Januan, 1984 and ordered him to lie. During the early 1980s, he and lie,or,ae had often collaborated on "lies," Cha- morro said during a recent interview at his Key Biscayne, Fla., home. At the time, Chamorro believed the lies were ju~ri- tied-chat they supported a good cause. For three years, Chamorro ~V Is a spokesperson for the Nicaraguan Demo- cratic Force (FDN), a group of rebels orga- nized by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1981 to tight the leftist Sandinista gov- ernment. Chamorro said he and his CIA contact frequently had late-night meetings at Chamorro's home in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras and a logistical center for contra operations. That night, "George" handed Cha- morro a press release written in excellent Spanish. Chamorro was amused to read that the contras were supposed to take credit for mining Nicaragua's harbors. "George told me to rush to our clandes- tine radio station and read this announce- ment before the Sandinistas broke the news," Chamorro said. "The truth is that we played no role in the mining of the harbors. But we did as instructed." The release was broadcast about 6 a. m. on Jan- uary 5, 1984. In fact, Chamorro said, the operation had been carried out by CIA commandos. p Jacqueline is an associate professor of journalism at the University of An;ona. She has won a Sidney Hillman Fouulan?n award and an Overseas Press Club award I, ,r her reporting on Central America for (,,,m. mon Cause Magazine. The Washingt?n portion of her research was underuntten by a grant from The Fund for Investigative Jour- nalism Inc. In a World Court deposition 20 months later in Nicaragua's case against U.S. sup- port for the contras, Chamorro, who was relieved of his FDN duties after protesting human rights abuses and the CIA's use of an assassination manual to train the re- bels, said the lie about the mining of the harbors was only one in a series. The CIA had a contra group take credit for bombing the airport in the Nicaraguan capital of Managua on September 8, 1983, according to Chamorro. This oper- ation could have killed two U.S. sena- tors-Gary Hart (D-Colo.) and William Cohen (R-Maine). Cohen and Hart were en route to Ma- nagua for meetings with Sandinista offi- cials when a Cessna began dropping bombs on the city's airport. Sandinista gunners shot down the plane, which crashed into the control tower, destroying the area where Hart and Cohen were scheduled to meet with reporters. The senators learned later that the plane used in the attack belonged to a U.S. aviation company with CIA ties. Other actions the CIA carried out and asked the FDN to take credit for included the destruction of Nicaraguan oil pipe- lines, storage tanks, and communications and military facilities, according to the ex- contra, who continues to oppose the San- dinistas' policies. After each of these oper- ations, "We were instructed by the CIA to publicly claim responsibility in order to cover the CIA's involvement, and we did," Chamorro said. These fake press releases have far. reaching implications. There are indica. tions that the releases are part of an exten. sive media campaign orchestrated by the CIA both in the United States and in Central America. The goal of the cam- paign is simple: to win public and congres- sional support for the contras' cause. According to Chamorro and other for- mer contras, the CIA has not only hand- delivered fake press releases to contra leaders but also has supervised U.S. press conferences, told the contras to lie about their goals to allay congressional concerns STAT about the Nicaraguan conflict, coached the rebels on lobbying techniques, provid- ed them with profiles of Members of Con- gress, and paid the expenses of rebel leaders who traveled to Washington and to Mem- bers' home districts to push for U.S. aid. "I attended meetings at which CIA of- ficials told us that we could change the votes of many Members of the Congress it we knew how to 'sell' our case and place them in a position of 'looking soft on com- munism,' " Chamorro stated in his World Court deposition. "They told us exactly what to say and which Members of the Congress to say it to. They also instructed us to contact certain prominent individu- als in the home districts of various Mem- bers of Congress as a means of hring(itwl pressure on these Members to change their votes." If such allegations are true, the CIA is violating U.S. law, which bars the agency from engaging in domestic operations de- signed to influence political opinion, pub- lic policy or congressional decisions. Agency spokesperson Kath Pherson said in a recent interview, e CIA, as an intelligence organization, does not confirm or deny allegations of intelligence activities. On the specific subject of Cen- tral America, we can say that we comply with congressional restrictions." During the past several years, Congress has been deeply divided about whether to give military and nonmilitary support co the contras, and about what the CIA's role should be regarding rebel activities. The Reagan administration has argued forcefully that the contras are freedom fighters who desperately need L'. S. arms, supplies and logistical support. But admin- istration critics charge that the contras are a CIA creation that has little support within Nicaragua and would collapse without U.S. hinds and leadership. A controversial Senate vote in August, just before Congress recessed, indicates the campaign to portray the contras is "freedom fighters" and their opponents as being "soft on communism" has been very Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 effective. In August the Senate approved a $100 million military and nonmilitary aid package for the contras. The House had approved a similar measure in June. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chair- man of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, proposed that the CIA or any government intelligence agency be barred from administering any of the funds allotted in the bill, but that measure was defeated, 57 to 42. The only specific con- gressional restriction the aid package con- tains regarding CIA involvement with the contras' military and paramilitary opera- I attended meet- ings at which CCL1 of'- crals told us that We could change the votes of many Members of the Congress if we knew how to `sell' our case and place them in a position of `look- ing soft on commu- nism, ' " Chamorro stated in his Wbrld Court deposition, tions is that U.S. military advisers cannot go within a 20-mile radius of the Nica- raguan border. It puts the CIA exactly where it wants to be-back in control. Some critics were deeply disturbed by the vote, saying it takes the United States down the road toward another Vietnam. Sen. Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.), for example, described the decision as "a watershed in American foreign policy." "People understand," he said, "that we're not simply talking about $100 mil- lion for the funding of a military operation in a distant land. We are talking about the first step toward war. " Another factor that concerned admin- istration critics was that the vote came de- spite a recent decision by the World Court, the principal judicial body of the United Nations, that the United States' support of the contras and military opera- tions inside Nicaragua violated interna- tional law. The vote was a complete reversal of Congress' position in mid-1984, when the House and Senate refused to extend fund- ing for the contra program. Several factors contributed to Congress' about-face, ac- cording to congressional aides. They say some Members felt frustrated by the lack of progress in negotiations and by the San- dinistas' refusal to restore full civil liber- ties. Others voted for the aid package be- cause they feared a communist threat in Central America, or because they were afraid that their constituents would con- sider them soft on communism if they did ! not. What concerns administration critics ! is that these very attitudes may have been shaped by an agency public relations ef- tort. CIA spokesperson Pherson denied that the agency was trying to influence con- gressional opinion or policies. "It's not the ' agency s job to be influencing U.S. opin- ion," she said. "It's our job to collect infor- mation abroad that will help policy mak- ers make foreign policy decisions." However, Chamorro, other former contras, former CIA personnel and con- gressional staffers believe the agency is en- gaged in a concerted PR campaign in the United States. They say the agency is also involved in a major campaign in Central I America. Although there is no law against the CIA conducting propaganda campaigns abroad, congressional staff and former CIA personnel point out that this type of operation also affects U.S. opin- ion. They say information planted by the CIA in foreign news media is picked up by American journalists and State Depart- ment officials and reported as fact. The campaign in Central America al- legedly is centered in Costa Rica and Honduras and is designed to persuade the people and governments in those coun- tries to rally behind the contras' efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government. Public support in those countries is crucial because they border Nicaragua. The con- tras and the CIA have set up military and logistical bases in both Costa Rica and Honduras, despite the fears of some offi- cials in those governments that these ac- tivities will further embroil their na- tions-which are democracies and offi. cially neutral-in the Central American conflict. The CIA's media campaign in Central America allegedly includes funding a con- tra newspaper supplement distributed in major Latin American newspapers, fi- nancing contra radio stations, and paying Costa Rican and Honduran journalists to print false and misleading stories designed to inflame public opinion against the San- dinista government. a. Allegations about the CIA's public re- lations efforts have arisen against a back- drop of intense debate in Washington. where the administration has not only battled Congress on behalf of the contras but has also criticized the House and Sen- ate intelligence committees, which are re- sponsible for overseeing CIA activities. Some Members of Congress believe that President Reagan, CIA Director William Casey and national security advisers in the White House want to change the over- sight process because they believe the committees are not supportive enough of administration policies and covert opera- tions such as the contra program. Meanwhile, leaders of the House and Senate intelligence committees have re- cently raised questions about the Reagan administration's extensive use of covert operations and Congress' ability to control them. The contra program and other covert operations such as those in Angola and Afghanistan are "not subject to ap- proval or even scrutiny by the whole Con- gress" and illustrate "the tensions between covert operations and the principles of open, democratic government," Rep. Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and ranking Democrat on the Committee on reign Affairs, said recently. House and Senate approval of the rebel aid package, which would put the CIA j firmly in control of the contra program again, came after months of intense lob- bying by the administration. Private con- servative groups joined in, spending hun- dreds of thousands of dollars on radio and TV advertising in the districts of repre- sentatives who were wavering on the con- tra issue. The ads-some of which report- edly were previewed by a State Depart- ment official-suggested that legislators voting against contra aid were not stand- ing up to the spread of communism and international terrorism in the hemi- sphere. In addition, private groups-including some working informally with the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean- organized speaking engagements around Congressional staffers say this type of campaign, involving White House offi- cials, the State Department and private organizations-possibly bolstered by the CIA's own secret PR campaign-is highly unusual. Adding to their concerns is the fact that one of the private groups involved in the lobbying was founded last year by Max Hugel, former CIA deputy director for op- erations and a friend of CIA Director Ca- sey. Hugel was also a senior adviser on Reagan's 1984 reelection campaign. Hu- gel's group, Project 88: Americans for the 4 ?pntinw0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 tele Sanitized Copy Approved for Release I more than a dozen Members' districts. (In i August the group started a drive to repeal I the 22nd Amendment, which limits a president to two terms.) Hugel's interest in shaping American I opinion was evident last year when he spearheaded an attempt to purchase Unit. ! ed Press International (UPI), one of the world's largest news organizations. The bid failed. The CIA's alleged activities in the United States and Central America raise a number of serious legal and ethical ques- 1 tions, including: ^ To what extent is the CIA influenc- ing U.S. foreign policy by secretly lobby- I ^ To what extent is the CIA planting distorted or false information in the U.S. and foreign media? ^ Does Congress have the power and I the will to oversee the CIA, which is un- der the direct control of the president? i ^ Are the CIA's activities undermining the neutrality and the democratic govern- j ments of Costa Rica and Honduras? Some of the techniques the agency al- legedly is using in the United States ap- pear to be alluded to in a foreign agent's registration statement filed with the Jus- tice Department in September 1985 by I FDN Washington spokesperson Bosco Matamoros. (Persons lobbying for a for- eign government or organization are re- quired to file a disclosure statement with the Justice Department every six months.) i In his statement, Matamoros said that as an FDN spokesperson he "promotes the purposes, positions and goals of the FDN" and "through the, media and otherwise, will endeavor to marshal growing Ameri- can awareness of and support for the ob- jectives of the FDN." He indicated he had done this by pre- paring and disseminating political propa- ganda to public officials, the media, and civic and educational groups. He also in- dicated that he did this through radio and TV broadcasts, magazine and newspaper articles, advertising campaigns, press re- leases and speeches. Matamoros stated on the form that he has been doing this work since June 1981-before the FDN was officially formed and before congressional oversight committees were briefed on the CIA's contra operation. Furthermore, if CIA funds have supported Matamoros' lobby- ing and propaganda activities, the CIA i has violated the prohibition against agen- cysponsorship of activities designed to in- fluence U. S. political opinion. Matamoros' Justice Department regis- tration form raises questions about state- ments he made to the General Account- A number of former CIA officials be- Iietae the agency is running an intense propaganda campaign in Costa Rica which lies on Nicaragua s southern bor- dter, to unn public support for the con? tras' e, fforts to oaerthrow the Sandinistas Carlos ,Morales director of Semanario L'niversidad one of Costa Rica's most outspoken neuspapers, says he knows journalists who are paid by the CL4 to wrote false and misleading stories about the contras. La Nacion, one of Costa Rica's most in- fluential neuspapers, camel a weekly supplement produced by the contras in San Jose. Continued Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 La Republica is one of three Costa Ri- can neu.spapers taenttfted bti- communtcali ms rearrbers as biased to fatrnr of the contras. Critics satiy the Costa Rican press is a target of CL4 efforts. ing Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, which tried to look into alle- gations about CIA lobbying last year. The GAO report, issued in December 1985, stated, "Mr. Matamoros said he has devel- oped contacts with Members of Congress who have expressed interest in Nicaragua. He said, however, he is not engaged in any lobbying activities." Matamoros could not be reached for comment. The GAO report states that Matamoros told investigators that the j money for his activities had come from private sources. Edgar Chamorro, among others, is not convinced. "It was CIA money until 1984," he said. "There were some very small donations from rich men-but not enough for all these projects." During a recent interview at his Florida home, Chamorro provided additional in- formation about contra operations that supplemented his September 1985 World Court deposition. Chamorro, 55, is a soft-spoken man who earned his master's degree in educa- tion at Harvard in 1972. He lives in an airy house just outside Miami-which he jokes is the only city the contras control. Since FDN leaders relieved him of his du- ties in 1984, Chamorro has spent his time writing and lecturing about what he calls the "tragic mistake" that the United States is making in continuing to support the rebels. At the same time, Chamorro says he still opposes the Sandinistas' poli- cies. Chamorro reluctantly left his native Nicaragua to move to Miami with his wife and two children in 1979. In Managua, I he had served as a dean at the Jesuit-affi- hated University of Central America and later had developed a career in advertising and public relations. But he was con- cerned about his family's safety during the civil war then raging between the Sandi- nistas and dictator Anastasio Somoza. He hoped to return after the Sandi- nistas took power later that year. But he was disappointed in the regime's policies and ultimately, in 1981, he joined the FDN because he believed the group repre- sented the best chance for achieving dem- ocratic reform in Nicaragua. When Chamorro talked about con- ducting his public relations work for the contras, he made it clear he was talking about a hidden war for the hearts and minds of the U.S. public and its leaders. He called it a war that "reveals the dark side of America." It began in 1981, when the CIA orga- nized the contras, Chamorro said. From the first, the agency made it clear that its personnel were going to supervise a PR campaign whose primary purpose was "to maintain the support of the Congress for the CIA's activities," he said. Chamorro was based in Miami, where he "did political propaganda work, wrote letters, organized rallies, set up commit- tees in various parts of the United States and generally worked at building support for our cause within the United States"- all under CIA direction, he stated in his World Court deposition. The CIA supervised press releases and press conferences "to ensure maximum fa- vorable publicity," and even wrote the FDN's statement of principles, he said. Agency officials also told contra leaders to lie about the FDN's goals, Chamorro stated in his deposition. When the CIA formed the FDN, "the CIA agents we " worked with spoke openly and confidently about replacing the government in Mana- gua." But after Congress prohibited the agency from using funds for this purpose in 1983, "The CIA instructed us that, if asked, we should say that our objective was to interdict arms supposedly being smuggled from Nicaragua to El Salva- dor.... The public statements by Unit- ed States government officials about the arms flow, we were told by the CIA agents with whom we worked, were necessary to maintain the support of the Congress and I should not be taken seriously by us." The agency also coached contra leaders about how to lobby Congress, Chamorro stated in the deposition. This effort was stepped up in 1984, after Congress voted to cut funding for the contra operation, he added. "Our CIA colleagues enlisted us in an effort to lobby the Congress to resume these appropriations," Chamorro said. He declined to name the targeted Members, saying it might raise unfounded questions about their integrity. Some CIA personnel also continued to give the contras military advice and train- ing'after the 1984 congressional ban on CIA assistance for rebel military or para- military operations, Chamorro said. "They just stayed and kept on working with the FDN. They simply never stopped. " Chamorro said that after working in Miami for several years, he was instructed by CIA personnel to relocate to Teguci- galpa, the capital of Honduras, to run the contras' public relations effort there. The CIA and the contras had set up base camps and logistics centers in Honduras, which lies on Nicaragua's northern bor- der. In addition, the Pentagon was build- ing airfields, radar sites and base camps in the area in conjunction with a series of military exercises. The Pentagon allowed the CIA and the contras to use many of these facilities, according to congressional staffers who work on Central American is- sues. "The CIA station in Tegucigalpa, which at that time included about 20 agents working directly with the FDN, gave me money, in cash, to hire several writers, reporters and technicians to pre- pare a monthly bulletin called Comandos, to run a clandestine radio station and to write press releases," he stated in his World Court deposition. "I was also given money by the CIA to rent a house, office space and automo- Continued Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 "People under- stand, " said Sen. Jim Sasser, "that we're not amply talking about $100 million for the funding of a military operation in a distant land We are talking about the first step to- u and war. " biles, and to obtain office supplies and communications equipment. I also re- I ceived money from the CIA to bribe Hon- duran journalists and broadcasters to j speak favorably about the FDN and to at- tack the government of Nicaragua and call for its overthrow. Approximately 15 Honduran journalists and broadcasters were on the CIA's payroll, and our influ- i ence was thereby extended to every major Honduran newspaper and radio and tele- vision station," Chamorro said in the de- position. He added that agency personnel told him a similar media campaign was under way in Costa Rica. In a recent interview, CIA spokesper- son Pherson said, "The CIA has not re- sponded publicly to any of Mr. Cha- morro's other claims and will not begin now, ' Chamorro said the agency looks at its Doonesbury J`~ What the newspaper doesn't tell read- ers is that it is produced in San Jose by a public relations official for the FDN, Pe- dro Joaquin Chamorro (a distant cousin of Edgar Chamorro). The ' walls of Cha- morro's room at contra offices in the Cos- ta Rican capital are covered with FDN lo- gos and "The 10 Commandments of Pub- lic Relations" in Spanish. In an interview, Pedro Joaquin Cha- morro refused to answer questions about how Nicaragua Hoy, which carries no ad- vertising, is financed. "I can't say any- thing about that," he said. But several former contras said the newspaper gets its money from the agen- cy. "Everyone knows the CIA funds it," said a spokesperson for former contra lead- er Eden Pastora, who left the rebels in May because he believed the CIA had too much control over the movement. "We carry the truth about Nica- ragua-anyone who has something truth- ful to say can get their story published," Pedro Joaquin Chamorro said. But despite his insistence that his paper is not a propa- ganda operation, it is interesting to note that Chamorro serves as the secretary of information for the United Nicaraguan Opposition, an umbrella group of, contra organizations that is controlled by FDN personnel. Recent issues have carried news items such as pictures of a graduation ceremony of an FDN military unit that had just finished its training. Former contras and Costa Rican jour- nalists said another major CI.A project has involved the purchase of a San Jose radio station. Edgar Chamorro said the CIA gave a Venezuelan group sympathetic to the-con- tras enough money to purchase Radio Im- pacto, one of Costa Rica's most powerful stations. Carlos Morales, a Universirv of Costa Rica journalism professor who runs Sernanario Uruversidad, one of the coun- OH, YOU MEAN THE NEROS 1 BY GARRY TRUDEAU YOUR NO OFFENSE, CIVILIAN BUT VHE5'D GEARS YOU FIND ARENEROS? 7HOSE Conbmied public relations effort in Central America "as a marketing experiment.... How can we get [the people of Costa Rica and Honduras] to say, 'We need the freedom fighters to fight the Sandinistas'."' A recent trip to Costa Rica suggested several reasons why such an effort might prove worthwhile. Costa Rica, the most prosperous Cen- tral American country, has no armed forces and proclaimed neutrality in the re- gional conflict in 1983. Public opinion polls in the early 1980s showed that Costa Ricans overwhelmingly supported this po- sition. Furthermore, while Reagan administra- tion officials continually refer to Costa Rica as "the showcase of democracy in Central America," the administration has been willing in the past to use economic and political pressure to force the Costa Rican government to go along with U.S. policy. Weeks of interviews in San Jose, Costa Rica's capital, turned up strong indica- tions that the administration is using the Costa Rican media to create support for the rebels. Although Ambassador Lewis Tambs vigorously denied that the CIA is running a concerted media campaign in the country, there are indications the agency is involved in both print and broadcast media. It appears that the CIA's most ambi- tious effort is Nicaragua Hoy (Nicaragua Today), a four-page newspaper supple- ment produced in San Jose and distributed to 624,000 readers through major newspa- pers in seven Latin American countries. The supplement, whose logo is a draw- ing of Nicaragua surrounded by barbed wire, states that its objective is to "publish information and articles of opinion about the Nicaraguan reality to try to compen- sate for the well-orchestrated disinforma- tion campaign of the Sandinista govern- ment. " Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 `I also received money from the CIA to bribe Honduran jour- nalists and broadcast- ers to speak favorably about [the contras] and to attack the gov- ernment of Nicaragua and call for its over- throw; " Chamorro saidin hisWbrld Court deposition, try's most outspoken newspapers, said he believes that the CIA financed the pur- chase because it wanted an outlet for pro- ; contra programming, and because Radio Impacto's signal can reach Nicaragua, which increases its propaganda value. A number of Costa Rican journalists and policy analysts interviewed for this story said the radio station consistently slants the news. "The contras are por- j trayed as saints, and the Sandinistas as an evil threat to the hemisphere," said Fred Morris, director of the Institute for Cen- tral American Studies in San Jose, which publishes a newsletter on Central Ameri- can affairs. In July, Radio Impacto denounced June Erlick, a L.S. journalist based in Mana gua who has written for various publica- tions. Isabel Ovares, who works for tions, including Time. Impacto called Er- Agence France Presse, and Patricia Leon, lick a "piricuaca," a derogatory term for who works for Inter Press Service, did a Sandinistas that literally means "rabid content analysis of the papers over a dog," and claimed she was being paid by three-month period in 1983 and pub- the Nicaraguan government. lished their findings in Social Science, a The attack prompted Erlick-who in Costa Rican academic journal. fact has written numerous articles critical The three papers were "neither impar- of the Sandinistas-to write an open let- tial nor objective" about the contras and ter to Radio Impacto defending her jour- the Sandinistas, the journalists wrote. nalistic integrity. The report stated that the newspapers In an interview at her home in Mana- used "partial versions of events, omitted gua, Erlick said, "The whole episode was information and falsified information." very intimidating. It wouldn't have been The papers also published photographs so bad if they had presented legitimate of contras praying and referred to their criticism of a specific story I had writ- military operations as battles "in a holy ten-that's fair. But they didn't do that. It war," the report said. The contras are pre- was just a personal attack. It upset me for sented "almost like Crusaders" fighting to days." save Christianity from the communists, it The director of Radio Impacto did not continued. respond to requests for an interview. Linking the contras' cause with religion Meanwhile, the CIA is paying journal- is a major theme in the CIA's propaganda ists to slant the news, according to jour- campaign, Edgar Chamorro said. "The nalism professor Morales and others inter- agency knows what a tremendous influ- viewed in Costa Rica. They said reporters ence the [Catholic] Church is in Central and editors on the agency payroll write America, and they told us to emphasize false or misleading stories about contra religious themes. We were to make the successes, delete stories about human contra war look like the Crusades-an ef- rights abuses and other problems among fort to stop the Sandinistas' 'evil, godless the contras, and create or distort stories empire.' about Sandinista repression and ties to in- Photographs and headlines are also dis- ternational terrorism. torted to link the Sandinistas to interna- "I know some journalists who, because tional terrorism, the report stated. It cited they're hungry, work for the agency," Mo- as an example a headline in the newspaper vales said. "They do it because they aren't La Prensa Libre, which said, ."Nicaraguan aware of the impact their stories have, and boat transports materials of terrorism." A because they need the money." large picture below the headline showed CIA spokesperson Pherson said she two Costa Rican patrol boats escorting a could not comment about allegations re- , ship that the newspaper said was trans- garding agency operations in Costa Rica porting material "of the type generally because the agency does not confirm or used in terrorist activities and sabotage." deny allegations of intelligence activities. It turned out that the vessel, which was I Allegations about media bias regarding sailing under a Panamanian flag, was car- the contras and the Sandinistas gained tying explosives to geologic institutes in credibility from a study of three major several Latin American countries. Nica- newspapers done by two San Jose journal- ragua was one of its ports of call, the report ists with master's degrees in communica- I said. Do onesbury BY GARRY TRUDEAU Continwd Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 "But the headline and photo had a real effect," said Ovares, one of the authors of the study. "People thought, 'Well, the Nicaraguan government really is export- ing terrorism.' " Repeated efforts to interview editors of newspapers that were studied were not successful. Costa Rican sources pointed out that the alleged CIA campaign to portray the Nicaraguan government as a threat to the hemisphere dovetails with the views of many Costa Rican newspaper owners. Many owners are wealthy conservatives who support Reagan administration poli- cies toward Central America, they said. "The CIA wouldn't have to pay the owners or editors of most of the media here," said Juan Jose Echeverria, a lawyer who is a former minister of public security and member of the Costa Rican legisla- ture. "All the CIA has to do is call them up and tell them what they want done." Several Costa Rican journalists said they believed the campaign has seriously harmed freedom of the press. They said reporters or editors who are not sufficient- ly pro-contra are labeled "subversives" " or "communists" and may be forced out of their jobs. The anti-Nicaragua campaign has meant "the death of political tolerance" in Costa Rica, said Jose Melende:, a former radio reporter in San Jose who is now a correspondent for the Mexico City news- paper Excelsior. "It is one of the saddest things that has happened here. The seeds of hatred have been planted, and the fruits will last 100 years." The effects of the alleged U.S. media campaign in Costa Rica are further evi- dence that CIA propaganda campaigns usually are counterproductive, according to former CIA personnel and administra- tion critics. "I don't believe we get enough profit out of it, and we just get a name for inter- Doonesbury 17ELL YOU, HOM/C/OA, I COME 7N4TCWSiS 7V MAK/N6 7HE N,Gt4N P/6 NOV_ AND BURY/N6 J AL/Pv./ I MEAN, 7H4T C105E! um N31 contiamw vening in foreign countries," says Harry Rositzke, former head of the agency's So- viet Operations Division, who calls such efforts "shortsighted." He and other critics say Chile provides an apt example of a counterproductive campaign. In the early 1970s, the CIA spent mil- lions of dollars undermining President Salvador Allende, whom the United States regarded as a leftist threat to the hemisphere. This operation-document- ed in the mid-'70s by a Senate panel chaired by former Idaho Democrat Frank Church-included efforts to destabilize the country's economy and involved pay- ments to Allende's political opponents. The mainspring of the effort was the agency's media campaign. The CIA subsi- dized news services, provided money for a TV station, paid journalists to plant false and distorted stories about the govern- ment in national and international me- dia, and poured $1.5 million into El Mer- curio, one of the nation's most influential newspapers, according to the Church Committee report. In 1973 Allende was overthrown and, in Rositzke's words, "a repressive and mur- derous military junta enjoying American support" took power. Chile, which until that time had one of the longest demo- cratic traditions in Latin America, is still under military dictatorship. From the point of view of former CIA official Ralph McGehee "What the agen- cy has onerrvocably taint the Latin American press. Genuine opposition newspapers and broadcast stations have lost credibility-not just with govern- ments, but with their own people-as a result of these agency media campaigns. The CIA has made it impossible for Latin Americans to tell whether media criticism is legitimate, or the product of the agen- cy. 11 This is exactly what appears to be hap- pening now in Nicaragua, where the San- dinista government closed La Prensa, the country's only opposition newspaper, the day after the House approved the $100 million contra aid package in June. Sandi- nista officials said the newspaper was be- ing closed because it was getting U.S. funds to work with the CIA to promote ! support for the contras' efforts to over- throw the Nicaraguan government. La Prensa editors denied the charges, and the newspaper's closure sparked a worldwide debate. It is interesting that Managua has be- come the focus of an international debate about press freedom. The city has two monuments to journa- lists-one of whom is a national hero- erected by the Sandinistas after the revo- lution. The first is an amphitheater in honor of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a former La Prensa editor (and father of FDN spokes- person Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, of Nica- ragua Hoy, who once worked for La Prensa). The elder Chamorro was one of dictator Anastasio Somoza's most outspo- ken opponents and was shot down in the street in 1978. His death gave enormous impetus to the Sandinistas' fight against Somoza. The other monument is a small park in a poor section of Managua. It was built in honor of Bill Stewart, an ABC-TV re- porter who was shot to death in 1979 by Somoza's National Guard while covering the revolution. Stewart was the first for- eign reporter killed in the conflict, and his death helped turn U.S. public opinion against Somoza. The park was built across the street from where Stewart died, and a simple plaque there reads: "Bill Stewart-He did not die in a strange land. We will always remember him, because he is part of free Nicaragua." Many visitors to Managua find it ironic that a city whose appearance is so unpre- BY GARRY TRUDEAU Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 'We carry the truth about Nicaragua,) says the supervisor of Nicaragua Hoy, a wide- ly distributed news supplement, Few real- ize, however, that it is produced by a public relations official for the contras possessing is the focal point of regional U.S. military and foreign policy. Mana- gua has changed little since 1972, when it was leveled by an earthquake. The main streets are still lined with decaying hulks of buildings. The roof of Managua's cathe- dral, which was destroyed by the quake, has never been replaced. A carpet of grass leads up the main aisle to the altar. Few pedestrians walk downtown. Tax- is--most dating from the 'S0s and '60s-wheeze and rattle down the streets, I in sharp contrast to Costa Rica, where throngs of people crowd San Jose's side- walks and many taxis are new Volvos. The brightest spots in Managua are the murals that line walls and sides of build- I ings. Painted in bright, bold colors, they are both works of art and propaganda de- vices, depicting the struggle and triumph of the Sandinistas' battle against Somoza. Managua is in this condition for several reasons. One is that Somoza pocketed most of the money the United States pro- vided to rebuild the city. Another is that the Sandinistas are diverting much of the national budget to defense. Sandinista of- ficials say this is necessary because of the war with the contras. The city also reflects the country's Trou- bled economic situation. The Sandinistas say this results from the contras' strategy of trying to cause economic hardship by at- tacking farms, cooperatives and factories. Reagan administration officials say the problems result principally from the San- dinistas' economic policies and poor man- agement. Whatever the reasons, rice, beans, meat and many medicines are in short supply. Some supermarket shelves are empty. Food shortages are sometimes evident even at the Hotel Inter-Continental, one of the city's best. The Inter-Con, as it's known, was built by Somoza and is now controlled by the Sandinistas. It is the center of considerable intrigue. With the air of Rick's bar in Casablanca, the Inter-Con is often packed with jour- nalists, mercenaries, members of U. S. re- ligious organizations, documentary film- makers and Americans on fact-finding tours. The closed opposition newspaper La Prensa is about a 20-minute taxi ride from the Inter-Continental. The outside of the newspaper's offices is papered with stories that government cen- sors deleted from the newspaper. La Prensa staffers refer to it as "the wall of censorship." Inside, the mood is somber. The newsroom is dark, and reporters pass the time playing chess. None of this has daunted the newspa- per's editor, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. A striking, silver-haired woman, Cha- morro took over the newspaper after her husband was shot dead eight years ago, and continued his campaign against So- moza until the dictator was overthrown in July 1979. When the Sandinistas took power, she was a member of the ruling junta, but she resigned when she felt its policies were swinging too far to the left. Feelings about the Sandinistas split the family. One of Violeta's sons is a Sandinista official. A daughter is Nicaragua's ambassador to Costa Rica. It is her son, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, who produces Nicaragua Hoy for the contras in San Jose. Another daughter works for La Prensa. Violeta Chamorro gives the Sandi- nistas no quarter. She calls them "Marx- ist-Leninist thugs" who have turned Nica- ragua into a "concentration camp." She angrily denies Sandinista President Daniel Ortega's charges that La Prensa was being funded by the Reagan administration to help the CIA build support for the con- tras' efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. However, the La Prensa situation is more complex than this. Some former CIA personnel and congressional staff be- lieve the newspaper has indeed gotten agency money; others say they are not sure. But all agree that aside from this de- bate, two factors in the situation illustrate the larger point that the CIA's history of propaganda campaigns has in itself com- promised genuine voices of dissent in the media. One of the factors is that Violeta Cha- morro's son is a public relations spokesper- son for the FDN and produces a weekly news supplement reportedly funded by the CIA. This situation makes Violeta Cha- morro uncomfortable, and she bristles slightly at questions about it. "We don't have any connection with Pedro Joaquin's publication," she said. "We don't have anything to do with that." The other complicating factor is that La Prensa indirectly received U.S. gov- ernment funding in 1985 and 1986. Last year, the newspaper was awarded a $100,000 grant from the National En- dowment for Democracy, a private U.S. group that receives money from Congress each year to promote democratic princi. ples and projects abroad. The endowment assigned the grant to PRODEMCA, an- other private U.S. organization, which arranged for the newspaper's longtime supplier in Miami to buy ink, equipment, supplies and wire service contracts for La Prensa. In 1986 the endowment approved an- other $100,000 for La Prensa. The first $50,000 was assigned to PRODEMCA, which arranged purchases of equipment i and supplies. Last March, shortly before a House vote on contra aid, PRODEMCA took out full-page ads in major U. S. news- papers, calling on representatives to sup- port the measure. PRODEMCA also worked with other private groups to coor- dinate speaking engagements by contra leaders in the United States. When U. S. news media carried stories about these ac- tivities, the endowment selected another organization to administer the $50,000 re- maining in the original 1986 grant. En- dowment officials also decided to supple- ment that sum with an additional $53,000. None of that $103,000 went to La Prensa, however, because the paper was closed before the funds could be spent. But "the endowment is holding the funds for the newspaper pending clarification of the situation," an endowment spokesper- son said. Violeta Chamorro said she knew noth- ing about the connections between PRO- DEMCA and contra supporters. She also i said no one from the endowment, PRO- DEMCA or the Reagan administration had tried to control the editorial policy of her newspaper. The La Prensa situation points up a ma- jor problem with the agency's media ma- nipulation campaigns, former CIA offi- cials and other critics say. The agency's ! history of paying editors and reporters to j create or slant news still haunts Latin I America. Because it is so difficult to track covert CIA support for print and broad- cast media, governments are quick to la- bel any opposition voice "a tool of the CIA," and to use this as a rationale for placing restrictions on all media, agency critics say. "What the CIA's media campaigns have done is undermine the democratic =l es and institutions the agency it is trying to protect in Central America," says former CIA official John 4 r-nnbniue0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Stockwell, who worked in Vietnam and Africa during his 12 years with the agency. He and other former agency personnel interviewed for this story say the public relations program Edgar Chamorro de- scribes is very similar to PR campaigns the agency ran in the 1970s in Southeast Asia, Africa and South America. Ralph McGehee, a 25-year veteran of the agency whose jobs included represent- ative to the CIA's International Commu- nism Branch in the Directorate for Opera- tions, says agency personnel refer to the mechanism that runs these campaigns as the "mighty Wurlitzer" because it is an "organ on which the CIA could play any propaganda anywhere in the world at any time." One person who played the mighty Wurlitzer is Stockwell, who supervised a media campaign when he was chief of the CIA Angola Task Force in the mid-1970s. Stockwell-who resigned from the agency ih 19771 and has spent several years studying the CIA's role in Central America-said 'in a recent inter- view that "if you changed the names of the countries you couldn't tell the differ- ence" between the campaign Chamorro describes and the one he ran in Africa. "Even some of the issues and the rhetoric are the same," he said. In 1975 and 1976, Stockwell worked with more than a dozen propaganda ex- I perts to persuade Congress and the Amer- ican people that the United States should support Angolan rebel groups known as UNITA and the FNLA to keep the coun- try from becoming a "Soviet beachhead." Another aspect of Stockwell's job was to hide the fact that the U.S. government was giving military aid and training to the rebels, despite repeated statements by ad- ministration officials to Congress and the U. S. news media that America was not directly involved. "Basically, we lied a lot," Stockwell said. In a recent interview in New York City, he stated that the Angolan cam- paign included having rebel leaders lobby Members of Congress; drafting false state- ments read by State Department and oth- er officials regarding U.S. military in- volvement in the conflict; and paying journalists to plant false and misleading stories in newspapers, magazines and broadcast media. One such story involved a report that Cuban soldiers had raped a number of An- golan schoolgirls. It was picked up by the media in Angola and ran in major U.S. newspapers. Later, another report from the field said that the Cuban troops re- sponsible for the assaults had been cap- tured, tried by a local tribunal and execut- ed by a firing squad made up of the girls they had raped. This also got major U.S. media play. There was only one problem with these stories: They were total fabrications. "There was no commitment whatso- ever to the truth in a program like this," Stockwell said. "Your commitment is .. . to win the propaganda war, to win the minds of the American people and the people in the Western world." When stories created or distorted by the agency and placed in news media abroad are picked up by stringers and re- porters for U. S. media and reported here as fact, the result is known as "blowback." Such information also filters to the United States through the Foreign Broad- cast Information Service (FBIS), a com- pendium of foreign newspaper and broad- cast reports that is produced by the CIA. Many congressional staffers and State De- partment and Pentagon correspondents use FBIS as a reference, but they have no way of knowing which stories are genuine and which stories are CIA fabrications. The agency itself often doesn't know, according to former CIA officers. The CIA's own disinformation is often picked up and filed as genuine intelligence, fur- ther distorting the information and analy- sis that legislators and government offi- cials use as the foundation for U.S. policy. "There was no mechanism that pre- vented that disinformation from contami- nating and spoiling the CIA's own infor- mation files," said McGehee, who moni- tored newspapers, magazines and cables while working with the CIA's Directorate for Operations. "Many articles that I kept and filed, that served as background for studies I wrote, later turned out to be CIA propaganda. " McGehee, other former CIA officers and congressional staff said they believe the CIA deliberately uses blowback to in- fluence public opinion about its own co- 'Silenced but not subjugated" sans the sign at Ii Prensa, the Nicaraguan neus- paper shut down by the Sandinista gov- ernment the day after the L:S. House of Representatives approved the conl'fa aid package in June. Editor Videta Cha- morm (inset left) denies charges that la Prensa is helping the CIA. The National Palace on Managua's main plant, now occupied by the Sandi- nista government. CN*NW Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 A blend o/'art and ptr)/a aneki, murcds extolling (he.~iuu/ntislci rernlutinu adorn a tam ucdls in tlatu~Wtut. vert actions or to reinforce administration police. Instead of simply "gathering genuine intelligence that could serve as the basis for reasonable policies, the CIA often ends up distorting reality, creating out of whole cloth 'intelligence' to justify poli- cies that have already been decided upon," McGehee wrote in his book Dead- IN Decei s-.~iy 25 bars in the CIA. "What this means is that the 'Ministrv of Truth'-the propaganda ministry in Geor_,,e Orwell', i964-has become a re- alin-," he said in a recent interview at his home in Herndon, Va. CIA spokesperson Kathy Pherson said the CIA's function is to gather intelli- gence, not to influence opinion or policy, and that the agency abides by congres- sional restrictions on its role. McGehee, who plans another book about the agency, said the controversy over the contras' goals is an excellent ex- ample of how disinformation can affect public policy. For example, Edgar Cha- morro stated that when Congress devel- oped misgivings about the contras' goals, the agency told the rebels to lie and to say their objective was not to overthrow the Sandinistas, but to interdict arms being smuggled from Nicaragua to leftist El Sal- vadoran rebels. State Department and Pentagon documents repeated the same statements. As late as April 1984, CIA Director Casey told U. S. News & World Report in a copyrighted interview that the contras "certainly have had an impact" on the flow of supplies from Nicaragua to the leftist rebels, "though it's hard to quanti- fy. Chamorro stated in his World Court deposition that "It was never our objec- rive to stop the supposed flow of arms, of which we never saw any evidence in the first place. . . . Our goal, and that of the CIA as well (as we were repeatedly assured in private), was to overthrow the govern- menr of Nicaragua." ' Chamorro s statements about an arms flow to El Salvador are reinforced by Da- vid MacMichael, a former estimates offi- cer with the CIA's National Intelligence Council who dealt with Central Ameri- can affairs. MacMichael left the agency in 1983. He testified before the World Court that he could find no substantial evidence of Nicaraguan complicity in arms ship- ments to leftist El Salvadoran rebels ex- cept for a brief period at the end of 1980 and very early in 1981. "The administration and the CIA have systematically misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in the supply of arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas to justify its efforts to 11 1 overthrow the Nicaraguan government, said MacMichael, who now works as a se- nior research fellow for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a policy institute in Washington, D.C. Some former CIA personnel and con- gressional staff said they believe a great deal of pressure to politicize intelligence has come directly from Casey, who ran Reagan's 1980 election campaign. They said such actions distort the CIA's primary mission: The gathering and analysis of ob- jective data for policy makers. MacMichael is only one of several agency personnel who have resigned in re- cent years because they believed the CIA was distorting information. Another is John Horton, former national intelligence officer for Latin America and a highly re- spected analyst. Horton wrote in an op-ed piece in The Washington Post after he resigned in 1984 that he left "because of the pressure put on me by the director of Central Intelligence to come up with a National Intelligence Estimate on Mexico that would satisfy him." A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is a major document policy makers rely on when making economic and na- tional security policy. ".Attempts to squelch displeasing intel- ligence reports or judgments that don't back up an administration's policies" have been a recurring problem, Horton wrote. "William Casey, the current director, most differs from previous directors of Central Intelligence in that he is a part of the policy-making group where Central America is involved as much as he is the president's chief intelligence officer." The op-ed piece drew a strong response from Casey, who replied, "Improving the estimating process was my primary con- cern when I assumed office in 1981.. .. There were disagreements between the drafting analyst and Mr. Horton over de- letions made by the latter." Members of Congress have also criti- cized the agency for the increasingly polit- ical content of its analyses. A 1982 staff report by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation of the House Select Com- mittee on Intelligence stated, "The con- cern underlying this report is not simply that an occasional inaccuracy or oversim- plification appears in intelligence... . They may signal that the environment in which analytic thought and production decisions occur is under pressure to rein- force policy." Harry Rosit:ke, who retired in 1970 at- ter 25 years with the agency, said in a re- cent interview he is concerned about "whether or not the president really gets a realistic assessment of what the contra ca- pabilities are. . . . Casey would be in- clined to encourage him [the president] on a gambit that he's been working on for four years. So it's sort of like the Vietnam war. " Other former CIA personnel also drew parallels between Central America and Vietnam. Ralph McGehee, the former represent- ative in the agency's International Com- munism Branch who worked in Southeast Asia, said the CIA's media operations against the Sandinistas are similar to tech- niques used in Vietnam, which he de- scribes as "the agency's greatest and long- est disinformation campaign." Underlying the concerns of former agency personnel and other administra- tion critics is the feeling that Congress will be unable to stop the drift toward war. They believe that the House and Senate simply cannot adequately oversee the ac- tivities of the agency. "Congress has neither the will nor the means to control the CIA," former CIA officer Stockwell said. Some Members of Congress also have Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 doubts about the oversight process. "The intelligence oversight committees of the Congress review covert actions, but they have very restricted power, which does not match the kind of full congressional review and legislative power that is essen- tial for developing a credible policy over the long run," said Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the Senate Se- lect Committee on Intelligence. The House and Senate oversight com- mittees were set up a decade ago in the wake of congressional reports about intel- ligence community abuses at home and abroad. The committees authorize the CIA budget and oversee all agency opera- tions. By law, the president can initiate a co- vert operation abroad. He is required only to make a determination (a "finding") that such an operation would be in the I national interest, and to notify the House and Senate intelligence committees of the Salvadoran rebels. finding. House committee members also indi- The committees review the finding in cated they believed that the agency had secret, and send their recommendations circumvented restrictions Congress had to the president. The committees approve placed on CIA funding for the contras. most covert plans, but do not have legal The report stated that congressional authority to stop a covert operation they disagree with. The committees' only re- course is to urge the president to reconsid- er the project. Congress can only block a covert opera- tion by specifically restricting funds for that operation. Members of the intelligence commit- tees say that another problem with over- sight is that CIA briefings are vague, mis- leading or after the fact. For example, the agency did not brief the House Intelligence Committee on the contra operation until December 1981- four months after Chamorro says the group was formally organized and began receiving funds, training and weapons from the agency. Intelligence committee members com- plained bitterly that the CIA had not ade- quately informed them of plans to mine Nicaragua's harbors in January 1984. Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Com- mittee at the time, characterized the min- ing as "an act of war." Agency personnel said information about the operation was listed in a report it gave the committees. Nevertheless, in April 1984 the House and Senate passed non-binding resolu- tions opposing the use of U. S. funds for mining Nicaraguan waters. In addition, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moy- nihan (D-N.Y.) resigned as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee to protest the CIA's handling of consulta- tions with Congress regarding the mining. He withdrew his resignation after Casey apologized to the committee and agreed to "The truth had nothing to do with our decisions to run these operations, " says for- mer CIA official John Stockwell. provided by the CIA, they would not brief us, but would be willing to brief [Proxmire at his) request. " The Senate Intelligence Committee said any briefing would have to be classi. fied, according to a Proxmire aide. Prox- mire declined the briefing, because he would not have been able to use the infor- mation in hearings, debates or speeches, the aide continued. The GAO incident illustrates two problems with the oversight process. One is that even though the GAO is the investigative arm of Congress, it can- not look into many types of controversies involving the agency. By law, the presi- dent can limit the GAO's access to finan- cial transactions related to foreign intelli- give prior notice of any significant antici- pated intelligence activity. However, some committee members and congressional staff say the agency has not lived up to the spirit of the agreement. "People mistakenly believe the com- mittees are fully informed," said one con- gressional staffer familiar with intelligence issues. "The agency gives a perfunctory briefing when they know we're going to read about it in the papers the next day, so their asses are covered." Members' frustrations surfaced in a May 1983 report by the House Intelligence Committee, which recommended that Congress prohibit additional funding for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. Committee members made it clear that they thought the CIA was not being truthful when it said the only goal of the contras was to interdict arms allegedly being shipped from Nicaragua to leftist El gence or counterintelligence activities. In addition, the GAO has no authority to audit the CIA's confidential, extraordi- nary or emergency expenditures. The second problem is that the agency is supposed to brief the intelligence com- mittees, but the briefings themselves in- volve classified material that committee members then cannot discuss publicly. When the intelligence committees do try to openly examine CIA policy, they are excoriated by administration officials. who accuse them of compromising the U.S. intelligence system and the nation's measures "which sought to limit insurgent activity to arms interdiction . . . [and] prohibited assistance for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nica- ragua" had "proved ineffective as moder- ate curbs on insurgent activity or U. S. policy." However, the report stated the princi- pal reason it wanted Congress to cut fund- ing for the contra program was that Mem- bers believed it was a failure and "counter- productive" to long-term U.S. interests in Central America. Despite this report and indications that-as Edgar Chamorro later said-the agency had consistently lied to Congress about the goal of the contras and the ways in which U.S. funds were spent, the com- mittee's effort to halt the program ulti- mately failed. Another indication of Congress' diffi- culties in overseeing CIA operations can be seen in the way allegations that the agency was illegally lobbying Congress were handled. According to Edgar Chamorro, these activities continued for years before Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc. ), who is not a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, asked the GAO to look into the allegations. However, "The CIA would not meet with us to discuss the lobbying activities alleged by Mr. Chamorro," GAO investi- gators said in their December 1985 report. "They stated that they had briefed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence about Mr. Chamorro's statements... . The committee staff director stated that because of the nature of the information j security. When Sen. David Durenberger (R-Minn. ), chairman of the Senate Intel- ligence Committee, criticized some as- pects of Casey's policies last November, the CIA director wrote a letter accusing him of "the repeated compromise of sensi- tive intelligence sources and methods. ?" Former CIA personnel pointed out why this type of response may intimidate com- mittee members. "You have to get reelected," Stockwell said. "You have to deal every day with pressure from the public, and one little leak about your past, your background, your positions, your allies, your whatnot, and you know, you're sweating blood." Some Members of Congress believe ConOnulQ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4 Reagan, Casey and national security ad- visers want to change the oversight proc- ess because they believe the committees are obstructing administration policies program. CIA spokesperson Kathy Pherson said, "The CIA works closely with its congres- swer any questions they might have about CIA activities. This is a democracy. We The oversight battle heated up in July, when the administration announced that it wanted the CIA to take over supervi- Many Members of Congress were in- censed. Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif. ) said the plan would remove agency activi- ties even further from congressional con- trol and could lead the country into an- Nicaragua, he said, "could be a rerun of Vietnam. First American. money, then American advisers, then* American con- Cranston wants the Foreign Relations Committee to investigate the administra - CIA's role, but previous efforts to get a f H , i CIA and contra activities-including al- legations the rebels were involved in gun- running, drug trafficking and assassina- "A lot of people in Congress don't want a full investigation of the contras and the CIA," said one congressional " staffer. It would be like opening Pando- ra's box; they're afraid all kinds of things Although there seems to be widespread I sional oversight process is flawed, there is little agreement on what should be done about it. Suggestions range from combin- ing the House and Senate intelligence committees into one joint committee with expanded powers to restricting the CIA to intelligence-gathering and creat- ing a new agency to handle covert opera- tions. But many agency critics believe that no reforms will occur until the public de- mands them and is willing to hold the president responsible for the agency he di- rectly controls. "Establishing a truly effective intelli- gence agency is no problem," noted for- mer CIA official McGehee. "The only problem is getting our leaders to want one. 0 Kathleen McHugh and John Day conm- buted to this article. Gary Hovatrer, E. B. Boyd and Peter Schlossman provided research assistance. .I,n 0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4