STAFF REPORT SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00530R000500970003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCEDURES IN
THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
STAFF REPORT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 1979
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
51-417 WASHINGTON: 1979
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PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(Established by H. Res. 658, 95th Congress, 1st session)
EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts, Chairman
CLEMENT I. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia
BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri JOHN M. ASHB ROOK, Ohio
MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois ROBERT McCLORY, Illinois
LES ASPIN, Wisconsin G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST, Virginia
CHARLES ROSE, North Carolina C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky
NORMAN Y. MINETA, California
WYCFIE FOWLER, JR., Georgia
THOMAS K. LATIMER, Staff Director
MICHAEL J. O'NEIL, Chief Counsel
PATRICK G. LONG, ASSOCiate Counsel
JEANNE M. MCNALLY, Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
LES ASPIN, Wisconsin, Chairman
CHARLES ROSE, North Carolina
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky
EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts
LEON S. FIIERTH, Professional Staff Member
RICHARD D. ANDERSON, Jr., Professional Staff Member
G. ELIZABETH KEYES, Professional Staff Member
PATRICIA GARBER, Secretary
JOHN M. ASHBROOK, Ohio
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
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CONTENTS
Page
1
3
I
Introduction
Authorities, Procedures and Organization
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of State
6,
Department of Defense
8
National Security Agency
11
Defense Intelligence Agency
12
Problems and Recommendations
13
CHARTS
I?State Department?Statistics on SCI Clearances
8
II?Department of Defense?Statistics on SCI Clearances
13
III?National Security Agency?Statistics on SCI Clearances
13
IV?Summary of the Similarities and Differences for Gaining SCI Access
in the Intelligence Community
14
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A-Executive Order 10450_
21
APPENDIX B-DCID 1/14
25.
APPENDIX C-Public Law 88-290
30
APPENDIX D-Testimony by the FBI concerning domestic security
investigations
32
LIST OF WITNESSES
WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1979
Karl D. Ackerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State.
Robert Gambino, Director, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency.
THURSDAY, MAY 17, 1979
Thomas J. O'Brien, Director for Security Plans and Programs, Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Review, Department of Defense.
Col. Karl V. Haendle, Assistant Deputy Director for Security Services, Defense
Intelligence Agency.
Arthur Mathisen, Assistant Deputy Director for Management Services, Na-
tional Security Agency.
THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1979
Gordon H. Barland, Ph. D., American Polygraph Association.
Jeremiah S. Gutman, New York attorney, representing the American Civil
Liberties Union.
Jack Blake, recently retired Acting Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Ray Cline, Executive Director, World Power Studies at Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
THURSDAY, TUNE 21, 1979
Daniel P. Jaffe, Assistant Attorney General, Department of the Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Thomas J. O'Brien, Director for Security Plans and Programs, Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Review, Department of Defense.
Bernard J. O'Donnell, Director, Defense Investigative Service, Department of
Defense.
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Harry W. Bratt, Director, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics
Service, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice.
Helen Lessin, Office of General Counsel, LEAA, Department of Justice.
Carol Kaplan, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service,
Department of Justice.
Donald T. Perrine,-Assistant Section-Chief, Document Classification and Review
Section, Records Management-Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Gary Stoops, Loyalty and Applicants Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Lawrence Lawler, Section Chief, National Criminal Information Section, Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Conrad Banner, Deputy Assistant Director, Identification Section, Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Paul Nugent, Terrorism Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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INTRODUCTION
The Oversight Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence has recently completed an in-depth study of
security clearance procedures used by the Central Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, the Department of State, and the De-
partment of Defense. This effort was specially focused on procedures
used to screen applicants for access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI)?a particularly delicate and important category
of intelligence data.
The subcommittee's interest in this area grew out of the recent
proliferation of unathorized disclosures and incidents of espionage,
involving members of the intelligence community or persons who were
otherwise authorized access to intelligence information. Given the
failure of the clearance and screening process to work in such well-
publicized instances as the case of William Kampiles,1 the sub-
committee believed it would be useful to examine the system and to
determine whether it is working effectively.
The obvious bottom line of any personnel security system is that it
must be able to support reasonable determinations that hiring persons
for intelligence work, or grantinc,b employees of the Federal Govern-
ment (or its contractors) access to SCI is consistent with the national
security. Based on the results of its investigation, the subcommittee
believes that the screening process cannot presently meet uniform
high standards in this regard. The subcommittee notes a number of
factors which contribute to this conclusion:
Although the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is in theory
(and in law) generally responsible for protecting intelligence sources
and methods, this function is in fact diffused among a number of
agencies.
Clearance procedures and philosophies differ widely among, and
sometimes even within these agencies. There are, for example, ma,or
variations in the use of and attitudes towards the polygraph.
Cuts in manpower have placed pressure on investigative procedure
and standards, and put a premium on efficient procedure and
organization.2
Investigative branches report increasing difficulty in compiling
adequate data bases from the FBI and other sources. A major problem
appears to be inadequate access to criminal justice records.
I Kampiles, a former employee of the CIA, was convicted of espionage in 1978 for selling a classified docu-
ment to the Soviets.
2 DoD alone processed more than 100,000 persons for clearance last year. It should be noted that literally
thousands of SCI clearances are held by employees of nonintelligence agencies. Although the subcommittee
has not yet pursued this area, we do know that CIA and NSA account for the granting of about 2,500o1 these.
(Still other nonintelligence agencies grant their own SCI clearances. The Department of Justice for example
grants SCI access and notifies the DCI after the fact.)
(1)
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AUTHORITIES, PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION
SECTION I: THE FRAMEWORK OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is authorized to conduct
background investigations of prospective and current employees of
the CIA by the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of
1949. Both acts prescribe the establishment of programs and pro-
cedures for the protection of national security sources, methods and
data.
Concern over revelations of Communist penetration of the U.S.
Government in the late 1940's and early 1950's led to the publication
of Executive Order 10450 25 (April 27, 1953) which established a
security investigation program for the entire government. Executive
Order 10450 remains the basis for security background investigations
of government employees. The criteria and standards established in
that Executive Order are still adhered to by all government agencies.
Executive Order 12036 (January 24, 1978) directs that
The CIA shall protect the security of its installations, activities, information
and personnel by appropriate means including such investigations of applicants,
employees, contractors and other persons with similar associations with the CIA
as are necessary. (1.811)
Executive Order 12036 also spells out the DCI's broader responsi-
bility for setting clearance standards for the entire intelligence
community.' Within this framework, the DCI has defined specific
requirements that must be satisfied before access should be granted to
SCI. These can be found in the Director of Central Intelligence
Directive (DCID) 1/14 4 which sets forth "minimum personnel
security standards and procedures governing eligibility for access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)."
On the other hand, however, Executive Order 12036 also provides
that
All Foreign Intelligence Agencies (CIA, NSA, DIA, etc.) are authorized to
conduct their own investigations of present, former or prospective employees as
deemed necessary in the interest of national security (2.208(c)).
Given this latitude, each intelligence agency therefore maintains
its own program for investigation, clearance and employment. In
addition, a number of other departments and agencies conduct back-
ground investigations under Executive Order 10450; for example,
the Office of 'Personnel Management (formerly the Civil Service
Commission), the State Department and the Defense Department.
The major screening programs are discussed below.
2. See appendix A.
3 The DCI shall "Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community, of common security and
access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information and products." (1.601
(0)
See appendix B.
(3)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CIA's security clearance procedures appear to be the most compre-
hensive and stringent in the intelligence community.
Once a detailed personal history statement has been filed, a full field
background investigation of each applicant begins, based on the cri-
teria established in Executive Order 10450 and DCID 1/14. According
to the testimony of Robert Gambino, Director of Security at CIA, the
purpose of this background investigation is to establish the applicant's
identity and to determine that he or she is of unquestionable loyalty,
excellent character, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness.5
A National Agency Check (NAC) is the first step of the full field
background investigation. The NAC consists of a review of holdings
'Which may be on file at the following federal agencies:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation;
The Office of Personnel Management ((OMP), formerly Civil
Service Commission) ;
The Defense Central Indices of Investigation; and Coast
Guard Intelligence, Department of Transportation, if the appli-
?cant has served in the military;
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), if the
applicant is an alien immigrant;
The State Department's passport files, to cover foreign travel;
and other federal agencies as appropriate.
When the NAC uncovers a problem, CIA's Office of Security sum-
mons an applicant for a personal interview. Such interviews are not
routine; they take place only if the NAC indicates that an applicant
may have a problem meeting CIA security standards.
CIA's background investigation encompasses the last 15 years of an
applicant's life or the years from his 17th birthday, whichever period
is shorter. Identity is established through birth records, verification of
parentage and citizenship. Investigators examine the applicant's
education, employment, and residences and conduct neighborhood
checks, criminal justice information checks and credit checks. A
minimum of five character references must be interviewed with a view
toward establishing the habits, loyalty and morals of the individual.
Both positive and negative information must be taken into account
Material from the background investigation in the field is passed to
CIA "appraisers" for evaluation. CIA's appraisal process categorizes
problems under two headings: suitability and security. Suitability
problems are processed by CIA's Applicant Review Panel (ARP),
comprising 4 members: one from the Office of Personnel, one from the
Office of Security, one from the Office of Medical Services and one
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Office. Each panel member
reviews a case individually and offers a separate evaluation to the
Director of Personnel. Final decision on whether to accept or reject
an applicant on suitability grounds is exercised by the Director of
Personnel.
Security problems, on the other hand, are dealt with through an
"adjudicative process". Should an appraiser's recommendation be
negative on security grounds, the case is referred through a chain of
experienced senior security officers. If their recommendation is nega-
tive, the case then goes to the Director of Security, who alone can
'"Security Clearance Procedures", Transcript, May 16, 1979.
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disapprove an applicant on security grounds. (The DCI has delegated
this power to the Director. of Security; however, the DCI maintains
the power to overrule any decision made at that level.)
There are several suitability and security factors which would cause
the automatic disqualification of an applicant. According to Mr.
Gambino's testimony,' the following might be reasons for rejection on
grounds of suitability: (1) emotional instability and immaturity;
(2) personality idiosyncracies; (3) limited mental capacity/scholar-
ship deficiencies; (4) physical impairments; (5) limitations preclud-
ing adapability and flexibility; (6) poor employment record; (7)
financial irresponsibility; (8) alcohol abuse; and (9) marital difficulties.
The following would be considered disqualifying data in the security
area: (1) illegal use of drugs; (2) thievery; (3) homosexuality,. and
(4) gross character deficiencies. Any characteristic clearly outside the
criteria established by Executive Order 10450 or DCID 1/14 is suffi-
cient reason for immediate rejection of any applicant case.
If no problems arise in the background investigation, or if adjudica-
tion has resolved any uncertainty, the applicant next submits to a
physical exam and psychiatric screening. The psychiatric screening
consists of a battery of tests designed to measure the candidate's
professional flexibility, stress level, and reactions to pressure in the
hope of identifying problems he or she might have as an employee of
the Agency.' If there is an indication of abnormality, the candidate
would be referred to a psychiatrist for an interview.
As the final step in the clearance process, all applicants for employ-
ment at the CIA are subject to a polygraph examination. CIA uses the
polygraph to supplement and/or cross-check information developed by
the background investigation. Questions asked during the examination
are standard, with problem areas discussed beforehand. No set of
questions is ever asked just once. Examiners look for repeated reac-
tions; a single atypical reading cannot be used as evidence of lying or
concealed problems. Control questions are used for comparison. During
the exam, if the polygraph operator notes an abnormality, (repeated
reaction to a particular area of inquiry), he will concentrate on this
until it can be cleared up; there is no time limit on the exam.
Polygraph operators do not judge applicants; their function is to
collect information and report it to apprasisers for evaluation. When
security problems are revealed by the polygraph, the case must go
back through CIA's adjudication process. Despite extensive use of the
polygraph, CIA stresses that applicants are looked at from the "total
person' standpoint, with the polygraph serving as an adjunct to this
effort.
Ten percent (10 percent) of all CIA applicants are turned down for
security reasons; 3 to 5 percent are turned down for suitability reasons.
Of the ten percent (10 percent) security turndowns, twenty-four point
five percent (24.5 percent) are turned down based on the background
investigation alone; seventy-five percent (75 percent) are rejected on
the basis of information derived from the polygraph, or the combina-
tion of polygraph results and the background investigation.'
Ibid.
7 CIA also uses psychological assessment designed to match the skills of the subject with particular assign..
ments.
it should be noted here, that because of the psychological effect the polygraph has on some of those being
examined, a substantial number of revelations and admissions are volunteered prior to the actual testing.
DoD and State, which do not use polygraph, believe that the same information can be obtained through a
well-conducted personal interview without the aid of a polygraph. This raises the question, discussed below
of whether the polygraph is in fact indispensable or merely one of several alternative screening tools.
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The polygraph can be waived for reasons of: inconclusive heart
patterns, pregnancy, and physical disability. Waivers for other reasons
must come from the DCI. If a subject refuses the exam on religious,
moral or any other grounds, the polygrapher sends a statement with
the reason to Security; polygraph examiners make no recommendation
but report only the simple statement of fact. Admiral Turner recently
granted two exceptions involving the polygraph: one for an applicant
who took the polygraph but "did badly"; one for an applicant who
refused the polygraph on moral grounds.
Every CIA employee is subject to reinvestigation at five year
intervals. Reinvestigation consists of a neighborhood check, a police
check, interviews with current and former supervisors and coworkers,
and a polygraph. The polygraph questions at this time focus on
counterintelligence issues. Repolygraphing is seen as a deterrent and
as a way to detect security breaches.9
According to the CIA, when a "security allegation" or "special
issue" involving an employee is raised, the polygraph clears people as
often as it brings about an admission. Confession of a violation may
lead to disciplinary action or termination of employment.
Finally, under CIA policy, contractors, military personnel and all
people needing "stall-like access" 10 to the CIA go through the same
clearance procedures as all other employees.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The Foreign Service Act of 1946 provides basic legal authority to
establish procedures for determining the loyalty of Foreign Service
Officer candidates. The State Department also draws authority for
performing background investigations on prospective employees from
Executive Order 10450, Executive Order 11652 and Executive Order
10865, all of which state that no person shall be given access to
classified information and materials unless that person has been
determined to be trustworthy and that his or her employment is
clearly consistent with the national security.
After filino?6 Standard Form 86 h1(personal history statement),
prospective employees are interviewed in depth" by State Depart-
ment security investigators. Investigators explain the standards which
must be met to gain a clearance at the State Department. Questions
are designed to be "deeply probing" so that the investigator may
develop an understanding of the candidate. Interviewers first verify
and clarify all information provided in the personal history statement.
Applicants are then asked if there is anything in their background
which, if revealed during the investigation, might conflict with the
criteria for clearance. Interviewers aim to develop information to
supplement the personal history statement, as an aid to a more
accurate and thorough investigation.
9 The subcommittee has determined that while CIA policy is, and has been, to reinvestigate employees
every five years, such reinvestigations were for some time not conducted for the majority of employees, due
to the pressure of other responsibilities on the staff of the Office of Security. In the wake of the Moore case,
however, the five year requirement was again put into practical force. (Edwin Moore, a former employee of
the CIA, was convicted of espionage in 1977, for attempting to transmit national defense information to the
Soviets.)
19 "staff-like access"?Term applied to persons needing unescorted entry to CIA's buildings in order to do
their job.
11 This is the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) standard application "Security Investigation Data
for Sensitive Position":
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The next step in the screening process is a medical examination.
There is no pre-employment psychiatric screening or psychological
assessment at State. After the medical, a full field background in-
vestigation begins. This investigation goes back 7 years or from an
individual's 18th birthday, whichever period is shorter. State has its
own security staff to conduct these investigations. There are ap-
proximately 450 professional level security agents in the State Depart-
ment. However, in addition to security investigations, this staff
is also charged with the protection of foreign diplomats.
The Department of State's approach to background investigations
is on the principle that mere absence of disqualifying information is
insufficient:
There must be enough known positively about the indivudial * * * to conclude
that he or she can be trusted with the responsibilities of more than routine con-
sequence to the nation * * *. It is the purpose of the background investigation to
acquire the information necessary and relevant to such a determination."
Karl Ackerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security at State,
told the subcommittee that:
Our investigative objective includes determining the individual's identity,
establishing the continuity of his or her claimed background and activities, and
acquiring sufficient information to permit a reasonable conclusion to the individual's
loyalty, character, integrity and trustworthiness.13 (italic added).
Most positions at State fall into what is known as the "critical-
sensitive" category. The standard investigation for "critical-sensitive"
positions at State is based on the criteria established in Executive
Order 10450. For "critical-sensitive" positions, State believes that
seven years' background is adequate. If, however, a SCI clearance is
wanted, the investigation expands to cover the full fifteen-year
minimum requirement of DCID 1/14. Both the standard investigation
and the investigation for access to SCI are essentially the same except
for the time element involved.
State's standard full field investigation consists of a National Agency
Check (NAC), followed by verification of birth and citizenship. An
applicant's education records will be checked if they fall within the
seven year investigative period. If an applicant's education does not
fall within the seven year period being checked, the highest level of
education attained above high school must be verified. An applicant's
employment for the last seven years is investigated, including an
interview with the current employer. Any military service of a pro-
spective employee is always checked whether or not it falls within
the seven year investigative period. A minimum of four character
references must be interviewed: two listed by the applicant and two
developed by the investigator.
Neighborhood checks are used to verify the applicant's current
address, as well as any other residences exceeding six months in
duration over the last two years. Other addresses are verified when
possible through education and employment checks. Both credit
records and police records are investigated. State and Defense De-
partment (see below) regard law enforcement records as their most
productive and effective source of information. Both agencies note
difficulties in gaining what they consider adequate access to criminal
justice information.
Office of Security Instructions and Procedures, Volume 2, "Investigations", (412.1) Department of State.
la " Security Clearance Procedures," transcript, May 16, 1979.
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- Information from the background investigation is compiled and
sent to the Chief of the State Department's Evaluation Branch,
where an analysis- of the case is prepared and a recommendation is
formulated. In the event of a negative recommendation on suitability
grounds, the applicant's file is sent to State's Applicant Review
Panel, comprising: the Chief of Evaluation, the Medical Advisor,
and a member of the Office of Personnel. Most rejections at State
are, in fact, on grounds of suitability rather than security. If enough
adverse data is collected, on an individual to warrant the case going
before the Applicant Review Panel, the applicant is usually reinter-
viewed. Moreover, if the Applicant Review Panel recommends in
favor of an applicant, but State's Office of Security disagrees, it will
notify the Panel that although the subject is suitable he or she cannot
be granted a security clearance, whereupon the case is closed. When
a final negative decision is made, the applicant is informed in writing
as to why employment and/or clearance has been denied. Where
access to SCI is concerned, the Senior Intelligence Officer in State's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research makes all final decisions. In
calendar year (CY) 78, 746 SCI cases were adjudicated, of which
three were denied.14 There is no formal applicant appeal process.
Sensitive Compartmented clearances at State are revalidated at
least every five years in a procedure which involves a review of the
employee's security file, an internal name check and name checks
with local authorities, and an update of biographic data. Revalidation
does not involve reinvestigation unless information has been developed
which requires follow-up. David McCabe, State Department Assistant
Director for Personnel and Investigations, testified that there is no
instance where revalidation has led state to cancel an SCI clearance.15
If problems are discovered at this time or during the interim between
initial employment and revalidation, the subject may be moved to a
less sensitive position. Meanwhile, the employee may retain access to
classified materials other than SCI.
The State Department makes only very limited use of the polygraph
and does not use it as a preemployment screening device. State
asserts that the procedure would be of little value for its purpose.
Routine use of the polygraph is not essential to an effective clearance program
and that * * * current procedures do, in fact, serve the personnel security needs
of the Department wel1.16
CHART I
STATE?STATISTICS ON SCI CLEARANCES
Adjudicated Denied Granted SCI Revoked
Calendar year 1977
725
3
722
Calendar year 1978
. 746
3
743
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The Department of Defense has a centralized office to conduct its
background investigations?the Defense Investigative Service (DIS).
14 See Chart 1.
" "Security Clearance Procedures," transcript, May 16. 1979.
"Additional remarks submitted for May 16, 1979 record, Department of Stats;
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, DIS is authorized by DoD Directive 5105.42 to conduct preem-
ployment personnel security inveStigations for the entire department.
However, DIS, in turn, services a number of agencies '7 within DoD
which, all apply their own methods and procedures to determine
whether or not to grant clearances.
DoD has three clearance categories: Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) ; Collateral/Top Secret; and Contractor/Confi-
dential. Applicants for employment at D.oD are cleared for specific
kinds- of intelligence access by investigative procedures varying ac-
cording to the type of clearance. For SCI, the DIS conducts a Special
Background Investigation (SBI) ; for Collateral/Top Secret, the DIS
conducts a Background Investigation (BI).
Background Investigations, per DoD Directive 5210.8, cover the
last five years of the applicant's life or from his 18th birthday, which-
ever is shorter. BI's are designed to lead to a determination that em-
ployment of a person is clearly consistent with national security. Suc-
cessful completion and favorable adjudication permits an applicant
to be cleared at the Collateral/TS level.
A BI includes a National Agency Check (NAC), verification of
birth and citizenship, a check on college education and full time em-
ployment within the five year scope of the investigation, a check of
local criminal justice records and, in the near future, will also include
a credit check. BI's do not include neighborhood checks. However, the
BI procedure requires DIS investigators to develop and personally
interview three character references. These references must have suffi-
cient knowledge of the applicant to comment intelligently on his
background, suitability and loyalty. Foreign travel for more than 90
days within the investigation period is examined, and extensive in-
quiries are made when an applicant has foreign connections. If any
negative information is developed during a Background Investigation,
' the BI must expand automatically to cover a full 15 years.
The Special Background Investigation (SBI) conforms to minimum
investigative requirements prescribed by Executive Order 10450 and
DCID1/14. Successful completion and favorable adjudication result
in a clearance for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).
SBI's cover the last 15 years of applicants' lives, including all those
points needed for a BI. In addition, the SBI includes a neighborhood
check and a credit check.
DIS requires verification of all residences for a period of 6 months or
more during the past 5 years. The investigator tries to interview at
least two neighbors who have enough knowledge of the applicant to
comment on his suitability for a senstive position.
Credit bureau checks go back 5 years. When credit bureau records
are not available, credit references must be interviewed. Points of
concern are financial responsibility and/or any unexplained affluence.
Persons entering military service enlist for specific Military Oc-
cupational Specialities (MOS). After such persons have been niter-
viewed for enlistment and tested for aptitude, they are .' !):iven a security
interview. At this point, approximately 60 percent of those wh
would be intellectually qualified for 'positions involving access to
intelligence data are dismissed from further consideration. During
17 This includes the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Army,
Navy and Air Force.
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basic training, candidates for security clearance file a Statement of
Personal History (DD 398). A prenomination interview is held and
the person is examined again from a security standpoint. This process
eliminates another 12 percent. Special Background Investigations
(SBI) begin at this point for those who have favorably completed
processing.
DoD's screening process for civilians is much the same as for the
military. Civilian applicants are first interviewed for employment
qualifications, and are informed at this point that a background
investigation will be needed. Applicants file Standard Form 171 and
DD 398, Statement of Personal History-, and then are called for a pre-
employment security interview. interview. The interview determines if there
is any automatically disqualifying information about the applicant.
Any information clearly outside the guidelines of DCID 1/14 elimi-
nates the applicant for SCI but not necessarily for other types of
clearance. It is exceptional for a person to be eliminated at this
point; ordinarily the prenomination interview leads to an SBI.
Under Executive Order 10865, the Department of Defense adminis-
ters an industrial security (i.e., contractors) program for DoD, its
agencies (NSA, DIA), and 15 other departments and agencies of the
government. When a contract requiring SCI clearance is to
be awarded, DoD investigates the management and key officials
of the company in question. Foreign ownership, control or influence
will disqualify a company. If all is well, the contracting agency will
instruct DIS to conduct an SBI based on Executive Order 10450 and
DCID 1/14. There are approximately 13,000 SCI-cleared contractors
currently associated with DoD, and there are 1 2 million contractor
clearances of all kinds. For contractors who need Top Secret access,
DIS will also do a background investigation; for Secret and Con-
fidential access, a National Agency Check (NAC) is conducted.
There is also a program of "company-confidential" clearances, whereby
the contractor is authorized to grant employees access to confidential
materials.
r In 1974, the DIS suffered a 25 percent appropriations cut, causing
5, a reduction in the DIS work force from 3,000 to 1,800 spaces. After
further cuts, DIS now has approximately 1,000 positions with 860
agents in the field. These agents conducted 120,000 BI's in calendar
year 1978.
Prior to 1974, DIS routinely covered a 15-year period for all back-
ground investigations. Because of its manpower losses, DIS now re-
quires that only the Special Background Investigation for access to
SCI must cover 15 years. Requirements for other clearances. were
reexamined, coverage diminished and reporting standards abridged.
For example, under a "no news is good news" approach, favorable
information about an individual is written up in very summary
fashion; only negative data is developed and reported in detail.
Both DIA and NSA have criticized background information they
are obtaining from DIS. Col. Carl V. Haendle of the DIA stated
during testimony on May 17, that:
From the standpoint of those who have to adjudicate investigations and make
decisions as to whether an individual has access to Sensitive Compartmented In-
formation, I am less than pleased with the information that we have to make that
decision on.18
" Transcript, "Security Clearance Procedures", may 17, 1979.
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Mr. Arthur Mathisen of the NSA expressed these same sentiments.
If we are going to make affirmative findings regarding people that are very im-
portant in their lives and to the Agency, we really need data to put everything
in context. We need information that is positive about reliability and trustworthi-
ness and integrity, character, reputation. That is missing and makes the adjudica-
tion a difficult process to be fair."
Shortcomings in DIS' performance were underscored in 1978, when
it was learned that DIS had done the Special Background Investiga-
tion on an individual who had applied at DoD under an assumed
identity. The SBI failed to detect this and the individual was cleared
for SCI access. On another occasion, an Air Force enlistee was cleared
for access to "Secret" inforation, although it was later learned he had
been granted clearance under a false name. The Department of Defense
has initiated meetings between the producers and consumers of DIS
investigations. The subcommittee hopes that some of the issues high-
lighted during its hearings will be resolved, and looks forward to the
outcome of these meetings.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
As a result of hearings held by the House UnAmerican Activities
Committee in 1962, Congress enacted Public Law 88-290 20 which
provides specifically that employment of any person at the National
Security Agency must be deemed in the interest of the national
security.
Applicants at NSA are initially briefed on the criteria that must be
satisfied for employment with the agency. They are advised that proof
of citizenship, and information on membership in organizations, use
of drugs, foreign travels and other overseas associations will be sought.
The applicant then files DD 398, Personal History Statement.
The first step in NSA's clearance process is a polygraph examination.
This procedure is based on DoD Directive 5210.48. It is worth noting
however, that 52.10.48 stipulates that
The polygraph shall be employed only as an aid to support other investigative
techniques and be utilized generally only after the investigation by other means
has been as thorough as ciricumstances permit."
The Directive goes on to state specifically that the polygraph may
be used on "those competitive career employees of the Defense agencies
who are to be assigned for training in * * the National Security
Agency." 22 Notwithstanding the prescribed sequence, NSA poly-
graphs prior to the background investigation as an initial security
screening measure.
The principal difference between NSA and CIA polygraphing is
that NSA explicitly uses the polygraph as a primary tool for the col-I'
lection of adverse information. According to NSA, at least 95 percent
of all negative information on applicants comes from the polygraph;
8590 percent of this information, in turn' is considered significant
enough to warrant investigation. Out of 2,531 applicants for whom
security processing was completed during fiscal year 1978. 775 were
closed out by the Joint Personnel Security/Medical Review Panel
19 Ibid.
29 See Appendix C.
21 DoD Directive 5210.48 "The Conduct of Polgraph Examinations and the Selection,
Training and Supervision of DoD Polygraph Examiners." Sec. III?A.
22 Ibid. Enclosure I, c, 1, b.
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without a favorable hiring determination. In roughly 90 percent (about
700) of these cases, the polygraph report was a contributing factor in
the decision!'
NSA uses the polygraph screening technique only on its civilian
applicants. Military assignees are exempted on the grounds that their
assignment to duty at NSA is not voluntary. Since submission to a
polygraph examination must be a voluntary act, NSA considers that
requiring it of military 'personnel would violate their rights. In con-
trast, CIA polygraphs all military employees assigned to them, noting
that their association with CIA is voluntary. It is an interesting
question, whether this volutary/involuntary distinction is meaningful
in the context of the all-volunteer military service.
A further peculiarity relating to military personnel at NSA is that
when such persons retire and seek reemployment as civilians, they are
then subject to the polygraph. Sixty-eight (68) military assignees
found themselves in that position during fiscal year 1978. Approxi-
mately 20 percent of these candidates were adjudicated unfavorable
by the Joint Personnel/Security/Medical Panel. In 90 percent of these
cases, information obtained through the polygraph contributed to the
decision. This means that thirteen (13) people who already had access
to SCI through the clearance process at DoD were denied such access
when NSA procedures came into play.
Following the polygraph, applicants undergo psychological testing.
A psychological assessment battery is used as an aid in determining
suitability and acceptability for employment at NSA and access to
SCI. Ninety percent of all applicants are interviewed by a clinical
psychologist. The results of the polygraph and the psychological tests
are evaluated and information developed from them is forwarded to
the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) for the Special Background
Investigation (SBI).
SBI results are sent to NSA for evaluation. All information obtained
about an applicant from the polygraph, psychological testing, and the
full field investigation is then put together and brought before NSA's
Applicant Review Panel (ARP). The ARP is comprised of representa-
tives from NSA's Personnel, Medical and Security offices. It examines
each applicant on the "total person" principle. The Panel either
decides in favor of employment and access, or refers cases to NSA's
Director of Personnel.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) conducts its own adjudica-
tion after a personal interview, and a Special Background Investiga-
tion (SBI) is conducted by DIS.24
Col. Karl V. Haendle testified that in "the absence of any significant
derogatory information, the decisions are made at the branch level to
grant SCI access." 25 Where there is "significant derogatory informa-
tion," cases are referred to a security review panel. The original
adjudicator outlines the case and makes a recommendation. Cases are
then reviewed by several senior security officials each of whom makes a
25 The Committee notes, however, that NSA keeps no statistics record of the reasons why persons are
denied employment. NSA records only reflect that a person was denied employment, but not whether a
secwity issue was involved. See Chart III, Page 13.
21 see Chart II, Pate 13.
25 Security Clearance Procedures. Transcript, May 17, 1979.
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recommendation. All these recommendations ultimately go to the
Assistant Deputy Director for Security Services, DIA, for final
determination.
DIA considers the following information to be automatically dis-
qualifying: use of illegal drugs, financial irresponsibility, indebtedness,
homosexuality, foreign relatives, immediate relatives foreign-born who
have made no attempt to become U.S. citizens, and mental and
emotional problems.
In contrast to CIA and NSA, DIA does not polygraph as part of its
security screening process. Current policy provides for the polygraph
to be used only to resolve situations which cannot be settled m any
other way.
POST-EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ISSUES
After a person has been cleared and employed at DoD, if a security
issue arises or, adverse information about the person comes to the
attention of a supervisor, an evaluation must be made. If there is
reason to believe that such a person's activities constitute an im-
mediate threat to the national security, emergency suspension of the
subject's clearance occurs. If, after a detailed investigation, continuing
the person's clearance is still not considered to be consistent with the
national security, the clearance is removed.
Cases of espionage are referred to the Federal Bureau of Inv-e-sti-:
gation for followup examination. Clearances in such instances are
lifted at the time the case is referred, unless for the purpose of insuring
a complete resolution of the case, the FBI requests that it not be.
CHART II.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE?STATISTICS ON SCI CLEARANCES.
Adjudicated
Denied;
Granted SCI
Revoked
Army (April 1978 to March 1979)
1
10, 500
1
710
9, 790
232
Navy (calendar year 1978)
11,280
173
11, 107
306
Air Force (calendar year 1978)
7, 900
381
7,519
456
DIA (calendar year 1978)
5, 985
48
5, 937
?
35
Total
34, 353
2 1,
029
1 Estimates.
2 Or 3 percent.
CHART III
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY?STATISTICS ON SCI CLEARANCES
Processing
not corn-
Adjudicated Denied pleted Granted SCI Revoked
- NSA (fiscal year 1978)____....
2, 531 1775 732 1,024 14 (or 1.37 percent) civil-
ian; 23 (or 2.25 percent)
military.
In 90 percent or 700 of these, information learned on the polygraph was a contributing factor,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Broadly speaking, the subCommittee sees two overall area where a
heed exists for improvements in the way security screening is carried
out: there is a need for greater uniformity in investigative procedures
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and standards; and there is a need for improved access to pertinent
information.
PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS
DCID 1/14 established minimum security standards and procedures
governing access to SCI. However, as the subcommittee has dis-
covered, each agency conducts its own investigation, and all such
investigations differ one from the other in depth, scope, and technique.
It is clear that each part of the intelligence community has peculiar
needs, and that there is a role for diversity in the design and operation
of personnel security systems. On the other hand, it also seems logical
that to the extent each agency is trying to protect similar kinds of
data?e.g., SCI?granting clearances ought to involve basically similar
information about applicants, allowing for some reasonable variation.
The subcommittee believes, however, that, even making allowances
for varying needs among intelligence agencies, the divergencies in
their screening techniques have become excessive. Chart IV graphi-
cally illustrates how widely differentiated these procedures are.
CHART IV
(Key: 0?Yes; 0?Ncil
CIA State DOD/DIA NSA
Prenomination interview ? ? ? 0
Background investigation ? I ? ? ? a
Psychiatric screening ? 3 0 0 ?
Psychological assessment 0 8
6
Polygraph examination 04 05
Polygraph military personnel 0 0 0
All types data (positive and negative) e e 0
SCI clearance: A condition of employment 0 0 0 e
I Conducted prior to the polygraph exam.
2 Conducted by DIS following the polygraph exam.
3 Testing for professional flexibility, stress level and reactions to pressure. If there are problems, an interview by a
psychiatrist follows.
4 Administered after the background investigation on all civilian applicants and military personnel.
s Used prior to the background investigation for leads; is the primary source for negative information; used only on
Civilian applicants; military personnel are exempt.
Several features recorded on the chart merit further comment.
The subcommittee notes, for example, an existing pattern according
to which persons being screened for the two most sensitive agencies of
our government, the so-called intelligence "producers"?CIA and
NSA?will not be granted employment unless they can be cleared
for SCI from the start. On the other hand, employment by the so-
called "intelligence consumers"?DoD and State?is not based on
SCI access being granted. At DoD and State, a person can begin
eniployment with access to other classified data, up to and including
"Top Secret," and need only be cleared for SCI later upon need.
The label "Top Secret," however, is applied to information, "the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to
cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security." 28 The
subcommittee believes that the boundary line between "Top Secret"
and SOT information, in teims of pertinence to national security, is
likely to be so thin that persons being cleared for "Top Secret" 'access
ought to be subject to the same background investigation as those
being cleared for SCI even if actual SCI access is not yet required.
E.O. 12065 Section 1-102.
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The subcommittee also notes a major discrepancy among the
services in terms of the basic profile of information considered relevant
to the clearance process. CIA and the Department of State, for
example, stress the need?under the "whole person" concept?to
search out both positive and negative information about candidates.
The DIS, on the other hand, follows an approach which essentially
downplays positive information and focuses overwhelmingly on a
search for the negative. No news is not necessarily good news, how-
ever. While DIS' approach obviously helps it stretch manpower
resources further, the subcommittee sees this technique as a point of
weakness in the DIS product, and believes that in order for the
screening process to be effective, both positive and negative data must
be sought out and weighed.
As the chart shows, no feature of the security screening process is
marked by greater interservice difference and by more anomalies than
the polygraph.
CIA and NSA polygraph people whose intended level of access is so
low?receptionists, char-force, et cetera?as to raise a question
whether the investment is worthwhile. Other agencies hardly use the
polygraph and argue that other techniques are equally effective for
their purposes.
CIA uses the polygraph on all applicants, military and civilian,
while NSA exempts military personnel. DIA, meanwhile, does not
polygraph, although the agency is clearly involved in the production
of SCI intelligence. ILLEGIB
CIA polygraphs as a last step, while NSA uses the polygraph as the
first step in its screening process, although this appears to contradict -/
the sense of DoD Directive 5210.48. Both agencies adhere to the
"whole person" approach to clearance, but NSA's heavy reliance on
the polygraph may be inconsistent with a well-balanced approach.
Evidence presented to the subcommittee demonstrates the that
polygraph accounts for a substantial proportion of decisions to deny
access. On the other hand, gaps in the statistics kept by the intelli-
gence services do not make it possible to make the clear judgment
that the polygraph is unique and indispensable. There has been insuf-
ficient research on the accuracy of the polygraph technique in screen-
ing job applicants. The subcommittee urges the DCI to conduct a
study to validate the accuracy of the polygraph in the preemployment
setting and to establish some level of confidence in the use of that
technique.
The subcommittee also feels that the intelligence community
should consider whether and how it can exercise more discrimination
in the use of the polygraph. One basic constraint already in effect owes
to the fact that the polygraph, by and large, is used in the so-called
"intelligence-producing" services rather than in the "intelligence
consuming" agencies. Although this concept is not embodied in any
regulation, it may make sense insofar as it can simultaneously protect
intelligence sources and methods, while establishing a reasonable outer
limit to polygraphing. If this arrangement is to be truly secure, how-
ever, close attention must be paid to assure that as SCI moves through
government, sources and methods are in fact kept under protection.
The subcommittee understands that the DCI is studying methods for
processing intelligence with this view. The Subcommittee may be
interested in looking into this area at a later date.
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In light of these significant variations in practice regarding the
polygraph, the subcommittee believes that the DCI, in consultation
with the heads of other intelligence agencies and departments, should
establish some communitywide criteria relating to the use of the poly-
graph. Once these criteria have been established, they should be
absolute conditions of employment and waivers should only be granted
by the heads of any of the intelligence agencies in extraordinary
circumstances.
All these differences of technique underscore the fact that each
program is administered by separate screening bureaucracies answering
to several parent institutions.
Each of these screening systems faces a heavy case load complicated
not only by uncertain legal standards and diminished public respon-
siveness, but by reductions in work force combined in some cases
with a multiplication of responsibilities.
The DIS, for example, exhibits all these problems. As has been
"noted, DIS suffered a substantial reduction in force some years ago.
Meanwhile, as the subcommittee learned in the course of its hearings,
DIS investigators are also assigned to investigate white collar crime
in the Department of Defense. A similar situation exists in the State
Department, many of whose investigators double in brass, arranging
for the protection of foreign dignitaries visiting the United States.
More uniform procedures seem to be needed, along with some means
to assure quality control across the entire set of systems. It is possible,
in fact?and the subcommittee believes the Executive Branch should
examine the benefits and costs of such a proposal?that the solution
to both the procedural and the resource problems is to establish a
.z centralized office to conduct background investigations for the entire
-r?7- intelligence community. Such an office need not replace the adjudica-
tive systems presently used by the intelligence services, but could,
rather, provide these systems with a more standardized and qualita-
tively superior form of background information about candidates for
employment or SCI access. Certainly, if such a body were to be
established, the subcommittee believes that its sole function should be
the conduct of security investigations. Other, unrelated activities of
the types now burdening some of the services, can only be to the
detriment of their main objectives.
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
The intelligence agencies have testified before the subcommittee
that criminal justice records provide their most effective and produc-
tive source of leads for negative information developed by background
investigations. The subcommittee has heard repeatedly, however,
not only about the need for access to criminal justice records, but
about the roadblocks involved.27
" Karl Ackerman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security at the State Department, stated at the
hearing on clearance procedures on May 16 that:
"* ? ? we have encountered more than a few cases doing routine police checks where the constraints as
perceived in a given local jurisdiction by privacy legislation has caused them to question whether they are
able to give us information from police check files. We have ? * * run into the question of whether E.O.
10450 is indeed a proper statutory background for release of that information to us. Some (have) gone so far
as to say, well, you know, if that were a law?they are really questioning, I suppose, whether the executive
orders have the force of law. But it is being triggered by concerns for privacy." (p. 43)
The Director for Security Plans and Programs at Defense, Thomas J. O'Brien, expressed the same senti-
ments during testimony on May 17; O'Brien evaluating the investigation by the DIS, stated:
"* * ? as far as the lessening of quality, I think an awful lot of it relates to that information that will be
released by institutions, local law enforcement agencies * " There seems to be much, much less of that,
with the standard remark furnished by the DIS agent is that this particular jurisdiction will not provide
that information."
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Problems in this area arise primarily from guidelines established by
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). LEAA
defines "criminal history record information" as information collected
by criminal justice agencies (courts, government agency or subunit
thereof involved in the administration of criminal justice) on indi-
viduals "consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests,
detentions, indictments, information or other criminal charges, and
any disposition arising therefrom, sentencing, correctional supervision,
and release." 28
These guidelines on Criminal Justice Information Systems place no
restrictions whatsoever on the dissemination of conviction data,
arrests made within the year of an inquiry, and arrests where charges
are actively pending. However, the guidelines state specifically that
policies regarding dissemination of nonconviction data by law enforce-
ment agencies is left to states, and that is where the problem occurs."
Because LEAA guidelines allow all 50 states to develop their own
policies on dissemination of criminal justice information to non-law
enforcement agencies, a very scattered pattern exists. Much useful
information is denied intelligence agency investigators.
To overcome this problem, federal legislation would be necessary.
Such legislation could state that the intelligence agencies shall have
access to the personal records of a subject, upon the subject's written
consent, for the sole purpose of supplying information pertinent to the
granting of a security clearance. The legislation might call not only
for access to criminal justice records, but also education, employment,
credit and medical records. As a safeguard, the law might require
that this information be used only by intelligence services and dis-
seminated to each other only for employment purposes.
Witnesses before the subcommittee also noted that certain infor-
mation formerly available from the FBI in the course of an NAC is
no longer obtainable?that is, information on groups which "advocate
the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United
States" or information on groups which "unlawfully advocate or
practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others
from exercising their rights under the Constitution." " The collection
of such information was greatly curtailed by the institution of the
Attorney General's Domestic Security Investigation Guidelines in
June, 1976. The essence of those guidelines is to restrict investigations
of individuals or groups advocating force or violence to overthrow the
government or deprive others of their constitutional rights to those
individuals or groups who may be engaged in activities which involve
or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve a viola-
tion of federal law. It is this stricture that has led to the large scale
reductions in domestic security investigations since 1976."
The subcommittee recognizes that the purposes of the Domestic
Security Investigation guidelines was, and is, to curtail investigation
28 28 CFR, "Judicial Administration", Subpart A, Section 20.3(b).
22 State and local government wills determine the purpose for which dissemination of criminal history
record information is authorized by State law, executive order, local ordinance, court rule, decision or order.
(28 CFR, 20, 21 C3)
30 Section 8(a) (4) and (5), E.O. 10450.
"For an evaluation of the impact of these guidelines, see November 9, 1977 GAO report entitled "FBI
Domestic Intelligence Operations: An Uncertain Future," GGD-78-10. An earlier GAO report "FBI
Domestic Intelligence Operations?Their Purpose and Scope: Issues That Need To Be Resolved", 2/24/76
GGD-76-50 had found that the many domestic security investigations previously in existence were unpro-
ductive and did not lead to positive results and "The Erosion of Law Enforcement Intelligence and its
Impact on the Public Security" report of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures", Senate
Judiciary Committee 1978.
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of activities protected by the First Amendment?however extreme or
unorthodox?absent a showing of illegality or the imminence of
The subcommittee also recognizes that the FBI is responsible for
preventing the commission of federal crimes, including acts of ter-
rorism and similar acts of violence. Such crimes threaten the lives and
"domestic tranquility" of the American people, who have every right
to expect that the Federal Government's law enforcement arm will be
given the necessary authority to provide that protection. The FBI
has the additional investigative responsibility under the law to identify
applicants who constitute security risks so as to prevent those securing
sensitive government employment.
The attempt, as reflected in the guidelines, to achieve an appropriate
balance between concerns for freedom of speech and association and
the government's responsibility to provide information necessary to
satisfy the security needs of federal agencies whose employees must
satisfy minimum standards consistent with the national security, has
produced some anomalies.
One such anomaly lies in the fact that an intelligence agency, in
investigating an applicant for a security clearance, must rely on the
FBI for any information concerning that person's activities to over-
throw the government or deprive others of their constitutional rights
or those of a group to which the individual belongs, while the Domes-
tic Security Investigation Guidelines do not permit the FBI to in-
vestigate such a person or a group unless the person or group is con-
nected with actual or imminent acts of violence in violation of Federal
law. Since the FBI is likely to be the only source of information on
groups identified by Executive Order 10450, intelligence agencies are
unable to secure information that could assist them in making security
assessments under the Executive Order, since by its terms the Execu-
tive Order only requires information about advocacy or association.
Examples of the above were cited to the subcommittee, during the
hearing on June 21, 1979.
Thomas J. O'Brien, of the Department of Defense, testified about
procedures used by that agency in identifying security risks. Mr.
O'Brien responded to questions by Committee staff member Herbert
Romerstein and testified as follows: "
Mr. ROMERSTEIN. Where would you get that kind of information (regarding
groups that plan the overthrow of the government by force and violence or to
deny others their constitutional rights by violence) normally? Is there another
agency that would supply it if they had the data?
Mr. O'BRIEN. We would go to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
inquire as to their knowledge of the organization.
Mr. ROMERSTEIN. If a group such as one of those referred to in Executive Order
10450 publishes a plan to penetrate the armed forces, from whom would you expect
to get the information so that you could take protective measures to prevent such
people from coming in?
Mr. O'BRIEN. Our primary source of information of this type is the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Donald Perrine and Paul Nugent testified on behalf of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in response to a series of questions by Con-
gressman C. W. (Bill) Young. They testified as follows:
1VIr. YOUNG. I want to talk about the organizational cases. It is my under-
standing that most of them have been closed since the Attorney General's
guidelines were issued.
"Sections of the transcript are presented as appendix D.
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Mr. NUGENT. The answer to your question is yes, that the majority of the
cases, investigative cases which have been closed since the adoption of the guide-
lines in April 1976 have been due to the criteria established by the guidelines for
investigation. They either did not meet that criteria or were closed for other
reasons, but the vast majority of them have been closed for that reason.
Mr. YOUNG. Now, if a case on an organization has been closed, is the FBI
still permitted to collect public type information relative to the group and its
activities?
Mr. NUGENT. No, sir.
Mr. YOUNG. What about the case of, say, a newspaper article.
Are you permitted to collect that?
Mr. NUGENT. To peruse the newspaper and clip it? No. sir, that is not done
at this point.
Mr. YOUNG. You say it is not done. Are you not permitted to do it?
Mr. NUGENT. I say based on the Department ruling and that one investigative
case which was cited specifically by the Department, we would not do that, and
do not do that.
Mr. 'YOUNG. Are you allowed to read it and remember it?
Mr. NUGENT. I would think that might be allowable in the private confines of
one's home.
Mr. YOUNG. When was the case on the Progressive Labor Party closed?
Mr. NUGENT. The Progressive Labor Party case was closed in September 1976,
September 20, 1976, to be exact.
Mr. YOUNG. Well, the Progressive Labor Party has publicly proclaimed that
they intend to take power in the United States by using "armed struggle" and
that they are engaged in a program of penetrating the Armed Forces.
This information appeared in the Progressive Labor Magazine, their own
magazine that was published in the spring of 1978.
In a case like this where they themselves have made this declaration, can the
FBI collect these public documents on a group like the Progressive Labor Party,
despite the fact that the case has been closed?
Mr. NUGENT. Absolutely not.
Mr. YOUNG. If the United States Army sent you a name in a national agency
cheek of someone who had recently joined the PLP, and had penetrated the Army,
which is what they say they are going to do, would you have to answer no record?
Mr. NUGENT. Well, that is a hypothetical question, I realize' and to answer
hypotheticals is rather difficult, but if that name were submitted today and that
individual had joined such an organization last week, I would say that the
possibilities of our coming up with that name in a name check situation would
be practically remote.
Mr. YOUNG. Not because you weren't able to do it, but because you weren't
permitted to, is that it?
Mr. NUGENT. Well, we just wouldn't have the curl ency of information with
respect to that organization which has been closed, now for 3 years. The,member-
ship of that paiticular group and any other would have changed two times in that
period of three years, and we wouldn't have the identities of the membership.
Mr. YOUNG. There has been previous testimony before this committee that the
FBI closed the case on the Maryland Ku Klux Klan shortly before Maryland
State Police arrested a number of the leaders of the group in a plot to bomb,
churches, Jewish temples and the home of a Member of Congress.
If the State Police had not had Sergeant John Cook under cover in this violent
group, they very likely would have been able to bring off this act of terrorism.
Now, if someone had joined the Maryland Klan after you closed that case, and
had then applied for security clearance, would you have had any information to?
supply in a national agency check?
Mr. PERRINE. Probably not unless it came from other sources, another investi-
gative service who may have forwarded it to our agency, but as an active investiga-
tion on the part of the FBI, as Mr. Nugent indicated, no.
This is not to say that if violent, illegal acts do occur, or are im-
minent, that the FBI could not investigate. Rather, before such acts-
occur, groups cannot be investigated for mere advocacy of violence.
The subcommittee recoguizes ? that the inconsisteney between
Executive Order 10450 and the Domestic Security Investigation
Guidelines is bound to produce similar examples. The subcommittee is. i
divided as to whether it s the Executive Order or the Guidelines which
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should be reassessed, but all members of the subcommittee agree that
the inconsistencies of these two policy documents should be resolved
so as to provide a clearer understanding of what information should be
collected and made available for security clearance investigations.
This reassessment should also examine the provisions of the Privacy
Act and take into account the applicable Supreme Court decisions.
The upcoming consideration of the recently proposed FBI charter
will offer an appropriate opportunity to resolve these issues.
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APPENDIX A
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
Whereas the interests of the national security require that all persons privileged
to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government, shall be
reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerv-
ing loyalty to the United States; and
Whereas the American tradition that all persons should receive fair, impartial,
and equitable treatment at the hands of the Government requires that all persons
seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be employed in the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government be adjudged by mutually consistent and
no less than minimum standards and procedures among the departments and
agencies governing the employment and retention in employment of persons in
the Federal service:
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and
statutes of the United States, including section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States (5 U.S.C. 631); the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403;
5 U.S.C. 632, et seq.); section 9A of the act of August 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1148 (5
U.S.C. 118j) ; and the act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476 (5 U.S.C. 22-1, et
seq.), and as President of the United States, and deeming such action necessary in
the best interests of the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION 1. In addition to the departments and agencies specified in the said
act of August 26, 1950, and Executive Order No. 10237 1 of April 26, 1951, the
provisions of that act shall apply to all other departments and agencies of the
Government.
SEC. 2. The head of each department and agency of the Government shall be
responsible for establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an
effective program to insure that the employment and retention in employment of
any civilian officer or employee within the department or agency is clearly con-
sistent with the interests of the national security.
SEC. 3. (a) The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any depart-
ment or agency of the Government shall be made subject to an investigation. The
scope of the investigation shall be determined in the first instance according to
the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could
bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security, but
in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check
(including a check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation),
and written inquiries to appropriate local law-enforcement agencies, former
employers and supervisors, references, and schools attended by the person under
investigation: Provided, that upon request of the head of the department or
agency concerned, the Civil Service Commission may, in its discretion, authorize
such less investigation as may meet the requirements of the national security
with respect to per-diem, intermittent, temporary, or seasonal employees, or
aliens employed outside the United States. Should there develop at any stage of
investigation information indicating that the employment of any such person
may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, there
shall be conducted with respect to such persons a full field investigation, or such
less investigation as shall be sufficient to enable the head of the department or
agency concerned to determine whether retention of such person is clearly con-
sistent with the interests of the national security.
(b) The head of any department or agency shall designate, or cause to be
designated, any position within his department or agency the occupant of which
could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse
effect on the national security as a sensitive position. Any position so designated
shall be filled or occupied only by a person with respect to. whorri a full field
1 CFR, 1951 Supp., p. 430.
(21)
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investigation has been conducted: Provided, that a person occupying a sensitive
position at the time it is designated as such may continue to occupy such position
pending the completion of a full field investigation, subject to the other provisions
of this order: And provided further, that in case of emergency a sensitive position
may be filled for a limited period by a person with respect to whom a full field pre-
appointment investigation has not been completed if the head of the department
or agency concerned finds that such action is necessary in the national interest,
which finding shall be made a part of the records of such department or agency.
SEC. 4. The head of each department and agency shall review, or cause to be
reviewed, the cases of all civilian officers and employees with respect to whom
there has been conducted a full field investigation under Executive Order No.
9835 2 of March 21, 1947, and, after such further investigation as may be appro-
priate, shall re-adjudicate, or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the
said act of August 26, 1950, such of those cases as have not been adjudicated under
a security standard commensurate with that established under this order.
Sac. 5. Whenever there is developed or received by any department or agency
information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or em-
ployee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of
the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the
employing department or agency or his representative, who, after such investi-
gation as may be appropriate, shall review, or cause to be reviewed, and, where
necessary, re-adjudicate, or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the
said act of August 26, 1950, the case of such officer or employee.
SEC. 6. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indi-
cating that the employment of any officer or employee of the Government may
not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, the head of
the department or agency concerned or his representative shall immediately
suspend the employment of the person involved if he deems such suspension neces-
sary in the interests of the national security and, following such investigation and
review as he deems necessary, the head of the department or agency concerned
shall terminate the employment of such suspended officer or employee whenever
he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the
national security, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950.
SEC. 7. Any person whose employment is suspended or terminated under the
authority granted to heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with
the said act of August 26, 1950, or pursuant to the said Executive Order No.
9835 or any other security or loyalty program relating to officers or employees
of the Government, shall not be restored to duty or reemployed in the same
department or agency and shall not be reemployed in any other department or
agency, unless the head of the department or agency concerned finds that such
reinstatement, restoration, or reemployment is clearly consistent with the in-
terests of the national security, which findings shall be made a part of the records
of such department or agency: Provided, that no person whose employment has
been terminated under such authority thereafter may be employed by any other
department or agency except a determination by the Civil Service Commission
that such person is eligible for such employment.
Sac. 8. (a) The investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be de-
signed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in em-
ployment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly con-
sistent with the interests of the national security. Such information shall relate,
but shall not be limited, to the following:
(1) Depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national
security:
(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the in-
dividual is not reliable or trustworthy.
(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material
facts.
(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest., immoral, or notoriously disgraceful
conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, sexual perversion,
or financial irresponsibility.
(iv) An adjudication of insanity; or treatment for serious mental or neurological
disorder without satisfactory evidence of cure.
(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be sub-
jected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary
to the best interests of the national security.
2 CFR, 1947 Supp.
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(2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or
attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting
another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason,
or sedition.
(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy,
traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret
agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign
nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or
with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the
government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of
the United States by unconstitutional means.
(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the
United States, or of the alteration of the form of government of the United States
by unconstitutional means.
(5) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign
or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of
persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has
adopted, or shows a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of
force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of
the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United
States by unconstitutional means.
(6) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information,
or of other information disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or willful violation
or disregard of security regulations.
(7) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so
as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of
the United States.
(b) The investigation of persons entering or employed in the competitive
service shall primarily be the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission,
except in cases in which the head of a department or agency assumes that responsi-
bility pursuant to law or by agreement with the Commission. The Commission
shall furnish a full investigative report to the department or agency concerned.
(c) The investigation of persons (including consultants, however employed),
entering employment of, or employed by, the Government other than in the com-
petitive service shall primarily be the responsibility of the employing department
or agency. Departments and agencies without investigative facilities may use
the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission, and other departments
and agencies may use such facilities under agreement with the Commission.
(d) There shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
all investigations being conducted by any other agencies which develop informa-
tion indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence,
or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information
relating to any of the matters described in subdivisions (2) through (7) of sub-
section (a) of this section. In cases so referred to it, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation shall make a full field investigation.
SEC. 9. (a) There shall be established and maintained in the Civil Service Com-
mission a security-investigations index covering all persons as to whom security
investigations have been conducted by any department or agency of the Gov-
ernment under this order. The central index established and maintained by the
Commission under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, shall be made
a part of the security-investigations index. The security-investigations index
shall contain the name of each person investigated, adequate identifying informa-
tion concerning each such person, and a reference to each department and agency
which has conducted an investigation concerning the person involved or has
suspended or terminated the employment of such person under the authority
granted to heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with the said
act of August 26, 1950.
(b) The heads of all departments and agencies shall furnish promptly to the
Civil Service Commission information appropriate for the establishment and
maintenance of the security-investigations index.
(c) The reports and other investigative material and information developed by
investigations conducted pursuant to any statute, order, or program described in
section 7 of this order shall remain the property of the investigative agencies con-
ducting the investigations, but may, subject to considerations of the national
security, be retained by the department or agency concerned. Such reports and
other investigative material and information shall be maintained in confidence,
and no access shall be given thereto except, with the consent of the investigative
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94
agency concerned, to other departments and agencies conducting security pro-
grams under the authority granted by or in accordance with the said act of Au-
gust 26, 1950, as may be required for the efficient conduct of Government business.
SEC. 10. Nothing in this order shall be construed as eliminating or modifying in
any way the requirement for any investigation or any determination as to security
which may be required by law.
SEC. 11. On and after the effective date of this order the Loyalty Review Board
established by Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, shall not accept
agency findings for review, upon appeal or otherwise. Appeals pending before the
Loyalty Review Board on such date shall be heard to final determination in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the said Executive Order No. 9835, as amended.
Agency determinations favorable to the officer or employee concerned pending
before the Loyalty Review Board on such date shall be acted upon by such Board,
and whenever the Board is not in agreement with such favorable determination the
case shall be remanded to the departinent or agency concerned for determination
in accordance with the standards and procedures established pursuant to this
order. Cases pending before the regional loyalty boards of the Civil Service
Commission on which hearings have not been initiated on such date shall be re-
ferred to the department or agency concerned. Cases being heard by regional
loyalty boards on such date shall be heard to conclusion, and the determination of
the board shall be forwarded to the head of the department or agency concerned:
Provided, that if no specific department or agency is involved, the case shall be dis-
missed without prejudice to the applicant. Investigations pending in the Federal
Bureau of Investigation or the Civil Service Commission on such date shall be
completed, and the reports thereon shall be made to the appropriate department
or agency.
SEC. 12. Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended, is hereby
revoked. For the purposes described in section 11 hereof the Loyalty Review
Board and the regional loyalty boards of the Civil Service Commission shall
continue to exist and function for a period of one hundred and twenty days from
the effective date of this order, and the Department of Justice shall continue to
furnish the information described in paragraph 3 of Part III of the said Executive
Order No. 9835, but directly to the head of each department and agency.
SEC. 13. The 4ttorney General is requested to render to the heads of depart-
ments, and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish
and maintain an appropriate employee-security program.
SEC. 14. (a) The Civil Service Commission, with the continuing advice and
collaboration of representatives of such departments and agencies as the National
Security Council may designate, shall make a continuing study of the manner in
which this order is being implemented by the departments and agencies of the
Government for the purpose of determining:
(1) Deficiencies in the department and agency security programs established
under this order which are inconsistent with the interests of, or directly or indi-
rectly weaken, the national security.
(2) Tendencies in such programs to deny to individual employees fair, im-
partial, and equitable treatment at the .hands of the Government, or rights under
the Constitution and laws of the United States or. this.order.
Information affecting any department or agency developed or received during
the course of such continuing study shall be furnished immediately to the head
of the department or agency concerned. The Civil Service Commission shall
report to the National Security Council, at least semiannually, on the results of
such study, and shall recommend means to correct any such deficiencies or
tendencies.
(b) All departments and agencies of the Government are directed to cooperate
with the Civil Service Commission to facilitate the accomplishment of the respon-
sibilities assigned to it by subsection (a) of this section.
SEC. 15. This order shall become effective thirty days after the date hereof.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.
THE WHITE HOUSE;
April 27, 1953.
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APPENDIX B
DCID No. 1/14 13 May 1976
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE No. 1/14 1
MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGI-
BILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
(Effective 13 May 1976) .
Pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 11905, Section 102 of the National
;Security Act of 1947 and National Security Council Directives, the following
minimum personnel security standards, procedures and continuing security
.programs are hereby established for all United States Government civilian and
military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors and other
individuals who require access to Sensitive Compartmented Information 2 (here-
inafter referred to as SCI). The standards, procedures and programs established
herein are minimum and the departments and agencies may establish such addi-
tional security steps as may be deemed necessary and appropriate to ensure that
-effective security is maintained.
Purpose
1. The purpose of this Directive is to enhance the security protection of SCI
through the application of minimum security standards, procedures and continu-
ing security programs, and to facilitate the security certification process among
Government departments and agencies.
Applicability
2. The provisions of the Directive shall apply to all persons (other than elected
,officials of the United States Government, federal judges and those individuals for
whom the DCI makes a specific exception) without regard to civilian or military
.status, form of employment, official rank or position or length of service.
3. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria contained herein
and who are, therefore, denied access to SCI shall not, solely, for this reason, be
,considered ineligible for access to other classified information. Individuals whose
-access to SCI has been authorized as an exception granted in accordance with
:paragraph 7 below, shall not, solely for that reason, be considered eligible for access
to other classification information.
General
4. The granting of access to SCI shall be controlled under the strictest application
of the "need-to-know" principle under procedures prescribed in the several existing
.authorities which govern "access thereto, and in accordance with the personnel
,security standards and procedures set forth in this Directive. All persons account-
Able under the authority of this Directive and given access to information (SCI)
containing sources or methods of intelligence shall, as a condition of obtaining
_access, sign an agreement that they will not disclose that information to persons
not authorized to receive it.
Personnel Security Standards
5. Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for
-access to SCI areas follows:
a. The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and
of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
I This directive supersedes DCID 1/14 approved 1 July 1968.
2 The term "Sensitive Compartmented Information" as used in this Directive is intended to include all
Information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present
and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community
systems6f compartmentation haie been or will be fort-I-40 eglablished: The term'does not inelnde'Reitticted
Data as defined in Section II, Public Laws 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
(25)
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b. Except where there is a compelling need and a determination has been.
made by competent authority as described in paragraph 7 below that every
reasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances the.
security risk is negligible:
(1) Both the individual and the members of his or her immediate family
shall be US citizens. For these purposes "immediate family" is defined as-
including the individual's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters and children.
(2) The members of the individual's immediate family and persons to.
whom he is bound by affection or obligation should neither be subject to
physical, mental or other forms of duress by a foreign power, nor advocate
the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United
States or the alteration of the form of Government of the United States.
byunconstitutional means.
6. In exceptional cases, the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) of the Intelligence-
Community organization, or his designee, may determine that it is necessary or
advisable in the National interest to authorize access to SCI prior to completion of
the fully prescribed investigation. In this situation such investigative checks as
are immediately possible shall be made at once, and should include a personal
interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel. Access in such
cases shall be strictly controlled, and the fully prescribed investigation and final
evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practicable moment.
Exceptions
7. The exceptions to paragraph 5.b.(1) (2) above may be granted only by the-
SIO or his designee, unless such authority has been specifically delegated to the
head of an office of organization as set forth in inter-departmental agreements. All
exceptions granted will be common sense determinations based on all available
information, and shall be recorded by the agency making the exception. In those
cases in which the individual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial
period of his life, a thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investigation in
terms of fulfillment of the minimum investigative requirements, and judicious
review of the information therein must be made before an exception is considered.
Investigative Requirements
8. The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for access
to SCI will be thorough and shall be designed to develop information as to whether
the individual clearly meets the above Personnel Security Standards.
9. The investigation shall be accomplished through record checks and personal
interviews of various sources by trained investigative personnel in order to establish
affirmatively to the adjudicating agency complete continuity of identity to include-
birth, residences, education, employments and military service. Where the cir-
cumstances of a case indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic requirements
set out below to ensure that those responsible for adjudicating access eligibility
have in their possession all the relevant facts available.
10. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement, fingerprints.
of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a signed release,.
as necessary, authorizing custodians of police, credit, education and medical
records, to provide record information to the investigative agency. Photographs of
the individual shall also be obtained where additional corroboration of identity
is required.
11. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:
a. Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship.
b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of'
Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, and such other
National agencies as are appropriate to the individual's background. An
additional check of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shall be
conducted on those members of the individual's immediate family who are
United States citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens.
c. A check of appropriate police records covering all areas where the indi-
vidual has resided in the US throughout the most recent fifteen (15) years or
since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period.
d. Verification of the individual's financial status and credit habits through
checks of appropriate credit institutions and interviews with knowledgeable
sources covering the most recent five (5) years.
c. Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all the individual's residences
in excess of six (6) months throughout the most recent five (5) year period.
This coverage shall be expanded where the investigation suggests the existence
of some questionable behavioral pattern.
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f. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen (15) years or
since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period but in any event the most
recent two years. Personal interviews with supervisors and co-workers at
places of employment covering the past ten (10) years shall be accomplished.
g. Verification of attendance at institutes of higher learning in all instances
and at the last secondary school attended within the past fifteen (15) years.
Attendance at secondary schools may be verified through qualified collateral
sources. If attendance at educational institutions occurred within the most
recent five (5) years, personal interviews with faculty members or other
persons who were acquainted with the individual during his attendance shall
be accomplished.
h. Review of appropriate military records.
i. Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable acquaintances (a
minimum of three developed during the course of the investigation) as
necessary to provide a continuity to the extent practicable, of the individual's
activities and behavioral patterns over the past fifteen years with particular
emphasis on the most recent five years.
j. When employment, education or residence, has occurred overseas (except
for periods of less than five (5) years for personnel on US Government
assignment and less than ninety days for other purposes) during the past
fifteen years or since age eighteen, a check of the records will be made at the
Department of State and other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to
develop sources, generally in the United States, who knew the individual
overseas in order to cover significant employment, education or residence
and to attempt to determine if any lasting foreign contacts or connections
were established during this period. However, in all cases where an individual
has worked or lived outside of the US continuously for over five years, the
investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period in his life through the
use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be
available to the US Government in the foreign country (ies) in which the
individual resided.
k. In those instances in which the individual has immediate family members
or other persons with whom he is bonded by affection or obligation in any of
the situations described in subparagraph 5.h.(2), above, the investigation will
include an interview of the individual by trained security, investigative or
counter-intelligence personnel to ascertain the facts as they may relate to the
individual's access eligibility.
I. In all cases the individual's spouse shall at a minimum be checked
through the subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other
National agencies as appropriate. When conditions indicate, additional in-
vestigations shall be conducted on the spouse of the individual and members
of the immediate family to the extent necessary to permit a determination by
the adjudicating agency that the provisions of paragraph 5, Personnel
Security Standards, above, are met.
m. A personal interview of the individual will be conducted by trained
security, investigative or counterintelligence personnel when necessary to
resolve any significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies developed
during the investigation.
12. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past five
years which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it may serve as a
basis for granting access approval provided a review of the personnel and security
files does not reveal substantive changes in the individual's security eligibility.
If a previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards
or if it is more than five years old, a current investigation shall be required but
may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's file up-to-date in ac-
cordance with the investigative requirements set forth in paragraph 11 above.
Should new information be developed during the current investigation which bears
unfavorably upon the individual's activities covered by the previous investiga-
tion, the current inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to develop full details of
this new information.
13. Programs shall be instituted requiring the periodic reinvestigation of per-
sonnel provided access to SCI. These reinvestigations will be conducted on a five-
year recurrent basis, but on a more frequent basis where the individual has shown
some questionable behavioral pattern, his activities are otherwise suspect, Or
when deemed necessary by the SIO concerned.3
2 In DoD, an SIO may request, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense or his designee, more frequent
reinvestigations under special circumstances.
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14. The scope of reinvestigations shall be determined by the SIO ?cOnCerned
based on such considerations as the potential damage that might result from the
individual's defection or willful compromise of SCI and the availability and prob-
able effectiveness of other means to continually evaluate factors related to the
individual's suitability for continued access. In all cases, the reinvestigation shall
include, as a minimum, appropriate National agency checks, local agency (including
overseas checks where appropriate), credit checks and a personal discussion with
the individual by trained investigative, security or counterintellgence personnel
when necessary to resolve significant adverse information or inconsistencies.
15. The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on an in-
dividual's loyalty and suitability shall be accomplished under the cognizance of
the SIO concerned by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment and wide
experience in personnel security and/or counterintelligence. When all other infor-
mation developed on an individual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement
which has not been met should not preclude favorable adjudication. In all evalua-
tions the protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning
personnel having access to SCI shall be resolved in favor of the national security.
The ultimate determination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent
with the interests of national security shall be an overall common sense determina-
tion based on all available information.
Continuing Security Programs
16. In order to facilitate the attainment of the highest standard of personnel
security and to augment both the access approval criteria and the investigative
requirements established by this Directive, member departments and agencies
shall institute continuing security programs for all individuals having access to
SCI. In addition to security indoctrinations, these programs shall be tailored to
create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape notice or
he left unresolved which brings into question an individual's loyalty and integrity
or suggests the possibility of his being subject to undue influence or duress through
foreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an individual is as-
signed to perform sensitive compartmented work requiring access to SCI, the
SIO for the department, agency or Government program to which the individual
is assigned shall assume security supervision of that individual throughout the
period of his assignment.
17. The continuing security programs shall include the followings:
a. Security education programs to ensure that individuals who are granted
access to SCI are intially indoctrinated and periodically thereafter instructed
as to its unique sensitivity and that they understand their personal responsi-
bility for its protection. The individual should be instructed that the ultimate
responsibility for maintaining eligibility for continued access to SCI rests with
with the individual. Therefore, the individual is encouraged to seek a pro-
priate guidance and assistance on any personal problem or situation which may
have a possible bearing on his eligibility for continued access to SCI, and se-
curity counseling should be made available. These instructions should be
conducted by individuals having extensive background and experience re-
garding the nature and special vulnerabilities of the particular type of com-
partmented information involved.
b. Security supervisory programs to ensure that supervisory personnel
recognize and discharge their special responsibility in matters pertaining to the
security of SCI, including the eligibility for SCI access. Such programs shall
provide practical guidance as to indicators which may signal matters of se-
curity concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures shall be
disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective
action to safeguard the security of the United States as well as to provide all
necessary help to the indivuidal concerned to neutralize his vulnerability.
c. Security Review Programs to ensure that appropriate security authori-
ties invariably receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all information
bearing on the security posture of persons having access to sensitive infor-
mation. Personnel history information shall be kept current. Security and
related files shall be kept under continuing review.
18. Whenever adverse or derogatory information is discovered or inconsistencies
arise which could impact upon an individual's security status, appropriate in-
vestigations shall be conducted on a timely basis. The investigation shall be of
sufficient Scope necessary to resolve the specific adverse or derogatory information,
or inconsistency, in question so that a determination can be made as to whether the
individual's continued utilization in activities requiring SCI is clearly consistent
with the interests of the national security.
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Effective Date
19. This Directive supersedes DCID 1/14, 1 July 1968. Existing directives,4
regulations, agreements and such other references governing access to SCI as.
defined herein shall be revised accordingly.
GEORGE BUSH,
Director of Central Intelligence.
4 These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards and Investigation and Evaluation sections
off the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations.
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APPENDIX C
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY?PERSONNEL SECURITY PROCEDURES
PUBLIC LAW 88-290; 78 STAT. 168
An Act to amend the Internal Security Act of 1950.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That:
The Internal Security Act of 1950 is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new title:
TITLE III?PERSONNEL SECURITY PROCEDURES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
"REGULATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT SECURITY"
SEC. 301. Subject to the provisions of this title, the Secretary of Defense (here-
after in this title referred to as the 'Secretary') shall prescribe such regulations
relating to continuing security procedures as he considers necessary to assure?
"(1) that no person shall be employed in, or detailed or assigned to, the
National Security Agency (hereafter in this title referred to as the 'Agency'),
or continue to be so employed, detailed, or assigned; and
"(2) that no person so employed, detailed, or assigned shall have access to
any classified information;
unless such employment, detail, assignment, or access to classified information
is clearly consistent with the national security.
"FULL FIELD INVESTIGATION AND APPRAISAL
"SEc. 302. (a) No person shall be employed in, or detailed or assigned to, the
Agency unless he has been the subject of a full field investigation in connection
with such employment, detail, or assignment, and is cleared for access to classified
information in accordance with the provisions of this title; excepting that condi-
tional employment without access to sensitive cryptologic information or material
may be tendered any applicant, under such regulations as the Secretary may
prescribe, pending the completion of such full field investigation: And provided
further, That such full field investigation at the discretion of the Secretary need
not be required in the case of persons assigned or detailed to the Agency who have
a current security clearance for access to sensitive cryptologic information under
equivalent standards of investigation and clearance. During any period of war
declared by the Congress, or during any period when the Secretary determines
that a national disaster exists, or in exceptional cases in which the Secretary (or
his designee for such purpose) makes a determination in writing that his action is
necessary or advisable in the national interest, he may authorize the employment
of any person in, or the detail or assignment of any person to, the Agency, and
may grant to any such person access to classified information, on a temporary
basis, pending the completion of the full field investigation and the clearance for
access to classified information required by this subsection, if the Secretary
determines that such action is clearly consistent with the national security.
"(b) To assist the Secretary and the Director of the Agency in carrying out
their personnel security responsibilities, one or more boards of appraisal of three
members each, to be appointed by the Director of the Agency, shall be established
in the Agency. Such a board shall appraise the loyalty and suitability of persons
for access to classified information, in those cases in which the Director of the
Agency determines that there is a doubt whether their access to that information
would be clearly consistent with the national security, and shall submit a report
and recommendation on each such a case. However, appraisal by such a board is
not required before action may be taken under section 14 of the Act of June 27,
1944, chapter 287, as amended (5 U.S.C. 863), section 1 of the Act of August 26,
1950, chapter 803, as amended (5 U.S.C. 22-1), or any other similar provision of
law. Each member of such a board shall be specially qualified and trained for his
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duties as such a member, shall have been the subject of a full field investigation in
connection with his appointment as such a member, and shall have been cleared
by the Director for access to classified information at the time of his appointment
as such a member. No person shall be cleared for access to classified information,
contrary to the recommendations of any such board, unless the Secretary (or his
designee for such purpose) shall make a determination in writing that such em-
ployment, detail, assignment, or access to classified information is in the national
interest.
"TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
"SEC. 303. (a) Notwithstanding section 14 of the Act of June 27, 1944, chapter
287, as amended (5 U.S.C. 863), section 1 of the Act of August 26, 1950, chapter
803, as amended (5 U.S.C. 22-1), or any other provision of law, the Secretary may
terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he
considers that action to be in the interest of the United States, and he determines
that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termi-
nation of the employment of that officer or employee cannot be invoked consist-
ently with the national security. Such a determination is final.
"(b) Termination of employment under this section shall not affect the right of
the officer or employee involved to seek or accept employment with any other
department or agency of the United States if he is declared eligible for such em-
pl97ment by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(c) Notwithstanding section 133(d) of title 10, United States Code, any author-
ity vested in the Secretary of Defense by subsection (a) may be delegated only to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of the National Security Agency,
or both.
"DEFINITION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
"SEC. 304. For the purposes of this section, the term 'classified information'
means information which, for reasons of national security, is specifically designated
by a United States Government agency for limited or restricted dissemination or
distribution.
"NONAPPLICABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
"SEC. 305. The Administrative Procedure Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. 1001 et
seq.), shall not apply to the use or exercise of any authority granted by this title.
"AMENDMENTS
"SEC. 306. (a) The first sentence of section 2 of the Act of May 29, 1959 (50
U.S.C. 402 note), is amended by inserting, 'without regard to the civil service
laws,' immediately after 'and to appoint thereto'.
"(b) Subsection (5) of section 2 of the Performance Rating Act of 1950 (5
U.S.C. 2001(b) is amended?
"(1) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (13) and inserting
in lieu thereof a semicolon; and
"(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"'(14) The National Security Agency.'"
Approved March 26, 1964.
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APPENDIX D
To OVERSIGHT REPORT
? Thomas J. O'Brien, of the Department of Defense, testified, on June 21, 1979,
about procedures used by that agency in identifying security risks. Mr. O'Brien
responded to a series of questions by Committee staff member Herbert Romerstein
and testified as follows:
? Mr. ROMERSTEIN. Among the criteria in Executive Order 10450 for denying
employment are knowing membership in a group that plans the overthrow of the
government by force and violence, or knowing membership in a group that advo-
cates the use of violence to deny others their civil rights.
Does the DoD have the data base to determine whether the prospective em-
ployee or member of the Armed Forces holds such a membership?
Mr. O'BRIEN. We do not hold a data base, per se. We conduct an extensive
investigation. During the interview portion of the investigation, we will ask
questions with respect to the person's involvement in activities that might
advocate the overthrow of the government or that might advocate the denial of
others' constitutional rights. Conceivably the person would have been arrested in
some context that might lead to this kind of a discovery.
Mr. ROMERSTEIN. But you don't collect data on such organizations so that
you would be able to determine if a member of such a group?
Mr. O'BRIEN. We do not.
Mr. ROMERSTEIN. Where would you get that kind of information normally?
Is there another agency that would supply it if they had the data?
Mr. O'DONNELL. We would go to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
inquire as to their knowledge of the organization.
Mr. ROMERSTEIN. If a group such as one of those referred to in Executive Order
10450 publishes a plan to penetrate the armed forces, from whom would you
expect to get the information so that you could take protective measures to
prevent such people from coming in?
Mr. O'BRIEN. Our primary source of information of this type is the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Mr. ROMERSTEIN. Thank you.
Donald Perrine and Paul Nugent testified on behalf of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in response to a series of questions by Congressman C. W. (Bill)
Young. They testified as follows:
Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Perrine, let me just ask the questions and then anyone, you
or anyone can respond.
Mr. PERRINE. All right, very well.
Mr. YOUNG. I want to talk about the organizational cases. It is my under-
standing that most of them have been closed since the Attorney General's guide-
lines were issued. Is that correct?
Mr. PERRINE. Yes, and I would like to have Mr. Nugent address that question
more specifically.
Mr. NUGENT. The answer to your question is yes, that the majority of the cases,
investigative cases which have been closed since the adoption of the guidelines.
in April 1976 have been due to the criteria established by the guidelines for in-
vestigation. They either did not meet that criteria or were closed for another
reasons, but the vast majority of them have been closed for that reason.
Mr. YOUNG. Now, if a case on an organization has been closed, is the FBI still
permitted to collect public type information relative to the group and its activities?
Mr. NUGENT. No, sir.
Mr. YOUNG. You are not.
Mr. NUGENT. As a matter of policy, and there is documentation of this, the
Department of Justice has considered the collection of public source information
or information from the publication of even the group itself which has since been
closed as active investigation. Now, ,that is not to say that certain information
on this type which may be volunteering by citizens or other individual sources
or informants cannot be accepted in the file.
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Mr. YOUNG. What about the case of, say, a newspaper article.
Mr. NUGENT. Yes, sir.
Mr. YOUNG. Are you permitted to collect that?
Mr. NUGENT. To persue the newspaper and clip it? No. sir, that is not done
:at this point.
Mr. YOUNG. You say it is not done. Are you not permitted to do it?
Mr. NUGENT. I say based on the Department ruling and that one investigative
ease which was cited specifically by the Department, we would not do that, and
do not do that.
Mr. YOUNG. Are you allowed to read it and remember it?
Mr. NUGENT. I would think that might be allowable in the private confines of
one's home.
Mr. YOUNG. When was the case on the Progressive Labor Party Closed?
Mr. NUGENT. The Progressive Labor Party case was closed in September 1976,
September 20, 1976, to be exact.
Mr. YOUNG. Well, the Progressive Labor Party has publicly proclaimed that
they intend to take power in the United States by using "armed struggle" and
that they are engaged in a program of penerating the Armed Forces.
This information appeared in the Progressive Labor Magazine, their own
magazine that was published in the spring of 1978.
In a case like this where they themselves have made this declaration, can the
FBI collect these public documents on a group like the Progressive Labor Party,
despite the fact that the case has been closed?
Mr. NUGENT. Absolutely not.
Mr. YOUNG. Absolutely not.
Now, let me make sure that I make sure I understand and anybody who reads
this record understands. The Progressive Labor Party who has proclaimed through
their own publication that they edit, publish, print, and somebody pays for, has
said that they intend to take power by armed struggle. Now, there is something
in gut law against advocating the violent overthrow of the government, isn't
there?
Mr. NUGENT. That is quite true. However, due to the nature of the investiga-
tions which are conducted under the Domestic Security criteria today, if you have
seen the guidelines, it is very specific in that advocacy or rhetoric is not the criteria
on which we can base a domestic security investigation. There has to be that
one step further, involvement in force and violence and violation of federal law,
or at least a conspiracy to violate some federal law with force and violence on which
we can base basically a criminal type approach to an investigation, not a searching
for programs which groups may advocate in the press or in speechmaking and so
forth.
Mr. YOUNG. In other words, you are not allowed to be involved in fire preven-
tion; you have to wait until the fire starts.
Mr. NUGENT. Pretty close to that, yes, sir.
Mr. YOUNG. I wonder what the American people would say if they all knew
about that. I have an idea what their reaction would be.
If the United States Army sent you a name in a national agency check of some-
one who had recently joined the PLP, and had peneteated the Army, which is
what they say they are going to do, would you have to answer no record?
Mr. NUGENT. Well, that is a hypothetical question, I realize, and to answer
hypotheticals is rather difficult, but if that name were submitted today and that
individual had joined such an organization last week, I would say that the pos-
sibilities of our coming up with that name in a name check situation would be
practically remote.
Mr. YOUNG. Not because you weren't able to do it, but because you weren't
permitted to, is that it?
Mr. NUGENT. Well, we just wouldn't have the currency of information with
respect to that organization which has been closed now for three years. The
membership of that particular group and any other would have changed two times
in that period of three years, and we wouldn't have the identities of the
membership.
Mr. YOUNG. Since the regulations were issued, have you had any instance of
the United States Army giving you,a name and asking for information relative to
whether or not this person was an infiltrator from the PLO?
Mr. NUGENT. No, sir, we haven't, to my knowledge. Maybe Mr. Perrine could
recall one on a name check basis. I don't get involved in the name check process
per se.
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Mr. PERRINE. Mr. Young, the mechanics would be that the Department of
Defense or the Army would submit a form, either 1584, one of the routine forms
requesting a check of our files. This would be initiating the national agency check.
So unless they had some real special reason to flag the organization, we would
have no way of knowing beyond our normal search procedure, which would be for
any reference in our fdes, and if the information were not in our files, they would
get a no record return.
Mr. YOUNG. But the possibility of that person being what the Army suspected,
that he was one of the PLO's infiltrators
Mr. PERRINE. Would go undetected.
Mr. YOUNG. That worries me. Does that worry you?
MT. PERRINE. Certainly.
Mr. Young. Well, I am certainly glad it worries more than just me.
There has been previous testimony before this Committee that the FBI closed
the case on the Maryland Ku Klux Klan shortly before Maryland State Police
arrested a number of the leaders of the group in a plot to bomb churches, Jewish
temples and the home of a Member of Congress.
If the State Police had not had Sergeant John Cook under cover in this violent
group, they very likely would have been able to bring off this act of terrorism.
?Now, if someone had joined the Maryland Klan after you closed that case,
and had then applied for security clearance, would you have had any information
to supply in a national agency check?
Mr. PERRINE. Probably not unless it came from other sources, another investi-
gative service who may have forwarded it to our agency, but as an active investiga?
tion on the part of the FBI, as Mr. Nugent indicated, no.
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