INTERVIEW WITH FIDEL CASTRO, PART I

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201040013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 11, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
PROGRAM The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour STATION WETA-TV
PBS Network
STAT
DATE February 11, 1985 7:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
Interview With Fidel Castro, Part I
ROBERT MACNEIL: Our major focus section tonight is a
newsmaker interview with Cuban President Fidel Castro. Last
month the U.S..and Cuba successfully negotiated an agreement
under which Cuba will take back 2500 undesirables who came in the
Mariel boatlift of 1980 and the United States will reopen normal
immigration procedures in Havana. Since then, Castro's said he'd
be willing to talk further about improving relations. Washington
has reacted coldly, saying Castro is saying nothing new, and it
wants to see Cuban deeds, not words.
How far Castro wishes to push his new effort has not
been clear. But in Havana, part of his motivation is obvious.
Havana today expresses the weaknesses of the Cuban
revolution. Its successes are in the countryside, where better
nutrition, health care and education have changed more lives.
Havana, the symbol of the decadent past, was neglected, with
little new building.
But with an economy still unable to meet all Fidel's
goals an acute need for hard currency, old Havana is getting a
facelift to attract tourists. Buildings and streets from the
Spanish colonial period are being refurbished, as is the square
of the old cathedral.
The bulk of the tourists are still people from the
Eastern Bloc, their presence symbolizing Castro's dependence on
the communist world for economic survival in the face of the
American trade blockade. That's been in force for a quarter of a
century and has been tightened by the Reagan Administration.
Cuba's lifeline is a procession of Soviet merchant ships
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bringing virtually everything, from oil and lumber to light
bulbs. They return taking Cuban sugar, citrus and nickel, but
recently not enough-to meet the plan quotas.
So Cuban consumers have been asked to tighten their
belts again, to wait for more attractive consumer goods, while a
big drive is made to boost exports to the Soviet Bloc and to the
West, both to meet Cuba's commitments to her communist partners
and to earn hard currency to pay her Western debts.
This is the context for the growing suggestions that
Castro, 26 years after his revolution, would like to patch things
up with the U.S.
There is no slackening of revolutionary zeal. The
spirit that defeated the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 is con-
stantly nourished, and the symbols of Castro's rise to power are
a national shrine. The revolution is still young enough to enjoy
tweaking Uncle Sam's beard. This poster says, "Mr. Imperalist,
we are absolutely not afraid of you." It is located close to the
U.S. Mission, now called the U.S. Interest Section because there
are no full-scale diplomatic relations, where U.S. officials try
to read the signals that Castro is sending.
On Friday night President Castro sat down with me for
the first major American television interview in six years. With
a Cuban government interpreter, we talked for more than four
hours, first about relations with the United States.
Mr. President, every time that you begin to talk about
improving relations with the United States, Washington says,
"Show us deeds, not words." What actions or deeds are you
prepared to make to improve relations with the United States?
FIDEL CASTRO: You said many times I speak of improving
relations. Actually, there are not many times.
Now then, I have read a few statements in which it is
said that they want deeds and not words. I believe that that is
a style of speaking. I would say a style of a great power. I
understand that it is not easy for the United States to change
its style. We are a small country. We cannot speak in those
terms. But we are also a country with a lot of dignity, and no
one can suppose that we would beg the United States for an
improvement of relations. We have never done so, and we shall
never do it.
My intention is not that they belive what we say; but,
rather, simply to analyze our ideas and to go deeper in them, to
make objective analyses of events. It is not a matter of faith,
of confidence. It is a matter of objectivity.
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MACNEIL: Let's go through an objective analysis. The
State Department and the White House always say that there are
three obstacles to improving relations between Cuba and the
United States, and they are your allegiance to the Soviet Union,
what they call subversion in this hemisphere, and the large
number of your troops in Africa. Sometimes they also mention
human rights in Cuba. The White House mentioned human rights in
Cuba this week again.
Can we discuss in detail each of these, starting with
relations with the Soviet Union?
Is there a formula by which you could keep your ties to
the Soviet Union and improve relations with the United States?
CASTRO: If the United States believed that there are
three obstacles, actually there are quite few -- quite little. I
thought there were much more.
Now then, if we analyze these three types of obstacles,
the first -- that is, the relations that we have with the Soviet
Union, with the socialist countries, and with any other country
are matters of our sovereignty, and in fact cannot be questioned;
or, at least, we are not ready to discuss that.
And this is always -- this is something that I always
say in a very frank way. If in order to improve our relations
with the United States we must give up our convictions and our
principles, then relations will not improve on those grounds. If
we are going to question our sovereignty, then they will not
improve, either. Relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union are
based in the most strict respect for independence and sovereignty
of our country. We have friendly relations, very close relat-
ions, and these relations cannot be affected in order to improve
relations with the United States.
I believe that the United States would not respect a
country that would do such a thing. The countries that do those
things simply are not respected. And actually, we are not going
to change neither our flag nor our ideas. And our relations with
the Soviet Union and our friendship will be maintained intangible
[sic]. I say this being fully frank and fully sincere. And it
is necessary that this be understood.
MACNEIL: The Director of Cuban Affairs in the State
Department, Kenneth Scoog (?), he said in a speech in December,
"What Cuba could not do and still retain Moscow's favor is to
alter its fundamental commitment to unswerving support for Soviet
policy."
And so my question is, isn't that unswerving support for
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Soviet policy the price of the Soviet aid that keeps the Cuban
economy going?
CASTRO: Well, we coincide in many things with the
Soviet Union because we have a community of political principles.
It is a socialist country. We are a socialist country. We do
have many things in common with the Soviet Union. And in many
international problems, we have our common stands. That is based
on political ideas and principles. It is a friendly country of
whose friendship we will not reject and of which we cannot feel
ashamed of. Because, actually, we are not going to fight with
our friends to become friends of our adversaries. That we shall
never do. And the Soviets have never imposed any conditions on
us, on their assistance. And they have never attempted to tell
us what we should do, what we must do, with which countries we
ought to trade, and with which countries should we have relat-
ions.
So, I simply can't understand where these theories come
from -- that is, that our relations with the Soviets are an
obstacle. And if someone thinks that we are going to sell out or
that we are going to give up our banners or our flags or that we
are going to change our ideas, that is in error. Cuba is a
country that cannot be bought. And countries that are bought are
simply not respected.
MACNEIL: I think what the United States Government is
saying is that your economic dependence on Moscow makes you
automatically a part of the Soviet camp, in having to agree to
policies like the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
Would you, Fidel Castro, who values the independence and
integrity of a small country, would you alone have approved the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan if you had been free to make
your own choice? Did you, privately and personally, approve of
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan?
CASTRO: When it was put forth at the U.N. -- that is,
the question, the issue -- we said clearly that in that conflict,
in that attack, that tremendous attack against the Soviet Union
led by the United States, we were not going to be on the side of
the United States, simply not. And we were then on the side of
the Soviet Union. In otherwords, we did not deal or delve on the
topic. That is what we said: This is our position because of
this.
MACNEIL: But isn't that the point, that your friendship
and dependence on the Soviet Union makes you part of the camp,
and therefore take positions which Washington regards as anti-
American positions?
CASTRO: You establish this dependency, or something,
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that is actual. In fact -- but in today's world, in the economic
arena, no one is absolutely independent, not even the United
States, nor Japan, nor Western Europe. They depend on oil, raw
materials. And from many other countries, they need markets,
they need trade. That is, no country is totally independent
economically.
MACNEIL: Is it not true that your role, in return for
all the aid you get from the Soviet Union, is to be a thorn in
America's side?
CASTRO: If that were true, we would not be talking
about improving relations with the United States. If our role is
to be a thorn, then it would not be convenient for us.
Actually, it does not bring us great benefits, either.
That is, we are based on a conviction and it is the necessity to
struggle in our area, in Central America, throughout the world.
It is a duty, actually a duty that we have in order to lower
tensions and to achieve relations of peace as well. And I say
this sincerely, although I am a revolutionary, I was a revolut-
ionary, I am a revolutionary, and I shall always be a revolution-
ary, and I will not change a single of my principles for a
thousand relations with a thousand countries like the United
States.
MACNEIL: Will the Soviet Union continue to provide you
with the aid and support it does, do you believe, if you have
good relations with the Soviet -- with the United States?
CASTRO: Look, our relations with the Soviet Union, with
the socialist countries are solid things based on principles and
have absolutely nothing to do with our economic and political
relations with the United States.
I will say one thing, though. The Soviet Union and the
Soviet people feel great appreciation and great respect toward
Cuba. But it is -- they respect Cuba because they admire us,
others people do, the courage of Cuba, Cuba's staunchness, and
Cuba's capability to resist for over 26 years the aggressions,
the economic blockade, and the brutality of the United States.
MACNEIL: Would the Soviet Union like it if you had
better relations with the United States, the blockade perhaps
were lifted, and the economic burden on the Soviet Union were
shared or lessened?
CASTRO: The United States will pay us for our sugar at
the price of the Soviets, or will they be buying the nickel, and
they will be maintaining the type of relations and trade that we
have with the socialist countries? But I believe the idea
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that we have any needs to trade with the United States should be
totally eradicated. Everything we have done during these 26
years, we have done it without trade with the United States. And
our future has been conceived without trade with the United
States.
Actually, we have not asked from the Soviet Union.
Generally, we don't ask their opinion on our economic or politic-
al relations in an international arena. But I know the Soviet
Union very well and I know the policy of the Soviet Union. And
the Soviet Union would never be against Cuba's developing its
economic relations with the other capitalist countries, including
the United States.
MACNEIL: So, to move on to the second point that
Washington says is an obstacle to better relations, what the
White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, called this week your
subversion in the hemisphere.
Let me quote you again Mr. Scoog of the State Depart-
ment. "It is Cuba's striving, with Soviet support, to introduce
Marxist-Leninist regimes throughout the hemisphere which still
lies at the heart of our differences."
Would you comment on that?
CASTRO: Well, I could also accuse the Pope of practic-
ing subversion in Latin America and preaching Christianity and
Catholicism. He has visited the countries even recently. He met
with natives and said that the land had to be given to the
natives, and the land properties. And he declared that schools
were necessary for the children, jobs for the workers and for the
families, medicine and doctors for the ill, and also foodstuffs
or housing.
What we preach is more or less that. And besides, it is
what we have done in our country.
So then, we will continue being Marxists and we'll
continue being socialists. And we will always say that our
social system is more just. But we have said also, because we
are convinced about it, we have said the following, and which is
my answer to that: Neither can Cuba export revolution, because
revolutions cannot be exported. And the economic, social
factors, the cultural, historical factors that determine the boom
of the revolution cannot be exported.
The external, the huge external debt of Latin America
cannot be exported. The formula applied by the International
Monetary Fund cannot be exported by Cuba. The unequal trade
cannot be exported by Cuba. Underdevelopment and poverty cannot
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be exported by Cuba. And that is why Cuba cannot export revolut-
ion. It is absurd. It is ridiculous to say that the revolutions
can be exported.
But the United States cannot, on the other hand, avoid
them, either. The United States accuses us maybe of wanting to
promote change. Well, we would like to see changes occur. But
changes will come whether the United States likes it or not,
whether or not Cuba likes it.
I could answer by saying that the United States wants to
maintain an unjust social order that has meant for the people's
of this hemisphere poverty, hunger, underdevelopment, diseases,
ignorance. And the United States wants to maintain that.
And we could also say that the United States wants to
avoid change. We are accused of wanting to promote change. We
can also accuse the United States of wanting to avoid change and
of wanting to maintain an unjust social regime.
But actually, neither can we export it, nor can the
revolution avoid it -- nor can the United States avoid it.
MACNEIL: In supporting militarily the Sandinista regime
in Nicaragua, is Cuba not helping to sustain and introduce a
Marxist-Leninist regime?
CASTRO: In helping Nicaragua, by offering military
cooperation? Well, we are helping an independent country. We
are helping a just revolution to defend itself. That's simply
what we're doing. In the same way that, for example, the United
States has also sent their weapons to this hemipshere to other
people. It sent weapons to Somoza. It sent weapons to Trujillo
when Trujillo was there. It sent weapons to Pinochet. It sent
weapons to all of the repressive governments of Latin America,
governments that murdered, tortured dozens of thousands of
people, governments which disappeared tens of thousands of
people. They had no moral obstacle in giving any economic,
financial, and military assistance to these governments.
So, with what moral grounds can it be questioned -- that
is, can our right be questioned to help Nicaragua, and Nicarag-
ua's right to receive that aid?
I ask the following: Can the United States help the
counterrevolutionary bands, supply weapons to them, explosives to
fight inside Nicaragua, something that has meant the lives of
thousands and thousands of people, and on the other hand question
Cuba's right and Nicaragua's right for us to give them economic,
technical aid, and even some cooperation in the military field?
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MACNEIL: So you would not stop giving such aid as a
condition of improved relations with the United States.
CASTRO: We shall not make any unilateral decision in
our relations and cooperation with Nicaragua. What we have said
is that in Central America a political negotiated solution is
possible. What we say is that we support the effort of Contadora
to seek solutions of peace in Central America, that we support it
staunchly, sincerely, and that we believe that political solut-
ions exist and peace solutions exist that are convenient for
Nicaraguans, for Central America, and for the United States
itself. And we are ready to struggle for that. And also, in
fact, the agreements that are reached shall be complied by us in
a determined way. That is, any agreement reached between
Nicaragua and the Contadora framework shall be complied by us to
the very limit.
MACNEIL: How hopeful are you that -- now that some
political settlment can be reached in Central America?
CASTRO: I am absolutely convinced. I have a lot of
information about the work of Contadora effort or the discussions
of the burning issues there, the positions of the United States,
Nicaragua's positions. And I am convinced, fully convinced, that
it is possible to find formulas that will be acceptable by all
parties, or to all parties. . I have that conviction. I'm
convinced about that.
Now then, for it, it is necessary for the United States
to want to really cooperate in finding a political solution. I
believe that as long as the United States is convinced that it
can destroy the Sandinista revolution from within by combining
the effectof the economic measures against Nicaragua with the
economic difficulty inside Nicaragua and the actions of the
counterrevolutionary bands, as long as they're convinced that
they can destroy the revolution from within, it will not be
seriously ready to seek a political solution to the problems of
Central America. Because if it believes that it will destroy the
revolution, why negotiate, then? Why reach agreements?
Now then, now, when the United States becomes persuaded
that it shall not achieve that goal, that the Nicaraguan revolut-
ion cannot be destroyed from within -- because of the questions I
mentioned, problems I mentioned, I believe that they can face the
economic problems with what they produce and with the aid they
are receiving, the economic aid they're receiving. If they
handle it correctly, efficiently, they can face the economic
problems. I'm convinced of that.
I am also convinced that they can defeat the bands, and
that the bands will never be able to defeat...
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MACNEIL: Excuse me. By "the bands" you mean what are
called in the United States the Contras.
CASTRO: Yes. The counterrevolutionary bands. That
will be defeated -- they will be defeated.
So, then a situation will come up before the United
States -- that is, the United States will have no other altern-
ative but to negotiate seriously to seek a solution, or invade
Nicaragua. And since in my view, in my criteria, a U.S. invasion
in Nicaragua is unconceivable, since it would mean such a serious
mistake, a terrible mistake, that I do not simply think that the
United States would really get to the point of making that
mistake. I cannot assure you that it might not do it, but I say
that it is unconceivable that under the present circumstances in
Latin America, under the present circumstances of crisis, with
the present feeling on the part of the Latin American peoples, at
the times we're living in, the aggression and invastion against a
Latin American country would be as catastrophic, in political
terms, it would mean such a political cost, and not only a
political cost, but also in terms of U.S. lives.
MACNEIL: Let me turn to Africa. The third of those
obstacles that Washington sees to improving relations with you,
your troops in Angola. You talked recently about circumstances
arising which would cause you to bring them home. What would
happen -- what would have to happen to start bringing the Cuban
troops out of Angola?
CASTRO: What is needed there? Well, discussions have
taken place, with the participation of the United States. The
United States has had dialogues, talks with Angola's leadership.
We are informed, through the Angolans, about these negotiations
or talks that have been held, with our support and with our full
cooperation. That is, they have carried out these negotiations
in close contact with Cuba.
MACNEIL: Could you withdraw any of your troops before
there is agreement?
CASTRO: No. No. The Angolans would not agree with
that. And from our point of view, it would be a mistake. And
the Angolan proposal -- that is, if those circumstances come up,
then Angola commits itself, then Cuba, of course, would support
it, to withdraw in a period of three years what is called the
grouping of troops in the south, which is made up by approximate-
ly 20,000 men. And even the figure was given.
This is the bulk of our troops, actually. But there are
still troops in the center and to the north of Angola, including
Cabinda. The Angolans have not included these troops in the
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negotiations, these present negotiations. And their position is
that to withdraw those troops, it will be something that would
have to be discussed between Angola and Cuba, whenever it is
considered that they can dispense of these troops.
MACNEIL: Do you think that this projected settlement of
the Angola situation, does that erase Cuban troops in Angola as
an issue between you and the United States?
CASTRO: Before, there were no troops in Angola, and
relations were very bad with the United States. Today, were
there no troops in Angola, or in some other place, or there are
no advisers in Central America, maybe the United States might
invent something else.
MACNEIL: Just to sum up our conversation about improv-
ing relations with the United States, why is this the right time
to raise this? And realistically speaking, how hopeful are you
that it can happen?
CASTRO: Whether this is the right, best moment, I
believe that if the United States is objective, if it is realist-
ic, I would say that it is the best moment for the United States.
Not for us. Actually, we can go on for five, 10, 15, 20 more
years.
The only obligation on our part, really, is toward
peace. If there's peace here and in other areas, we will feel
more pleased. If the relations are normalized, even more
pleased. Because it would be, then, a progressive progress.
Peace is convenient for all. But from the political point of
view, I'm convinced, and I'm saying this frankly, I think that
the United States benefits most than us. We can sit here and
wait calmly and see what happens in the coming years.
MACNEIL: Tomorrow night Fidel Castro talks candidly
about human rights in Cuba, political prisoners, dissent, the
controlled press, and the mistakes of his revolution. He also
discusses what he sees as an explosive economic situation.in
Latin America.
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RADIO N REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
PROGRAM The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour STATION WETA-TV
PBS Network
DATE February 12, 1985 7:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
ROBERT MACNEIL: Tonight we have part two of our
newsmaker interview with Cuban President Fidel Castro. It is the
first major American television interview Castro has given in six
years. It was recorded last weekend in Havana.
Last week White House spokesman Larry Speakes said that
one of the obstacles the Reagan Administration sees to improved
relations with Castro is what Speakes called violations of human
rights in Cuba. I asked Castro about that.
[Castro speaks through a translator]
FIDEL CASTRO: Which are the violations of. human rights
in Cuba. Tell me which. Invent one. Do we have disappeared
people here?
Look, if the United States...
MACNEIL: Well, let me give -- you asked. I'll give you
an example of what is said. For instance, human rights organi-
zations, like the Amnesty International, estimate that you have
up to 1000 political prisoners still in your jails here.
Do you have political prisoners still in jail in Cuba?
CASTRO: Yes, we have them. We have a few hundreds
political prisoners. Is that a violation of human rights?
MACNEIL: In-democracies it is considered a violation of
human rights to imprison somebody for his political beliefs.
CASTRO: I will give you an example. In Spain there are
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many Basque nationalists in prison. They're not political
prisoners? What are they? Because you also have to analyze what
is a political prisoner and what is not a political prisoner.
Now then, those that committed crimes during Batista's
time, did we have the right to put them into trial or not? Okay.
Those that invaded Cuba through [unintelligible]. Did we have
the right to try them? Oh, no. Those thata became CIA agents,
those that placed bombs, those that brought about the deaths of
peasants, workers, teachers. Do we have the right to put them
into court or not? Those who, in agreement with a foreign power
like the United States and backed by the United States and
inspired by the United States, conspires in our country and
struggles and fights against our people and its revolution
--because this revolution is not of a minority. This is a
revolution of the overwhelming majority of the people. What are
these people? What are they, political prisoners?
Those that have infiltrated through our coasts, those
that have been trained by the CIA to kill, to place bombs , do we
have the right to put them to trial or not? Are they political
prisoners?
They are something more than political prisoners. They
are traitors to the homeland.
MACNEIL: Is there anybody in jail simply because his
political beliefs are -- he dissents from you politically?
CASTRO: No one. Not because of political beliefs, nor
because of religious beliefs, that are in prison.
MACNEIL: After Jesse Jackson came here last summer, you
released 26 political prisoners. Are you going to release more
of the kinds you were describing a moment ago?
CASTRO: Of course we cannot be willing to release them.
It's a bit under 200, actually, on that situation. These are
people who are potentially dangerous. We're not going to release
them and send them to the United States for them to organize
plans against Cuba, or for them to go to Nicaragua or Honduras or
Central America as mercenaries, or as a guerrilla for any
country, to prepare attacks, so that when I visit these coun-
tries, as they, have done on other occasions, organizing a true
human hunt. That's the psychology instilled in them by the CIA
and the U.S. authorities.
MACNEIL: The other human rights question that is raised
by the United States i's that you don't have a free press. Your
revolution is now 26 years old. It's very stable. In your
recent speeches you've told of how-successful it is. Why
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wouldn't you feel confident about allowing a press to have a full
expression of ideas and discussion and opposition?
CASTRO: Well, you are right. We do not have a press
system like that of the United States. In the United States
there is private property over the mass media. The mass media
belong to private enterprises. They are the ones who say the
last word.
Here, there is no private property over the mass media.
There's social property. And it has been, is, and will be at the
service of the revolution.
Here, we do not have any multiparty system, either, nor
do we need it. The political level of our people, the informa-
tion level of our people is much greater. In surveys that have
been made in the United States, an astonishingly high number of
people do not know where Nicaragua is, where the countries of
Latin America are. They don't know what countries belong to
Africa, what countries belong to Asia. There is an incredible
ignorance, astonishing. That does not happen here.
Your system might be wonderful. But we -- at least the
results of ours are better, undoubtedly.
MACNEIL: May I raise a point? Your system, which you
say works very well, it does presuppose that the leadership of
the country, you, are always right, that you are infallible. Is
that not so?
CASTRO: No, it does not presuppose that, because we're
not as dogmatic as a church -- although we have been dogmatic.
And we have never preached the cult of personality. You will not
see a statue of me anywhere, nor a school with my name, nor a
street, nor a little town, nor any type of personalilty cult,
because we have taught our people to -- we have not taught our
people -- we have not taught our people to believe, but to think,
to reason out. We have a people that thinks, that thinks. It's
not a people that believes, but rather that reason out, that
think. And they might either agree or disagree with me. In
general, the overwhelming majority has agreed, has been in
agreement.
Why? Because we have always been honest. We have
always told the truth. These people know that from the govern-
ment a lie has never been told to them.
And I ask you to go to the world, tour the world and go
to the United States and ask if they can say what I can say, that
I have never told a lie to the people.
And these are the.reasons why there's confidence. Not
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because I have made -- have become a statue or an idol, but
rather simply because of the fact that they trust me.
And I have very, very few prerogatives in this country.
I do not appoint ministers nor vice ministers nor directors of
minstries nor ambassadors. I don't appoint anybody. That's the
way it is. We have a system, a system for the selection of the
cadre based on their capacity, etcetera. I have less power, a
hundred times less power than the President of the United States,
who can even declare war, and nuclear war.
MACNEIL: But doesn't the system mean that the revolu-
tion is always right?
CASTRO: You, when you made your independence wars, you
did not even free the slaves, and said that you were a democratic
country. You, for 150 years, did not even allow a black man to
participate and be part of a baseball team or a basketball team,
to enter a club, to go to a white children's school. And you
said it was a democracy.
None of those things exist here, neither racial discri-
mination nor discrimination due to sex. It is the most fair,
egalitarian society there has ever been in this hemisphere. So
we consider that it is superior to yours. But you believe that
yours is the best, without any discussions whatsoever. Although
there might be multimillionaires and people barefooted, begging
in the streets, without any homes, people unemployed, and you
believe it's perfect. Because you believe things, things that I
don't think that that type of society is perfect, really.
I think that ours is better. We have defended a better
and more just society. We believe in it. Now, we make a
mistake. But whenever we make a mistake, we have the courage to
explain it. We have the courage to admit it, to recognize it,
acknowledge it, to criticize it.
I believe that very few -- there are mighty few people,
like the leaders of a revolution, who are able to acknowledge
their mistakes. And I first of all acknowledge it before myself,
because I am first of all more critical with myself than with
anybody else. But I'm critical before my people, critical before
the world, the U.S., everybody.
But don't worry. If this analysis had not been correct,
the revolution would not be in power. The revolution would not
be in power.
MACNEIL: How do you measure that? How do you, as the
leader of this country, know that for so sure, when you don't
have the vehicles for public expression and open discussion of
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issues that the democracies have, for example? How do you know
that the people feel that way?
CASTRO: We have a party with almost half a million
members. They're everywhere, in every factory. We know more
than the United States about the things that happen there.
MACNEIL: But isn't the dynamic, isn't the dynamic of a
one-party state that the instruction and information goes
downwards. And if people disagree with it, they don't dare say
so? And so dissent which may exist doesn't come back up the
system.
CASTRO: Actually, we know what there is and we know the
way our people think much better than what the President of the
United States knows about the way the U.S. people think. You
should have no doubt whatsoever about that. We have many ways of
knowing this. The facts prove it.
Let's suppose that people might not agree with the
revolution. How could we have millions of people organized to
defend the country? How could we have an armed people?
Tell the South Africans, the South African friends that
they give the weapons to the blacks in South Africa. Tell your
friend Pinochet to give the weapons to the people of Chile. Tell
your friends in Paraguay or in Haiti to give the weapons to the
masses, to the people. Tell many of the friends that you have in
Europe, you who speak of democracy.
And the first and the most important form of democracy
is for the citizens to feel part of power and part of the state.
And how do we prove this? We have an armed people, men and
women, millions of people. If they would not be in agreement
with the government, they could solve things rapidly. We would
not be able to stay in power for 24 minutes. Do you want more
proof of that?
MACNEIL: I have seen it reported that, increasingly,
Cuban troops are refusing to go for service in Angola, that. the
families of troops who are there and have been there are getting
more and more unhappy over the Angolan experience. Is that true?
That you're feeling public pressure to end this?
CASTRO: For revolutionaries to fulfill an international
mission is something that is considered a great honor, and that
should not make anyone feel strange about it, when people have
motivation and when people have ideals. Of course, that implies
sacrifices. It impaies sacrifices from families, as they
separate from their relatives for a certain period of time. In
some cases, it means risks, undoubtedly, and it means sacrifices.
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But our people can carry on these missions because they
are prepared to do so.
MACNEIL: How many have been killed in Angola?
CASTRO: That question has already been asked by a
journalist, and I told him I was not going to answer the ques-
tion. Because our rule has been that we would not publish the
number, that the enemy should not have that information. And we
are maintaining it secret. Someday all of that might be pub-
lished.
The family knows when there's a loss. They are informed
about it immediately.
MACNEIL: But isn't it a matter of public interest and
the concern of the Cuban public as a whole, the cost in lives of
your activity in Angola?
CASTRO: No, no. They know well that this is a policy
that is followed and that it is a correct one, because we base
ourselves on the confidence and the support of the revolutionary
policy by the people.
MACNEIL : Tell me an example of a mistake you feel you
made and admitted.
CASTRO: In politics we have committed few mistakes,
fortunately. We have been quite wise in the decisions we have
made. -
In the economic field we made mistakes, and these were
mistakes that resulted from our ignorance because, in general,
revolutionaries have ideas, very noble ideas: to have education,
to have health for all, to have work, to have jobs, to have
development. That is, very noble ideas, but very general.
MACNEIL: You said in your speech to the National
Assembly, "We do not become capitalists." Do you begin to lean a
little capitalist?
CASTRO: On the contrary, totally the contrary. I'm
increasingly happier, mentally, spiritually, philosophically, of
capitalism [sic]. Every day, I'm more convinced about the
advantages of the socialist system over capitalism, more con-
vinced about the fact that capitalism has no future. Well, I say
no future on a long-term basis. I'm not saying that capitalism
will disappear in ten years. But the present capitalist system
is no longer the capitalist system of the past century.
MACNEIL: Aren't you allowing creeping private enter-
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prise, to permit free markets where vegetables and food and
things can be wold by the people who -- to open new supermarkets
where goods, consumer goods which are otherwise scarce are priced
at full market prices and not at supported prices? Is this not
creeping private enterprise?
CASTRO: When you asked about mistakes, I said that in
politics we had not. But you did not allow me to continue,
because you asked me other things. But that item was not dealt
with.
In the development of the economy, where at the begin-
ning we did not have any, experience, and where we even had an
attitude of certain disregard for the experiences of other
socialist countries, actually, we were a bit self-sufficient.
Actually, this is something that has happened to many revolu-
tionaries. At times they believe that they know more than the
rest.
In the economic field we made mistakes, which we call
idealistic mistakes. In essence, these were of wanting to jump
over historic stages and trying to get to a more egalitarian
society, even more egalitarian. We had gotten to the point of
distributing almost to depending on the needs of the people, not
according to their work, the amount and quality of their work.
When we came to the point of understanding that that had
negative effects, that our society was not yet a society with the
necessary communist culture and consciousness, we rectified
things.
But it's not that we are leaning to capitalism. The
more I analyze today's world, Third World, and even the problems
of the industrialized countries, unemployment has not been
solved. In Europe unemployment is growing yearly. And you can
plan, and they can plan how many unemployed they can have in 1990
and the year 2000.
The deeper I think and the deeper I meditate, the least
capitalist I feel.
MACNEIL: Can we move to defense? In the last year or
so, you have greatly increased, as you said, your military
capacity. You said on January 2nd you've increased your weapons,
the number of weapons by three times. You have roughly a quarter
of a million men on active duty, 190,000 reserves, a million
people as militia -- 190,000.
My question-is, my question is, why does Cuba need this
very large armed force?
CASTRO: Of course, I will rectify something. Armed
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forces and reserves are more than half a million. Militia,
territorial troops, over one million. We have tripled the number
of weapons, but we have multiplied many times our resistance
capability by changing the conception.
In the past, the conception was the army and the reserve
are the ones to defend to country. The conception is all of the
people today defend the country, in every corner, in every city,
in the countryside, in mountains. And they're actually or-
ganized. The idea is that every citizen in this country is
armed.
MACNEIL: Is this a lesson from Grenada?
CASTRO: No. After Grenada we intensified it. Yes.
The Nicaraguans also. The Grenada thing did not weaken us. It
actually made us feel-stronger and multiplied our determination
and our will and our readiness to become stronger and fight.
You asked why so many weapons? The United States, our
adversary, being such a powerful country, the country that
harasses us, the country that blockades us, the country that
threatens us by invading us, through an invasion, they don't
understand why we make this effort? The country that is in-
vesting in peace [sic] $313 billion, one-third of the budget,
taking that away from ill people, from aged? We don't do that.
At least we don't do that. And they don't understand that us,
being neighbors of the United States and feeling threatened by
facts and the words of the United States, that we make an effort
to defend ourselves? Actually, do we have to explain that?
MACNEIL: You had an invasion scare last fall, last
autumn. You had exercises. You had people, including children,
digging air raid trenches. Have you relaxed now? Are you now
not fearing an American invasion?
CASTRO: Look, we were relaxed, we are relaxed, and we
will always be relaxed. We have been for 26 years relaxed.
That's one thing.
Another thing. The measures we have taken to defend
ourselves, we are not going to wait for a government of the
United States to decide to attack the country for us to then
start perparing ourselves? We have prepared ourselves, we are
preparing ourselves, and we will continue preparing ourselves
always.
So, hypothetically, if the United States were to become,
let's say, in the world -- not a socialist -country, let's say a
Marxist-Leninist country and more communist than the U.S.S.R. and
China, we, here next to the United States, would not disregard
our defenses. It is a philosophical principle.
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If one day...
MACNEIL: So one of your -- excuse me for interrupting.
So one of your motives for seeking or suggesting improved
relations with the United States is not so that you can relax
your military investment.
[Technical difficulties]
CASTRO: Do you ask if I feel any frustration? No. I
have no frustration. I feel no frustration whatsoever.
I can tell you this directly. We have done more than
what we dreamed of doing, Many of the things we're doing now, we
had some general idea, but not as precise and concrete as we have
now. I can tell you that reality has surpassed our dream, in
what we have done. And we're not speaking about the future.
It's not the same as at the beginning, that we spoke of
our good intentions, but rather we now speak with a revolution
that has been made after 26 years. And it has certain advantages
not to speak of things that we were intending to do, but rather
to speak of things that have been done.
MACNEIL: Finally, let me ask you a couple of personal
questions, if I may.
you die?
Do you want to go on being the President of Cuba until
CASTRO: It depends on how many years I live. If I'm
told that I can be now, I would say, yes, I think I can be. If I
could not do my job, because of the experience I have now, I
would also tell you that.
I think that I am useful. I don't think I am indispens-
able. Nothing opposes my philosophy more than that. I believe
we have done a lasting work that goes beyond us, beyond all of
us. And if it were not so, why have we worked so much? If it
were not so, we would have failed.
But our work is not a work of stone, is not of materi-
als, but of consciousness, of moral values. And that is lasting.
Either being President or not being President, I'm fully
hopeful that the others will be better. And the sooner a new
generation that is better than us comes, a more capable one to
replace us, the better. If we live three, four, five years,
maybe ten, I don't know. But the day when I do not feel, really,
because of my physical capabilities or mental capabilities, that
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I could fulfill my duty and do my work, I will be the first to
say it. If I live many years, you can be sure that I will not
die as the President of this country. And the first that would
not want that, for sure, it's me. If I want my mind to maintain
itself clear and illuminated, it's precisely to come to that very
minute, to that very minute in which I'm able to notice that I
have already done my work, and that others can do it.
So, if I tell you now that I will resign, I'm a solier
of the revolution and I think I can still struggle. But I have
no personal affection for honors and power or force, or the force
in power.
You have a President that is older. Maybe at that age I
do not have the physical or mental capabilities to do my work.
MACNEIL: Tomorrow night Fidel Castro predicts violent
political explosions in Latin America. And we have an official
U.S. response from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kenneth
Dam.
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
PROGRAM MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour STATION WETA-TV
PBS Network
DATE February 13, 1985 7:00 PM CITY Washington, DC
Interviews with Fidel Castro and Secretary Dam, Part III
ROBIN MACNEIL: Cuban President Fidel Castro predicts
there will be political explosions in large Latin American
nations like Brazil, Argentina or Chile if a solution is not
found to their large debts.
Castro made the statement in the latest segment of an
extended interview with this program. He said it would be
necessary to give the debtor nations a grace period of up to 20
years just on the interest on their-debts.
FIDEL CASTRO [Through Translator].
TRANSLATOR: It is the most critical and serious
situation that history has ever learned up -- the history of this
hemisphere. I firmly believe this. And, if a solution is not
found on the problem of debts these Latin American societies will
explode because there is a situation of fear among the workers,
among the middle strata and even in the oligarhy.
In our first focus session after this news summary, we
have an amplified version of Castro's remarks and a U.S. offici-
al's response.
MACNEIL: For our lead focus session tonight, we return
briefly to our interview with Cuban President Fidel Castro. Then
we have an official State Department response.
Our four-hour conversation with Castro in Havana last
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weekend touched on many subjects.
In our Monday program, we covered relations with the
U.S. Last night, human relations -- human rights in Cuba.
Castro kept saying ask me anything, and one of the few questions
he refused to answer directly concerned El Salvador. I asked him
specifically what aid Cuba was giving to the guerrilla, groups in
El Salvador.
TRANSLATOR: I do not want to make any declarations or
any commitments about that. I'm not saying yes. I'm not saying
no.
In reality, it is almost impossible to spend for
military supplies to reach these revolutionaries in El Salvador.
That's what I say, because it is practically impossible to have
military supplies reach them. The revolutionaries in El Salvador
have the capabilities to resist indefinitely if they would not
receive any military supplies. Even if they would not receive
any supplies, even a single bullet, they are in a position to
resist indefinitely.
They are also in a position to issue supplies -- that
is, the way we did in our 'struggle.-- with the weapons that
belong to El Salvador. And I believe I am absolutely convinced
about the fact that the revolutionaries in El Salvador can
indefinitely resist without receiving any other supplies of
weapons. And that is not the essential issue.
MACNEIL: I also asked the Cuban leader -- looking at
the hemisphere as a whole -- which countries he considered ripe
for revolution right now.
TRANSLATOR: I would say that from the point of view of
social positions, and objective conditions [sic] -- objective
conditions, not only in Central America, but actually and more
important South America. In that area, a situation has-been
created from the objective point of view that is a pre-revolut-
ionary situation. I am absolutely convinced of that.
I'm not wanting to say that this hemisphere will
unavoidably explode, but I am absolutely convinced of that, that
the problems are very serious, that the-social problems have
tripled, that the calculations have doubled and that they face
situations in which you find no way out.
During Kennedy -- when Kennedy put forth [words unin-
telligible], he thought-- he thought he could try to avoid a
revolutionary situation. He believed that by injecting 20
billion dollars for certain social reforms the problems of Latin
America could be solved.
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Twenty-four years have elapsed. You understand that the
populations have doubled, and so the social problems have
tripled. The debt is 350 billion, and only in interest they must
pay 40 billion dollars per year, double that of what Kennedy
thought was going to solve the problem. To this we must add the
flight of capital, the repatriation of profits and other prob-
lems. And, in my opinion, it is the most critical and serious
situation that this hemisphere has ever learned of --this
hemisphere. I firmly believe this.
And, if a solution is not found on the problem of debts,
I am convinced that the Latin American societies will explode
.because there is a situation of fear among the workers, among the
middle strata and even in the oligarhy. But, in this case, the
problem is general. It's a general problem, and.it may explode
in one country. I believe that the debt makes it. They cannot
pay for the debt. It's not that they don't want to pay for it.
No, they can't pay it.
But I'm not only referring to the debt the interest,
the 40 billion in interest -- they cannot pay for it, even if
they wanted to, they cannot pay for it. And the experts who are
in a position to force them to pay for it will actually bring
about a social convulsion and a revolutionary- explosion. I
believe that it would be necessary, at least to have a 10-to-20
years of grace that would include interest.
MACNEIL: Let me understand you. You're saying that to
prevent an explosion in Latin Amer-ica, that the the international
banking community needs to give them 20 years of grace on
interest. Is that what you mean?
TRANSLATOR: Correctum. I am absolutely convinced that
under the present circumstances they are obliged to pay not the
debt, because they could postpone the debt for 10, 15 years, and
it could actually as long as up to 25 years. The interest on the
debt,:they cannot pay for it. And if they continue demanding on
the payment of these interests, an explosion will take place.
As long as it's a question of social changes in small
countries, in Grenada and Central America, you think it can still
be made up in madness by solving them through invasion. But, one-
day as the change takes place in South America, in Brazil, in
Peru, in Chile, that I forgot to mention, which is really one of
the countries where in my opinion there's a pre-revolutionary
suspicion, the United States knows now -- at least understands
that -- that if the situation in Chile continues, in the not-to-
distant future they might face in Nicaragua or either somewhere
else than Nicaragua another problem. This is the situation that
we see.
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How will they solve it?
Will they send in a battalion of the 82nd Airborne?
Anybody understands that that cannot be. And in those respects,
I think it will be convenient for the United States to change its
condition on this hemisphere stop being the strong enemy for
special, interests and learn to coexist with us. That's my
reasoning.
JIM LEHRER: Now, to an American response to and
comments on what Fidel Castro had to say in our extensive
intereview. They will come from the number two man at the State
Department, the Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Dam.
Mr. Secretary, welcome.
Let's begin with what he said tonight and work backward.
First of all, do you agree with his assessment that
South America is in a pre-revolutionary situation and the whole,
all of Latin America is about to explode?
SECRETARY DAM: I don't agree with that. I do believe-
that there is a debt problem. But, frankly, I think a lot of
progress has been made on that. I think the program of the
United States and of the International Monetary Fund and other
creditor countries have provided an approach which as. relieved
the pressure. But there remains a serious economic problem.
We reall-y need more growth in Latin America in order to
provide jobs for the populations of those countries.
LEHRER: What about his suggestion of a 20-year grace on
the -- on the debt, the international debts to these Latin
American countries?
SECRETARY DAM: One of the things that has been done for
those 'countries that have been willing to help themselves by
getting their own house in order has a negotiation on multi-year
debt rescheduling. That is rescheduling of the principle of the
debt.
I think that if there were to be a moratorium on
interest that would simply result in the countries not being able
to -- to borrow anymore and, frankly, they need more capital in
order to expand. Now, most of that capital, it's true, is going
to have to come from domestic savings in those countries, and
that will require some economic reforms in many of the countries.
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LEHRER: What about his final point that the United
States has always positioned itself in opposition to social
change, that we should get out in front and help social change?
What's your response to that?
SECRETARY DAM: I don't really think that that's true.
There have been a number of countries that have moved from
authoritarianism to democracy in the last five years, as we saw
earlier on this program. The United States has strongly support-
ed that kind of change and supports that kind of change in Latin
America today.
We are on the side of democracy development, human
rights and the like.
LEHRER: The specific point on El Salvador -- do you
think the Cubans are supplying direct military aid to the rebels
in El Salvador?
SECRETARY DAM: I think there's not much question about
the fact that the rebels in El Salvador are receiving a good of
assistance. Some of it is military equipment. A lot of it is
command control and the like. I think there's no doubt at all
that the Cubans are contributing greatly to the Nicaraguan
ability to do that.
Now, I'm not prepared to say that the Cubans are
shipping directly into El Salvador, but you notice that Mr.
Castro did not deny that there was assistance going from Cuba to
the guerrillas in El Salvador.
LEHRER: What about his point that the -- the rebels
could holdout forever, you know, even without any more military
aid?
SECRETARY DAM: Well, we have pointed out that they have
received a great deal of equipment in the past. They have
captured some. Undoubtedly, they have an ability to withstand
battles for a time without any additional assistance. All.of our
intelligence indicates that there's been substantial flow in the
past and it continues to this day.
LEHRER: In a general way, in the piece that we ran the
other night, he told Robin -- Castro told Robin that it is
impossible for Cuba to import revolution into any of these Latin
American countries, and that it's equally impossible for the
United States to stop a revolution if in fact the situation on
the ground is there.
Generally, do you agree with him?
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SECRETARY DAM: I don't agree that he can't play a role
in turning revolutions into authoritarian situations. It -- it
is certainly true that local conditions are very important,
economic conditions, social conditions and so forth. But even
when there is a revolution, there are several ways in which
things can go. That was true at the beginning of the Sandinista
revolution.
LEHRER: In Nicaragua.
SECRETARY DAM: Yes, in Nicaragua. And the United
States government did support the Sandinistas, you will recall,
at the beginning. But, certainly Cuba used its influence and its
equipment and so forth to turn that Sandinista revolution into
one which did purport to and -- as well as actually doing it
--export revolution into neighboring countries and made it into a
more authoritarian regime. I think he can -- at the very
minimum, Cuba can have a tremendous impact on what happened in a
situation of -- of uncertainty.
LEHRER: Now, what Castro said was that all he's doing
is helping Nicaragua defend itself from the anti-Sandinista
guerrillas that the United States is arming. What is your
comment on that?
SECRETARY DAM: Well, I think it's important to look at
the historical records there.
First of all, the Cubans, were helping the Sandinistas
even before they ran the government. At the beginning -- and at
the beginning of the Sandinista government, the United States was
helping the Sandinistas. In fact, we were the major donor.
From the very beginning, the Cubans were starting the
military buildup there, cooperating with the Soviets and Eastern
Bloc countries. And while we were -- at the end of the Carter
Administration -- helping the Sandinistas on the economic side,
the military buildup was going on. Now, there were no conquer-
ors. The United States was supporting to Sandinistas.
So, I don't think historical records will support what
he's saying.
LEHRER: A direct charge he made is that the United
States would never be interested in a peaceful solution to the
Nicaraguan situation, to negotiating a way out until they were
convinced a military way could be -- a military way could not be
used to get rid of the Sandinista government.
SECRETARY DAM: I think that just turns our position on
its head. What we've been trying to do is to find a peaceful
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solution. We've done that in a variety of ways. We have met
with the Nicaraguans. We have supported the Contradora process.
So it seems to me that that's just the inverse of the truth-.
LEHRER: He says he supports the Contradora process.
you agree that he supports it?
SECRETARY DAM: I don't see much evidence of that. As a
matter of fact, insofar as his support for Nicaragua, I think
we're seeing the contrary, because the Nicaraguans have been
taking a very hardline position. They want to sign the first
draft. They don't want to have any improvements. They don't
want to have things on verification and the like, and through
their actions with respect to the Costa Ricans who've sought
asylum in Nicaragua it appears that, maybe the Contradora process
will be solid. I'm not exactly sure how that's going to work
out, but I think that indicates the [word unintelligible] benefit
to the Contradora process.
LEHRER: So, he was wrong when he says the U.S. purpose
is to get rid of the Sandinista government?
SECRETARY DAM: That is not our purpose. We want to see
a peaceful solution. We want to see reconciliation as the -- in
Nicaragua between the various factions that the government and
the opposition and indeed the Nicaragua bishops have called for.
We would like to see a regional solution.
LEHRER: Now, speaking of reconcilation, our first
segment that we ran on Monday night dealt almost extensively with
reconciliation between the United Sates' and Cuba. He says he's
ready. Is the United States ready?
SECRETARY DAM: We are ready. But the question is,
realdy for what?
We are prepared to talk to the Cubans. We have a way of
doing that. If he wants to talk to us, were there. We have
what you call an "Interest Section" in Havana, and they have an
"Interest Section" in Washington. These are diplomatic estab-
lishments fully equipped for diplomatic dialogue. So, he doesn't
need to talk to visitors to Cuba. He can talk to the U.S.
Government. He doesn't have to talk on television. It's, of
course, his privilege, but he can talk directly to us. And, as a
matter of fact, we have tried to talk.
And I would say the second point to bear in mind is that
the historical record is very bleak in this respect. The Ford
Administration tried it. The Carter Administration tried it, and
this Administration has tried it.
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In the Ford Administration, they tried and it ended when
they moved into Angola. The same thing happened in the Carter
Administration, when they moved Cuban troops into Ethiopia. And
we've had several occasions in this Administration where we've
had high-level talks with the Cubans -- one by Secretary Al Haig
and another involving Vernon Walters.
But, in every case, when the chips were down, not only
was there no substance there but usually there was a slap in the
face, like the Mariel Boat mess which ended the Carter Admini-
stration's second try.
LEHRER: Is there any -- is there any indication from
your point of view that this particular initiative -- and it's
clearly an initiative on his part -- is anything different from
the prior ones?
SECRETARY DAM: We haven't seen anything. We will
examine very closely what he has to say, and we will have to see.
But, we don't see any evidence, and the historical record is not
encouraging.
LEHRER: Well, specifically, he said that one of the
United States conditions for better relations is that he turn his
back on Marxism and Socialism. Forget it. He isn't going to do
that. Is that a condition?
SECRETARY DAM: We believe that if you interpret that as
the following, if_that is a condition, we don't believe that he
can continue to be a conduit toward supporting Marxist-Leninist
movements in this hemisphere. We believe that that....
You want him to stop that?
SECRETARY DAM: We want him to stop that. And we think
if it's really -- if his position is really bona fide, he will
separate himself in some way from the Soviet foreign policy. In
vote after vote, for years and years and years, he has never
deviated one inch from the Soviet position.
LEHRER: Well he says -- he told Robin that the Soviet
Union is his ally. Why should he turn his back on a friend after
26 years?
SECRETARY DAM: We're not asking him to turn his back.
We're just simply telling him if he really is serious then he has
to have some kind of an independent foreign policy.. He certainly
has to give up on trying to produce other Cubas in this hemi-
sphere.
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LEHRER: What would he have to do to prove his independ-
ence from the Soviet Union-to the U.S. satisfaction?
SECRETARY DAM: Well, I think he can start behaving
differently, and particularly with regard to using this massive
Soviet economic and military assistance to him as a way of
financing the kinds of activities that have been going on in
Central America, in Angola, in Ethiopia and other places where
there are Soviet troops and Soviet military advisers.
LEHRER: He told Robin that he was willing to talk about
the Angola situation. Is the United States willing to talk about
that?
SECRETARY DAM: The situation-is this. We're very
actively invovled. It's a regional problem to begin with, and
one aspect of it does involve Namibia and its independence. And
part and parcel to that is some solution to the problem of Soviet
troops in Angola. And he has said that he is prepared to
withdraw the Cuban troops but, of course, only if the Angola
government asks him -to, and he seemed quite reluctant at that.
We're working very hard with the parties in that area to
trying to bring about a resolution to that situation.
LEHRER: Mr. Secretary, what is your own feeling about
whether or not anything is really going to come of this -- of
this latest initiative of Castro's? Do you think that it's
possible there could be some kind of lessening of the tension
between the two countries?
SECRETARY DAM: I think that it's prudent for us to
examine carefully what he has to say, particularly what he has to
say to us diplomatically where it isn't just a big public blitz.
We have been able to -- on small things deal with Cuba. Of
course recently we had the negotiations about the return of the
Mariel Boatlift people, the so-called excludables, and they will
be going back to Cuba and we will be, permitting political
prisoners and other immigrants into the United States, according
to the agreement. That's a small agreement.
But, to go beyond that into large subjects having to do
with the general political positions....
LEHRER: Trade -- lifting the trade boycotts, diplomatic
relations, et cetera, that's not in the cards anytime soon?
SECRETARY DAM: No, until there is some change in the
behavior of Cuba.
LEHRER: Finally, let me ask you this. Fidel Castro's
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been in power for 26 years. Every administration, going back to
the very first one -- Eisenhower's Administration -- has been
essentially trying to get rid of him one way or another, and yet
he is still there. What is your own analysis of why he's been so
successful just in terms of having staying power ninety minutes
from here -- ninety miles from here, I should say?
SECRETARY DAM: Well, first of all, he has an authori-
tarian state. It's a little easier to stay in power whenever
there's an opponent who speaks out he's thrown in jail, or he can
have massive depression of the normal civil liberties. That's
point one.
Point two is he, as we've seen, a personality, and no
doubt that helped particularly in the earlier part of his career
to stay there.
And, thirdly, he's determined to stay. He more or less
said in one of these segments that he's going to stay in power
until he felt like leaving.
LEHRER: O.k., Mr. Secretary, thank you.
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