WHAT S NEXT MOVE IN THE SOVIET PLAN?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000101020058-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: February 5, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/28 :CIA-RDP90-005528000101020058-6
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~~ The,tliffeit?ii'tq scenccj?ios
for?.?`after ~~4fghanistai't'
- By John f~iaclean~
Chiu9o Tribune Prss Ser~ice~
1Y.15HItiC,TOr - ~1Vhen .Marshall
Shulman, the State Department's special
adviser on Soviet affairs, tries to p-?edict
what aggressive move the oviet Union
might make ne4t, he sees a possible
. thrust into Pakistan against Afghan in-
surgents in camps there.
When former Secretary of. State Henry
Kissinger speculates on the same .sub-
ject, he sees the greatest threat as coop-
w^xation between the Soviet i;nion and
India to break ? Central Asia into tribcil
states such as Ealuchistan, ,which in-
cludes parts of Afghanistan, Iran; "and
Pa.L-istan.
University of Chicago Professor :ilor-
ton Kaplan, a Soviet expert, sees a clif-
fci?ent short-term threat. The Soviets, I:e
says,. are. likeliest to_make a_cosmetic;
withdrawal of some troops? from Afghan- ~
istan,.thereby lulling? the Free_,Wortd,.to'
be foil~;ged by a peace offensive aimed
at splitting Western Europe from the)
Unted States. ` = :: ;?.
'. Like blind ?men feeling ?different parts
'af en elephant, these experienced and
t~ghtful experts view the same situa-~
flail in widely differing terms:. They all
a.~e however, that the Soviet invasion
o!: ~ Afghanistan has brought new and
?~angerous opportunities for Soviet - ad-
:~.ntures?throughout the world.
'"I'4E CAN ONLY guess at what Soviet
bttentions are," Shulman-told a,House
-3sternational Affairs Committee late last
rlek:. `,`Whatever their. original inten-
llons, it [the Afghanistan invasion] does
open. up further pQSSibilities such as
Pakistan. Their intentions`may.be very
,*x+oad indeed." ~ - ,
' :The guessing game _abouE~fuEUre?Sovi-
tt. ?actions ~ has ? reached ~ a.~fever pitch
;~aere.. Watching-it unfold is~a, bit like
reading ? a John LeCarre ? spy .novel ~'in
;w h i c h.? intelligence..operatives gush
'siound seprching .for, .they .know-.now
:what. At one moment, .the Soviet inva-
. ~alan is. an: internal affairaimed at prop-
bir-g up a sagging proSoviet. regime.. At
another moment.,the invasion. is a dag-
ger: aimed. at the? West's oil lifeline,.. the
oil fields.of~Persia and Arabia:.::.:.." '~
If the answers aren't clear, the~ques-t
CHYCAG O TR ZBU NE
5 February 1980
~.~"Shulman said ?the first hints of gnus-j
lion came in October when American?
mtelltgence reported the massing of So-I
~~iet troops just north of the border with
~Afrhanistan. 'Three teams of Solviet
troops. just north of the border with Af-!
ghanistan. Three teams of Soviet offi-~
cials, including high KGB and military ~
:men, visited Afghanistan in late sum? I
'frier and fall;"apparently to r~poit nn
.what steps shouldbe taken to presea~e~
the~regime there: " ~ ? . ? _...- ._.__ __:._~
f THE LAST GROUP, including 12 gen?'
erals; probably reporaed that the Kabul
government was "going down the
'drain," Shulman said, and was likely to,
~be replaced by a fundamentalist Moslem
`leadership with anti~oviet leanings. The,
Kremlin then debated through mid-No-
:vember about how much force to use.
"The Military probably promised a
quick 90-day, option. It appear, they
chase this intermediate option involving
five to six divisions. It would require)
more than t~1ce that -to take on the)
Afghan insurgents." f
-The Soviets now have 85,000 to 92,000
troops in Afghanistan, Shulman said. If~
they choose now to crush tha rebels, it!
will require at leastdoubling that fig-
ure, he said. , , . _ , . _
' In addition to propping uv the re>?~ime.
the Soviets must have calculated that ~a
move into Afghanistan put them closer
to warm water ports on the Arabian sea
and in a'stronger position if they want.
to' move on Iran's oil fields:
"Look at the assets they gained," said '
Chicago's? Kaplan. "You're within. MIG
fighter range of the Persian Gulf, you
have the key to stirring up trouble i n
Baluchistan . [which has warm water i
por-ts].1t gives you the potential to.deny
oil to the West if things stir up." -.
SOti1E ALSO CITE the illness of Snvl-
et Party Leader T eonid Brezhnev as a
causer - .: ~ '?:: .: . ~ : -:' ,..
' "The defense mutister., [Dimitrl Usti-
nov1, is:. the strongest, person. slily; the
toughest,, most aggressive,'" said Sen:
Percy [R., Ill.]; a member of`the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. _ ?
-? Shulman agreed the military played a
leading' role. He said the military has
dominated policy on Central Asia and
Africa from the days of the czars: He
`also tivazned that the military and KGB
would have' a:,stranger hand during the
ttransition period. when Brezhnev finally
departs the scene ~ ; , ~? ' :. .
~: ~A~ final underlying cause of the inva-
Tsion is the presence of 6 million ~ i4los-
lems iri'the. Soviet: Union who could be
stirred by~ a successful Islamic rebellion
in Afghanistan. - .
?: Putting together-the collective wisdom.
"They may be~ preparing to extend
their power by force through Pakistan
and Iran to the Persian Gult," said Sen.
Stevenson [D., Ill.], a member of the
?Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
This view..covers a. host of possibilities.'
' ~'HE 1?SILDEST is Shalman's warning l
that the Soviets .may make a q,.tick;
thrustr~into Pakistan, or simpyl bock the ;
five passes leading from Afghanistan to
the refugee camps in Pakistan. The
most alarming is a arning that the Sovi-;
ets have' embarked on a "giant pincer"
movement to encircle Persian Gulf oil.
The other end of the pincer is Ethiopia
and South Yemen, where the Soviets
have a military ~ presence. The pincer
theory has been pu` forward by the re-
spec[ed_ Iierltage_F:nundation and others
of conservative bent.
`Afghanistan constitutes a flanking
movement," a hi;hly detailed policy pa-
per of the foundation states. "The Sovi-
ets have occupied most important Af-
ghan air bases, fortified them with sur-
face-to-air missile batteries, and are
equipping them with modern command
;and control facilities. Soviet planes are
.now. situated closer. to the strategic
Straits of Hormuz-through which pass
40 per cent of 1~Yesern- oil imports-than
if htey were based in Tehran." , _
So far. they Carter administration re-
.spouse has been one of gradualism,
ducking direct confrontation with the So-~
vials and working to build international
.support behind such moves as the Olym-1
pics boycott, grtain boycott, and con-}
damnation resolutions in the United Na-i
lions. , - .~
Carter's answer to the Russtans''aiso~
has been criticized on grounds ha? has;
followed an erratic;. -superficialcourse,l
bending backwards in Cuba when _ he
discovered Soviet military personnel;
then drawing aline much ~ farther from
home in the Persian Gulf, where the
U.S. cannot back up its military threats
for a long tinge to come - -.
WHaT `D0 OTHERS offer?~ The~Cen~
tral Intelligence A~encv [CLA] advised!
Carter early in 1\ovember when Ameri-'
can diplomatic hostages were seized iri;
.Iran to seta 7 to 10 day dead ine.Z~ar`~'
ter turned down t e a nce, an o e;
cons uence has been the overlapping of
life Iran and Afg arustan cnses.~ -
Chicago's Kaplan recommended that+
Carter impose a naval blockade-of Cuba
directly, after-the: Soviet invasion iu Af-~
ghanistan, insisting that Soviet military
~pesonnel finally be withara:~?n and that`
puclear submarine facilities be disman-
tled. Both the CIA and Kapaln said their
`advice would have been worth trying..
only in the early days of those ruses:
"The President's actions have been
largely cosmetic," :said. Kaplan. "They
Soviets will be able to bring this unde~
lions are: w Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/28 :CIA-RDP90-005528000101020058-6 -,.~ ~.ea