FLOOR SPEECH BY REP. LES ASPIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100240025-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 2, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Re oor speech by
P? Les Aspin
Monday, June 2, 1980
t:r. Speaker, the arrival in I'lorida of more than .50,000 Cuban emigres,
with the possibility that many tens of thousands more krill follow, is
moro than just aizother refugee story. ~?!hether you believe in the Open
E'-:rms Policy enunciated by the 'resident on April 13, or the Closed Doors
'.'ol.icy enunciated by the President eleven days later, we can all agree
that the resou!'ces of the United States are being taxed, the welfare of
millions of citizens in Florida affecr_ed, and the very lives of the
-_ _ ~:ie :.~ risk,
Clearly, this is a situation where advance notice from intelligence
sources could have made an enormous difference. In that regard, I have
goad news and I have bad news to report.
The good Haws is that the Cer.tral~Intellig~nce Agency was on i.ts
toes and provided well reasoned, well supported analyses, clearly warning
off' the situation which has now develo}~ed, and that the Agency did this
as early as last January.
By January 31, the CIA concluded, and so reported, that Cuba was
l.it;ely to resort to massive emigration, on the scale of a hundred
t.ilousand or more persons. CIA believed that in this way, Castro could
relieve political pressures building up as a result of Cuba's miserable
economic co~lditions. The CIA reported: "T?ie Castro regime may again
resort to Large-scale emigration to reduce discontent caused by Castro's
~~eteriorating economic condition."
On four other separate occasions, the CiA reported similar views,
:icing as its vehicle a variety of intelligence publications, such that
one way or another taord reached every rank of reader from working level
to tl~e President.
;3y early February, the State Department learna?J 41~at the Cuban
p,overnment was considering resorting to massive emil;ra.tion if the United
Mates did not move faster to process the backlog of former political
prisoners awaiting exit to the United States, and deal effectively with
the question of Cuba boats being hijacked to Florida.
There is no question that the U.5. government was adequately warned.
STAT
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The baci news is that the U.S. government never took advantage of its
lead time, conducted a relatively weak defensive diplomatic strategy,
and failed to organize for tre human flood it should have known was
comin~.The Administration recognized that the consequences of opening
the doors wide would be "catastrophic" -- but rather than mobilize, the
U.S. simply suggested to Cuban officials that if they would only wait a
fey, months until the new Refugee Act of 1980 was in place, we would begin
to move people out at the rate of perhaps a thousand a month.
During 2~Yarch, there were Wore Cuban threats bath public and private,
ti?~c~c~t a wave of emigration. On i~iarch 8, Castro stated in a speech:
r....;: _ ~_~;~ so,az.= _~f aar ~.nformation and analyses with tl~e:n. ~,:rpressions of
concern should have been hitting the Cuban govefnment right aiid left,
before matters broke out of control, in an effort to take some insurance
against a Cuban initiative.
~Sr. Speaker, in the past there hive been instances of intelligence.
failures leading to bad U.S. policy. In this cage, we have had an
intelligence success that nevertheless seems to have r,ade little impact
on the consequent behavior of our gavernm~..t. T. he reasons for this are
outside the responsibility of an intelligence oversight subcommittee --
but the question deserves an answer.
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PRESS RELEASE FP,O~S C0~`iGRESSMAN LES ASPI".?~ 442 Cannon Building;
R~?LEASE DATE:
tiond~t June 2, 1980, A.M. Paper, 4Jashinnton, D.C. 20515
For further inquiry COlltact Leon Fuerth 202 22~-0788
ASPIN FLAILS ADi?iZNIST!~ATIG2? FOR IGNORING CIr~ SC00?' 0?J CI13A
[]ASHINGTOiv'; D.C. -- Rep. Les Aspin (D-h1is.) today char?~ed that the Carter
Admin.i.stration had converted a great intelligence success into a great national disaster
by i;;nor.ing rep,~ated CIA warnins that Fidel Castro caas prepared to flood Florida with
refugees.
Aspin said the United States government had advance raarning from Cciba -- given
both in the open and behind closed doors -- that Castro c?~as angry that r?.'ashington
?~aasnst processing his political opponents out of Cuba as fast as possible and that he
?~^s ?-~atening to retaliate by opening the floodgates of emigration.
"in addition," Aspin said, "Castro r?ade clear that he rags mad at us for doing
nothing to stem the frequent hijackings of Cuban boats by people fleeinE to Florida --
yin ironic twist considering that cae pressed Castro fervently in the 1960s to stets the
hijackings of American planes to Cuba."
Aspin criticized the administration for failing to respond to either of these
complaints and for ignoring the repeated warning that date from January that Castro
mould averrahel~, the straits with refugees if we didn't do something,.
"The point is not that the Administration should have bent over backwards to
please Castro," Aspin said. "The point is that caith several months warning, the
administration didn't ever. bother to plan for a possible refugee influx.
'`Zns~ead we have been treated to the spectacle of a floundering administration
declaring first a closed door policy and then an open door policy and then a closed
door policy again.
"?Je pay the CIA to fine out rohat is about to happen around the globe. And we flay
tt~e CiA o~hen it fails to feret out major developments.
"But when the CIA hands the events of. May to the administration on a silver platter
in Janu~~ry, there is not one possible excuse for the amateur and fumbling policy we
have been witness to these last weeks,?' Aspin said.
Along with his speech on the House floor, Aspin released the text of a report on
the Cuban refugee issue prepared by the House Intelligence Oversight Subcommittee of
which Aspin is chairman.
OOQ0000000
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`'E.S ? '~'?+.~ T''ERE
~~ic. I,II~ ~~ ~ C~ ~ I v; .~~-
A ~t;,S. I.~~TELLIi~c'CE FI~ILI9~'E7
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If there was confusion
could be traced in Florida, its on ~?
ZO ~~ partly to Washington. At fijn~
gencies were automaticail Least
a Large-scale refugee y involved in such
has twice previousl program' Even though Castro
refugees, his latest announcemen~ates for
leave Cuban
Cuba came without warnin that anyone could
immediate guidance from g- There was no
(TIME magazine the highest levels,
May 19, 1980, P? 16.)
The Oversight Subcommittee of
the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence has undertaken the task of exams
Status Government's Wing whether the United
mismanagement of the massive
:: _ - + influx of Cuban refu
the ic~~ult or gees
a failure on the part of the
?;overnment's intelligence entities to provide ade
problems have been caused as quate warning or if the
a result of the policy-makers disregard of
clear indications of
what was about to ha
The Subcommittee held ppen?
a hearing on riay 21 ~ 1980
f%'om the Central I with witnesses
ntelligence Agency and the State Department to cl
tl-~e issues raised below: arify
-- Was the United States Government
of the Castro
regime in opening Marcel?
taken by surprise by the action
-- What were the first indications that
ta~;e ~;uch dramatic action?
the Castro regime would
w~- 47as the intelligence community on top of the
iJere the situation?
oli
p
cy-makers aware
of the sit
uation
- What. that was brewing?
~` wa5 the response of the policy-makers?
On January g' 1880
' the CIA had reported on the
Po1i-tical situation in economic, social and
Cuba:
Until mid-1977 public dissa
inadequate public tisfaction over food
been expressed 3ervxces' and lack of shortages,.
and low through such passive meansoasing had
productivity. The trend s absenteeism
toward more open displays of frustrationhen has
vandalism bean
antigovernment eactivi~artures crime,
and even some isolated
y and sabotage,
By late 1979, .Raul Castro -
hardliner -- was demandin the regime's id
revolutionaries, g the eOjobical
Last month Suppression of counter-
an unusual series of identificationity forces
arrests instituted
in the Havana area, checks and mass
the appointment of hardliner The operation
Interior _ Ramiro Valdes~aslong with
- underscored the regime's detercninationster of
crack down.
to
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The decision to use harsh tactics results from Havana's
recognition that no short-term solution to its socioeconomic
dilemma exists.
As early as January 31, the Cuba Analytic Center of the CIA,
responsible for assessing the political, economic and social conditions
in Cuba, forecast that "The Castro regime may again resort to large-scale
emigration to reduce discontent caused by Cuba's deteriorating economic
condition." The State Department received this article in draft form on
January 30 and coordinated it prior to publication.
The January 31 article continued:
The increase in emigration largely reflects a
clareriora*_ion in the Cuban standard of living over
_,. , past year and the b12a'tC prospects for substantial
ireprovements any time soon. The consumer problem has
been magnified by exposure to Western affluence through
recently instituted visits by exiles from the U.S.,
by the enhanced expectations of a new generation of
Cubans born and educated under the Castro revolution,
and by persistent government warnings that austere
conditions will persist for at least another decade.
During the 1960s, Cuba resorted to large scale emigration
to rid itself of opponents of government policies and
to reduce demand for scarce goods by the least produc~'ive
members of the population. Some 200,000 were allowed
to-leave between 1960 and 1962, and over 30x,000
between 1966 and 1971. The revival of such a paaicy
could reduce popular discontent .
The Subcommittee has learned that from this point right up
until the first emigres began arriving in Key West in April, the
Cuba Analytic Center repeatedly warned that a "Camarioca"~ was a
likely occurrence.
The CIA witness before the Subcommittee c;. May 21, 1980,
summarized the basis for the forecast of a possible large-scale
exodus frori Cuba. He testified that:
Cuba's current anti-U.S. propaganda campaign and the
continuing refugee exodus from the island are responses
to economic, social, and political pressures that have
been building since 1977:
-- The Cuban economy stagnated, and the already
austere standard of living has deteriorated even
further.
A rapidly expanding labor force has created a labor
surplus, and many recently graduated Cuban youths
have been unable to obtain fobs.
*Camarioca is the port that the Castro regime opened in October 1465
to virtually unrestrained emigration. The chaos that immediately
ensued led to the agreement by Cuba and the United States to
regularize the flow of refugees by creating the Varadero-i~iiami airlift.
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The visits by obviously prosperous exiles living
in the U.S. -- which brought badly needed hard currency,
have damaged public morale.
The incidence of crime, of poor job performance,
and of political discontent and minor acts of dissidence
were on the increase.
By lass January 1980, it became apparent that the Castro
regime might resort to large-scale emigration to help
alleviate sore of these pressures. This assessment
was reached for three reasons.
Pirst, there was strong evidence of a sharp increase
in the numbers of Cubans desiring to leave the island.
The number of Cubans who left the island by illegal
and often dangerous means such as forcing their way
into foreign embassies and by boat to Florida rose
from approximately 25 in 1978 to about 440 in 1979.
:~:~~:zd, tea C:x.~tro regime re.axed its emigration policy
in 1979, Havana authorized the exodus of an estimated
15,000 Cubans during 1979 -- over five times the 1975-
1976 average.
Third, the use of emigration on a massive scale had
been utilized by Cuba before as a political and economic
safety valve. Some 200,000 were allowed to leave
between 1960 and 1462, and over 300,000 between 1965
and 1971.
On February 21, the State Department learned that discussions
about reopening Camarioca were taking place within the Cuban government
and that Cuba wanted the U.S. to allow more Cubans to migrate to the U.S.
The CIA viewed this as confirmation of their earlier warnings.
On March 8, the Cuban government in a speech delivered by Fidel
Castro raised the possibility of a Camarioca by publicly criticizing the
U.S. for encouraging illegal departures from Cuba by way of hijacking
boats to Florida. The Cuban government felt that while they have responded
to U.S. wishes with regard to skyjackings, we have not responded to them
in kind for maritime hijackings or other illegal departures from Cuba.
Castro stated:
We hope they will adopt measures so they will not
encourage the illegal departures from the country
because we might also have to take our own measures.
We did it once We were forced to take measures
in this regard once. We have also warned them of this.
We once had to open the Camarioca port We
feel it is proof of the lack of maturity of the U.S.
Government to again create similar situations.
At this stage the State Department believed "that the reopening of
Camarioca did not seem imminent."* The State Department instructed the
U.S. Interests Section in Havana to brief Cuban officials on the Refugee
*Testimony - Witness, Department of State, 5/21/80.
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4.
Act of 1980 which would allow the admittance of 1,000 Cubans per month in
FY 1980. The State Department's view was that this act, which it expected
to become effective in April 1930, would provide the outlet the Castro
regime was lookinu for.
On Friday, April 4, following; the removal of Cub