FOR AMERICA: THE LESSONS OF THE CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100330005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100330005-1
IJITICLI: LIFE MAGAZINE:
qir PAGE JANUARY 1930
STAT
F o r A m ge r.%* C =
IMF
f t h e 1. 1% 0 1 r- 1 61-11 SO- FAA. 1. r * 3" 0
By George W. Bahl
Former undersecretary of stateforPresidents
Kennedy and Johnson, George Ball is a
lawyer, investment banker and authority on
foreign affairs.
he agonizing ordeal of our cap-
tives in the Tehran embassy
could mark a critical point
in our national experience. It
has-for the moment at least
. -renewed our unity of pur- i
pose; it may well have cured us of hang-ups
left over from Vietnam and Watergate.
We can be proud that Americans have, al-
most without exception, supported a position
based on the most elemental of humane prin-
ciples-concern for the individual as against
the compulsions of world politics. To be sure,
the few who sedulously nourish the thesis of
America's vanishing power and authority
have asked derisively, "Can you imagine the
Russians ever letting their embassies be held
hostage?" They imply, of course, that the So-
viets would react with military force, but what
of it? Since the Kremlin's ideological values
differ fundamentally from our own, no doubt
Moscow would put the tactical interests of an
abstraction-the state-above the lives of in-
dividuals, coolly sacrificing Soviet citizens to
demonstrate the state's effective power.
That we have-rejected such a course shows
that we. have got our priorities right. There is
nothing more invigorating to a nation than to
be true to itself. That is, it seems to me, why
the American people have seemed so impres-
sive during these recent painful days; only a
few fringe voices called for us to send home
the Shah or for military action that might en-
danger the hostages. Though some feared that
our constraint might be interpreted as impo-
tence, it is, instead, a brilliant demonstration
of strength.
In many ways. the whole trying period has
been a therapeutic experience that has taught
us Americans a great deal about ourselves.
Probably a crisis of some kind was necessary
to sweep up the last leftover breakage from
Vietnam and Watergate. After years of wran-
gling and self-doubt, we have learned, to our
astonishment, that we as a people can unite
when the issues are unambiguous and our
national position accords with our national
traditions. We know now that when the coun-
try is sufficiently aroused, Americans-almost
to a man or woman-will be prepared to use
their military power. Contrary to the mourners
and lamenters, our national will is firm and
intact.
Though our sustained policy of restraint
may have puzzled other countries, Americans
themselves have well understood it. We have
found no contradiction in the fact that the
strongest nation in the world is still willing to
put the lives of its citizens ahead of the desire
to indulge its anger or the urge to express its
manhood. We have, in other words, behaved
as a mature people and should not be too con-
cerned about how others perceive us.
Let us hope that out of our current unify-
ing experience America will emerge as a
stronger, more confident country. better aware
of its strengths and purpose than in recent
dreary years. Let us also hope that we now
have the wisdom to solve complex problems
where the issues of right and wrong are not so
clearly drawn as in the case of the hostages.
Finally, let us hope that, rather than wringing
our hands, as many were doing, we will take
the actions necessary to assure our strength.
These are lessons we should now have
learned:
First, we must improve our military capa-
bility to respond quickly to threatening situ-
ations any place in the world that could
seriously jeopardize vital national interests.
Our experience in Iran has demonstrated de-
finitively that the Nixon Doctrine does not
work. If, as that doctrine teaches, we try to se-
cure our interests by anointing a developing
country in a strategic region as the protector
of our inte.ests and then overload it with so-
phisticated arms, we shall only encourage the
disintegration of a political structure too frag-
ile to sustain such a burden. We must, there-
fore, face the unpleasant reality that regional
surrogates offer no easy solution, and proceed
promptly to expand our own airlift capabili-
ties, extend our naval reach and earmark and
train adequate units for emergency deploy-
ment. Such a capability is essential to enable
us to help strategically important, friendly na-
tions resist aggression from foreign enemies.
The visible evidence of that capability is re-
quired to give those nations confidence that
they can count on our protection and at the
same time to deter others from attacking them.
CONTINUED
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100330005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100330005-1
We must be able to react largely from Amer-
ican bases since, with the pervasive spread of
nationalism, American installations on for-
eign soil are a vanishing species.
Second, we must stop talking about the
need to reduce our dependence for energy on
unstable producers in OPEC and act promptly
to make that talk reality. We are living in a
fool's world and we no longer dare temporize.
At the same time, if we are not to face even
more serious crises in the Middle East, we
must concentrate on an Israeli-Palestinian set-
tlement. We have spent 12 years living with
the debris of the 1967 war and it is time we
finally cleaned it up-a goal we can achieve
only by reconciling a Palestinian national
home with adequate arrangements for the se-
curity of Israel. In spite of obstructionism from
both sides, such a reconciliation should not
be Impossible, If we only show enough reso-
lution and stop being immobilized by frozen
patterns of thought.
Third, we must frankly face the realities of
today's world, where power is subject to in-
creasing constraints. The crisis of the hos-
tages shows how restricted are the options in
dealing withcowardly regimes that, sanctify
kidnapping; the toppling of the Shah exposed
the limits of our power to keep a hated ruler
in place against the will of his people. Yet even
though we equip ourselves to help friendly na-
tions resist outside aggression, we will still be
relatively powerless to deal with the internal
revolutions that may now be set In motion not
only by the crumbling of old cakes of custom
but also by social and economic dislocations
created as high oil prices make nations either
too poor or too rich.
Some critics of current policy, notably Mr.
Kissinger. have refused to acknowledge the
practical limits of our power to restrain or
manage great internal convulsions, darkly im-
plying that the Carter administration let Iran
slide into chaos by not giving greater support
to the Shah-though just what form that great-
er support might have taken is not clear. That
is dangerous talk. The last thing we need Is
an argument over who lost Iran that adopts
the same keening theme song as the old who
lost China argument. Our last awkward and
brutal effort to interfere with internal political
change. in Chile, is an episode few regard as a
shining example of America's wisdom or skill.
tries, quietly keep in touch with opposition
leaders, advise those leaders of American
views and policies, and provide some continu-
ity of contacts in sensitive areas where gov-
ernments tend to change frequently. To avoid
such Indecencies as the Chilean adventure, we
must obviously hold such operations under
tight and responsible restraint; but we should
promptly dismantle the present absurd re-
quirements of scrutiny by multiple congres-
sional committees that make a mockery ofI
secrecy. Meanwhile, our vituperative post-
mortem has left us with the worst of both
worlds. It has reinforced the fantasy pre-
vailing throughout the Third World that
the CIA is cunning, pervasive and caps e
of unimaginable feats of interference, while
almost totally 4 estro ing our intelligence
instrument.
Fourth, we shall have to develop a thicker
skin and lower our expectations of world sym-
pathy. Though the United States has been the
preeminent world power ever since the Sec-
ond World War, we are still surprised and
somewhat hurt when other nations, particu-
larly our Western allies, do not always sup-
port our policies-or support them only half-
heartedly. Sometimes our reaction reflects a
failure of imagination; we are too self-centered
to comprehend how a particular situation may
appear from a foreign perspective. Although
the powers of Europe have greatly enlarged
their wealth and improved their standards of
living, they still remain regional-indeed, pa-
rochial-in their outlook. Or. put another way,
though there has been a vast redistribution of
wealth and economic power since the Second
World War, there has been no commensurate
redistribution of political and military respon-
sibility outside the European theater.
To be sure, European leaders clearly stat-
ed that the violation of our embassy in Teh-
ran menaced the whole structure of world
diplomacy, but they indicated little eagerness
to participate in any economic measures
against Iran or take or approve any action that
might-to their detriment-reduce Iran's oil
production. Indeed, several have seemed
ONTIETUED
et, though we cannot stop an
aroused people from over-
throwing a hated ruler, we
dare not be the only major
nation without an effective
intelligence service. We
must have the resources to gather information
and, at the same time, the operational person-
nel to follow political trends In strategic coun-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100330005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100330005-1
primarily concerned with the financial con- those resentments explain to some extent
sequences of America's. action in freezing what has seemed a lackadaisical response on
Iranian bank accounts, even though that ac- the part of Europe. Iran, they tell us, is
tion was taken to forestall a wholesale Irani- America's problem.
an withdrawal -that would have deprived Though'we may feel let down by Europe's
American' banks of any security for their lack of vigorous assistance, the reluctant sup-
Iranian loans. port of Third World countries is easier to un-
To justify their semidetached position to- derstand. Since disparities in wealth and
ward America's predicament, the French power breed resentment, it is not surprising
sought to distinguish between the hostage that many Third World leaders automatically
problem, which they recognize as having uni- attribute their relative poverty to Imperialism
versal Implications, and our quarrel with Iran or colonial exploitation. That explanation is no
over the Shah's retutn,'which they treat as a doubt comforting: it need concern us only
bilateral Iranian-American problem. But it is when it serves as an all-purpose excuse for
not clear what practical implications are to be obstructive action.
drawn from such Cartesian logic-chopping:. In essence, we should not be too sensitive
Finally, history cannot be left out of the to the opinions of other nations, nor should
footnote that explains why Europeans regard we judge the reactions of others solely in
Iran as primarily an American responsibility. terms of good or evil. We can never he sure
The United States greatly expanded its rela- how we would behave if we viewed the world
tions with Iran in 1953, when we helped the from the vantage point of any particular for-
Shah return to his throne after Prime Minis- eign government. The most we can do is try to
ter Mossadegh had nationalized British oil in- understand why a government reacts as it does
terests. In sorting out that problem, American and factor that political datum into our cal-
oil companies were given a substantial share culations, recognizing that no matter how
in Iranian production. We greatly increased wisely or generously we may behave accord-
our involvement with the Shah after 1968, ing to our own lights, we cannot please all peo-
when Britain began to withdraw from east of ples everywhere and we should never try. Once
Suez. As a result, the British have tended to we- have enlisted the help and counsel of
think of Iran as within an American sphere friendly powers, we must at the end make our
of interest, and, indeed, our identification own decisions.
with that country has been extraordinarily Only we Americans can take the final re-
close. France, Italy and Germany have had lit- sponsibility for our future, and we are now suf-
tle financial participation In Iranian oil pro- ficiently grown-up to recognize that that future
duction, even though they have depended on I will never be free of dangers and disasters. The
Iranian output for a significant part of their ! world's dark woods are filled not merely with
consumption needs. Such an imbalance was elves and fairies but also with wolves and drag-
bound to produce quiet resentments, and ons and fanatical ayatullahs. 4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100330005-1