'A TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100260026-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: September 29, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ONPIIt Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000100260026-6
U.S.NEWS Q WORLD REPORT
29 September 1986
Commentary by Seweryn Bialer
`A test of Soviet intentions
The Ruggles Professor of Political Sci-
ence at Columbia University offers an
assessment of possible outcomes of the
Nicholas Daniloff affair.
The case of Nick Daniloff has ceased
to be just another international incident
in the tension-rich Soviet-American relationship. For
the White House, it has become a test of Soviet inten-
tions with regard to the Gorbachev-Reagan summit and
to the new spirit of resumed Soviet-American communi-
cations and negotiations. For the Soviets, it has become
a charged issue of internal-leadership politics, involving
the highly sensitive theme of Soviet equality with the
United States-fears that the American perception of
Soviet weaknesses would lead U.S. leaders to believe
that the Soviets could be pushed around.
The American decision to agree to the release of the
two prisoners-Daniloff and the Soviet physicist and
U.N. employe Gennadi Zakharov-into the custody of
their respective ambassadors was an act of statesman-
ship by President Reagan, providing, of course, that any
direct exchange of Zakharov for Daniloff remains abso-
l
utely unacceptable to the Americans' side.
Some critics see the embassy development as
can capitulation to the So-
viets by equating the
treatment of a Soviet spy
and an American journal-
ist. Far from capitulation, it
is a useful gesture on the
road to a negotiated solu-
tion that will leave Ameri-
can principles intact. It will
provide Kremlin leader
Gorbachev with the time
needed to negotiate with his
colleagues in the Politburo
and to negotiate with the
White House some way
to salvage as much Soviet
face as possible and leave
is not resolved soon-in a week or two-
one will have to conclude that General
Secretary Gorbachev is not strongly
committed to a summit meeting in the
near future, particularly since he is deal-
ing with an American administration
that wants unequivocally to convene a
summit and probe for Soviet-American agreements. One
would also have to conclude that Gorbachev still has a
long way to go to really consolidate his power.
The third scenario-a solution at least partly face-
saving for the Soviets and flexible to a point on the
American side-immediately brings up the tactical
question of what kind of formula would be satisfactory.
A unilateral Soviet expulsion of Daniloff, without any
steps whatsoever on the American side, is possible once
the clamor dies down. The Kremlin, without withdraw-
ing its accusations against Daniloff, could present the
case as an example of Soviet magnanimity and as a real
contribution to the cause of arms control and summitry.
A Soviet decision to release him could be reinforced bv
a formal American declaration that it is against Ameri-
can policy to use journalists as spies.
Another formula might invo ve a seemingly indepen-
dent swap of Zakharov for jailed Soviet dissidents. The
The Kremlin doesn't understand America, says Bialer
expulsion of Daniloff
would then become a sepa-
rate and somewhat foggy
act, left to the independent
interpretations of each of
the two governments.
Let us hope that the pat-
tern of Soviet behavior seen
in the Chernobyl tragedy,
which signaled the new,
Gorbachev style, will pre-
vail in the Daniloff case. At
the beginning of the nuclear
accident, all the hallmarks
of the typical Soviet heavy-
handedness and security
open the road to talks on important world problems. time, however, the incident paranoia
established a record of
There are three scenarios in which the Daniloff affair openness of information inside the Soviet Union un-
can wind down. The first, which I view as unthinkable, known before.
would be Reagan's agreement to swap the spy for the Whatever path developments take, one conclusion is
nonspy. The second would be failure of the superpowers inescapable and worrisome: Soviet leaders have shown a
to find any mutually acceptable formula to resolve the lack of understanding of America, its principles and its
affair. Such a nonresolution could be quite serious. moving forces. At the beginning, they were prisoners of
Retaliatory American acts would be followed by retalia- their disbelief in American idealism and sense of fair play,
tory Soviet acts. A major weakening or even shattering of their misperception about how much Americans care
of newly established lines of communications between about the fate of their compatriots. The Soviets believe in
the Gorbachev regime and the Reagan administration the supremacy of the state and "inevitable" historical pro-
would ensue. The third would be a Soviet formula for a cesses. Individuals for them are dispensable cogs. The
dignified retreat from the blunder of their own mak- case also shows that the Soviets, far from being master
ing-a formula that would be acceptable to an Ameri- propagandists, need to learn the basic lessons of public re-
can administration eager to have a summit and willing lations. Inside the Soviet Union, where no competition to
to be flexible without abandoning its principles. state propaganda exists, any lie will do. When pitted
Should events follow the second scenario-the nonso- against the Western media, however, the Soviets need to
lution-a reconsideration of U.S. assumptions about the learn the ropes of the public-relations game in the interna-
extent of Gorbachev's strength would result. If the affair tional arena.
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