LETTER (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00530R000200320001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 5, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

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1 CIslhationadlbAccademy of Public Administration
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, D.C.
Dear Rick,
July 5, 1988
Enclosed are copies of material prepared for the July 12
NAPA Panel meeting. We would like any comments the SSG has
on this material by noon, July 7.
The enclosures are:
--Paper on the future mission of the IC agencies as
it impacts human resource planning. (S)
--Paper on the uniqueness of the IC agencies in the
Federal civil service. (U)
(C)
--Paper on staffing issues. (C)
--Paper on training and career development issues.
--Paper on personnel security issues. (C)
--An outline of conclusions to be included in the
September 1 report to Congress.
The analysis on creating a more diverse workforce has not
been completed. This issue will therefore be considered at
the Panel's next meeting.
Also enclosed for information is dcopy of the agenda for
the Panel meeting.
In addition to substantive comments on these papers, please
confirm the classification levels assigned to this material.
Sincerely,
Don Wortman
Enclosures: As Stated
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#231/4July1988
1120 G Street, N.W., Suite 540 Washington, D.C. 20005 [phone]
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ,PERSONNEL STUDY
INTELLIGENCE UNIQUENESS
Background
With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the
Central Intelligence Act of 1949 the Congress recognized the need
to maintain a secret foreign intelligence program. Congress
provided extraordinary authorities to the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) for protecting sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure and for coordinating foreign intelligence
collection.
"Uniqueness" of intelligence is founded on three central
themes: secrecy of operation, protection of sources and methods,
and National Security. The following excerpt from an April 1,
1988 Court of Appeals, Fourth District, in U.S. v Morison
capsulizes the substance of this point:
"National Security is Public Security, not government
security from informed criticism.... Intelligence gathering
is critical to the formation of sound (public) policy and
becomes more so every year with the refinement of technology
and growing threat of terrorism. Electronic surveillance
prevents surprise attack by hostile forces and facilitates
international peace-keeping and arms control efforts.
Confidential diplomatic exchanges are the essence of
international relations. None of these activities can go
forward without secrecy. When the identity of intelligence
agents are known, they may be killed. When our surveillance
activities are revealed, counter measures can be taken to
circumvent them. When other nations fear that confidences
exchanged at the bargaining table will only become
embarrassments in the press, our diplomats are left
helpless. When terrorists are advised of our intelligence,
they can avoid apprehension and escape retribution."
"Uniqueness" of intelligence work has been repeatedly
recognized in public records. For example, Senator Durenburger,
addressing the U.S. Senate as Chair of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, stated, after a detailed listing to the Senate of
the impact of intelligence work on'IC personnel and families, "In
short, intelligence is unlike any other work in government ...
their responsibilities are unique". Similarly, the court order
rendered in the Pittman case held, "the CIA, because of its unique
and specialized function, was granted by Congress authority to
formulate its own personnel policies consistent with the unique
needs of the Agency."
This "uniqueness" is formally reCb-gnized in that all
principal intelligence agencies covered by the National Academy of
Public Administration (NAPA) study (except INR/State) are excepted
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by law or executive authority from all or part of Title V of the
competitive civil service on various grounds, including (a) the
special sensitivity of classified missions, (b) consequent
requirements for secrecy, (c) a high degree of personnel
selectivity for specialized tasks, and (d) need to protect the
covert nature and identity of foreign intelligence operatives.
These exceptions have been granted over time, i.e., from a 1941
Executive Order excepting the FBI; to direct legislated exclusions
for CIA under the National Security Act 1947 and CIA Act 1949; the
National Security Agency under the National Security Act of 1959
(Public Laws 86-36 as amended) and PL 88-290; and the Defense
Intelligence Agency and Military Intelligence Agencies under
Public Laws 98-618, 99-145, and 99-569.
Further, the record contains Comptroller general decisions
and OPM decisions over time which also recognize the need for
exception. Congress has provided selective exemption to
intelligence agencies from reporting requirements levied by and on
other executive agencies with respect to various functions.
Another example is that all of the main intelligence agencies
exercise independent policies and procedures for terminating
employees and these have been upheld by the courts.
To further illustrate the uniqueness argument, the attached
table provided by CIA, lists the restrictions that each IC agency
places on its staff because of the nature of the intelligence
mission and compares these restrictions to the non-intelligence
executive branch agencies.
Discussion
It is true that the IC agencies are substantially different
from other government and private organizations. However, many
other government organizations can establish their uniqueness and
also limitations placed on their staff due to agency mission. The
Security and Exchange Commission lawyer working on a stock market
insider trading case faces restrictions on social life, on taking
work home, and on making financial investments. The National
Institutes of Health AIDs researcher faces unique personal risks
in the laboratory. The Bureau of Prisons requires frequent
geographic moves of professional staff who aspire to senior
positions in the Bureau; a requirement that creates significant
family strains.
These and other agencies can properly claim that their
uniqueness and the demands placed on their staff require special
personnel policies. Also it must be recognized that the nature of
the staff and the risks faced by the staff in the IC agencies have
changed significantly over the past 40 years. The increasingly
technical nature of intelligence activities has created a ,
significantly different workforce than existed when CIA was
established.
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The "Not Official Cover" positions and the para-military
operations officers are now a far smaller proportion of the total
IC community staff. Much of the current staff have skills and
perform work comparable in many ways to that performed in other
government agencies and private sector organizations. And in
fact, the arguments made in recent years for special personnel
authorities for DIA and the military intelligence agencies have
not been based on the uniqueness of the intelligemce activity but
rather on the need for greater personnel management flexibility in
order to be able to better able to compete with the other IC
agencies for quality staff.
For example, in a period when Federal pay has been
progressively less competitive, CIA and NSA have successfully
hired and retained, both in numbers and quality, engineers,
computer scientists, and mathematicians. ?This success is largely
due to the ability of these agencies to independently recruit for
staff without the constraints of the general civil service system,
including the ability to establish occupationally specific salary
schedules.
Similarly, the ability to dismiss staff with relative ease,
while not used in a large number of cases, has enhanced the
ability to manage these organizations.
NAPA Staff Views
It is clear that the special personnel authority granted to.
the IC agencies has been increasingly used to meet market, and to
some extent employee morale, needs. These concerns appear to far
out-weigh security and personal risk considerations.
In the judgment of the staff, the change in the nature of the
intelligence activity calls for a change in the criteria for
establishing special personnel authorities for the IC agencies. A
distinction needs to be made between the personnel management
flexibilities needed to effectively manage and the need for
special benefits for some staff engaged in the intelligence
activity.
It is clearly essential to the IC agencies that these
personnel management flexibilities which enhance the ability to
manage these organizations be retained. However a distinction
should be made between this essential management flexibility and
the need for special treatment in terms of better benefits for IC
staff because of their uniqueness.
Special treatment of IC staff, as compared to non-IC civil
servants, should be limited to those persons in the IC agencies
who are truly unique. This will require developing a rationale to
identify people warranting special tre.itment. For example, the
need to work in deep cover or where post-retirement employment
opportunities are severely limited might call for special
treatment for the affected staff.
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? Any rationale developed will have to be regularly
reexamined. However the overall guide should be to limit truly
special treatment of staff to the relatively few who truly serve
in unique positions and situations.
The SSCI and the HPSCI should authorize special pay and
benefits only for IC staff who meet the defined rationale. Other
staff should receive benefits comparable to the overall civil
service.
Attachment: As Stated
228/2 July 1988
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL STUDY
OVERVIEW OF STAFFING ISSUES
Recruitment and Retention of Critical Skills
The Intelligence Community (IC) Agencies report that they
have been able to satisfy most of their critical skill
requirements (engineers, computer scientists, mathematicians and
linguists) despite a highly competitive market. CIA and NSA have
been especially successful and both have sophisticated and
effective recruiting mechanisms. DIA, FBI and the Military
Services hire fewer engineers, computer scientists and linguists,
but report greater recruitment difficulties. Also, DIA and many
service recruitment efforts are aimed at experienced,
full-performance professionals, whereas CIA and NSA concentrate
their efforts on recent college graduates at the entry level. CIA
and NSA attribute their recruiting success to three major reasons:
(1) their premium pay scales which make them competitive
with the private sector;
(2) a challenging and interesting work environment; and,
(3) good advancement and career opportunities.
Difficulties in filling engineering, S&T, computer science
and mathematics jobs experienced by some agencies (notably the
military services) result primarily from higher salaries and
better career opportunities elsewhere, including elsewhere in the
IC. CIA and NSA report having difficulty in hiring the highest
quality critical skill college graduates and top individuals with
advance degrees. The salary and benefits packages they are able
to offer simply cannot compete.
All agencies have problems recruiting linguists, due
primarily to the small pool of potential applicants. Requirements
for native or near-native language capability, especially in the
esoteric, Slavic, Far East, Near East and Mid East languages are
very hard to satisfy. FBI has difficulties recruiting agents with
bi-lingual capability, especially Spanish. Security requirements,
which make many foreign-born or native speaking linguists
ineligible for employment, compound the problem. One solution, as
advocated and practiced by NSA, is to hire individuals with an
aptitude for and interest in languages and train them in the
languages needed. Although it has proven successful, this is a
time-consuming and costly process.
The military services report thaihey are not able to
effectively compete with the private sector for ex-military
personnel with requisite knowledge and experience. Higher salary
offers and the dual compensation limitations on military retirees
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are the major problems. The services are becoming increasingly
concerned about the diminishing direct military experience among
their civilian workforce.
Most IC organizations experience continuing problems
recruiting and retaining secretaries/clerical and other such
support people, especially in the large metropolitan high-cost
areas. Higher salaries attract away many candidates, and many of
the best on-board employees leave for the same reason. High
turnover of support people in large urban areas is a fact of life,
however, and, special rates of pay notwithstanding, will likely
continue in the future. The problem is not as severe in areas of
smaller populations. NSA, for example, located near but not
directly in a major metropolitan area enjoys relative stability
among its clerical workforce.
NAPA Staff Views
Although the problem of hiring qualified and experienced
ex-military personnel is of growing concern to the military
services, the staff does not believe that there is sufficient
justification to seek exception from the dual compensation
limitations for the military intelligence organizations. Such
action would undoubtedly spur similar requests for exception
throughout the government. The services would be better served by
concentrating their efforts on the recruitment of ex-military who
are not retirees and to work to retain them by providing good
career opportunities and a good job environment.
Quality of Hires
CIA and NSA have been able to attract and hire at a quality
level which equals or exceeds any past hiring experience. DIA is
also satisfied with its overall quality, especially with its
intelligence specialists, but does have some difficulty with
respect to the engineering and S&T skills. The FBI is selective
in its hiring of agents, but also experiences problems in
attracting sufficient number of quality technical applicants.
The Military Services, have a great deal of difficulty
attracting engineers, computer scientists and mathematicians.
With the exception of AF jobs at Electronic Security Command (ESC)
and Foreign Technology Division (FTD), hiring is focused on
experienced, full performance candidates. Low salaries and
limited career potential find the services at a distinct
disadvantage when competing with the private sector and other
government agencies, including other IC agencies. ESC and FTD
fare somewhat better as they recruit at the entry level anq their
postions are located in lower-cost of I.:lying areas.
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NAPA Staff Views
The staff believes that notwithstanding the overall high
quality of IC personnel, IC agencies are rarely able to compete
for the truly outstanding technical skills personnel. Whether it
be the top 10 percent of the graduates of the best engineering
schools in the country, a top PhD mathematician or other highly
skilled technical professional, salary and benefits that the IC
agencies are able to offer simply do not measure up. It is a rare
case when a top quality applicant decides that dedication to the
national security mission outweighs a fat pay check and generous
benefits.
Looking ahead, flexibility is the key. Assuming availability
of adequate applicant pools and the effective use of proven
employment screening processes, input of high quality hires should
be possible so long as the IC agencies continue to be given the
management flexibility to compete in the future job market.
Attrition
Attrition rates within the IC agencies are all well below the
national average for the private sector and the US government
average. CIA is 4.7 percent, NSA 5 percent, FBI 8.2 percent and
DIA 8.7 percent. Turnover of support personnel generally runs
considerably higher in all agencies, but this is typical of other
organizations, especially in the larger urban areas.
The military services intelligence agencies experience
somewhat higher attrition, but they have no specific data due to
their assorted record keeping and reporting systems. Only the
military agencies emphasized that the staff they werellosing were
among their quality staff. They believed they were losing some of
their best staff, many to other agencies in the IC.
While losses were not a large proportion of the total
workforce, any loss is costly, given initial recruitment and
processing expenses. The CIA estimates these figures to be in
excess of $11,000 per hire. Also, mission is affected when
billets go unfilled for any length of time.
NAPA Staff Views
No organization likes to lose the staff they believe to be
among their best and brightest. Within the IC, there is the added
factor of the time it takes to recruit and the cost of security
clearances, so agencies want to retain their high quality people.
- Considering the low attrition rat eg -and the fact that only
the military services said they are losing their top staff, it
appears that this is not a major issue. Given the reported high
quality of the staff recruited, it may be that the agency-wide top
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quality eases some of the problems associated with losing
particularly effective staff.
Future Staffing Needs
All IC agencies see advancing technology as having
significant effect on their future workforces. More sophisticated
systems and greater complexity of skills will require finding and
hiring people who possess the requisite skills. Computer literacy
will be vital for many jobs.
NSA forecasts a need for people to possess a blend of skills,
rather than the single skill of most specialists of today. CIA
predicts that advancing technology will produce a need for more
engineers and engineer support personnel, as well as growth in
counterintelligence and arms control requirements. FBI foresees a
requirement for more foreign language qualified people, especially
special agents, due to the growing international aspects of
counterintelligence, international terrorism, and criminal and
legal attache programs. Technical advances in fingerprinting and
information processing will also require people with better skills.
The demographics of the future US workforce is also of
concern. The decline in the birthrate at the end of the "baby
boom" will result in fewer college graduates in the 1990's, hence
increased competition for the available talent. An increase in
the number of foreign born college graduates, especially in the
scientific and technical area, will likely further reduce the
shrinking pool of eligible candidates. More effective recruiting
mechanisms and incentives will have to be developed to meet this
future challenge.
Cooperation With the IC on Staffing
The view of the NAPA staff is that there is very little
cooperation or coordination exists on staffing matters within the
IC. The only formal mechanism in being is the Defense
Intelligence Career Automated System (DISCAS), which is used
primarily by DIA and to a lesser extent by the military services.
Each agency concentrates on meeting its own hiring requirements,
which vary from one agency to another. No attempt is made to
share employment information or to refer potential candidates when
a hiring requirement does not materialize. In times of large
hiring programs, there are likely few good candidates to refer who
are not given job offers, but in times of litle or no growth, such
referrals might prove very beneficial. Also, the sharing of
information on hiring techniques and strategies, as well as the
possible sharing of recruitment resources might prove beneficial.
Impact of Changing Authorization Levels
Most agencies of the IC have experienced wide fluctuations in
authorized strengths over the past 20 years, and these
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fluctuations have affected mission accomplishment and workforce
structure. Only the military service intelligence organizations
have escaped these rather radical changes in authorized strength.
CIA, NSA and DIA experienced large personnel reductions in
the 1970s following the end of the war in Southeast Asia. This
resulted in serious loss of intelligence capability in many
areas. Cuts in DIA, for example, reduced them to one-deep in
analysts and completely eliminated any capability to generate
product on many areas of the world, notably the Third World
countries and Latin America.
The rapid and sizeable buildup in the IC agencies beginning
in 1981 and continuing through 1987 has had a great impact.
Agencies did not achieve the productivity authorized because of
the many vacancies which existed until the recruitment process
could catch up. Also, experienced staff had to be diverted from
operational missions to train the large numbers of new,
inexperienced employees being hired.
The workforce structure at NSA, in terms of age and length of
service, was greatly affected by these severe changes in
authorized strength. Today, because of the large hiring programs
in the 1980's, 40 percent of that agency's total strength have
under five years of service, and 50 percent are under age 35. At
the same time, 29 percent of NSA employees have over 20 years of.
service and most of these will be eligible to retire within the
next 10 years. NSA will likely be faced with difficult management
problems as older workers leave the workforce and there is a dirth
of experienced middle and senior level managers and technicians
ready to take their place.
The staff notes that strength fluctuations are inevitably the
result of budget and political considerations and are often passed
along to IC agencies as "fair share" reductions, seemingly without
regard to their impact on national security priorities. If cuts
must be made for overriding political considerations, then the
Intelligence Committees of the Congress and the President must
realign priorities consistent with those adjustments.
NAPA Staff Conclusions and Recommendations
There is no doubt that the success in hiring critical skill
personnel enjoyed by CIA and NSA in recent years was made possible
by their management ability to remain competitive through
effective use of their authorities to set special salaries where
needed. Since DIA obtained similar special authorities in 1984,
their recruitment problems have eased. The military services have
also recently been granted like authoriaes, and the NAPA staff
recommend that Congress grant the same authorities to the FBI,
thus putting all the major members of the IC on equal terms as
regard their basic personnel authorities.
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The NAPA staff also recommend that all IC agencies be allowed
to freely use their special authorities to solve their respective
problems in meeting staffing goals. This will be especially
important if they are to be competitive in the expected difficult
future job market. A clear delineation should be made as to the
scope and extent of such authorities, and thereafter oversight
should concentrate on equitable application of pay and staffing
policy and practices with the Community.
The NAPA staff recommend that an IC Inter-Agency Working
Group be established to examine the feasibility of developing a
mechanism to share staffing and staffing related information and
resources. An applicant referral system, exchange of recruitment
strategies and ideas, and a possible sharing of staffing resources
could result. For .example, focusing attention of the problems of
hiring linguists could well prove beneficial to all concerned.
Finally, the NAPA staff recommend that Congress be especially
sensitive to the impact on the IC Agencies of severe 'fluctuations
in authorized strengths. The inverted bell-shaped curve of NSA's
staff in terms of years of service and age places inordinate
pressure on that organization in developing the next generation of
managers and senior experts. If reductions in staff do occur as a
result of government-wide policies or if tasks continue to
increase while staffing remains level, then it is incumbent on the
Intelligence Committees to assist in reordering priorities.
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL STUDY:
OVERVIEW OF TRAINING AND CAREER. DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
All agencies of the Intelligence Community (IC) conform to
the policies of the Government Employees Training Act which are
supplemented by directives and regulations of their parent
departments and/or individual agencies. In most intelligence
agencies, training is seen as primarily a management
responsibility; supervisors assess the needs of subordinates and
initiate training or prepare development/training plans-, -a process
in which subordinates may usually elect to take part. Although in
CIA the supervisor is also responsible for securing the immediate
training of subordinates to ensure they perform effectively,
primary responsibility is placed on the individual to be alert to
training opportunities and to take the initiative toward
self-improvement.
Overview of Training Programs: In general the curricula
offered by providers of training of IC agencies- are rich in
variety and extensive in the numbers of who are.trained,each
year. Based on the data provided and discussion with IC agencies
representatives, it appears the training given for Intelligence
Community personnel may rank at the top of the Executive-Branch.
In some areas training is critical to mission accomplishment.
Without the unique courses of NSA's National Cryptologic School in
cryptanalysis, traffic analysis, cryptomathematics, intelligence
reporting and computer science applications, NSA could not carry
out its SIGINT missions. Similarly, without the operations or
tradecraft training given by CIA's Office of Training and
Education, the several organizations engaged in HUMINT could not
carry out their missions.
CIA, DIA, NSA and the FBI each have their own training
capability through a central provider of training which is
supplemented by training by other components in selected areas of
specialization. Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence personnel
receive both general and cryptographic training in specialized
schools under the commands responsible for training across each of
the military services; major emphasis is on training uniformed
personnel at the tactical level, not civil personnel on joint,
strategic or national level intelligence.
In terms of annual investment of staff time in training
status, in fiscal year 1987, NSA was the leader with an average of
13 days per employee. In contrast, naval intelligence civilians
received an average of slightly over orie day of training. CIA was
highest in expenditures for external training with an average of
$435 per employee, followed by NSA's $335 per employee.
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Comparable data are not available for all IC organizational
elements, but is clear that expenditures for military service
intelligence civilians lag far behind.
Overview of Career Development: As with training, the career
development programs of IC agencies are extremely varied. NSA, in
terms of coverage of its personnel, and the exceptional
integration of training, career development and related planning
processes for human resource management, may well have the most
highly developed system within the Executive Branch. NSA's
professionalization program which certifies employee qualification
in different career fields through training and developmental
assignments, its intern program of three years for up to 400 new
hires at any one time, and its senior executive program for
approximately 60 participants for up to three years are
supplemented by other career development programs and activities.
The career development program for FBI Foreign
Counterintelligence (FCI) personnel is the same as for all Bureau
employees: career development is synonymous with management
development of special agents. The management development track
has a well-articulated progression of assignments of increasing
responsibility interpersed with subject matter and management
training.
CIA does not have an overall career development program for
its employees. With its decentralized career service system for
each of the four directorates and the Director's area, there are
several programs which range from minimal to highly developed.
For agency elements which have well-developed career programs,
such as the Science and Technology and the Intelligence
Directorates, training and career development are closely linked.
CIA reports that work is underway to develop the tools needed to
strengthen planning aspects of human resource management.
Career development has been mandated for intelligence
civilian employees of the Army, Navy and Air Force under the
DOD-wide Intelligence Career Development Program. Responsibility
for career development falls, however, on the immediate supervisor
who frequently lacks knowledge of training and the capability for
getting subordinates into training: Implementation of career
development plans is regarded by many supervisors as at odds with
mission accomplishment; training and/or developmental assignments
for an employee means not only a temporary loss of services, but
is usually followed by permanent loss through transfer to one of
the larger intelligence agencies or to private sector
organizations.
Cooperation on Training and Careek'Development: Cooperation
on training, career development and personnel management matters
among the IC agencies of the Intelligence Community is quite
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limited. At the meeting with NAPA Staff on 29 February-1 March
1988 many IC agency representatives commented that the meeting was
particularly valuable as it was an opportunity to exchange
information and views about their organizations and to learn about
problems they faced in common. The current lack of structured
contact between agencies limits the effectiveness of the
Intelligence Community as a whole in training, career development
and human resource management. The causes appear to derive from a
sense of individual agency self-sufficiency and a lack of
awareness of the benefits to be derived from cooperation to the
Community as a whole and to each individual organization. NAPA
staff recommends that, in order to encourage greater sharing of
information and views and greater cooperation among training and
personnel specialists within the Intelligence Community, there be
established, under the DCID committee structure, a Committee on
Training and Career Development.
Understanding of Intelligence Work: Based on conversations
with training and career development personnel, it is clear that
many personnel of the Intelligence Community do not have a
rudimentary understanding of the Community and its missions and in
many instances lack a thorough grasp of how their organization
contributes to the broader IC missions. The situation inhibits
the ability of IC Agencies to perform their work on a fully
effective basis. The causes stem from parochialism, a sense of
self-sufficiency within agencies and historic factors involving a
misplaced sense of security requirements. NAPA staff recommends
that, to give employees across the Intelligence Community a more
accurate identity of their profession and an understanding as to
how their work contributes to the overall foreign intelligence
mission, inter-service and inter-agency orientation programs be
developed; the JCS-DIA orientation given by CIA is such a
program. NAPA staff also recommends the opening of training
courses to a greater extent than at present to personnel outside
the training provider's parent organization.
Lifting of Training Limitations: The Government Employees
Training Act, prohibits government support of training (paying of
tuition or permission to attend training during regular duty
hours) for the sole purpose of obtaining a degree or for training
courses which are not related to the incumbent's current job or
identified next assignment. National Security Agency
representatives observe that lifting of the GETA restrictions
would enable NSA to compete more effectively with firms in private
industry, which promise prospective new hires support for
obtaining graduate degrees, in attracting high potential persons
in hard-to-hire fields in science and technology. Representatives
of several agencies noted that GETA restrictions inhibit
developing the careers of personnel whOirhave high potential but
lack education. The effects of the restrictions are to place
limitations on the government as employer and on the potential of
Intelligence Community employees.
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NAPA staff recommends that the NAPA Panel consider support
for the DOD legislative proposal to authorize government payment
for a degree.
Strengthening Career Development: In CIA the lack of an
overall career development policy and program, stemming from the
decentralized career service system, has hobbled human resource
management planning and career development activities which cross
career service boundaries. This issue was addressed by the CIA
Human Resource Task Force which in 1986 studied all aspects of
human resource management in CIA. NAPA staff recommends
implementation of the proposal of the Task Force for an
agency-wide career development policy and the establishment of a
"corporate" planning-support staff. Reporting to top management,
such a staff element would: develop agency-wide policies;
undertake research and planning in such areas as workforce
projection; provide staff support to cross-directorate programs
such as developmental assignments and succession planning; and
arrange expert assistance on career development matters for the
career services and sub-groups.
The limited or inadequate career development programs for
military service intelligence civilians, as compared with the
highly developed programs of some IC agencies, has been discussed
above. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1987 authorized the
Secretary of Defense to establish a separate excepted service
civilian personnel management system (CIPMS) for the intelligence
elements of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Service representatives
expect the new system to improve the training and career
management of military intelligence civilians. NAPA staff suggest
that the Panel register support for the full and early
implementation of CIPMS. Even with CIPMS, civilian career
development within military intelligence will remain the primary
responsibility of supervisors who receive little professional
assistance. NAPA staff also recommends that there be established
within each of the three services' principal intelligence units a
central staff capability for planning, providing information,
consulting and training of supervisors on career development
matters.
More Effective Use of Resources: All lc agencies supplement
their internal training programs by sending employees to external
training which is not available or less costly than that inside
government. External training includes courses supplied by
vendors, often in response to new or special requirments. For
example, agencies use vendors to provide personnel with training
on automated intelligence dissemination and other unique ADP
systems. Supervisory training adapted to intelligence environment
is another example. Like government d'entracting in general, the
process for letting contracts with a prospective vendor is
laborious and time-consuming. DIA is currently working on a new
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system to replace awarding of individual contracts with a Basic
Ordering Agreement under which a number of vendogs.will,have.?
competed and been cleared to provide classified,
intelligence-related training, after which approved they could be
tasked by purchase order to provide individual courses. NAPA
staff believes that the Basic Ordering Agreement system would be
more efficient and timely. NAPA staff recommends that, in order
to ensure that IC agencies' funds for external training be
expended with maximum utility, DIA by authorized to establishing
an intelligence training revolving fund. (Establishing a
revolving fund would require statutory authority.)- Such a
'revolving fund, coupled with DIA's proposed Basic Ordering
Agreement, would promote efficiency by .assisting IC agencies to
pool training requirements and funds for intelligence-related
external training.
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL STUDY
OVERVIEW OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ISSUES
Personnel security programs in the intelligence agencies
operate under the Director of Central Intelligence Directive on
"Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing
Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information" (DCID
1/14). This is supplemented by internal agency procedures.
DCID 1/14 provides specific requirements, and many portions of
it are applied in the same manner. For example, the adjudication
guidelines are supplemented with community-wide courses that most
adjudication staff will attend. Thus, while there remains an
element of individual judgment, security managers believe staff are
exposed to a common frame of reference.
In other areas, the requirements are applied quite differently.
The NAPA review of personnel security did not evaluate the varying
security procedures in terms of their potential impact on national
security, but did examine the disparate practices to see if they
made a difference in human resource or operational activities.
The four subjects discussed here are the: level of
investigation done for access to SCI; timeframes for security
investigations; agency policies about accepting one anothers'
clearances; and variations in the procedures for handling staff who
are involuntarily removed from an IC agency.
Level of Investigation Done for SCI Access
Each of the seven agencies (CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI, Army, Navy and
Air Force) have slightly different clearance procedures, with the
three services being similar to one another.
The five year periodic reinvestigation (PR) requirement in DCID
1/14 states that, as a minimum, the PR should include: appropriate
national and local agency checks (and overseas, if pertinent);
credit checks; and a personal interview if necessary to resolve
significant adverse information or inconsistencies. Agency
procedures add to these requirements. CIA and NSA include field
investigations and a polygraph, in addition to records checks
similar to those for the initial investigation. The FBI conducts a
credit and arrest record check and a review of personnel records.
Procedures for DOD agencies are similar to those of NSA and CIA, but
without the polygraph.
For initial clearance, procedures,are similar to those in the
PR in each agency. The exception is the FBI, which does a
full-field on all staff before they enter on duty. Also when staff
move from criminal to foreign counterintelligence work, the FBI
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reviews the personnel record if the staff member E0Di'd in the past
five years. If they entered before that, the FBI adds a
credit/arrest check and a National Agency. Check (NAC) for immediate
family members before granting SCI access.
Length of Security Processing Times
There was not a great deal.of data to support anecdotal
statements that lengthy security processing time causes the agencies
to lose qualified applicants. Medians and ranges (depending on how
data was kept by agencies) for security processing times are:
Agency Median Range of Time
CIA 2 1/2 months
NSA* 5 months
DIA* 3 months for DIS,
3 weeks for DIA
FBI 1 to 2 months
MI agencies* 6 to 12 months
*Field work done by the Defense
Investigative Service (DIS)
CIA statistics on the status of applicant cases indicate that
there are very few losses (16 percent) during employment processing,
and these are for all reasons, not just security processing. In
contrast, the FBI indicated that applicants for special agent
positions generally understood processing timeframes -- again, not
all security-related -- but even among this group they encounter
increasing numbers of skilled candidates who cannot wait a long time
for an offer. The problem is especially critical for applicants for
computer related and electronic engineering positions in
headquarters. The Bureau "regularly loses the opportunity to.
compete for some of these people" because of preemployment
processing requirements.
NSA maintains that the five months for security processing are
essential for a thorough investigation. As the only IC agency whose
personnel security program has a statutory base, NSA cannot issue
interim SCI access clearances. NSA can make a modified commitment
to hire after a favorable polygraph', and after an NAC can issue a
Limited Interim Clearance. This permits NSA to bring someone on
board before the SBI is completed. While such new staff members
cannot work in areas requiring SCI clearances, they can take entry
training courses and work in other areas, and NSA doesn't risk
losing a good recruit. NSA emphasized that very few staff granted a
Limited Interim Clearance are later denied SCI access.
DIA noted that security processing7-teans there is a long
vacancy period for positions that must-be filled from outside the
agency. To avoid losing clerical staff, DIA brings them on board in
non-sensitive positions and begins the security processing .
afterwards.
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The military intelligence agencies, as might be expected from
their timeframes, most often mentioned losing good candidates
because of the security processing delays. Staff indicated some
applicants went to other IC agencies, which could process clearances
faster.
NAPA staff views
While it is not clear that the IC agencies lose a lot of good
applicants because of delays in security processing, the staff
believe the intelligence agencies lose a great deal of
mission-related flexibility if they cannot bring new staff on board
as quickly as they need them. No matter how effectively the
agencies anticipate world events and estimate workforce needs
accordingly, they cannot predict the full range of, for example,
terrorist activities or popular uprisings. They thus need to be
able to add new expertise when needed -- often quickly -- and the
security investigation timeframes may sometimes inhibit this.
Security procedures must be sufficiently rigorous to give the
agencies full confidence in their accuracy. However, the NAPA staff
believe that there may be room for innovation -- such as that
employed by NSA in issuing Limited Interim Clearances. The staff
further suggests that agencies examine their processing times and
determine whether the timeframes are due to thorough investigative
procedures, backlogs or other factors.
Given the "farm club" image the military intelligence agencies
have of themselves because they lack career opportunities for their
civilian staff and the length of time it takes to clear new
employees -- six to nine months -- it is amazing they can function
as well as they do. Corrective action on the clearance delays must
proceed immediately and DIS should be protected from arbitrary force
reductions unrelated to its workload. To the extent that the
timeframe is largely due to processing in the Defense Investigative
Service, these IC agencies should work together with that service
to address these issues.
Policies About Accepting Other Agencies' Clearances
Only the military intelligence agencies immediately accept the
clearances of other agencies. Other agencies will usually review an
individual's file and supplement prior investigative work. For
example, the CIA administers a polygraph and may do other field work
to bring the investigation work to their clearance standards.
The Army administers a polygraph for their staff going on
special assignment to NSA, CIA and critical intelligence positions
at DIA. The DIA has locally availableSCI access-cleared'
candidates, come in for an interview. They have found that this may
be the first interview for some candidates, and information
uncovered makes them unsuitable for SCI access in DIA. This
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information is passed to the current hiring agency, and the
potential employee is not hired. If the interview is favorable, the
security staff will clear the candidate and then review the
investigation file once the candidate is on board. They do this to
determine whether there is data they want to monitor.
NAPA staff views
The staff believe this reticence to immediately accept one
anothers' clearances to be a result of the disparity among the
agencies' investigation requirements. Because the NAPA staff did
not do an efficiency evaluation, it did not develop data needed to
estimate whether this practice leads to wasted funds or adds to
investigation processing delays. However, as stated above the staff
believe that the level of investigation required for access to SCI
should be the same throughout the intelligence community.
The major difference between IC agencies in investigation
procedures involves the use of the polygraph and the lack of a
periodic background investigation of FBI FCI staff. While there is
no indication that these differences are resulting in security
problems, they do limit flexible use of staff between agencies and
create a lower level of certainty of staff security where agencies
have lesser initial investigation or reinvestigation requirements.
The NAPA staff recommends the IC agencies establish greater
uniformity in investigation procedures in order to facilitate ready
clearance of staff between agencies. The intelligence agencies
could then immediately accept one anothers' investigations as the
basis for Agency security determinations.
Variations in Handling Staff who are Involuntarily Removed
Given the caliber of staff in the intelligence agencies, it is
rare that organizations are faced with involuntary removal of their
employees. Data provided NAPA staff indicate relatively few adverse
actions.
The DCID 1/14 says only that, "A determination of ineligibility
for individuals who currently hold SCI access shall result in
immediate debriefing and termination of access for cause." Reasons
for involuntary removal include criminal acts, unapproved marriage
or continuing association with a foreign national, espionage,
mishandling classified information or material, illegal drug use,
unsatisfactory performance, gross misconduct or medical discharge.
The procedures for assessing the potential national security risk
posed by disgruntled former employees differ somewhat, but address
many of the same factors.
What differs most is how the agen6Ies handle employees once the
decision has been made to remove them involuntarily. Some agencies
expend more effort on outplacement, in an effort to resolve employee
bitterness and potential risk to the agency before termination.
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The CIA requires that the employee's office complete a risk
assessment for staff considered for removal or access denial, and
this is assessed by a review panel. The FBI, which is reviewing
this area, received a briefing on the CIA system. The CIA has only
limited outplacement assistance, the FBI has no formal program.
NSA does a similar security review when considering involuntary
outplacement, and has developed a Crisis Intervention Program to
"prevent counterintelligence emergencies caused by desperate or
resentful affiliates or ex-affiliates." Because of staff
limitations, the program is not fully developed.
DIA assesses potential impact in a similar fashion. If they
judge an employee to be a security risk if terminated immediately,
DIA places the staff in a less sensitive position for six months to
a year. At the end of that time, the sensitive data to which the
employee had access will be desensitizedl and the person can be
removed. The military services have similar risk review processes,
but staff were not_aware of outplacementlor counseling opportunities.
NAPA staff views
The staff recognizes that there is no precise method for
assessing an involuntarily removed employee's risk to national
security. This is a matter of judgment, and the agencies have
developed approaches which they believe can minimize risks. The
NAPA staff recommends the IC agencies develop a more proactive
effort to assess the risk created by involuntary separation of
staff. There may be a need for more effort to minimize employee
resentment and assist them in adjusting to the involuntary removal.
While on the surface this may appear to be a purely humane act and
not the responsibility of an intelligence agency, there are very
practical reasons for not wanting angry former staff -- who are soon
out of touch with their former employer -- planning acts of
vengeance.
ConclUding Thoughts
The IC agencies did not provide any data which indicates there
are any significant adverse impacts caused by the security program
on the ability of the IC agencies to recruit and retain high quality
staff. No major adverse impacts were found in the recruitment area,
although the FBI and the military service agencies cite anecdotal
evidence of problems. Data, where available, shows no adverse
impact on retention of quality staff.
The NAPA staff's recommendations in the personnel secuKity can
be implemented by the intelligence agendIes. Most of the ideas
would be better pursued with the Intelligence Community Staff, or a
group of the IC agencies' choice, moderating the decision making.
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While NSA's personnel security program is rooted in a statute, the
staff do not believe this need be done for other agencies. Thus,
the staff have no recommendations for congressional action in this
area.
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Suggested Content of September 1 Report
1. Panel conclusions on future mission and uniqueness; degree of
management flexibility required
2. Panel conclusions and recommendations in staffing area,
including:
--mission critical occupations
--turnover and retention problems in these occupations
--agency views of the quality of new hires.
--extent of recruitment coordination among agencies.
3. Panel conclusions and recommendations on training and career
development; specifically, how well each agency's training and
career development programs support current and projected future
agency mission accomplishment.
4. Panel conclusions and recommendations on personnel security;
specifically, the impact of personnel security requirements on
the ability of the IC agencies to recruit and retain top quality
staff.
5. CIA changes:
--leave changes
--administrative changes in awards program
--flexible benefits proposal
6. INR staffing problems; hiring and age of workforce.
7. Panel conclusions on SSCI's FY 89 NFIP comments re manpower
cost reductions.
153/4 July 88
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL STUDY
JULY 12, 1988, PANEL MEETING AGENDA
PHILLIP ODEEN - CHAIR
Location:
Telephone:
9:00-9:15
Room 412, Key Building
1200 Wilson Blvd., Rosslyn, VA.
Odeen
Wortman
Report on Activity since
April 1 Meeting
9:15-11:00
Presentation and Discussion
? of Tasks I-III:
--Future Mission of IC Agencies
--Workforce of the Future
--IC Agency Uniqueness
Wortman
11:00-11:15
Overview of Staff Studies
Yeager
11:15-12:30
Staffing--Presentation and Discussion
Sweet
12:30-1:15
Lunch
1:15-2:15
Training and Career Development
Presentation and Discussion
Smith
2:15-3:15
Personnel Security
Presentation and Discussion
Orr
3:15-3:30
Compensation and Benefits
Outline of Workplan ?
Howe
3:30-/:30
Discussion of Contents
of September Report
Odeen
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