COVERT ACTS NEED EVEN MORE OVERSIGHT
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00552R000100240048-4
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RIPPUB
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K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 22, 2010
Sequence Number:
48
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 24, 1980
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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STAT C'-rA-r
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/22 : CIA-RDP90-0
A' T I C LI:
ON FAGS
fes Aspin _
THE WASHINGTON POST
24 February 1980
6552R000100240048-4
Covert Acts Need Even More Oversight
From the-stories I've been reading in the papers
lately, I get the distinct impression that the greatest
danger to our intelligence system is the.U.S. Con-
gress.
Every week there are more expressions of shock
and concern over the fact that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency has to tell eight committees about any
covert operations it is undertaking, that the Freedom
of Information Act is forcing the CIA to divulge its
secrets and, consequently, that leaks and information
released under the act have paralyzed the CIA at a
time when we need to undertake more covert action.
I believe there is a case to be made that. Congress -
needs to revise the way it oversees covert action. But-
the problem is not that congressional oversight is too
strict already; the problem, is that it is not strict`
enough yet.
The popular. CIA argument-that the 1974. Hughes
Ryan amendment, which requires that covert actions
he reported.. to., eight congressional committees,
prevents covert action because of fears of leaks-is a
red herring. $ .
Contrary to published' reports, ,the Hughes-Ryan
.amendment does not mean that .160 or 200 members
of Congress and staff are told of these operations. In
fact, only three of the eight committees (the House..;
and Senate Intelligence committees and a House Ap-
propriations subcommittee) systematically review
? covert actions.. In the other committees, notification,;.
is limited to a few members. In all, notifications in the'
House go to 27 congressmen and. nine staff members
and in the Senate to 19'senators and eight staff mem =
bets. ti .
This is not anunreasonable number to-be briefed.-
about so crucial a matter of public policy as covert ac- 1
tions. The key to avoiding disastrous covert action is.,
the assurance that a cross section of people will con
sider it. A number of covert operations blew up in our faces in the past because they were terrible ideas to
begin with. They were put together by a handful of
true believers- who prevented anyone who might
question their judgment from having'a say. The
Nixon administration, for example, set up; the 40 Com-
mittee to oversee intelligence operations. But when
the White House had an inspiration it thought some,.
members of the committee might find less--than- in-
spiring, it simply bypassed. the committee That's how
we got Track II in Chile, and how we first helped, and
then cynically shut off help to the Kurds.
To be sure, the requirement to brief congressional
committees is no guarantee that foolish covert ac-
tions will be. avoided., The committees do not have
and are notseeking the power to veto an intelligence
operation, not do tpey have any unique wisdom But
bringing more people into the_.process forces those:;
Rep Aspin, d Democrat from tiyisconssn, was a
member of the Pike Committee; which investigated''=
the, ntelligencer?serv cea'n 1975-2976, and u t{ou
chairmanof the Hots subcommittee that oversees
covert operafsons " }
doing the planning to think through- what they want
'to do, to confront: arguments. against,it?and opens,
them up to opposition or ridicule if they have a dumb
proposal. A reporting requirement probably would,
have- prevented some of .. that foolishness against.
,Castro, for example.
Of course, the more who know of an operation, the-
greater, the opportunity for leaks. But where are all
these leaks- supposedly caused by Hughes-Ryan? We
are doing a fair amount of covert operations now and
have, been for some time; they are not being leaked. I
have sat through whole days of briefings on covert
actions and never seen anything about them in print.
What I do see, however, are articles saying the nation
is paralyzed because of Hughes-Ryan.
There is a need to change Hughes-Ryan. But such.
changes should be aimed at strengthening oversight.
Two are of particular importance.
`, First, Hughes-Ryan says that; unless Congress Is-
notified, no money may be spent by "the Central In-.
telligence Agency for operations in foreign countries,
other- than activities intended solely for obtaining'_
necessary intelligence."
That neatly provides. two loopholes. One is that covert
operations could. be. assigned,to intelligence. agencies.
other than-the CIA=and there are lots of them. (How
many people are aware that the-Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration has intelligence agents all over the world?)
The?other loophole is that sensitive intelligence- collec-
,tion operations are exempt from such review, although
one of.- the biggest intelligence flaps. in modem history.
-the downing of Gary Powers' U2-involved an intelli
gence'collection operation.
Hughes-Ryan erroneously assumes that intelligence
collection is' neutral and that foreign policy can only
"'be tripped'vp by covereaction Aefined in the`profes-
Sion as programs designed to influence the outcome
of. events through' clandestine, activity, ranging from
propaganda to_paramilitary,
Hughes Ryan should be amended so that'congres-.
- sional ,committees-be they two or eight or some-
thing in between-are informed of both covert action,;
and intelligence' collection mounted by any agency of
the government.
Second, Hughes-Ryan says that Congressshould be
notified "in a timely fashion." This is a term of art,.'
that doesn't tell us whether congressional committees
should learn about an operation while it is being
planned or only after it has gone into effect. It can be
interpreted to mean that Congress will be notified
after the event has taken place. One wag has suggest-
ed that."Congress should at Least::.be told before the:
Operation blows up in our faces, so they get hit. by
some of'the shrapnel too.". Hughes-Ryan should -be
,amended -so that Congress is 'informed before any covert action is launched. w,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000100240048-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000100240048-4
Many in the intelligence community would prefer
to return to the good old days; the fewer people it has
to go to the better, in its eyes. Imight note that most
school superintendents would prefer not to have to
run their ideas past school boards. Most..corporate
presidents would just as soon sxi those meetings
with the board of directors:
But whether we plan covert' operation, corporate
strategies or. congressional, campaigns, 'we're better
off in the long run if our ideas get sponged down by
outside critical minds. It might not be great for the
ego, but it provides a better end product
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000100240048-4