POLYGRAPHS IN THE WORKPLACE: THE USE OF :LIE DETECTORS" IN HIRING AND FIRING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00530R000601590003-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 30, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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POLYGRAPHS IN THE WORKPLACE: THE USE OF 3
"HE DETECTORS" IN HIRING AND FIRING c
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
H.R. 1524
POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF 1985
H.R. 1924
POLYGRAPH CONTROL AND PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1985
HEARINGS HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC ON JULY 30, AND SEPTEMBER
18, 1985
Serial No. 99-42
Printed for the use of the committee on Education and Labor
.??
,
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
55-4500 WASHINGTON : 1986
4111?1(
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COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR
AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS, California, Chairman
WILLIAM D. FORD, Michigan
JOSEPH M. GAYDOS, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM (BILL) CLAY, Missouri
MARIO BIAGGI, New York
AUSTIN J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
DALE E. KILDEE, Michigan
PAT WILLIAMS, Montana
MA'PT'HEW G. MARTINEZ, California
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
FREDERICK C. BOUCHER, Virginia
CHARLES A. HAYES, Illinois
CARL C. PERKINS, Kentucky
TERRY L. BRUCE, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
DENNIS E. ECKART, Ohio
TIMOTHY J. PENNY, Minnesota
CHESTER G. ATKINS, Massachusetts
?
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
E. THOMAS COLEMAN, Missouri
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
MARGE ROUKEMA, New Jersey
STEVE GUNDERSON, Wisconsin
STEVE BARTLETT, Texas
ROD CHANDLER, Washington
THOMAS J. TAUKE, Iowa
JOHN R. McKERNAN, JR., Maine
RICHARD K. ARMEY, Texas
HARRIS W. FAWELL, Illinois
PAUL B. HENRY, Michigan
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNMES
MATTHEW C. MARTINEZ, California, Chairman
AT WILLIAMS, Montana
3HARLES A. HAYES, Illinois
3HESTER G. ATKINS, Massachusetts
kUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS, California
(Ex Officio)
STEVE GUNDERSON, Wisconsin
PAUL B. HENRY, Michigan
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
(Ex Officio)
CONTENTS
Hearings held in Washington, DC on:
July 30, 1985
September 18, 1985
Text of H.R. 1524
Text of H.R. 1924
Statement of:
Krahulec, Jim, vice president, government and trade relations, Rite Aid
Corp., representing National Association of Chain Drug Stores, Inc.,
accompanied by Ty Kelley, vice president, government affairs, National
Association of Chain Drug Stores, Inc.; William L. Cole, security con-
sultant, Wells Fargo, Armored Service Corp.; and Larry Sherwood,
Sherwood Management Co., retail jeweler
Livingston, Hon. Robert L.
McKinney, Hon. Stewart, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Connecticut
Saxe, Leonard, associate professor of psychology, Boston University,
Center for Applied Social Science; David T. Lykken, professor of psychi-
atry and psychology, University of Minnesota Medical School, Psychiat-
ric Research Division; J. Kirk Barefoot, former president, American
Polygraph Association; Douglas Gene Williams, ex-police sergeant/poly-
grapher, Oklahoma City Police Department
Stanley, Walter Packard, III, Jeweler's Workbench; Norma Rollins, direc-
tor, the Privacy Project, New York Civil Liberties Union; Anthony
Lutty, International Secretary-Treasurer, United Food & Commercial
Workers International Union; Robert F. Harbrant, president, Food and
Allied Service Trades Department, AFL-CIO
Talley, Lawrence W., chairman, Georgia State Board of Polygraph Exam-
iners, vice president of risk management, Days Inn of America, Inc ,
vice president private, American Polygraph Association
Prepared statements, letters, supplemental materials, et cetera:
Abrams, Robert, attorney general, Department of Law, State of New
York, letter to Chairman Martinez, dated July 30, 1985
American Watch Association, prepared statement of
Barefoot, J. Kirk, past president, American Polygraph Association:
"Detection of Deception in 1984: In Defense of Preemployment Poly-
graph Testing," reprinted from Polygraph, 1984, 13, (3), 246-250
Prepared statement of
"The Accuracy and Utility of Polygraph Testing," from the Depart-
ment of Defense
Cole, William L., on behalf of Borg-Warner Corp., prepared statement of...
Courter, Hon. Jim a Representative in Congress from the State of New
Jersey, prepared statement of
Goodman, Stanley R., letter dated August 6, 1985, to Congressman Ray-
mond McGrath
Harbrant, Robert F., president, Food and Allied Service Trades Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO, prepared statement of
Krahulec, Jim, vice president, government and trade relations, Rite Aid
Corp., representing National Association of Chain Drug Stores, Inc.:
"Controlled Substance Diversion from U.S. Hospitals," article from
Registrant Facts, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1985
"Employee Screening?Non-Practitioners," Title 21?Food and Drug,
Chapter II?Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Jus-
tice
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Prepared statements, letters, supplemental materials, et cetera?Continued
Krahulec, Jim, vice president, government and trade relations, Rite Aid
Corp., representing National Association of Chain Drug Stores, Inc.?
Continued
Letter from Ronald W. Buzzeo, Deputy Administrator, Office of Di-
version Control, U.S. Department of Justice, dated July 19, 1985 295
Statement of the National Association of Chain Drug Stores, Inc 305
Lambert, Richard H., managing director, National Retail Hardware Asso-
ciation, letter to Chairman Martinez, dated Aug. 6, 1985 346
Livingston, Hon. Robert L, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Louisiana, prepared statement of
Lutty, Anthony J., International Secretary-Treasurer, United Food &
Commercial Workers International Union, prepared statement of
Lykken, David T., professor of psychiatry and psychology, University of
Minnesota:
"Detecting Deception in 1984" article from American Behavioral Sci-
entist, Vol. 27, No. 4, March/April 1984
Prepared statement of
Multi-Housing Laundry Association, prepared statement of
Paterson, Richard D., director of security, McKesson Corp., on behalf of
the National Wholesale Druggists' Association, prepared statement of
Rollins, Norma, prepared statement of
Saxe, Leonard, Ph.D., associate professor of psychology, Boston Universi-
ty, prepared statement of
Stanley, Walter Packard, III, Jewelers Workbench, Bangor, ME, prepared
statement of
Sherwood, Larry, Sherwood Management Corp., on behalf of Jewelers of
America and Manufacturing Jewelers & Silversmiths of America:
Chapter 17.6 Polygraph Examiners, excerpt from Business and Pro-
fessions Code
Gordon Jewelry Corp., a submission
"Is the real thief on your staff?" article entitled
Letter to Chairman Hawkins, dated July 19, 1985
Sherwood Management Co., Inc., a submission
Testimony of
Zale Corp., a submission by
Talley, Lawrence W., chairman, Georgia State Board of Polygraph Exam-
iners, prepared statement of
Williams, Douglass Gene, ex-police sergeant/polygrapher, Oklahoma City,
OK, prepared statement of
Williams, Hon. Pat, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Montana:
Letters from:
Anonymous by request, Lenexa, KS
Bali, Shirl I., Santaquin, UT
Cohen, Maurice, Brooklyn, NY
DeFiore, Patricia, Dix Hills, NY
Delaney, Eilene G., St. Claireville, OH
Guy, Darla C., Bedford, OH
Larson, Pat, Aurora, CA
Matthews, Gabriella, Taft, CA
McCale, Phyllis, Orange, TX
Ruhr, Marianne, Kinasha, WI
Prepared statement of
Section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1524
Page
352
42
119
116
348
340
30
111
27
322
319
331
318
320
315
317
356
277
83
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POLYGRAPHS IN THE WORKPLACE: THE USE
OF "LIE DETECTORS" IN HIRING AND FIRING
TUESDAY, JULY 30, 1985
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES,
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in room
210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Matthew G. Martinez
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Martinez, Williams, Gunder-
son, Henry, and Jeffords.
Staff present: Eric P. Jensen, acting staff director; Paul Cano,
legislative assistant; Genevieve Galbreath, chief clerk/staff assist-
ant; and Patricia Kelly, staff assistant. Minority staff: Dr. Beth
Buehlmann, Republican education staff director; Mary Gardner,
Republican legislative associate; Daniel V. Yager, Republican asso-
ciate labor counsel.
Mr. MARTINEZ. I call this meeting to order.
This is a hearing of the Subcommittee on Employment Opportu-
nities. In light of the recent publicity surrounding the rash of na-
tional security violations, the use of polygraph devices, better
known as lie detectors, has once again come to the forefront of our
attention.
The polygraph device measures the changes of one's pulse, blood
pressure, and perspiration in response to a series of questions.
These psychological responses purportedly indicate whether an in-
dividual is lying or telling the truth.
The use of the polygraph is controversial to say the least. Propo-
nents of their use feel polygraphs are essential in protecting their
business interests, while opponents argue that the polygraph has
no validity and employer reliance on this device unfairly denies
employment to honest individuals.
Of course, in determining whether the use of the polygraph in
the workplace should continue, we must weigh the interests of both
parties, employers and the employees alike. The right to privacy
and due process dictates that we must carefully scrutinize the va-
lidity and effectiveness of the polygraph, and we must scrupulously
protect the employees' right to fair employment opportunities. On
the other hand, we must consider the interests of the employer.
Employers also have the right to protect their business interests.
In the final analysis, the balance of equities and competing inter-
ests must be carefully and judiciously considered.
(1)
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146 147
THE ACCURACY AND UTILITY
OF POLYGRAPH TESTING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE -
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1984
Prepared by
Norman Ansley
Chief, Polygraph Division
Office of Security
National Security Agency
and
Marcia Garwood, Ph.D.
Research and Special Branch
Polygraph Division
Office of Security
National Security Agency
Technical Editor
Gordon H. Berland, Ph.D.
1984
Reprinted by the American Polygraph Association, 1984. Reprints available at $8.00
per copy, postpaid from the APA, P.O. Box 1061, Severna Park, Maryland 21146. Checks
'rust be payable to American Polygraph Association.
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14V
148
FOREWORD
This analysis of the scientific literature on the accuracy of the polygraph,
with supporting information on use and utility, was prepared at the direction of
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard G. Stilwell, General, USA (Ret.).
General Stilwell, with the concurrence of the Director of the National Security
Agency, appointed Norman Ansley to lead a working group of senior examiners from
the military services to prepare a report, setting forth the basis upon which the
polygraph is utilized in the Department of Defense. In addition, the report was to
include information on the use and results of polygraph testing in the Department.
The working group, listed below, provided information from their resources
on the use of the polygraph and case examples. They also served as an editorial
board, reviewing the text. This report was prepared by Norman Ansley, Chief,
Polygraph Division, Office of Security, National Security Agency, and Marcia
Garwood, Ph.D., Research and Special Branch, Polygraph Division, Office of
Security, National Security Agency. Gordon H. Berland, Ph.D., served as a
scientific editor of the report. William Fedor, Deputy Director (Personnel
Security) Counterintelligence and Investigative Programs, and William H. Bell,
Security Specialist, Counterintelligence and Investigative Programs Directorate,
ODUSD (P), represented DoD in the development of this report.
THE WORKING GROUP
Norman Ansley
Chief, Polygraph Division
Office of Security
National Security Agency
Robert A. Brisentine, Jr.
Chief Polygraph Examiner
U.S. Army Law Enforcement
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
Louise S. Fuse
Deputy Polygraph Program Manager
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
B. Frank Bloomingburg
Special Assistant
Scientific Investigations
Headquarters, Naval Investigative Service
James E. Hardy
Chief, U.S. Air Force Polygraph Program
Headquarters, USAF Office of Special Investigation
OVERVIEW
The federal government has over sixty?five years of experience with polygraph
techniques in criminal and counterintelligence testing. Beginning in 1951, the
Department of Defense established a polygraph school for the training of military
examiners. It conducts basic and advanced courses and now trains almost all of the
polygraph examiners in the federal service.
The use of the polygraph for the investigation of crimes is a well established
practice. Known errors in the field use are exceedingly rare. Where examinees are
found to be deceptive during testing, the confession rate is consistently high,
despite the fact that all of these criminal suspects had already been interrogated
by an experienced investigator. Moreover, there is nothing about the polygraph
technique that likely to cause a false confession because of the requisite low key
questioning. The use of the polygraph to confirm admissions and confessions with
additional testing also reduces the possibility of false confessions. This study
includes a number of representative cases of criminal investigations in which the
polygraph has played a significant role.
The polygraph is extremely useful in intelligence and counterintelligence
operations. There is positive evidence of the deterrent effect of screening
examinations. Examples of espionage and attempted espionage cases detected by
polygraph examinations are included in this study. Without the polygraph as an
Investigative tool, a number of espionage cases never would have been solved.
Helmich, Kampiles, and Barnett probably would not have been successfully prosecuted
without the skillful application of polygraph techniques. In addition, there is
definite evidence that some extremely sensitive U.S. intelligence operations would
have been penetrated by hostile intelligence services if the polygraph had not been
employed in screening for clearance and access. Examiners conducting screening
cases have obtained confessions from applicants of their intention to commit
espionage. In other cases they developed such significant admissions that
penetration attempts by hostile intelligence were detected and neutralized.
Screening has also kept our intelligence agencies from hiring some extremely
undesirable people. Examiners, in FY 82, obtained admissions from applicants of
undetected crimes involving murder, attempted murder, arson, rape, and numerous
other felonies.
The polygraph field is one of those rare situations where the practice has
outpaced the research. While scientists are debating how the various testing
formats work, and are trying to devise a satisfactory theoretical framework, others
are conducting research on the development of improved techniques and advanced
instrumentation. Much of the literature which discusses the issue of polygraph
validity was written for other purposes. Some of the polygraph research is very
limited in scope, some is dated, and some is flawed in design. Despite these
limitations the research produces results significantly above chance. Those
studies which approximate field conditions by using field instruments, trained and
experienced examiners, standardized techniques, and a complete field pretest
interview, produce higher rates of accuracy than those conducted with one
physiological channel, make?shift or novel techniques, and untrained personnel.
The polygraph is not limited to our culture. It is significant that research
results are similar throughout the world, regardless of varied cultures and
languages.
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It is important to realize that polygraph examinations are not conducted in
isolation. Their use is always in the context of a larger program. They play a
role in investigations but they are never a substitute for investigation.
Polygraph examiners do not make recommendations or decisions in regard to further
investigation or the adjudication of the results. In screening, the polygraph
examination is not used alone for clearance and access. It is an adjunct to the
national agency check and background investigation. Decisions and adverse actions
are not made solely on the results of an anlysis of polygraph charts. All other
factors in a situation are considered before decisions are made.
Used with prudence, and a full knowledge of its limitations, the polygraph will
continue to play a role in our criminal justice system and counterintelligence
operations.
CHAPTER 1 - UTILIZATION OF THE POLYGRAPH
1.1 THE POLYGRAPH IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
1.1.1 FEDERAL AGENCIES
The polygraph is currently used by the Department of Defense, United States
Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Postal Inspection Service,
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Administration, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Central Intelligence Agency, United States Marshals, United States Customs Service,
and the Department of Labor (Anti-Racketeering). These agencies often provide
polygraph service to those federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence
agencies and activities which do not have polygraph examiners. The Department of
Defense elements which currently have polygraph programs are the United States Army
Criminal Investigation Command, the United States Army Intelligence and Security
Command, the Naval Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, the U.S. Marine Corps Criminal Investigation Division, and the
National Security Agency.
These fifteen agencies are represented on the Federal Interagency Polygraph
Committee which meets quarterly, or more often if necessary. Although informal,
the committee has achieved the adoption of minimum standards for the selection and
training of federal examiners. The Committee has also established and operated an
advanced polygraph seminar. Each year, the FBI hosts a one-week seminar attended
by seventy or more federal examiners at its training facility at *Quantico,
Virginia. The program of instruction is planned and coordinated by a different
federal agency each year, although in some years two agencies combine to put on the
instruction.
1.1.2 Polygraph Examiners in the Department of Defense
All polygraph examiners in the Department of Defense must meet the minimum
requirements set forth in DoD regulation 5210.48 plus those established in each
service or agency. DoD examiners are college graduates, experienced investigators,
U. S. citizens, at least 25 years old, and specifically selected for their maturity
and judgment. All have been subjected to a thorough screening examination with a
polygraph, and have been the subject of an extensive background investigation. The
basic polygraph training of military examiners is the twelve-week course conducted
by the Army at the Military Police school, Fort McClellan, Alabama. All examiners
then serve a closely supervised internship of six to twelve months.
1.1.3 Number of Examiners
As of September 1983, the Department of Defense had 153 certified examiners.
That number does not include interns or those in basic training.
DoD CERTIFIED EXAMINERS
Army Army Marine
CID INSCOM Navy Air Force NSA Total
1980
39
9
11
20
8
' 13
100
1981
42
9
12
20
6
30
119
1982
44
12
14
20
6
26
122
1983
50
15
15
40
6
27
153
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1.1.4 Annual Polygraph Utilization
ANNUAL POLYGRAPH UTILIZATION (Number of Examinations)
Marine
Army Army Navy Air Force Corps
CID INSCOM NIS OSI CID NSA Total
1980
4005
214
1317
1415
258
5676
12885
1981
3690
281
1185
1418
245
7418
14237
1982
3686
390
1337
2026
263
9672
17374
1.2 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
1.2.1 History
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and its predecessor, the Bureau of
Investigation, made use of the polygraph technique occasionally from 1917 into the
1930's. In the mid-1930's Leonarde Keeler, who was then at the Northwestern
University Crime Laboratory, trained an FBI agent in polygraph technique. A few
years later he trained an agent from the United States Secret Service. The Army
began to have agents trained as examiners in World War II, and when Leonarde Keeler
established the first polygraph school in 1948 the federal government began to
expand the use of the polygraph for criminal investigations. Today fifteen federal
agencies or departments have polygraph programs.
1.2.2 Polygraph As An Aid To Investigation
In criminal cases, the polygraph is not used in the Federal Government as a
substitute for investigation. Field investigation is usually conducted as far as
circumstances permit before the polygraph plays a role. This requirement for prior
investigation plus a prior and separate interview of all prospective polygraph
subjects is mandatory in the Department of Defense, and may be waived by DoD
officials only in the most unusual circumstances. Despite these restrictions, the
polygraph is widely used in criminal investigations. Defense counsel in criminal
cases frequently ask for exculpatory examinations.
The Army, which is the greatest user of the polygraph for law enforcement
purposes in the Federal Government, has utilized the polygraph in 17% to 19% of its
investigation of felony crimes during the last year and a half. Further, the Army
has used the polygraph in 95% of its criminal investigations pertaining to crimes
for which the maximum penalty is 15 years or greater. The effectiveness of this
effort is illustrated by comparing the percentage of felony cases solved by the
Army with the national rate. The Army solved 64.7% of their felonies while the
national average for the same period was only 19.5%. The use of the polygraph was
one of the significant reasons for this extraordinary achievement.
The following tables depict the extent of use of- polygraph examinations in
criminal investigations in DoD, the pretest and post test confession rates, and the
administration of exculpatory polygraph examinations which are requested by the
suspect or his attorney:
1980
1981
1982
1980
1981
1982
1980
1981
1982
1980
1981
1982
1.2.3 Tables on Use in Criminal Investigation
Army CID
3990
3677
3665
Army
CID
12.5%
10.3%
10.7%
Navy NIS Air Force OSI US Marine Corps - Totals
1209
1049
1210
1336
1304
1745
PRETEST ADMISSIONS OR CONFESSIONS
Army
INSCOM
21.5%
16.0%
13.3%
Navy
NIS
11.5%
8.9%
11.0%
Air Force
OSI
10.0%
13.3%
12.0%
255
240
261
POST TEST ADMISSIONS OR CONFESSIONS OF DECEPTIVE SUBJECTS
Army
CID
46.4%
44.7%
48.7%
Army
INSCOM
19.4%
27.7%
51.3%
Navy
NIS
34.4%
36.5%
30.1%
Air Force
OSI
35.6%
33.3%
31.2%
1.2.4 EXCULPATORY EXAMINATIONS
(Requested by the suspect or his attorney)
Percentage of total cases in parenthesis
Army
CID
328 (8.2%)
349 (9.5%)
324 (8.8%)
Navy
NIS
239 (18.1%)
164 (13.8%)
209 (15.6%)
Air Force
OSI
506 (35.6%)
466 (32.9%)
542 (26.8%)
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6790
6270
6881
Marine Corps
CID
1.9%
3.7%
3.4%
Marine Corps
CID
50.0%
52.4%
36.7%
Marine Corps
CID
39 (15.1%)
24 ( 9.8%)
31 (11.8%)
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1.2.5 Criminal Investigation Case Examples .
In 1980, an Army captain was killed when his parachute failed to open.
Investigation revealed that the static line of the officer's parachute had been
intentionally cut. As this crime occurred in an airborne division, the possibility
existed that other parachutes had been cut and that additional military members
would be fatally injured during parachute jumps. As 160 parachute riggers had an
opportunity to commit this crime they were all considered suspects. A decision was
made to use the polygraph swiftly to determine the individual responsible for
sabotaging the parachute. Five days after the death of the officer, use of the
polygraph resulted in the identification of the person who sabotaged the parachute,
who then confessed.
In 1982, a serviceman had been scheduled for trial for the rape and sodomy of a
female military member. Based on a polygraph administered to the alleged
assailant, who requested this test in exculpation, it was determined that he had
not committed any sexual crimes with or upon the complainant. A subsequent
polygraph examination of the female complainant resulted in a confession that she
had made a false complaint because she was angry at some members of her former
military unit. In this instance, the polygraph prevented an innocent man from
going to trial for the serious crimes of forcible rape and forcible sodomy.
In June 1982, a female military person reported in a sworn statement that a
male military person had assaulted her with intent to commit rape. A criminal
investigation of the alleged incident failed to confirm or deny her complaint.
Subsequently, the alleged incident became a security clearance matter and was
reopened. The alleged perpetrator admitted "playing around" with the complainant,
but denied any aspect of assault or attempted rape and he volunteered to undergo a
polygraph examination. As a result of the examination, the male military person
confessed to all the charges made by the complainant.
A civilian employee operating a government owned service (gas) station on a
military installation was suspected of falsely reporting a $1,800.00 robbery of the
service station. HE was administered a polygraph examination which indicated
deception. The employee then admitted stealing the $1,800.00 himself and
identified a local military member as an accomplice.
An individual was tried and sentenced to life in prison for the murder of a
fellow soldier. This individual asked the Army to give him a polygraph examination
for exculpation. The results revealed that he had not committed the murder. The
investigation was reopened and the actual perpetrator of this crime was apprehended
and the innocent solder was released from prison. This matter would not have been
resolved without the use of the polygraph.
The body of a nine-year-old girl was found in a trash dumpster on a military
installation. An autopsy revealed the child had been sexually molested and the
cause of death was asphyxia. Investigation revealed that an individual reported he
had been robbed in the vicinity of the dumpster on the night in question. Further
investigation revealed the complainant of the robbery had been in a bowling alley,
which was the last place the girl was seen alive. The subject was offered a
polygraph examination and he agreed. The examination results indicated deception
on the issues of kidnapping and killing the girl. During the subsequent
interrogation by the polygraph examiner, the subject made a full confession.
A U. S. military member was suspected of setting a fire aboard a ship that
resulted in excess of one million dollars damage; he denied the charges. The
military member was administered a polygraph examination which indicated deception,
whereupon he confessed to intentionally setting the fire.
An Individual charged with Possession and Sale of Controlled Substance
maintained his innocence during the investigation and requested an exculpatory
polygraph examination. The examination was administered by an Army examiner and
the individual was found to be truthful when he denied criminal participation in
the possession and sale of the controlled substance. The polygraph evidence was
not considered during the pre-court martial hearings nor was it allowed to be
introduced during the court martial proceedings. The individual was convicted and
sentenced to serve time in prison. Following the conviction, the examiner
continued the investigation and identified a civilian subject who confessed to the
examiner that he committed the crime for which the military member was sent to
prison. The examiner then coordinated efforts to obtain the release of the
innocent military member from prison.
1.2.6 Criminal Conduct Revealed during Screening Examinations
A detailed analysis was made of the admissions made during the testing of
20,511 applicants for clearance and access at NSA from 1 October 1975 through 28
February 1979. There were 695 persons, 3.4% of the total, who admitted to the
commission of a felony. In almost all of these cases the perpetrator had gone
undetected. Among the few who had been caught, there were six who had been
convicted, but who had falsified their forms to conceal the arrest, conviction, and
time served. The admissions included murder, armed robbery, forcible rape,
burglary, arson, embezzlement, hit and run driving with personal injury, thefts of
expensive items or large amounts, smuggling and wholesale selling of illegal
drugs.
In addition, 2,489 persons (12.11) admitted to misdemeanors. These admissions
included petty theft, simple assault, tax evasion, falsification of travel
vouchers, malicious damage, indecent exposure, prostitution, selling illegal drugs
and controlled substances for profit, deliberately writing bad checks, and other
forms of fraud. Some of these cases may have been felonies. When there was doubt,
they were statistically classified as misdemeanors. Not all of the misdemeanor
admissions were disqualifying. The purchase, use or possession of illegal drugs
was not listed in this category.
There were 8,383 (40.1%) who admitted to the use of an illegal drug on at least
one occasion. There were 2,228 (10.92) who admitted using amphetamines,
barbiturates, hallucinogens and similar substances. There were 704 (3.4%) who
admitted to the use of heroin, cocaine, or opium.
The statistical rates for the admissions of crimes and drugs have changed very
little since that survey.
1.2.7 Examples of Crimes Admitted during Screening Examinations
The following admissions were made to NSA examiners during screening
examinations. All are from FY 1982 cases:
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An applicant for an engineering position at NSA, employed as an engineer by
another government agency, admitted that his engineering degree was phony (he
bought it through mail order from London for $100). He also admitted that he shot
and wounded his second wife (his prison term was not on his SPH) and his present
wife is missing under unusual circumstances that he would not explain.
An applicant admitted to setting fire to the trailer that his ex-wife and child
lived in. He had been questioned by the Michigan State Police as a suspect
(attempted murder/arson) but denied it, and refused their offer of a polygraph test.
An applicant said he killed a young girl while in combat in Vietnam. He
recognized her as a young girl when he shot her the first time, then for no reason
he could give, he shot her several more times at close range. He called it
murder. He also admitted stabbing a stranger in the face with a knife in an
argument over some beer.
An applicant admitted to the forcible rape of his ten year old niece, which was
never reported to the police.
An applicant for a position in which he would carry a firearm, admitted he had
been charged with attempted murder but not tried for lack of evidence. He admitted
firing his shotgun at six people, and hitting all of them.
An applicant admitted to firing a rifle into his estranged wife's home in an
attempt to murder her. He fled Connecticut which had a current warrant outstanding
for his arrest.
1.3 INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
1.3.1 History
The instrumental detection of deception was first used in an investigation for
the Army when a Secret Code Book was stolen from the Surgeon General's safe in
1917. The thief was detected among the 70 suspects tested, but he was not
confronted. Followed from Washington, D.C. to New York City, he was apprehended in
the act of passing the code book to a German agent. During World War I the Army
trained a group of psychologists at Camp Greenleaf in lie detection techniques for
counterintelligence purposes, but the Armistice was signed before they were put to
use (Marston 1938).
Beginning in the 1940's, the polygraph was used at the Oak Ridge atomic
facility for screening of employees. Operated entirely under contract by a private
company, the program continued until 1951 when the security responsibilities then
under contract were taken over by the government (Trovillo 1951). At the end of
World War II at Camp Wetherill, New Jersey, the Army used the polygraph to examine
274 German prisoners of war who had been screened and selected for police
leadership positions in the post-war German Government. A team of seven
experienced examiners using RI Technique asked questions about Nazi party sympathy,
communist sympathy, plans to engage in sabotage or subversion, activity for the
Gestapo, SS, or SA, and serious crmes. The results cleared 156 Germans (57%) for
senior police positions. There were 8 inconclusive cases (3%) and 110 (40%) were
not recommended. The examiners obtained admissions to Nazi Party membership by 24
candidates, and to SA by two and SS by one. Three were communists, of which one
was a party organizer. Among the Nazis was the Party Treasurer from 1933 to 1938
(Linehan 1978).
In 1947 the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency began using the polygraph
in support of operations and for specific investigations. They also began to use
the polygraph in screening. By 1950, CIA was screening all applicants.
In May 1951, the Armed Forces Security Agency, predecessor of the National
Security Agency, began using the polygraph to expedite the clearance processing of
more than a thousand employees who had been hired but could not be cleared until
the background investigation had been completed. Because of the Korean War, those
investigations were taking from nine to eighteen months to complete. Accordingly,
AFSA gave top secret access on an interim basis to employees based on a
satisfactory polygraph examination and a National Agency check. Soon thereafter,
AFSA-NSA began screening local applicants before they were hired and by 1953 was
giving polygraph examinations to all applicants prior to employment.
During the years 1951 to 1983 a number of other special activities in the
Department of Defense have used the polygraph for clearance and access
determinations, and for operational purposes. Some of these polygraph operations
were for specific projects of a limited duration, others were for long terms.
Acting on recommendations of a DoD Select Panel on Personnel Security, Frank C.
Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense, issued a Memorandum on 6 August 1982 which
established an aperiodic counterintelligence polygraph program in the Department of
Defense for those persons who have SCI access. Mr. Carlucci also restored the
Reinvestigation Program in DoD. The Carlucci polygraph program was implemented
only in the National Security Agency. Other elements of DOD needed a revision in
the DOD polygraph regulation before they could begin. The polygraph regulation was
under revision when Congress expressed an interest in the proposed expansion of the
polygraph in the Department of Defense.
On March 11, 1983, the President issued National Security Decision Directive
Number 84 "Safeguarding National Security Information," which was separate from the
DoD action. Among the many security measures in NSDD 84 is the requirement to
revise regulations and policies so that employees may be required to take a
polygraph examination in the course of investigations of unauthorized disclosures
of classified information.
Congress will hold additional hearings, on NSDD84 and the polygraph, and has
passed legislation which prohibits The Department of Defense from expanding the use
of the polygraph beyond that existing on 5 August 1982 (the day before the Carlucci
Memorandum), until 15 April 1984. NSA is exempt from this moratorium. The
moratorium is to provide Congress with time for hearings and, if necessary,
subsequent legistative action.
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1.3.2 Specific Investigations of Espionage
In many cases, espionage activity is initially detected by other means, and the
role of the polygraph examination is to find the guilty persons among those
suspects developed by investigation. Not infrequently, the examiner will get
admissions that are useful in furthering the investigation, or get confessions.
Polygraph examinations were important to the successful prosecutions of Barnett,
Kampiles, and Helmich. All received lengthy sentences for violation of the
espionage statutes. And in each of these cases the polygraph examination was
important to counterintelligence analysis and damage assessment.
Other espionage cases have been detected through screening operations conducted
by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Here, again, the
examiners have obtained information in sufficient detail to initiate
Investigations, and in some cases have obtained confessions. It is important to
note that in the screening situation, the applicant initiates the contact by
applying for assignment, employment, or some form of access. The applicants know
beforehand that they will be given a polygraph examination. The decision to take
the examination and risk exposure must be a difficult one to make. There are
several known cases in which agents have refused an assignment to seek employment
where the classified access required a polygraph examination. This deterrent
effect is illustrated by the refusal of Christopher Boyce to accept a job with the
CIA as a courier between the United States and sites in Australia. He feared that
the examination would reveal his espionage activities. He refused again for the
same reason on a later occasion when his Soviet handler suggested he apply for work
at CIA (Lindsey 1979). Likewise, Barnett opted not to apply for a staff position
at CIA or NSA because he feared the polygraph test.
Prime Minister Thatcher (1982), in her statement on the report of the Security
Commission about the Prime Case, said that "The Commission concludes that the
polygraph is the only measure of which it could be said with any confidence that it
would have protected GCHQ from Prime's treachery, either because it would have
deterred him from applying to join or would have exposed him in the course of
examination. In view of this and of the extreme gravity of the damage caused by
Prime, the Government accepts the Commission's recommendation that a full and
thorough pilot scheme should be carried out. The Commission recognizes that a
polygraph examination would be seen by some as an unwarranted invasion of their
privacy. But we are dealing with matters of the highest national security, and
those who have access to the nation's most sensitive secrets must expect to be
subject to the most rigorous vetting procedures."
1.3.3 Examples of Polygraph Cases - Espionage
A U.S. directed informant with access to the intelligence and security
functions of a foreign power reported on an unidentified agent inside a highly
sensitive U.S. communication center, and said that foreign government officials
were reading U.S. classified communiques almost as soon as they were put on the
wire. These communiques dealt with highly sensitive activities involving the
Defense and State Departments, and the White House. Investigation led to five
suspects. All were interviewed with sworn statements executed denying any activity
on behalf of the foreign government. Investigation produced no additional
indication of espionage activity. All five suspects agreed to undergo examination
on the polygraph. Four of the five were determined by the examiner to be innocent
of involvement. The remaining individual was reported as deceptive and
subsequently confessed that he was, in fact, in the employ of the foreign power.
He admitted furnishing far more information to the foreign power than was reported
by the U.S. informant. Much of the information he admitted providing to the
foreign power was subsequently confirmed by the U.S. directed informant.
A U.S. military member was arrested after selling classified material to
undercover federal agents following documented contact with the Soviets. The
military member denied any additional contacts or any additional violations. He
was administered a polygraph examination in which showed deception. He
subsequently admitted to additional Soviet contacts and possession of additional
classified information at his residence.
A U.S. controlled agent allowed himself to be recruited by a foreign
intelligence service in 1978. From 1978 until 1982, the agent was met periodically
by a foreign case officer, but never in the United States. In April 1982, the
foreign intelligence service agreed to have a courier meet the agent in the United
States. The courier was arrested when the meeting took place. He was tried and
convicted. Throughout his interrogation following his arrest, he did not identify
anyone else in the U.S. who might be engaged in espionage against the U.S. The
convicted courier subsequently agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The
examination resulted in the courier furnishing the names of several persons in the
U.S. known or suspected by him to be espionage agents for the foreign power he
represented.
A military service received information from another agency that a military
member was involved in espionage with a hostile intelligence agency. Subsequent
investigation included a polygraph examination where the member admitted being
involved in espionage against the United States for over a year.
A military service received information that an officer was involved in
espionage. Subsequent investigation disclosed the suspect was a missile launch
officer assigned to a western base. During one of his many trips he was arrested.
Through his defense counsel, arrangements were made to grant immunity if the
officer would disclose all compromises of classified information and pass a
polygraph examination to confirm the admissions. He was then thoroughly debriefed
by counterintelligence personnel and said he had told everything. However, he made
many additional significant admissions to the polygraph examiner before ultimately
passing the polygraph test.
A foreign civilian who was formerly employed by U.S. Forces, was reportedly
providing U.S. documents to a foreign intelligence service. That individual's
daughter was married to a member of the U.S. military, and she was also implicated
in the espionage activity. During an investigation of these allegations, three
sources of information were examined by the polygraph and were determined to be
truthful. Those examination results significantly aided in the development of the
investigation. The host country police arrested the foreign civilian and his
daughter for espionage. The American member of the military forces was interviewed
and denied any knowledge of his wife or father-in-law being involved in espionage.
He agreed to undergo a polygraph examinaton. The examination resulted in the
member admitting that he knew his wife and her father were involved in espionage,
and that he did not report that fact, even though he knew he was required to,
because he wanted to protect his wife.
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1.3.4 Espionage Detected During Screening Examinations
An applicant reacted to questions about involvement in intelligence for a
Foreign government, espionage activity, intent to commit espionage against the
United States, the accuracy of his security forms, and other related questions.
After the tests, he admitted that his forms were not correct when he listed his
academic affiliation during two long tours abroad, amounting to a total of eight
years. He admitted that he was, during those years, a scientific advisor to the
chief of a foreign military intelligence service. Although he admitted to the
examiner that he might pass classified information to that service, he claimed that
he had not done so. He had a Secret U.S. clearance before, between tours, and
after his work abroad for that agency. He admitted that he was still in contact
with the foreign intelligence agency, and the subsequent test charts indicated
consistent significant reactions to questions about giving or selling U.S.
classified information to that service.
An Army Sergeant who had access to cryptologic information applied for a
civilian position. During the polygraph examination, he reacted to various
relevant questions. In the post-test interview, he admitted to various petty
crimes and miscellaneous wrongdoing. The polygraph examiner noted continued
specific reactions to relevant questions and when the Sergeant was reexamined
several weeks later, the same situation continued. His access was withdrawn and an
investigation opened. While that investigation was still in progress, he was found
dead in his automobile. It was subsequently determined that he had been engaged in
espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.
A contractor employee seeking clearance and access reacted to polygraph
questions concerning espionage. She told the examiner that her former husband was
currently engaging in espionage against the United States for a foreign power.
This had been going on for several years while her spouse held various positions in
the government and with defense contractors requiring classified access. She gave
very specific details on his espionage activities.
An applicant for employment reacted to questions about committing espionage,
clandestine contacts, and related questions. He admitted that if employed, he
would sell classified information to a foreign intelligence service if he could get
enough money for it to live comfortably. The applicant had access to classified
information while in the service. He continued to react to counterintelligence
questions after his admissions.
An applicant described his various radical and Marxist connnections including
residence with a British Communist Party (CP) member while they both were students
at a British university. The applicant visited the Soviet Union twice, both times
with British student tours. He became particularly friendly with a young woman who
described herself as a student and part-time INTOURIST guide. She was his tour
guide on the second trip. Applicant later wrote his tour guide telling her he had
applied for employment with U.S. intelligence agencies. The Soviet tour guide came
to the U.S., supposedly to visit relatives; contacted the applicant; then arranged
to meet the applicant at an airport the day after his polygraph examination. He
continued to react to counterintelligence questions during his polygraph testing.
An applicant said he had lived with a foreign national, who he said was an
intelligence agent of a foreign power, while he was stationed in Berlin with U.S.
forces. The applicant provided information about her activities including
observation of a transmitter/receiver which was apparently for clandestine use. He
did not report her activity to his superiors, despite the fact that she worked for
U.S. military finance, because she paid for their apartment and he enjoyed living
with her.
An applicant for employment who had lived abroad for several years overseas
admitted that she was cultivated for several months by the host country
intelligence agency and finally offered a position in which she was to travel to
another country under a false identity, but as a U.S. citizen, then obtain
employment in the target country (not the U.S.). She said that after two days of
thoughtful deliberation, she declined. She had not previously reported this to
U.S. authorities, and did so during the polygraph test only after reacting to
counterintelligence questions.
An applicant who was about to retire from military service reacted to
questions about intending to commit espionage against the United States. The
applicant then described several visits to the Soviet Embassy to make arrangements
to defect to the Soviet Union. The Soviet officials took copies of his documents,
got extensive biographical information and when they learned of his pending
applications for employment with U.S. intelligence agencies, encouraged him to stay
in the U.S.
An applicant reacted to questions about knowing others engaging in espionage,
intent on his part to engage in espionage, and to questions about the truthfulness
of the information on his security forms. He admitted that he had been terminated
from employment with a U.S. intelligence service after a year of training but
before he was assigned to a position. After being fired he worked as a free-lance
journalist in the U.S. and abroad, with an Asian partner. During their work, the
Asian told him he was a professional and trained intelligence agent for his home
country. Although the applicant identified the agent by name, his location in the
U.S., and his intelligence service, he would not give many details of their joint
activities. After these admissions, he continued to react to questions about
intending to commit espionage against the United States and the accuracy of his
security forms.
An applicant admitted that a Russian, who stayed at his home for several days,
asked for a tour of potential military targets in New Jersey. The Russian was
allegedly with a Soviet delegation from the USSR Ministry of Health. The Russian
took numerous pictures while the subject drove him to all the major bridges and
petroleum plants in New Jersey, and to a nuclear power plant. The following year,
he allowed two Soviet citizens from the Ministry of Health to stay in his home
while they made tours during the daytime. They were vague about where they had
been. The applicant provided additional information about other U.S. citizens who
were assisting these Soviets in their non-medical activities.
One applicant, a frequent traveler to a Communist-bloc country, told the
examiner of being drugged, and while drugged, an attempt was made to get him to
engage in a homosexual act. Later, he was directly asked to work for the
intelligence service of that country against the United States. He said he
refused, but he did not report the entrapment attempt or the offer to any U.S.
official.
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1.3.5 Suitability Statistics
When considering for clearance and access those persons who have not yet had
the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty and trustworthiness, it is necessary
to make judgments from their general conduct. Initial clearance is also the
appropriate point at which undesirable people should be barred from access to
classified information.
The extent and nature of admissions to criminal activity, including drugs, made
by NSA applicants, has been set forth elsewhere in this report. Some other aspects
of the admissions made during screening should also be reported .
Falsification of the Statement of Personal History or Personnel Security
Questionnaire is reported only when it is deliberate, and the omission or false
entry is significant. Among the 20,511 applicant polygraph examinations conducted
at NSA from 1 October 1974 to 28 February 1979, there were 1,573 persons who
falsified their security forms. That was 7.7% of the total number of persons
examined. Omissions included criminal arrests and convictions, employment where
their work was unsatisfactory or they were terminated, less than honorable military
service, family, subversive organizations, falsified citizenship, education levels
and degrees not attained, foreign travel and numerous other matters. In many
cases, but not all, an accurate record would have given information that would have
been a bar to clearance and access, or to employment, or both.
Menta' and nervous disorders were described by 1,306 applicants (6.4%). When
appropriate, medical releases were obtained for use by those who conduct the
background investigation. In addition, 297 (1.5%) admitted they had attempted
suicide. Because these applicants were also interviewed at NSA by a qualified
clinical psychologist, an appropriate evaluation and prognosis was possible.
There were 2,820 persons (13.8%) who disclosed close contact with foreign
nationals. Of particular interest were the 857 persons (4.2%) who admitted close
contact with Soviet bloc citizens, whose identities were not listed on the security
forms. Many of these were contacts began with foreign language training but
developed into friendships, with contacts continuing through personal meetings and
correspondence.
The examination includes questions about unauthorized divulgence. There were
2,153 persons in the 1974-1979 study who had prior access to SCI level material.
Of those, 126 (5.9%) divulged classified information to members of their family and
129 (6.0%) disclosed classified information to others. The admissions, always
checked by a classification authority, ranged from a one?time disclosure of
confidential information to a member of the family to very serious compromises of
extremely sensitive operations to outsiders, including foreign nationals. There
were cases where the divulgence was not only serious, but frequent, and sometimes
to total strangers. There were a few cases where persons who did not have official
access to classified information heard it or saw it, and knowing it was classified,
passed it on to other unauthorized persona. The most flagrant case of this kind
was the son of a federal official who was stationed abroad. The son had casual
access to his father's office, and was able to get improper access to highly
classified material in the office without others noticing. He then disclosed this
information to the sons and daughters of foreign diplomats and other foreign
nationals in order to impress them. The disclosures were serious, but he was uever
detected while doing this.
1.3.6 USE OF POLYGRAPH IN ARMY PERSONNEL SECURITY CASES
The U.S. Army has no general personnel screening program in which polygraph is
utilized; however, the polygraph is utilized on a selective case?by?case basis.
When the U.S. Army Central Clearance Facility (adjudications) receives a completed
Background Investigation from the Defense Investigative Service in which there are
areas of adverse information which remain unresolved, a polygraph examination may
be requested to aid in the resolution. The polygraph examination is offered to the
subject on a voluntary basis to aid in clarifying the areas not fully clarified by
the investigation.
From February 1982 to September 1983, 180 such cases were referred for
polygraph examination. Of the 180 cases, 67 subjects declined to take the
examination. The following statistics summarize the results of those 113 cases in
which the subject agreed to undergo a polygraph examination:
Overall Results
Nondeceptive Deceptive Inconclusive No Opinion
28(25%) 81(72%) 2(1.5%) 2(1.5%)
Where there was Deception Indicated (DI), relevant admissions were obtained in
71 cases (or 88%). The following is a breakdown by area of the DI admissions:
Loyalty Drugs Sex Crimes Other Criminal Acts
16(20%) 40(49%) 11(14%) 14(17%)
Loyalty cases involve unreported contacts with foreign intelligence, unreported
travel to denied areas, unreported contacts with persons within denied areas,
association with communist/subversive organizations, and hostage situations.
Drug cases involve the use, possession, distribution, purchase or sale of
illegal drugs.
Sex cases involved homosexuality, child molestation, and other aberrant sexual
practices.
Other criminal cases involved admissions to criminal activity other than drug
Involvement or sex crimes, e.g. theft, embezzlement, fraud, etc.
Clearance Actions in Polygraph Cases
REEtElln
Clearance Granted: 15 (24%)
Clearance Denied: 36 (76%)
Nondeceptive
24 (89%)
3 UM
Action was still pending in 19 DI cases and 2 nondeceptive (MDI) cases. Some
of the DI cases were cleared up by minor confessions.
The above figures indicate that adjudications were not based solely on
polygraph results, but on the overall investigative file.
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1.4 POLYGRAPH and the TRADITIONAL METHODS
The polygraph examination is part of the processing for clearance and access in
NSA and CIA. Both are necessary for complete coverage. Although many agencies
rely entirely on the background investigation, neither NSA nor CIA have considered
authorizing SCI access without a polygraph in more than 30 years. During the
Korean emergency in 1951, when resources were inadequate to conduct background
investigations in a timely manner, NSA granted temporary access based on polygraph
results and a National Agency Check, with full access on receipt of the background
investigation.
1.4.1 1953 - Study of Polygraph/Background
In 1953, the National Security Agency conducted a study of the effectiveness of
their emergency procedure of using the polygraph and National Agency Check.* That
study considered 3,926 individuals who were processed f6r-clearance and access by
NSA (and its predecessor, AFSA) between 1 November 1951 through December 1952.
Of the 3,926 individuals concerned, 3,878 volunteered for a polygraph
interview, and 48 refused to do so. These 3,926 individuals are further broken
down into two categories: 2,902 who were interviewed prior to employment, and
1,024 who were recruited in the field and were interviewed after they were
employed. Of those who refused to take a polygraph test, 41 were applicants and 7
were employees. There were 2,772 complete or partial background investigations
reviewed during this study. The disparity between this figure and the total
persons in the study is because, generally, when applicants revealed information
during the polygraph examination which disqualified them from further
consideration, no background investigation was initiated. Another contributing
factor is that in the case of 64 employees and 209 applicants the reports of the
complete background investigations had not yet been received by the agency at the
time of the study. Of the 1,017 employees who were interviewed a total of 448 of
the tests indicated no deception and the employees gave no information requiring
evaluation, while 569 indicated deception, gave information requiring evaluation,
or they were physically or emotionally unfit for testing.
Of the 569 employees who required further security evaluation after the
polygraph interview, 83 were terminated or permitted to resign in lieu of
termination. In 65 of these cases the information which formed the basis for this
personnel action was furnished solely as a result of the polygraph interview.
Eight persons were terminated solely on the basis of information furnished from the
background investigation, and 10 persons were terminated on a composite of the
information from the two investigative methods. Of the 8 people who were
terminated solely as a result of their background investigations, 3 made no
admissions and appeared truthful on the polygraph test, while the other 5 made
minor admissions or were unfit for testing. Altogether, 8.108 of all employees in
the study were terminated, 78.32 on the basis of information from the polygraph
interview, 9.62 on the basis of information from the background investigation, and
12.1% from a composite of the two. In addition to the 83 persons who were
terminated, 248 persons covered by this study resigned voluntarily, for reasons.
unrelated to security, leaving 693, or 67.67% of this group remaining with the
Agency.
*NSA does not now authorize clearances on a polygraph and an NAC because PL 88-290
requires a full field investigation prior to clearance.
The clearance of 76 employees was delayed pending receipt of background
investigations. Six of these persons were later terminated on the basis of
information provided by the background investigation, while in the other 70 cases
no information was developed which was a bar to clearance. These persons had been
held for the completion of a background investigation because they were unfit for
testing, because they refused to volunteer for a polygraph test, or because the
information resulting from the polygraph interview was not sufficient to enable
analysts to reach a security determination.
In the case of 2,902 applicants for employment, 41 persons refused to volunteer
for a polygraph interview, leaving 2,861 who were examined with the polygraph. The
tests of 1,251 applicants indicated no deception and the applicants gave no
information requiring security evaluation. The remainder of the group of
applicants, 1,651 persons (56.92), required further security determination. Of
these, 696 (24.32) were disapproved for clearance on the basis of their admissions
during polygraph examination. The 610 (21.32) who gave minor admissions were
evaluated as satsifactory for clearance. Of those 2,902 who applied for
employment, 1,765 (61%) entered on duty. Some of the remaining 345 applicants were
denied employment for reasons not related to security, others declined proffered
employment.
There were 19 persons who were approved for hire on the basis of the
satisfactory evaluation of their polygraph interview and a National Agency Check
who were later terminated. Eleven of these persons had made no admissions and
appeared truthful on their polygraph interview. In 3 cases the individual made
minor admissions which were evaluated satisfactorily, and 2 cases involved those
who had refused to volunteer for a polygrah test, but were nonetheless hired. A
composite of the information from the background investigation and the polygraph
test formed the basis for the termination of 2 persons, and the remaining
individual was terminated on the basis of information developed during the
polygraph interview of another applicant. The 17 persons on whom derogatory
information was developed despite clear polygraph test results and no admissions or
only minor admissions represent a false negative error rate of 0.6% in the testing
of 2,902 applicants.
The use of the polygraph interview resulted in a considerable monetary saving
in the security clearance of employees. In the group under study there were 696
applicants who were disapproved for hire and 65 employees who were terminated
immediately on the basis of information derived from the polygraph interview.
Calculated on the basis of a nine-month clearance period at the GS-4 level, this
group of individuals would have cost the government *1,814,322 in salary alone
while awaiting the completion of a background investigation. This figure is low,
since the average salary of individuals awaiting clearances in the agency was above
the GS-4 level and the average background time was more than nine months.
The study concluded that the background investigation is at its best in areas
which are a matter of record, such as employment, education, naturalization,
criminal history, etc., although even in these areas more pertinent information was
developed through polygraph interviews. On the other hand, in personal matters not
of record, the polygraph interview is far More reliable as a producer of
information for security determination. In the polygraph interview this
information ii obtained directly from the subject. It does not, as with the
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background investigation, come from informants whose motiviation and reliability
are often unknown, and who, in a few cases where derogatory information is
concerned, are vindictive.
The authors of the 1953 study observed that the primary justification for the
use of the polygraph interview in personnel screening is not its financial savings
to the government, but from the fact that a combination of a complete background
investigation and polygraph interview provides more informaton for security
determination than can be obtained from any other methods yet devised. Neither the
polygraph interview nor the background investigation may be considered complete in
itself. Each supplements the other; each improves the validity of security
determinations.
1.4.2 1983 - Study of Polygraph/Background
In 1983, the National Security Agency conducted a pilot study comparing the
information obtained from polygraph interviews where the examiner did not have any
Information from a background investigation, with background investigations where
none of the polygraph developed information reached the investigators. These "dual
track" cases are unusual in that the investigation started well before the
polygraph examination was conducted. Even so, some of the dual track cases had to
be discarded from the study because information developed during the polygraph
intervew was totally disqualifying and the Defense Investigative Service was
advised to stop the investigation before it was complete. Other cases were deleted
from the study because information from the polygraph interview was given to DIS as
leads for further investigation, because DIS had not yet closed their case.
The subjects whose files were reviewed in this study had already been evaluated
as having acceptable information on their Personnel Security Questionnaires, and
had received a polygraph interview sometime between 1 October 1982 and 31 January
1983. The polygraph interview and Special Background Investigation (SBI) were
conducted independently, without any exchange of information. From a total of 248
randomly selected dual tracks cases, 194 cases were selected as meeting the
criterion of complete independence, required by this study.
The results of the study revealed that 782 of all information used for
evaluation was obtained from polygraph reports. The remaining 222 of information
used for evaluation came from the Special Background Investigations.
In 113 cases (581), the polygraph report was of particular value to the
clearance adjudicator because it was the only investigative method to develop
information for evaluation. By comparison, the SBI developed the only information
in two cases (1%).
In addition, there were 22 cases (112) in which the polygraph interview and the
background investigation produced dissimilar but useful information, and 14 cases
(7%) in which they developed similar information. There were 43 cases (22%) in
which neither source produced useful information. Although polygraph interviews
produced far more information than the background investigation, the contributions
of the latter were vital, and often on matters not developed or even covered in the
polygraph interview. For example, credit is discussed in a full scope polygraph
screening examination, but it is not the subject of a specific polygraph question
because it is not practical to develop a dichotomous issue. Similarly, character
deficiencies, alcoholism, a poor work record, and many other topics are often
better learned from the observation of others, or from official records. In
addition, the background investigation provides positive "whole person"
information. The obvious conclusion was that both sources of informtion are
productive, each from different sources, and both vital to the process of
evaluation for clearance and access.
1.4.3 1974 - 1979 Polygraph Results from Cleared Military Personnel
A study was made of admissions made by applicants who were currently or
recently in the military service who were cleared for SCI access and were in a
cryptologic service. This table includes the 2,426 who applied in the fiscal years
1974 through 1979.
Admissions During Polygraph Interviews, FY 74 - 79
from /,426 Military Applicants
Number of Persons making
Admissions
13
Topics
Espionage
Communist, Fascist
or Terrorist Activity
Divulgence of Classified
Information:
To family
To others
Secret Foreign Contacts
Soviet Bloc Travel
Soviet Bloc Contacts
Drugs
2.7%
Crimes
25
135
132
1
70
60
Marijuana 1654
Marijuana over 100
times
Uppers, Downer,
etc.
Cocaine and Heroin
Misdemeanors
Felonies
Alcohol Problems
Past
Present
Deliberate Falsification
of the Security Form
Serious Credit Problems
Psychological Problems
Treatment
Suicide Attempted
159
243
322
68
25
4
152
57
107
14
Percentage
0.6%
1.0%
5.6%
5.4%
.04%
2.9%
2.5%
68.2%
6.6%
10.0%
65
13.3%
3.3%
1.0%
0.2%
6.3%
2.3%
4.4%
0.5%
In regard to the espionage admissions, most knew of or had strong reason to
suspect others of engaging in espionage against the United States but had not
reported it. A few were personally involved in espionage. See examples in this
chapter.
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1.4.4 1981 Polygraph Results from Cleared Military Personnel
A study was made of the 318 applicant cases for FY 81 in which the applicant
was currently or recently in the military service in a cryptologic assignment with
SCI access. In every case they had been the subject of a Special Background
Investigation at some time in their career, and some had update investigations.
All these investigative results had been evaluated as satisfactory for clearance
and access. In some cases, the background investigation was in the security file
available to the examiner. In the majority of cases it was not.
The table below lists only that information obtained during the polygraph
examination which was not in the security file. The tables exclude all information
obtained during background investigation, special investigations, and security
interviews.
Admissions During Polygraph Interviews, FY 81
from 311 Military Applicants
Topic
Number of Persons making
f2ESEEt_at
0
0.3%
4.1%
3.1%
0
4.7%
1.9%
Espionage
Communist, Fascist or
Terrorist Activity
Divulgence of Classified
Information:
To family
To others
Secret Foreign Contacts
Soviet Bloc Travel
Soviet Bloc Contacts
Drugs
Admissions
0
1
13
10
0
15
6
Marijuana
141
44.3%
Marijuana over 100
times
16
5.0%
Uppers, Downers,
etc.
31
9.7%
Cocaine & Heroin
12
3.8%
Crimes
Misdemeanors
38
11.9%
Felonies
12
3.8%
Alcohol Problems
Past
7
2.2%
Present
1
0.3%
Deliberate Falsification
of Security Form
7
2.2%
Serious Credit Problems
14
4.4%
Psychological Problems
Treatment
14
4.42
Suicide Attempted
5
1.6%
Not all of the admissions listed above were disqualifying. The table does not
disclose amounts or recency.
Note that the first major topics are similar to the topics usually included
among the questions in counterintelligence polygraph examinations used for special
access determinations.
1.4.5 1983 ? Study of Interviews/Polygraph -
One of the additional techniques sometimes used in processing people for
classified access, particularly SCI, is a thorough security interview. For several
years, NSA has conducted security interviews of incoming military personnel
assigned to NSA. The interviewers are experienced Special Agents of NSA who are
specifically trained for this work. The scope of their interview is very similar
to that of the polygraph examinations given by NSA to civilian applicants for
clearance and access.
A 1983 study at NSA reviewed the information obtained on 13 topics that are
covered in both the security interview and the polygraph examination. A random
sample of 100 security files containing military security interviews was taken from
the list of those military persons who were interviewed between March 1981 and July
1983 on arrival at NSA. Another random sample of 100 cases for that period was
taken from the security files in which there was a polygraph examination of a
military assignee to NSA who took the examination as part of his processing for
civilian employment at NSA.
In 49% of the cases, the interviewers obtained admissions from already cleared
incoming military personnel which required security adjudication. In all, there
were 87 specific admissions. The subject matter included ten of the thirteen
topics covered in both the interview and the polygraph examination.
The polygraph examiners obtained admissions requiring security adjudication in
82% of the examinations of the already cleared military personnel who were seeking
civilian employment. There were a total of 111 specific admissions. The
admissions covered nine of the mutual topics.
A second analysis compared the security interview conducted on entry and the
subsequent polygraph examination of those 100 military persons who applied for a
civilian position at NSA. The security interview predated the polygraph
examination by a range. of a few months to three years. The polygraph examiner,
ofcourse, had access to the interview report prior to the examination. What is
interesting is that in these 100 randomly selected cases the examiner got
information which predated the security interviews, on nine of the thirteen mutual
topics. For example, in 31 cases (312), the examiner obtained information on drug
involvement that predated the security interview.
1.5 SURVEYS OF EXAMINEES
1982 Air Force Survey
In 1982 the Air Force began a pilot polygraph project to conduct
conunterintelligence/security polygraph examinations of personnel who have access
to extremely sensitive and highly classified USAF projects. After the project
began, AFOSI began a survey of individuals who had voluntarily taken an examination
in connection with that access. The questionnaire was answered in the reception
room immediately following the examination out of the presence of the examiner. No
identifying data was included with the replies. The 1,355 individuals responding
to the survey gave their answers, totaled below in percentages, to each of the six
questions. The "other" response includes answers such as "don't know" and no
answers.
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a. Were you offended, embarrassed, humiliated
or degraded in any way during any part of the examination?
b. Do you think the examination was unfair in any way?
C. Was there any objectionable or unwarranted invasion
of your privacy during the examination?
d. Do you feel counterintelligence security polygraph
examinations enhance the security of your work environment?
e. If you changed jobs and your new employer required
a counterintellignece security polygraph examination, would
you undergo the examination?
f. If an act of sabotage of espionage occurred and
you were asked to take a polygraph examination to find the
person who committed these acts, would you take a polygraph
examination to resolved the matter?
YES NO OTHER
2.0% 98.02 0
.92 99.0% .12
.72 99.1% .22
94.92 4.1% 1.02
98.2% 1.52 .32
99.22 .7% .1%
There are only two other surveys of employees who have taken polygraph
examinations for security clearance and access, or have taken counterintelligence
examinations.
1.5.1 1951 Survey of Atomic Energy Commission Employees
In 1951, Professor Paul V. Trovillo, a psychologist from Arizona State
University, was employed to survey the use of the polygraph by a private
contractor, Russell Chatham, Incorporated, at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. His survey
covered the use of the polygraph on employees at the Atomic Engergy Commission
facilities who had sensitive access. All of the employees had a full field
background investigation conducted by the FBI. The period covered by the survey
was 17 February 1946 to 10 April 1951. (It is noted that none of the persons
Involved in the extensive Soviet atomic espionage network which operated during
those years were among those who took polygraph examinations at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. Whether or not the polygraph deterred Soviet intellignece from an
attempt to penetrate the Oak Ridge facility is unknown.) Trovillo reported that
approximately 12,000 polygraph examinations were conducted in that period,
including applicants for clearance by employees of contractors, and applicants
seeking initial employment which required a Q clearance. In addition to the
Initial polygraph examination, each employee was subject to additional
examinations. Depending on the sensitivity of access, some employees were
reexamined every three or six months.
Trovillo personally interviewed a representative sample of employees who were
in the retesting program. The employees included engineers, scientists, clerks,
and chemical workers, including their union President. Of the 59 interviewed by
Trovillo, only two (3.4%) expressed any resentment toward the polygraph tests
(Trovillo 1947).
1.5.2 1956 Survey of NSA Applicants
A survey was taken of all applicants for employment at NSA who were processed
in January 1956. Of the 522 applicants who were surveyed, 361 were male, 362 were
unmarried, 186 had a baccalaureate degree in a liberal arts field, and 206 had a
degree in a scientific field. The survey covered these statements, with the
responses indicated in percentages:
a. The polygraph examiner impressed me as being professionally competent and
well trained.
1.
2.
strongly agree
agree
582
362
94%
3.
undecided
4%
4%
4.
disagree
1%
2%
5.
strongly disagree
agree
undecided
disagree
1%
b. In my opinion, the polygraph as used by NSA is important to protect the
security of the Agency.
74%
19%
7%
1.
2.
3.
4. disagree 52
5. strongly disagree
strongly agree
382
agree
36%
undecided
19%
agree
undecided
disagree
2%
c. If for future reasons, I were asked to volunteer for another polygraph
examination, I would:
1. be willing
2. undecided
3. refuse
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1.5.3 Surveys in Law Enforcement and Commerce
The Washoe County Sheriff's Department (Reno, Nevada) surveyed 85 applicants
after their preemployment polygraph examinations. The results were tabulated
(Putnam 1978) according to the responses to these questions:
1. Were you in any manner embarrassed, humiliated, or degraded by any
part of the polygraph examination process? No: 92.9% (rm79), Yes: 7.1% (n...6).
2. In your opinion, was there any objectionable or unwarranted invasion
of your privacy during the conduct of the polygraph examination? No: 100% (n..85).
3. Should you be hired, do you believe you will be more secure and
comfortable in your work knowing the polygraph is used in personnel evaluation?
Yes: 97.6% (n..83), No: 1.2% (n..1), no opinion: 1.2% (111).
Several very similar surveys of subjects of commercial screening have been made
in recent years. Dr. B. A. Silverberg of Canada conducted three surveys of the
subjects of polygraph examinations in 1980 asking the same questions used earlier
in surveys by Ash (1973) and Buckley (1980). The questions were used again
recently by Phannenstill (1983). A table shows the results of the six surveys.
The answers which are other than the one listed for each item are mostly the
Opposite, but there are also a few unclear replies, or no answers at all to that
item.
SURVEYS OF EXAMINEES OF COMMERCIAL TESTING
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1.6 QUALITY CONTROL
1.6.1 Selection and Training
The quality control program within the Department of Defense begins with a
detailed selection process of applicants for polygraph training. By regulation all
applicants must be trained investigators with a minimum of two years Federal
Government investigative experience and possess a baccalaureate degree. Applicants
must also be a U.S. citizen, 25 years of age who have been the subject of a Special
Background Investigation. The culminating application procedure has the qualified
applicant undergo a suitability and familarization polygraph examination prior to
final selection. Polygraph training is always on a voluntary basis. Most
important, agencies are careful to select only those agents who have demonstrated
mature investigative and personal attitudes. Examiners must be able to conduct low
key interviews as well as intense interrogations. They must be highly professional
investigators who get along well with subordinates and superiors, as well as
suspects, witnesses and victims.
The basic examiner training is accomplished at the Army Polygraph School, Fort
McClellan, Alabama. This course is 12 weeks in length. The examiner learns
various test techniques and receives instruction in psychology, physiology,
pharmacology, semantics, and polygraph instrumentation procedures. Each trainee
conducts at least of 45 to 50 practical exercise examinations prior to graduation.
After graduation each examiner serves a six to twelve month internship under the
direct supervision by a certified examiner of his respective agency.*
In 1965 DoD initiated research to establish the validity of polygraph
techniques and sought a means of monitoring field polygraph operations by having a
qualified polygraph examiner conduct a "blind" analysis of the polygraph charts and
allied documentation of another examiner. After a comprehensive study, it was
concluded that blind analysis was a valid concept which would increase the quality
of polygraph examinations. This concept led to the polygraph quality control
programs now existing throughout the DoD. Under the quality control concept,
supervisory polygraph quality control examiners, generally located at the
headquarters level, review every polygraph examination conducted within their
respective agencies. The review begins with a "blind" analysis of all polygrams
collected by the field examiner. Once the "blind" analysis is performed, the
reviewer then checks all related documents for correctness, completeness and
technical accuracy. The specific areas reviewed are pretest interview, test
construction, question formulation, chart patterns, chart markings, timing of
questions, post?test interrogation, length of examination, and the polygraph
report. Any notes, examiner comments and written admissions are analyzed and
compared to the information contained in the formal report. The formal report is
also checked for grammatical correctness and format prior to final approval.
*NSA examiners take another two weeks of formal instruction in
counterintelligence screening techniques before beginning their internship. NSA
always includes students and experienced examiners from other DoD agencies in their
course whenever requested; and on a space available basis. NSA trains examiners
from other federal agencies.
At NSA, every case is completely tape recorded. In all cases where the subject
of the interview has made admissions which will be reported and will require
evaluation prior to granting clearance and access, the examiner reviews with the
subject, in precise detail, the contents of his notes. While doing that, he makes
an additional recording with a cassette recorder In full view of the subject, and
has the subject audibly acknowledge the accuracy of his notes on each topic as it
is covered. When the supervisor reads the examiner's report he must listen to this
summary tape and certify on the report that the accuracy of the report has been
verified by listening to the recording.
All Air Force counterintelligence/security examinations are audio and video
recorded. Similarly, review of the audio and video tapes of these examinations by
polygraph supervisors provides a detailed quality control check. In criminal
cases, and specific issue cases, it is customary to take a witnessed, signed, sworn
statement covering all admissions/confessions. A written statement containing a
subject's admission/confession is documented in the final report as well as any
refusal to undergo further questioning or polygraph testing.
Each agency keeps independent statistics and oher personal information on the
professional attributes, training qualifications and performance of each examiner.
If an examiner's proficiency is found to be falling below accepted standards,
supervisor determines if the problem is the result of an atypical series of cases,
or a change in the examiner's methodology. Methodology changes are discussed with
the examiner and, when appropriate, corrective action is taken.
Advanced training of at least one week or more is required once every two years
for all Don polygraph examiners. In addition, examiners generally receive several
days of advanced training throughout each year by attending state and national
polygraph association meetings and seminars. Advanced training is an integral part
of the quality control program within the Federal Government as it assures the
continuing professional development of each examiner.
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1.7 US ARMY POLYGRAPH TRAINING FACILITY
The first use of the instrumental detection of deception was in World War I to
recover a stolen code book. The U. S. Army began using the modern polygraph during
World War II to screen German prisoners of war (POW) for post?war police
assignments. Use of the polygraph spread quickly into criminal and
counterintelligence investigations due to the success of the polygraph in resolving
the POW cases. Some Army agents received individual instruction in polygraph
techniques, and in 1948, the Army began sending special agents to the new Keeler
Institute, in Chicago, Illinois, the only polygraph school in existence at the
time. The Army's training needs soon exceeded the capacity of the Keeler
Institute. Therefore, in 1951 the Army established its own polygraph school and
attached it to the Military Police School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Initially, the
school was eight weeks in length and was used exclusively by the military services
and the U.S. Secret Service.
In 1964, as a result of the Moss Committee Hearings about the use of polygraph
in the federal government, the need for more extensive training was recognized and
the school was lengthened to 12 weeks. In 1969, the school was lengthened to 14
weeks in order to accommodate training requirements by military and federal
Intelligence agencies in the personnel security screening arena. As use of the
polygraph in the federal government increased, all federal investigative agencies,
except the CIA, began training their examiner personnel at the Army school. Three
agencies gave up their own training courses to take advantage of the Army training
In 1975, the Military Police School and the Polygraph School were moved to Fort
McClellan, Alabama. During 1980, to accommodate the increased training
requirements of the other federal agencies, the school was condensed to 12 weeks,
permitting an increase of sessions from three tb four classes per year.
Since the school's founding in 1951, the U.S. Army has trained over 2,000
military and federal civilian investigators to be polygraph examiners. Numerous
training requests are received each year from state and municipal police agencies.
While these requests cannot be accommodated in the basic training course,
occasionally spaces are provided to state and municipal examiners in the advanced
training course. The Defense Department plans to expand the Amy Polygraph
training facility to handle a maximum 18 students per class. Once expanded, the
Army may be able to be more responsive to state and municipal police agency
training requests.
There are two programs of instruction at the U.S. Army Polygraph School. The
primary program of instruction is the Basic Polygraph Examiner Training Course,
which is now twelve weeks in length and is conducted four times a year. Each class
consists of 12 students and the student to instructor ratio is 2 to 1. This ratio
provides the student with many hours of personal contact with qualified instructors
during the learning process. Further, each student conducts over 40 polygraph
examinations using a variety of testing techniques. This exposure to simulated
testing and the instruction in multiple testing techniques has established the Army
school as the leader in polygraph training.
The second program of instruction at the school is the Advanced Polygraph
Examiner Course, which is three weeks in length. It provides experienced examiners
with training in new instrumentation procedures and sophisticated testing
techniques. These lessons are then incorporated in comprehensive practical
exercises.
By regulation all DoD examiners must attend at least one advanced training
course every other year. In practice, all examiners are involved in several short
courses, seminars, and lectures every year, with a full course of a week or more at
least every other year. Many get a week or more of formal training every year.
Advanced courses used by DoD examiners are quite varied. Most commonly used are:
U. S. Army Advanced Course
Federal Interagency Polygraph Seminar
National Security Agency Advanced
Polygraph Screening Techniques Course
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Advanced Polygraph Studies Program
Delta College Polygraph Workshop
University of North Carolina Polygraph
Colloquium
University of Houston Advanced Polygraph
Seminar
University of Utah Polygraph Workshop
American Polygraph Association
Annual Seminar
3 weeks
1 week
2 weeks
4 weeks
1 week
1 week
1 week
1 week
1 week
In addition, most DoD examiners are active in a regional or state polygraph
association. These associations hold one or more weekend seminars each year, and a
few conduct lengthy training courses, often in conjunction with local
universities. Several of the courses above and some of the state associations
seminars offer college credits or continuing education units.
1.8 PRIMARY POLYGRAPH TESTING TECHNIQUES
The test formats taught at the Army Polygraph Training Facility include the
following:
1.8.1 Zone Comparison Technique (ZCT)
The ZCT was developed by Cleve Backster in 1960. The ZCT is a modification of
the control question concept developed in the 1940's and introduced two new
safeguards against errors and inconclusive results. The safeguards are referred to
as the sacrifice relevant and symptomatic questions. The sacrifice relevant
question allows for dissipation of excessive general nervous tension or undue
anxiety prior to the asking of the primary relevant questions. The symptomatic
question provides a means to identify outside issues extraneous to the test
issue(s) which may be of overwhelming significance to the examinee. Identification
of such issues aids the examiner in structuring a reliable test that is not
degraded by these external issues. The symptomatic question also helps the
examiner to properly word the relevant questions. Backster's ZCT was adopted by
the Army in 1961. It is the technique of preference for resolving criminal issues
which are limited or easily defined. The ZCT, as used by the Army, permits the
asking of questions pertaining to two primary issues in the body of the test. It
also has a "SKY" phase utilized on one or two charts which helps determine the
degree of the examinee's criminal knowledge, if any, of the primary relevant
issue. Because of its demonstrated accuracy (Bersh 1969), it has become one of the
most popular and widely used techniques in government law enforcement.
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1.8.2 Modified General Question Technique (MGQT)
The MGQT was adapted by the Army in 1956 from the 1953 Reid control question
test. It is the technique of preference in criminal investigation testing where
there are multiple issues within a singular case to be resolved, as it allows the
examiner to address primary involvement, secondary involvement, guilty knowledge
and evidence connecting issues. The MGQT is one of the more popular examination
formats in government law enforcement because of its flexibility. In addition to
being able to address multiple issues, examiners can shift the relevant questions
on one or more charts by collecting a mixed series questioning sequence. The
Army's MGQT utilizes control questions which are separated from the relevant issues
by time and/or place.
1.8.3 Relevant/Irrelevant (R/I)
The R/I techniques were developed in the 1920's and 1930's, and the Keeler
version became the first standardized polygraph question technique. R/I techniques
were used exclusively within the U. S. Government until 1956, when a control
question technique was introduced. R/I techniques are used extensively in
intelligence screening examinations and occasionally in criminal investigations.
R/I techniques in the government employ the use of irrelevant questions
interspersed among relevant questions, plus additional special purpose questions,
including one or more control questions. The R/I technique is the technique of
preference for people who decline to answer broad crime-related questions necessary
for the development of control questions as they are used in ZCT and MGQT, as well
as persons who are familiar with criminal polygraph testing procedures.
1.8.4 Peak of Tension (POT)
The POT was standardized by Leonarde Keeler in the 1930's and is used in
conjunction with virtually every type of testing technique known to polygraph.
Essentially, the POT is a guilty knowledge test where the examinee's knowledge of a
particular item within the overall testing issue can be detected. This test is
frequently used to find weapons, bodies, property, etc. In can be a known POT,
wherein the examiner and the guilty subject know the key item and the innocent
person does not, or a searching POT, where the key item is only known by the guilty
subject and not by the examiner.
1.8.5 Counterintelligence Screening Test (CIST)
The CIST is a general question test used to cover multiple issues pertaining to
intelligence or counterintelligence activity. If an examinee shows response to
relevant questions during the course of an examination, the issues to which the
examinee showed responses will be completely explored through the use of other
polygraph techniques or through interrogation. Each relevant question will be
asked at least three times.
1.8.6 Other Techniques
The technique described above are among the techniques utilized in the federal
government. There are a number of other techniques used in the law enforcement and
commercial polygraph field. Among the more popular are those developed by John E.
Reid, Richard O. Arther, and Lynn Marcy. Although some civilian schools teach
these techniques, there are other civilian schools which teach the Army techniques,
or teach both Army and other techniques. Government examiners are given
familiarization lectures on the more common other techniques so that they will
understand them; but they are not expected to use them.
CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH ON POLYGRAPH CRITERION VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY
2.1 FIELD STUDIES
Field studies have investigated both the validity and reliability of the
polygraph using various criteria. These studies typically use field model
polygraphs which record respiration, electrodermal activity, and cardiovascular
activity. Professional polygraph examiners are typically used, but they differ
widely in experience. Some examiners are still in internship training programs;
others have as much as 20 years of field experience. Field studies have used both
relevant-irrelevant and control-question techniques. A description of the
standardized formats appears in the Chapter on Utility.
The original examiner's decision of truth or deception is often a clinical
judgment based on information from physiological recordings, subject behavior, and
case facts, although some data on the numerical scoring of polygraph charts also
will be discussed. Most of the field studies suffer from significant
methodological problems.
Two types of studies will be discussed. First, studies investigating the
relationship between the examiner's decision and some criterion of truth or
deception will be presented as studies of polygraph criterion validity. All of
these studies use the clinical diagnosis of the original examiner to predict the
criteria. However, two of the studies (Berland and Raskin, 1978; Ginton, Daie,
Elaad and Ben-Shakhar, 1982) also use both numerical scoring by the original
examiners, and decisions of examiners not present during the test based on
numerical evaluation and chart scrutiny to predict truth or deception.
Second, studies investigating the relationship between the decisions of a blind
examiner and actual truth or deception using verified polygraph cases will be
discussed. Some of these studies have been used as evidence for polygraph
criterion validity and there are problems with this interpretation. The final
section focuses on the reliability of the polygraph examiner's decision.
2.2 FIELD STUDIES OF CRITERION VALIDITY
Field studies of criterion validity have used various criteria of ground
truth. Determination of ground truth is the major problem for such studies. The
ideal criterion is independent of the polygraph examiner decision of truth or
deception and accurately reflects subject guilt or innocence. If examiner decision
and the criteria are not independent, the accuracy of the polygraph in correctly
classifying innocent and guilty subjects will be reported as spuriously high.
However, most of the independent determinations of ground truth probably produce
spuriously low correct classification rates due to their nature. There is only one
study where the criterion is both independent and accurate (Ginton, et al. 1982).
This study will be discussed in detail at the end of this section.
Several studies have used the criterion of case disposition to assess toe
accuracy of the examiners' decision (Lyon, 1936; Peters, 1982; Edwards, 1981).
Case disposition as a criteria may be neither independent nor accurate. Lyon
(1936) determined the dispositions of randomly-selected cases involving 100
juvenile criminal suspects (81 boys and 19 girls over age 15). Twenty polygraph
tests were classified truthful and 80 were classified as deceptive. These cases
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were followed to determine if examiners' results were corroborated by- positive
evidence or confession. Only 40 cases could be verified. Seven cases classified
as truthful by the examiner were verified as truthful by additional evidence.
Thirty-three of the deceptive cases could be verified by confessions; some of the
confessions occurred immediately after the test. Thus, the examiner had correctly
classified all cases. Lyon, however, gives insufficient detail about the
verification procedure. Testing involved a unique procedure but was in the
relevant-irrelevant category. Respiration and cardiovascular activity were
recorded.
Peters (1982) reported on the disposition of 220 cases involving stipulated
polygraph examinations conducted at a state crime laboratory from 1976 to 1979.
Stipulation means that the prosecution, defense, and judge agree to admit results
of the polygraph examination into evidence with the examiner testifying and subject
to cross-examination, although the examiner actually testified about the subject's
truth or deception in only 11 cases. Control-question procedures and numerical
chart analysis (with an inconclusive range) were used. Of the initial 220
examinations, 25 were eliminated because they were inconclusive, 23 cases were
eliminated because the test could not be completed. The disposition of 100 cases
indicated that the subject was innocent or telling the truth (95 criminal suspects
had charges dropped, 1 criminal suspect was acquitted, and 4 victims or witnesses
were involved in trials where the accused was convicted). The polygraph examiner
had classified 88% of these cases as truthful. The disposition of 63 cases
indicated the subject was guilty or lying (10 criminal suspects were convicted at
trial, 51 pleaded guilty, and 2 alleged victims were involved in trials where the
accused was acquitted). The polygraph examiner had classified 981 of these cases
as deceptive. Six cases were pending and 3 cases had charges dropped with
conditions (these cases are not included in the correct classification figures).
Edwards (1981) surveyed licensed Virginia polygraph examiners to determine the
correspondence between polygraph examiner decisions and dispositions of case in
specific issue examinations. Only results from law enforcement examiners will be
discussed; the response rate for private firms was so low that it is meaningless.
Of the 2,433 polygraph examinations, 959 (594 guilty and 365 innocent) were
verified by means such as acquittal, conviction, confession, etc. The examiners
had correctly classified 99% of the guilty cases and 97.5% of the innocent cases.
Lack of independence between examiner decision and the criterion can occur in
several ways and it is impossible to determine the extent the nonindependence
influences the percentage of correct classifications. The examiner can influence
the trial process either by increasing the probability of conviction or that
charges are dropped. This is a particular problem in the Peters study involving
stipulated polygraph tests. Peters does mention that the examiner testified about
subject guilt or innocence in only 11 cases, but it is unclear the extent to which
the results of the polygraph test were influential in the decision to go to trial
or drop charges. Confession also is not independent of the polygraph examination.
Examiners usually interrogate only those showing physiological responses to
relevant questions. Thus, those showing no deceptive responses will be under less
pressure to confess. It also is possible to induce a false confession, although
that is extremely rare. Some researchers think the use of confession invalidates
the study, others think confession is acceptable as a criterion (see Horvath, 1971;
Lykken, 1981; Raskin and Podlesny, 1979).
Field studies using case disposition also are problematical because they report
data on a restricted sample. Typically, a large number of cases cannot be verified
and it is not clear if verified cases differ from unverified cases in the ease with
which an examiner can make a decision about the case. Horvath (1977) provides
preliminary data that verified and non-verified cases may be quite similar.
Two field studies have used panel judgments as the criterion to validate
polygraph examiner judgment (Bersh, 1969; Berland and Raskin, 1976). Berland and
Raskin (1976) is one of the studies Lykken (1979; 1981) cites in maintaining that
polygraph tests have a high rate of false positive errors.
Bersh (1969) investigated the reltionship between examiner judgment in criminal
investigations by the military services and unanimous guilt-innocence decisions by
a panel of four Judge Advocate General Attorneys who had complete access to case
files except for the polygraph examinations. Examiners also had access to a
subject's case file, but the author maintained the file was not complete and that
polygraph tests are only given when there is doubt about a person's guilt or
innocence. Cases were selected at random from 1963 to 1966 with some
restrictions. Cases involving confession by the subject and inconclusive judgments
by the examiner or the panel were eliminated. Cases were selected so that there
were similar numbers of deception and no deception examiner judgments and a mix of
zone comparison tests, Modified General Question Tests and relevant-irrelevant
tests. The first two formats are control question tests. However, Sarah grouped
the Modified General Question Test and the relevant-irrelevant test in reporting
the data. This was referred to as the General Question Test. Decisions by the
panel were unanimous in 157 cases. With the General Question Test group, the
examiner classified as deceptive 97% of the cases the panel judged as guilty, and
classified as truthful 90% of the cases the panel judged as innocent. With the
zone-comparison test, the examiner agreed with 90% of the cases the panel judged as
guilty and 94% of the cases the panel judged as innocent.
Harland and Raskin (1976) investigated the correspondence between polygraph
examiner decisions and panel decision (I judge, 2 prosecuting attorneys, 2 defense
attorneys) for 92 sequential independent cases involving criminal suspects. Panel
decisions were based on evidence collected by untrained investigators and the panel
had no knowledge of the outcome, of the polygraph examinations. Polygraph
examinations used control-question procedures. Panel decision was based on a
numerical score by each panel member. The original examiner used field numerical
scoring techniques and made a clinical decision from both this and other (e.g.
subject's behavior) information.
The panel unanimously made decisions in the same direction in only 22 cases
(24%) so these data will not be discussed separately but are included among those
66 cases (72%) where the criterion was a majority of the panel making a decision in
the same direction. Among the 66 cases, 100% of the guilty subjects and 35.7% of
the innocent subjects were correctly classified (omitting inconclusives) by the
original examiner's clinical diagnosis. With the same criterion, original
examiner's numerical score correctly classified 100% of the guilty subjects and
27.3% of the innocent subjects (omitting inconclusives). Numerical scoring by an
independent examiner correctly classified 97.5% of the guilty subjects and 45.5% of
the innocent subjects.
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REFERENCES CITED
Most of the references cited in the text will be found in the abstracts
section. Those references which are not in the abstracts are listed below:
Ash, Philip. "Survey of Attitudes on the Polygraph." Polygraph 2(3)
(September 1973): 200-223.
Berland, Gordon H. "On the Accuracy of the Polygraph; an Evaluative
Review of Lykken's Tremor in the Blood." Polygraph 11(3) (September 1982):
258-272.
Beijk, J. "Experimental and Procedural Influences on Differential
Electrodermal Activity." Psychophysiology 17(3) (1980); 274-278.
Carlucci, Frank. Memorandum for Secretaries of Military Departments,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directors of Defense Agencies. Subject:
"Degradation of Operational Readiness/Mission accomplishment Due to Personnel
Security Investigative Shortfalls." 6 August 1982.
"A Comparison of Information Obtained during Military Interview Program
Interviews with that Obtained during Military Conversion Polygraph
Interviews." unpublished manuscript, National Security Agency, 1983.
Dawson, Michael E. "The Delayed Answer Test (DAT) and the Effects of
Countermeasures." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Polygraph Association, Las Vegas, August, 1977.
Dawson, Michael E. "Physiological Detection of Deception; Measurement of
Responses to Questions and Answers During Countermeasure Maneuvers."
Psychophysiology 17(1) (January 1980): 8-17.
Engel, B. T. "Stimulus-Response and Individual-Response Specificity."
Archives of General Psychiatry 2(1960): 305-313.
Garwood, M.; Engel, B. T.; and R. Capriotti. "Autonomic Nervous System
Functioning and Aging: Response Specificity." Psychophysiology 19(4)(1982):
378-385.
Gustafson, Lawrence A. and Orne, Martin T. "Effects of Heightened
Motivation on the Detection of Deception." Journal of Applied Psychology
47(1963): 408-411.
Gustafson, Lawrence A. and Orne, Martin T. "The Effect of 'Lying 'in 'Lie
Detection' Studies." Paper read at the 35th Annual Meeting of the Eastern
Psychological Association, April 17, 1964, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Gustafson, Lawrence A. and Orne, Martin T. "The Effects of Verbal
Responses on the Laboratory Detection of Deception." Psychophysiology
2(1)(1965): 10-13.
273
Heckel, R. V.; Brokaw, J. R.; Sulzberg, H. C. and Wiggins, S. L.
"Polygraph Variations in Reactivity Between Delusional, Non-Delusional, and
Control Groups in a 'Crime' Situation." Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology
and Police Science 53(3)(1962): 380-383.
Kugelmass, Sol and Lieblich, Israel. "Relation Between Ethnic Origin and
GSR Reactivity in Psychophysiological Dectection." Journal of Applied
Psychology 52(2)(1968): 158-162.
Kugelmass, Sol; Lieblich, Israel; Ben-Ishai, Akiva; Opatowski, Abraham and
Kaplan, Maier. "Experimental Evaluation of Galvanic Skin Response and Blood
Pressure Change Indices During Criminal Interrogation." Journal of Criminal
Law, Criminology and Police Science.
Lieblich, Israel. "Manipulation of Contrast Between Differential GSR
Responses Through the use of Ordered Tasks of Information Detection."
Psychophysiology 6(1)(1969): 70-77.
Lieblich, Israel; Kugelmass, Sol; and Ben-Shakar, Gershon. "Efficiency of
GSR Detection of Information as a Function of Stimulus Set Size."
Psychophysiology 6(5)(1970): 601-608.
Lieblich, Israel; Naftali, Gideon; Shmueli, Joseph and Kugelmass, Sol.
"Efficiency of GSR Detection of Information with Repeated Presentation of
Series of Stimuli in Two Motivational States." Journal of Applied Psychology
59(1)(1974): 113-115.
Lindsey, Robert. The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship
and Espionage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979.
Linehan, John G. "An Aspect of World War II Use of the Polygraph."
Polygraph 7(3)(September 1978): 233-239.
Lykken, David T. "The Detection of Deception." Psychological Bulletin
86(1)(1979): 47-53.
Lykken, David T. "The Psychopath and the Lie Detector." Psychophysiology
15(2)(1978): 137-142.
Lykken, David T. A Tremor in the Blood, Uses and Abuses of the Lie
Detector. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980.
MacNitt, Reginald D. "In Defense of the Electrodermal Response and
Cardiac Amplitude as Measures of Deception." Journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology and Police Science 33(1942): 266-275.
Marston, William Moulton. The Lie Detector Test. New York: R. R. Smith,
1938.
Miyake, Yoichi. "A Study of Skin Resistance Response,
Photoplythsmographic Vasomoter Response and Eye Movement as Indices of Lie
Detection." Reports of the National Institute of Police Science 31(2)(May
1978): 18-24.
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Ohkawa, Hisatsugi. "Comparison of Physiological Response of 'yes', 'no',
and 'mute' Conditions in Peak of Tension Test." Research Materials No. 21,
Polygraph Reports, National Institute of Police Science (1963): 1-4.
Orne, Martin T. "Implications of Laboratory Research for the Detection of
Deception." in N. Ansley (Ed.) Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph.
Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1975, pp. 114-116.
Phannenstill, Richard J. "The Polygraph Passes the Test." Security
Management 27(8)(August 1983): 58-60.
Podlesny, John A. and Raskin, David C. "Effectiveness of Techniques and
Physiological Measures in the Detection of Deception." Psychophysiology
15(4)(July 1978): 344-359.
Putnam, Richard L. "Polygraph Screening of Police Applicants: Necessity
or Abuse?" Polygraph 7(4)(December, 1978): 257-262.
"Security Interviews with the Aid of a Polygraph Compared to the Special
Background Investigation as Sources of Information." Unpublished manuscript,
National Security Agency, 1983.
Silverberg, Ben A. "Attitudes of Job Applicants Toward the Arther
Security Clearance Examination." Journal of Polygraph Science 14(6)(May-June,
1980): 1-4.
Silverberg, Ben A. "Attitudes of Job Applicants and Employees Toward the
Polygraph." Polygraph 9(3)(September, 1980): 162-169.
Silverberg, Ben A. "Employee Attitudes Toward Periodic Polygraph
Examination." Journal of Polygraph Science 15(4)(January-February, 1981):
1-4.
Statistical Study on the Use of the Polygraph as a Personnel Security
Screening Aid." Unpublished manuscript, National Security Agency, 1953.
Thatcher, Margaret. "Text of Prime Minister's Statement: Security
Commission Report on the Prime Case." 1982,
Trovillo, Paul V. "Report on a Survey of Methods of Operation and
Accomplishments of Russell Chatham, Inc. Polygraph Program at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee." Unpublished manuscript, April 14, 1951. 43 pp.
Mr. DOUGLAS GENE WILLIAMS. My name is Douglas Gene Wil-
liams, and I plead guilty to crimes against humanity. I was a right-
wing terrorist. I tortured thousands of people, documented more
forced confessions than most Gestapo agents, violated countless
constitutional rights, and had absolutely no regard for human dig-
nity.
I was often rewarded for my skillful use of terrorism. There are
some truly grim stories behind those official letters of commenda-
tion I earned as a police detective sergeant.
I was a highly trained, well-equipped terrorist agent. My special-
ty was psychological trauma and my weapon was the lie detector.
I am here today to try to undo some of the damage I have done
by telling the truth about the lie detector.
The polygraph has been cloaked in shady scientific jargon for
over 50 years. Lie detector operators claim an accuracy rate of 96
to 98 percent. It has been endorsed by such bastions of journalism
and law as F. Lee Bailey and Jack Anderson. The polygraph has
received media validation on a national level. The polygraph has
developed into a multibillion dollar business since its invention in
the late 1920's, and it is now the longest running con game in the
history of this country.
The polygraph is not a lie detector and it is not a truth verifier.
The polygraph is simply a crude reaction recorder, and the reac-
tions it records can be indicative of just about anything. Anything
except deception. Let me share with you how the polygraph works,
and, incidentally, I have a machine here with me if anyone wants a
demonstration.
Please look at this exhibit A?correction?B. That is what the
polygraph actually records. I think you have been supplied with
these. What we have here is a machine that can watch you
breathe, watch two fingers on your right hand sweat, and watch
your heartbeat. That is all the machine is capable of recording.
During the test the examiner will ask a series of questions and
watch for any changes in your breathing, perspiration, and blood
pressure. These changes are called reactions.
A casual look at this diagram shows a person's breathing has
become erratic, blood pressure is elevated, and the hands are
sweating. Does this mean the person is lying? Although it is absurd
to come to this conclusion based on such flimsy evidence, that reac-
tion is what polygraph operators refer to as indicative of deception,
and that reaction has been the start of many tear-jerking sob sto-
ries because that reaction does, in fact, mean you have lied.
I would submit that this exact same lying reaction can be caused
by many things other than a lie. As a matter of fact, any number
of innocent stimuli can and do cause this exact reaction?fear,
rage, embarrassment, a phone ringing, hanging from the cardio
cuff, and even the tone of the examiner's voice.
The validity of the lie detector is based on a phony set of 50-year-
old pseudo-scientific principles. And even polygraph experts do not
have the temerity to refer to the polygraph as a lie detector, prefer-
ring words like "investigatory tool" instead. It is certainly a tool,
or more correctly, a psychological billy club which allows even the
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