(SANITIZED) FROM DON I. WORTMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00530R001002360008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 8, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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/NAPA
1INational Academy of Public Administration
Chartered by Congress
Director, Planning and Policy Office
Intelligence Community Staff
Dear
August 8, 1988
Enclosed is a draft of the panel's second interim report for SSG
review and comment. We Would appreciate your comments. by
August 15 as we are scheduled to circulate the report to the panel
beginning on the 17th.
We have classified the report secret. In addition to comments on
the draft, we would very much appreciate advice as to the adequacy
of this classification.
Sincerely,
Don I. Wortman
Enclosure: As Stated
#282 - August 8, 1988
1120 G Street, N.W., Suite 540 Washington, D.C. 20005 [phone]
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/NAPA
National Academy of Public Administration
Chartered by Congress
July 15, 1988
Director, Planning and Policy Office
Intelligence Community Staff
Dear
A major objective in the NAPA study is to develop
recommendations for improvement in IC agency compensation and
benefits systems beyond those currently being considered. In
order that this work be as relevant as possible to the
community, we would like to hold a meeting of senior agency
executives, preferably at the executive director level, to
identity the most critical areas of concern.
I suggest this meeting be scheduled for two hours during
the week of July 25. This will be a working session with the
objective of developing a community-wide consensus on the
following questions:
- The most pressing compensation generated problems the
community is facing today, and expects to face over the
next three to five years.
- The ranking, in priority order,
these problems.
of the significance of
- Organizations outside the intelligence community with
innovative compensation policies that might be
considered for application within intelligence agencies.
The Panel staff will interview officials of selected
private firms engaged in various aspects of intelligence related
work. This working session will give the community an
opportunity to recommend the firms and specific issues to be
studied. We are particularly interested in firms the IC
agencies feel they are losing staff to or that consistently
provide quality personnel on assignments performed for their
agency. First priority should be given to firms in the
Washington, D.C. area.
#242 - July 15, 1988
1120 G Street, N.W., Suite 540 Washington, D.C. 20005 [phone]
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, To stimulate thinking, we've attached a list of potential
areas for future change and some of the specific types of change
possible within each area. If you have any questions contact
Frank Yeager at Please give Frank or I a call as soon
as possible to set a date for this meeting.
V y truly yours,
Attachment: As Stated
0
Don I. Wor man
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POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FUTURE CHANGE
ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION APPROACHES
- Pay for performance
- Geographic pay
- Pay for knowledge
- Pay banding
- Group performance pay
- Gainsharing
- Occupational distinct pay systems
- Exchange rate offsets for overseas assignments
- Confidential pay rates for individuals
- Individualized pay adjustment cycles based on
performance
- Recruitment bonuses
ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
- Manage to budget
- Manage to promotion points
- Job sharing
- Group performance ratings
- Multi-skill professional positions
NEW BENEFITS
- Child care
- Elder care
- Inside sabbaticals (e.g. freedom to work on special
projects for up to a year)
- Non-monetary (e.g. ability to purchase special
equipment or get special training)
- Greater use of tax system options
- Cafeteria benefits
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ANALDIJAULPM.L lAMMUNITX FLtibUNNLL" bTUIn
INTELLIGENCE UNIQUENESS
Background
With the passage of the National Security Act of 3.947 and the
Central Intelligence Act of 1949 the Congress recognized the need
to maintain a secret foreign intelligence program. Congress
provided extraordinary authorities to the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) for protecting sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure and for coordinating foreign intelligence
collection.
"Uniqueness" of intelligence is founded on three central
themes: secrecy of operation, protection of sources and methods,
and National Security. The following excerpt from an April 1,
1988 Court of Appeals, Fourth District, in U.S. v Morison
capsulizes the substance of this point:
"National Security is Public Security, not government
security from informed critioism.... Intelligence gathering
is critical to the formation of sound (public) policy and
becomes more so every year with the refinement -of technology
and growing threat of terrorism. Electronic surveillance
prevents surprise attack by hostile forces and, facilitates
international peace-keeping and arms control effort.
Confidential diplomatic exchanges are the essence of
international relations. None of these activities can go
forward without secrecy. When the identity of intelligence
agents are known, they may be killed. When our surveillance
activities are revealed, counter measures can be taken to
circumvent them. When other nations fear that confidences
exchanged at the bargaining table will only become
embarrassments in the press, our diplomats are left
helpless. When terrorists are advised of our intelligence,
they can avoid apprehension and escape retribution."
"Uniqueness" of intelligence work has been repeatedly
recognized in public records. For example, Senator Durenburger,
addressing the U.S. Senate as Chair of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, stated, after a detailed listing to the Senate of
the impact of intelligence work on IC personnel and families, "In
short, intelligence is unlike any other work in government ...
their responsibilities are unique". Similarly, the court order
rendered in the Pittman case held, "the CIA, because of its unique
and specialized function, was granted by Congress authority to
formulate its own personnel policies consistent with the unique
needs of the Agency."
This "uniqueness" is formally recognized in that all
principal intelligence agencies covered by the National Academy of
Public Administration (NAPA) study (except INR/State) are excepted
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by law or executive authority from all or part of Title V of the
competitive civil service on various grounds, including (a) the
special sensitivity of classified missions, (b) consequent
requirements for secrecy, (c) a high degree of personnel
selectivity for specialized tasks, and (d) need to protect the
covert nature and identity of foreign intelligence operatives.
These exceptions have been granted over time, i.e., from a 1941
Executive Order excepting the FBI; to direct legislated exclusions
for CIA under the National Security Act 1947 and CIA Act 1949; the
National Security Agency under the National Security Act of 1959
(Public Laws 86-36 as amended) and PL 88-290; and the Defense
Intelligence Agency and Military Intelligence Agencies under
Public Laws 98-618, 99-145, and 99-569.
Further, the record contains Comptroller general decisions
and OPM decisions over time which also recognize the need for
exception. Congress has provided selective exemption to
intelligence agencies from reporting requirements levied by and on
other executive agencies with respect to various functions.
Another example is that all of the main intelligence agencies
exercise independent policies and procedures for terminating
employees and these have been upheld by the courts.
To further illustrate the uniqueness argument, the attached
table, lists the restrictions that each IC agency places on its
staff because of the nature of the intelligence mission and
compares these restrictions to the non-intelligence executive
branch agencies.
Discussion
It is true that the IC agencies are substantially different
from other government and private organizations. However, many
other government organizations can establish their uniqueness and
also limitations placed on their staff due to agency mission. The
Security and Exchange Commission lawyer working on a stock market
insider trading case faces restrictions on social life, on taking
work home, and on making financial investments. The National
Institutes of Health AIDS researcher faces unique personal risks
in the laboratory. The Bureau of Prisons requires frequent
geographic moves of professional staff who aspire to senior
positions in the Bureau a requirement that creates significant
family strains.
These and other agencies can properly claim that their
uniqueness and the demands placed on their staff require special
personnel policies. Also it must be recognized that the nature of
the staff and the risks faced by the staff in the IC agencies have
changed significantly over the past 40 years. The increasingly
technical nature of intelligence activities has created a
significantly different workforce than existed when CIA was
established.
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The "Non Official Cover" positions and the para-military
operations officers are now a far smaller proportion of the total
IC community staff. Much of the current staff have skills and
perform work comparable in many ways to that performed in other
government agencies and private sector organizations. And in
fact, the arguments made in recent years for special personnel
authorities for DIA and the military intelligence agencies have
not been based on the uniqueness of the intelligemce activity but
rather on the need for greater personnel management flexibility in
order to be able to better able to compete with the other IC
agencies for quality staff.
For example, in a period when Federal pay has been
progressively less competitive, CIA and NSA have successfully
hired and retained, both in numbers and quality, engineers,
computer scientists, and mathematicians. This success is largely
due to the ability of these agencies to independently recruit for
staff without the constraints of the general civil service system,
including the ability to establish occupationally specific salary
schedules.
Similarly, the ability to dismiss staff with relative ease,
while not used in a large number of cases, has enhanced the
ability to manage these organizations.
NAPA Staff Views
It is clear that the special personnel authority granted to
the IC agencies has been increasingly used to meet market, and to
some extent employee morale, needs. These concerns appear to far
out-weigh security and personal risk considerations.
In the judgment of the staff, the change in the nature of the
intelligence activity calls for a change in the criteria for
establishing special personnel authorities for the IC agencies. A
distinction needs to be made between the personnel management
flexibilities needed to effectively manage and the need for
special pay and benefits for some staff engaged in selected
aspects of intelligence work.
It is clearly essential to the IC agencies that these
personnel management flexibilities which enhance the ability to
manage these organizations be retained. However a distinction
should be made between this essential management flexibility and
the need for special treatment in terms of better benefits for IC
staff because of their uniqueness.
Special treatment of IC staff, as compared to non-IC civil
servants, should be limited to those persons in the IC agencies
who are truly unique. This will require developing a rationale to
identify people warranting special treatment. For example, the
need to work in deep cover or where post-retirement employment
opportunities are severely limited might call for special
treatment for the affected staff.
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Any rationale developed will have to be regularly
reexamined. However the overall guide should be to limit truly
special treatment of staff to the relatively few who truly serve
in unique positions and situations.
The SSCI and the HPSCI should authorize special pay and
benefits only for IC staff who meet the defined rationale. Other
staff should receive benefits comparable to the overall civil
service.
Attachment: As Stated
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229/2 July 1988
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