BOLANOS DESCRIBES FEARS THAT LED TO DEFECTION

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000100630003-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 23, 2010
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 25, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000100630003-0.pdf117.41 KB
Body: 
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0100630003-0 APT iuLE !.PFEARED 25 July 1983 Bolanos describes dears that led to defection Former guerrilla Miguel Bolanos on defecting from Nicaragua, and the workings of that country Miguel Bolanos, 24, led a 60-man guerrilla unit in the final battles that brought the Sandinistas to power in 1979. He defected from Nicaragua about 10 weeks ago by hijacking a light plane to Costa Rica. From January 1980, until his defec- tion May 7, Bolanos was an official of state security. He said he was schooled in Cuba for four months, and helped stage the public demonstrations during the pope's visit to Nicaragua last March. Thousands of anti-Sandinista Catholics were kept away while the pro-Sandinistas heckled the pontiff. He participated in a two-year plan to dis- credit opposition forces. "Operation Spiderweb" led to the recent expulsion of three U.S. diplomats from Nicara- gua.. Bolanos served briefly after the. Nicaraguan revolution as special assistant to the Sandinista army chief of staff, Joaquin Cuadra. He defected because he felt that genuine principles of the Nicaraguan revolution have been berreved by the Sovie: and Cuban con- tingent of the Sandinistas. He fears that Nicaragua is headed for totalitarism. Before fighting in the revolution, Bolanos attended college in the United States. His mother, Gloria Hunter, is an American. When he landed in Costa Rica in a hijacked plane he was carry- ing an expired U.S. passport. Bolanos has been debriefed by the State Department and the CIA. Bolanos spoke in English during the following interview conducted by free-lance writer Richard Bodurtha for The Wash- ington Times. Q: Are the Soviets planning to huild nuclear missile bases in Nicara, aa? Tomas Borge (a powerful member of the Sandinista junta) has said, "I can assure the United States that that is one thing it need not worry about." A: They don't need to (build the mis- sile sites). The strategy of the Soviets and the communists is to maintain the view that the big conflict, the battle against communism, will be a nuclear war. Then they can take over countries step by step by exporting the rev- olution and fighting little wars. With this kind of movement they plan to iso- late the United States, France and some other European countries they can win without fighting. Q: Some members of Congress have publicly doubted whether the Sandin- istas are supplying the El Salvadoran guerrillas with arms. Are they? A: Not any more. Just ammunition and whatever it takes to maintain what- ever they've sent in the last four years. Sandinistas have supplied the El Salva- doran guerrillas with 6,000 or 7,000 machine guns. When I was fighting with the Sandinistas in 1979 we had 150 machine guns in Manuaga. In just Manauga. About 2,000 in the whole country. Q: What were your reasons for fighting Somoza? You came from a background that was, what would you say, upper middle class? A: In the final two years Somoza was crazy. Until then he had always let the oppostion party run against him. And the press, too. An opposition press. But then in the last two years it became a crime to be young. If you were 18 you were a communist. He was killing too many people. It was a humanitar- ian motivation that made me fight against Somoza. Q: Recently in Washington there has been talk about the possibility of "peeling away" the hard core Marxists and communists among the El Salva- doran guerrillas. What do you think about that, A: For the international communists it is a matter of procedure to lead jour- nalists and others into thinking that some of the guerrillas are moderate and others are hard communists. But they are all pro-Cuban. All their talk about dialogue is just getting them time. It was the same way in Nicara- gua. I was on the inside there and I can tell you that all the talk about having a dialogue is a lie. Q: You knew Melinda Monies during the revolution in Nicaragua. She later went to El Salvador to join the guerril- las there. She was murdered by the guerrillas. Why? A: She wanted the Salvadoran guer- rillas to have a dialogue with the gov- ernment. Honest dialogue with the Sal- vadoran government. Q: Fellipe Gonzalez, the president of Spain, said during his recent trip to Washington that the current U.S. administration lacks "vision" regard- ing Latin America. What about adopting a policy formed by the Con- tadora Group or something like the San Jose Declaration signed in Costa Rica last year by the region's prime ministers? It states that the Salva- doran government talks to its external opposition and the Sandinistas do the same with their external opponents. Also that Cuba withdraws its advisers from Nicaragua and the United States brings its military advisers home from Honduras and El Salvador. A: Then the Sandinistas and commu- nists can work in peace. They will be able to consolidate their commu- nism and neutralize their internal opponents. At that moment there will be a static situation and they will have a dialogue to change international opinion, which has been generally bad for them. Q: What are some of your thoughts about the contras? Some of them have said that they can topple the Sandin- istas in a few months. Is that Latin bra- vado, big talk? A: The contras cannot win the San- dinistas in that short of time. But you see, they have many factors on their side. All of the.Indians are with them. The contras are making Sandinistas retreat from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific. Q: Hogs is the junta holding up? Is there dissension among the nine mem- bers? A: The people see them join hands in public and they think that the junta has unity. I was an intelligence officer and I can tell you that the junta is not united. Underneath the surface there are fractions. GO_'\TTJNL'Ev STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0100630003-0