SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND ORGANIZATIONS FOR PROPAGANDA AND INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01451R000200230001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
a ~tf ~ Directorate of Secret
Soviet Exploitation of
Religious Leaders and
Organizations for Propaganda
and Intelligence Purposes
A Research Paper
pPU7E7L`T NUNS ~o / b ,~ l
TYTP,L NUMBER OF O)PIFS
DISSEM DATE
n t
PAGE NUMBERS
Secret
SOV 88-I0025X
May 1988
Copy 384
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 : CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
Intelligence 25X1
Soviet Exploitation of
Religious Leaders and
Organizations for Propaganda
and Intelligence Purposes
This paper was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from
office of Leadership Analysis
It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Regional Policy Division, SOYA,
Reverse Blank
Secret
SOV 88-10025X
May 1988
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
Secret
Soviet Exploitation of
Religious Leaders and
Organizations for Propaganda
and Intelligence Purposes
Summary The Soviets have had considerable success in manipulating international
Information available religious organizations and shaping certain religious themes to support
as of 1 January 1988 Soviet foreign policy objectives. Using high-profile ecumenical gatherings
was used in this report.
and persistent personal interaction with Western and Third World reli-
gious leaders and organizations, Soviet churchmen have convinced a
significant number of their counterparts that "opinions" they express
(official propaganda) are independently derived and freely held, that Soviet
and Bloc religious figures enjoy a degree of societal prominence and
influence comparable to that of their Western colleagues, and that the
Soviet Government is working in earnest to secure and maintain a stable,
peaceful world.
Moscow has been largely unsuccessful, however, in exploiting Soviet
Central Asian Muslims to curry favor in the Islamic Third World. Except
in the radical, Soviet-allied Islamic nations, "official" Soviet Muslim
clerics are generally rebuffed for their subservience to an "atheist regime."
Moreover, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan has cost
Moscow much of the influence it had garnered in Islamic religious circles.
Under Gorbachev, Soviet propagandists appear to have been persuaded
that traditional active measures and propaganda activities have become
ineffectual among the more sophisticated target audiences of Western
Europe and North America. As traditional Soviet religious fronts such as
the Christian Peace Conference have lost credibility and influence in the
West, new methods and venues of access have taken their place. The
revamping of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department
under former Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin sug-
gests that propaganda activities aimed at religious audiences are likely to
become more nuanced and audience-specific. The creation and support of
so-called fronts of fronts-new, more flexible international organizations
aimed at members of specific professions or at specific issues-is one such
propaganda initiative.
In particular, Soviet propaganda organs are preparing a sophisticated
media blitz in 1988 to commemorate the Millenium of Christianity in
Russia (Kievan Rus'). While the regime's repression of domestic religious
activity continues unabated, the outward appearance of state tolerance will
be enhanced by the full cooperation of the official Soviet church hierarchy
during the Millenium celebration
Secret
SOV 88-10025X
May 1988
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
oV I CL
the Millenium also will be used as a forum to attack the US
Strategic Defense Initiative and to endorse Soviet disarmament proposals
in an effort to create the impression that Christian bodies in both the East
and the West are united in their opposition to US foreign policy.
The Soviet Government continues to regard Zionism as an effective US
tool for generating anti-Soviet sentiment in the West and subversive
activism within the indigenous Jewish population,
Soviet propagandists use a small number of "patriotic"
Jews to counter the negative publicity surrounding the plight of Soviet
Jews. Such persons often host visiting Western officials who hope to learn
more about the emigre problem.
Despite a gradually increasing level of communications, the long-term
standoff in Kremlin-Vatican relations has changed little under the papacy
of John Paul II. Likewise, the Russian Orthodox Church has maintained
correct, if not always cordial, relations with Roman Catholicism. John Paul
II's interest in overcoming denominational barriers presents an opportunity
for warmer East-West ecumenical ties, but Moscow's wariness of Vatican
support for Christian dissent within the Soviet Union makes significant
improvement unlikely. It is equally unlikely that John Paul II will be
allowed to travel to the Soviet Union for the Millenium celebration.
To the best of our knowledge, Soviet propagandists have not as yet made
many attempts to exploit directly the Marxist-influenced rhetoric of
liberation theology. Among Moscow's client states, however, Cuba appears
to have begun exploring the movement as a potential venue for social
destabilization in Latin America. Soviet fronts such as the Christian Peace
Conference have also provided sympathetic forums for the rhetoric of
liberation theology.
Russian Orthodox Church missions outside the Soviet Union were once
used extensively as stations for intelligence-gathering activities, but this
practice now appears to have been restricted mainly to closed areas, such as
Jerusalem. The payoff has always been of marginal significance, and the
risk of compromising the church's ostensible independence seems to have
outweighed potential benefits. The extent to which Russian Orthodox and
other religious bodies are used as intelligence covers remains unclear.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
Secret
The Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) 2
The Millenium of Christianity in Russia (988-1988) 5
Berlin Conference of European Catholics 19
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
OCLACL
Exploitation of
Religious Leaders and
Organizations for Propaganda
and Intelligence Purposes
Part of the domestic church-state arrangement pro-
vides that church leaders play the role of unofficial
goodwill representatives for the Soviet state in hosting
their Western and Third World counterparts on visits
to the USSR. State officials hope to disseminate
specific propaganda themes as well as to convey the
appearance of religious freedom for all believers in
Soviet society. The larger policy goal is for the foreign
religious envoys to bring home with them favorable
impressions of official tolerance and respect for
"believers' rights."
Over time, however, religious conferences in the Sovi-
et Union-hosted most often by the Russian Ortho-
dox Church-have come to be seen by many Western
religious leaders as predetermined media events. Sovi-
et churchmen are nonetheless quite successful at
attracting visiting delegations for a variety of reasons:
many well-intentioned clergymen believe that they
can convince Soviet political and religious leaders of
their sincere desire for mutual understanding and
accommodation; others recognize that they are being
manipulated by Soviet propaganda organs, but feel
that maintaining ties to coreligionists in the Soviet
Bloc is more important; also, the opportunity for a
free or substantially subsidized trip to the Soviet
Union, with prospects for international media expo-
sure, is a major factor. In 1987, for example, Moscow
sponsored a peace conference for members of various
professions, including religious representatives, and
paid for all expenses, including travel to and from the
event. The Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Yuvena-
liy, Imam Pashazade (Pashayev) of the Muslim Reli-
gious Council for the (Soviet) Transcaucasus, and a
Soviet Buddhist representative cochaired the religious
component of the peace conference.
activity to include, for example, allowing the clergy to
visit believers in hospitals and prisons. Moreover,
religious associations appear to have been given the
status of juridical persons in the eyes of the Soviet
state. Theoretically, the Moscow Patriarchate and
other religious organizations acquire standing to bring
claims against organs of the government or the Com-
munist Party before the Soviet judicial system. Al-
though domestic pressures may be an important fac-
tor in the liberalization of legislation on religious
activity, many Soviet believers remain skeptical. For
example, a foreign Orthodox clergyman resident in
Moscow comments that these new statutes are merely
more window dressing; he doubts that they will have
any perceptible effect on the actual life of the church
in Soviet society.
To burnish its image of religious tolerance, Moscow
has accorded church officials greater prominence and
more favorable publicity for foreign audiences. For
example, two articles featuring the Russian Orthodox
Church appeared in 1986 in Soviet Life, the govern-
ment's glossy equivalent of Life magazine, for foreign
distribution. Both articles give the impression that
Russian Orthodox clergymen-and, by implication,
all religious leaders-are widely accepted as respected
members of Soviet society.
Soviet propaganda organs have prepared a sophisti-
cated, media-oriented celebration to commemorate
the Millenium of Christianty in Russia (Kievan Rus').
Anticipating a sharp increase in church-related tour-
ism to the Soviet Union, Soviet propagandists report-
edly plan to highlight recently refurbished ecclesiasti- 25X1
cal "showcases" to convey an atmosphere of religious
tolerance-even of deference-to visiting clerics.
Moscow has already incorporated promises of liberal-
ized domestic religious regulations into its interna-
tional propaganda. These liberalizations of the Soviet
law on religion, published in the January 1986 issue of
the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, may signifi-
cantly extend the scope of legally sanctioned religious
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
25X1
25X1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
secret
The Central Apparatus
General guidelines and specific directives regarding
Soviet foreign policy positions and corresponding
propaganda activities usually are issued from the
International Department of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee. An element in the International Department is
responsible for general oversight of `mass organiza-
tions, " such as peace groups and religious bodies, and
their international activities. The Councillor Reli-
gious Affairs (CRA), a subordinate body of the
Council of Ministers, is responsible for maintaining
overall control of church-state relations in the USSR.
In 1984 former General Secretary Andropov replaced
aging Chairman Kuroyedov with Konstantin Khar-
chev, who last served in a Ministry of Foreign Fairs
diplomatic post rather than in a Party slot-the
traditional career path of CRA chairmen.
Policy guidance regarding foreign religious propagan-
da appears toflowfrom the International Department
to the CRA, and then to the particular religious
organizations and persons to be tasked. Domestically,
the regional heads of the local committees on reli-
gious affairs are charged with controlling the actions
and statements of clergymen through networks of
informants that infiltrate religious communities. Pro-
paganda formulations for foreign dissemination ap-
pear to be communicated to Soviet churchmen pri-
marily by the International Department. Input and
oversight of this process can involve several other
foreign policy components, however, such as the,
KGB's Service A (Active Measures), the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and various institutes of the Acade-
my of Sciences. For example,
in 1983 Professor Podlesnyi of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of the-United
States and Canada (IUSAC) accompanied the Soviet
church delegation to the General Assembly of the
World Council of Churches in Vancouver and also
was a `principal expert speaker" at a meeting of the
Christian Peace Conference in Moscow.
described Podlesnyi as a "quite senior official" at
IUSAC, who reports directly to Arbatov on issues
related to the Christian Peace Conference and the
Russian Orthodox Church.
Because Soviet Government and party control mecha-
nisms within the Russian Orthodox Church and other
religious bodies are so pervasive and ingrained, they
are not easily perceived by many Western observers,
who tend to project their own experiences onto other
societies. This tendency often works to the advantage
of the Soviet propaganda organs. Western visitors to
the Soviet Union for the most part observe open,
functioning churches and may assume that beneath
this ostensible evidence of religious freedom lies a
church-state dynamic similar to that in their own
societies. The reality of government control over
church policy rarely emerges.
The Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)
Beginning with the creation of the Christian Peace
Conference-a Soviet front-in 1958 and the grant-
ing of permission for the Russian Orthodox Church to
join the World Council of Churches in 1961, Soviet
religious leaders have become increasingly outspoken
in their advocacy of foreign policy objectives. Indeed,
vigorous support of Soviet policies appears to have
become a part of the larger "understanding" that
defines church-state relations in the USSR.
The entire administrative structure of the Russian
Orthodox Church is monitored-and often infiltrat-
ed-by state security organs. Thus, the Soviet leader-
ship is undoubtedly confident that only "reliable"
clerics will reach positions of authority and high
public profile. Church leaders and administrators
have developed a keen sense of where the parameters
of permissible activity lie. Regardless of the personal
sentiments of an individual cleric, he generally can be
counted on to exercise prudent self-censorship when
dealing with foreigners.
The Russian Orthodox hierarchy's loyalty and reli-
ability is often rewarded by the Soviet Government
with special perquisites and favorable publicity.
the overall relation-
ship between the Soviet leadership and Russian
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
Orthodox hierarchy, while always a coercive game of
cat and mouse, has developed from one that was
almost all stick and no carrot into one that-at least
for senior clergymen-has come to include more and
more carrot, and with only tacit reference to the stick.
Soviet officials have publicly acknowledged the inter-
national propaganda value of the Russian Orthodox
Church in the struggle to strengthen universal peace
and to halt the arms race.
place of unprecedented prominence in anti-SDI and
nuclear weapons test moratorium campaigns. In June
1986, a lengthy "open letter" to President Reagan,
attributed to the Patriarch, was given front-page
coverage by Izvestiya and broadcast worldwide
through the TASS wire service. Both the "open
letter" and the Patriarchal Easter sermon for 1986
echoed official Soviet propaganda formulations re-
garding arms control issues. The Patriarch's com-
ments also included a counterattack on the human
rights front: he called for Soviet believers to initiate a
letterwriting campaign in support of "persecuted"
American churchmen participating in the sanctuary
movement for refugees in El Salvador.
25X1
25X6
25X6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
Although the Patriarch and other church leaders have
been used as mouthpieces for propaganda formula-
tions in the past, the recent exposure granted religious
figures in the Soviet domestic media is unprecedented.
Also, the Patriarch's call for an active response by
Soviet believers to events taking place in the United
States served to add credibility to the church's en-
dorsement of Soviet foreign policy positions. Such
state-approved "religious activism" has the additional
effect of buttressing the new leadership's claims of
greater societal freedom and openness. Propaganda
experts such as International Department head Do-
brynin have probably developed this strategy of creat-
ing the appearance of vigorous participation by reli-
gious leaders in Soviet policy "debates" to attract
favorable attention in the Western media.
grated financially as well as st
continues to be inte-
foreign propaganda apparatus,
Regular, sizable contributions of funds
from the church's still ample coffers to the official
Soviet Peace Fund is a longstanding aspect of rela-
tions between church and state in the USSR. This
fund is controlled by the Soviet Peace Committee,
which coordinates the activities of all front organiza-
tions
The Russian Orthodox Churc]
sionally from the Soviet state'
of religion. For example, the s
has benefited occa-
heavyhanded control
Catholic (Uniate) Church was forcibly reunited with
Russian Orthodoxy. The Soviet Government, long
distrustful of Ukrainian ties to Rome, actively sup-
ported this merger. In 1986, during the 40th anniver-
sary of the L'vov Assembly-at which the reunion
was effected-TASS issued a lengthy, laudatory
statement, giving rare coverage to a religious event.
The Soviet Government also can use the Russian
Orthodox Church to finesse a controversial policy
decision by couching it in terms of respecting the
separate church-state spheres of influence. In Febru-
ary 1985, the Vatican requested Soviet authorization
to appoint an Apostolic Administrator to Minsk to
preside over Belorussian and Ukrainian Catholics.
Then Foreign Minister Gromyko responded by refer-
ring the Vatican to the Moscow Patriarchate, thus
indirectly tabling the request. When the Vatican then
approached the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, the
church's response incorporated longstanding Soviet
foreign policy goals vis-a-vis Poland and the Vatican
in the form of preconditions to favorable consider-
ation.
The Soviet Government now appears to be increasing
the foreign policy role of the church, especially in
situations where state-to-state or party-to-party rela-
tions have proved ineffectual. For example,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 : CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
Russian Orthodoxy: Still the State Church
Despite unrelenting state repression, the Russian
Orthodox Church (the Moscow Patriarchate) contin-
ues to maintain a sizable following in Soviet society.
The spiritual and administrative head of this body is
its presiding bishop, the Patriarch of Moscow. Upon
the demise of the last pre-Revolutionary Patriarch, it
appeared that Stalin was planning to have the office
abolished, as Peter the Great had done two centuries
earlier. The sudden end to the Soviet-Nazi Alliance,
however, left Stalin in need of a means of rallying the
people to the war effort. As part of his policy of
abandoning the rhetoric of an international proletari-
at in favor of appealing to the nationalist sentiments
of the Russian people, he allowed the church to be
revived, but in a tamer, "Leninized" reincarnation.
The confined parameters of 'permissible" domestic
religious activity have changed very little under
succeeding Soviet leaders. The extent to which reli-
gious groups are exploited for propaganda purposes,
however, has steadily increased. This bifurcated reli-
gious policy has been described by Western observers
as "no politics at home, nothing but politics abroad."
shown interest in improving relations with Lebanese
Christians. In December 1986, the Moscow Patri-
archate invited the Maronite Lebanese Patriarch to
visit the Soviet Union. Soviet diplomats
have conveyed through the Russian Orthodox
Church a commitment to using Soviet influence with
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt to facilitate the return
of Lebanese Christians to their traditional residences
in the Shuf Mountains.
The Millenium of Christianity in Russia (988-1988)
Soviet propaganda organs are gearing up for a major
international media blitz based on the 1988 Millen-
ium of the establishment of Christianity in Kievan
Rus' (Ancient Russia and the Ukraine). We believe
Moscow is planning to manipulate the yearlong cele-
bration to increase its influence in religious circles
Figure 1. Russian Orthodox bishops laying a
wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by
beyond the Soviet Bloc and to enlist religious leaders
in promoting Soviet peace policies. 25X1
the official celebration of the 25X1
Millenium will be used as a forum to attack SDI and 25X1
to endorse Soviet disarmament proposals in an effort
to create the impression that Christian bodies in the
East and West are united in their opposition to US
foreign policy.F___1 25X1
In addition to conducting a foreign media blitz, the
government has designated various ecclesiastical
"showcases"-cathedrals and other religious edi-
fices-in the major cities as focuses of Millenium 25X1
activity. These showcases recently have been remod-
eled-and sometimes completely reconstructed=for
the purpose of hosting visiting clerics. For example,
the Soviet state has restored the ancient Danilov (St.
Daniel) Monastery in south-central Moscow for use as
the church's downtown administrative headquarters,
and has constructed a hotel for visiting clerics on the 25X1
Danilov Monastery grounds. This planned isolation of 25X1
the foreign visitors will enhance the overall "Potemkin
village" aura of the Millenium celebration: Western
and Third World clergymen will have little reason to
leave the grounds to mingle in secular Soviet society. 25X1
In preparation for the Millenial year, the Russian
Orthodox Church has held two conferences and plans
a third on various aspects of the Millenium of Russian
Orthodoxy. The first conference took place in Kiev in
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
June 1986 and dealt with historical aspects of the To spread its commemoration of the Millenium be-
conversion of Kievan Rus' to Christianity in AD 988. yond Soviet borders, the Russian Orthodox Church is
A second conference on religious dogma was held in reported to be planning a "Goodwill Cruise" of
the summer of 1987 in Moscow. Finally, the actual church clergy and lay leaders to visit other Orthodox
celebration of the Millenium is scheduled to take patriarchates in the Mediterranean Sea.
place in the summer of 1988, primarily in Moscow. a
Foreign clergymen and other dignitaries are invited to ship with as many as 200 people will embark on the
attend each of these events, and predetermined Soviet
policy pronouncements on peace themes are scheduled
for ratification by the assembled religious leaders.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
Secret
voyage. Ports of call may include Constanza, Roma-
nia (Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate); Varna, Bul-
garia (Bulgarian Orthodox Patriarchate); Athens,
Greece (Greek Orthodox Archbishopric); Alexandria,
Egypt (Patriarchate of Alexandria); Latakia, Syria
(Patriarchate of Antioch); Larnaca, Cyprus (Arch-
bishopric of Cyprus); and Istanbul, Turkey (Ecumeni-
cal Patriarchate of Constantinople). Church Millen-
ium planners are also looking into a visit to Jerusalem
(Patriarchate of Jerusalem) and a possible audience
with Pope John Paul II in the Vatican City
a major objective
propaganda themes.
In August 1987, Demetrios I, Ecumenical Patriarch
of Constantinople (Istanbul), traveled to Moscow and
visited various holy places. The visit was the first
meeting of Greek and Russian Orthodox patriarchs in
400 years. Western observers noted that, in addition
to agreeing to attend the Millenium festivities, Deme-
trios I may have discussed measures for increasing
interchurch cooperation with his Russian hosts.F
The overall goal for Soviet propagandists is to attract
as many prominent Western clergymen as possible to
the Millenium celebrations to legitimize the official
propaganda pronouncements that will accompany the
religious aspects of the occasion.
All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists
The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-
Baptists (AUCECB) is the officially approved umbrel-
la organization that coordinates and controls the
activities of many officially registered Protestant
churches within the Soviet Union. Although small in
relation to the Russian Orthodox Church, AUCECB
is called on to perform similar functions.
The organization is regularly represented at Soviet-
approved ecumenical gatherings by its General Secre-
tary, Aleksey Bychkov, or the Council Chairman,
Vasiliy Logvinenko. It reportedly adopts foreign poli-
cy positions and propaganda lines dictated by the
Figure 2. The Danilov Monastery undergoing
repairs.)
International Department and the Council for Reli-
gious Affairs. In April 1986, AUCECB held a plenary
session in Moscow at which a resolution was adopted
urging "Christians of the whole world" to treat with
"particular censure" the US development of SDI.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Because many Western ecumenical organizations-
such as the World Council of Churches and its
national affiliates-are predominantly Protestant,
AUCECB's participation in "East-West exchanges"
and "dialogues" is a useful method of bridging the
denominational gap for the Russian Orthodox Church 25X1
and, thereby, the Soviet Government. For example,
Soviet officials have been quite successful in manipu-
lating the visits of a prominent American preacher for
propaganda purposes. They were insistent that his
visits be well documented and broadcast back to the
West. The American clergyman's participation in a 25X1
May 1982 Moscow "Peace Conference" did in fact
receive wide coverage in the Western media.
This "Protestant-to-Protestant" link is equally effec-
tive in visits outside the Soviet Union. In early 1986, a
delegation of the AUCECB paid a fraternal visit to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
secret
the Baptist Church in Nicaragua on the occasion of
the latter's 50th Convention Assembly. The rhetoric
that ensued adhered to standard Soviet-Nicaraguan
propaganda formulations.
Catholics in the Soviet Union
The Catholic presence in the USSR, in addition to
being relatively small, is divided ethnographically into
two groups: traditional (Latin rite) Roman Catholics
of the Baltic republics (primarily Lithuania) and the
Belorussian SSR; and the Ukrainian (Byzantine rite
or Uniate) Catholics. Although neither religious
community provides significant foreign propaganda
opportunities, overall Soviet policy toward these indig-
enous Catholic populations has important propaganda
implications.
As a result of the absorption of the Ukrainian Catho-
lic Church into Russian Orthodoxy, neither the Soviet
state nor the predominant Russian Orthodox Church
recognizes the existence of Ukrainian Catholicism.
Officially, there are no longer any Ukrainian Catho-
lics in the USSR, and the protestations of Ukrainian
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
Secret
emigre groups to the contrary are labeled as manifes-
tations of anti-Soviet slander campaigns. The whole
Ukrainian Catholic "question" or "issue" is thus a
serious detriment from the vantage of Soviet religious
propaganda. Beyond denying that the problem exists,
Soviet Government and religious spokesmen will not
"Anti-Zionist" rhetoric, however, plays an important 25X1
role in Soviet anti-Western and anti-Israeli propagan-
address the topic.
The traditional Roman Catholic populations of the
Baltic republics and Belorussia, however, are official-
ly recognized and addressed by Soviet propaganda
organs. According to Igor Troyanovsky in The Catho-
lic Church in the USSR (Moscow: Novosti Press
Agency Publishing House, 1984), "the rights of Ro-
man Catholics are effectively guaranteed by Soviet
law, and complete freedom of conscience and religion
is ensured." Even though the officially recognized
Soviet Roman Catholic communities are comprised
primarily of the more restive and nationalistic Lithua-
nian and Polish ethnic groups and present few oppor-
tunities for effective religious propaganda exploita-
tion, Soviet propaganda organs nonetheless try to put
a good face on a relatively stagnant situation. Various
Soviet publishing houses issue books-primarily in
Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian-on the purportedly
happy state of affairs of Catholicism in the USSR. A
Leningrad film studio has even made a film on the
subject "Catholics in the USSR." The film deals only
with "good" (Latin rite) Roman Catholics and high-
lights state-funded restorations of Catholic churches
in the Baltic republics and Belorussia. Julian Cardinal
Vaivods, the elderly primate of Soviet Catholics,
makes a rare appearance to pray "that the Lord
should save us, our land and the whole world from a
new war. Life is good in itself, and will be even better
if we uphold peace."
The Anti-Zionist Committee
The Soviet Government considers its Jewish popula-
tion to be primarily an ethnic group, such as the
Ukrainian and Baltic minorities, rather than a reli-
gious community. Officially, the Soviets do not view
the challenge they pose as being similar in nature to,
for instance, the growth of unofficial, activist Chris-
tian congregations.
Soviet propagandists have counterattacked with rhet-
oric distinguishing "good," "patriotic" Soviet Jews
from "reactionary Zionists"-dissidents and refusen-
iks. There are, indeed, a small number of Soviet Jews
who allow themselves to be used for such counterpro-
The Anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet Society was
created in April 1983 to counter the negative publicity
surrounding the plight of Soviet Jews. It is headed by
retired Col. Gen. David Dragunskiy, who is an ethnic
Jew. In its opening "appeal," the Committee accused
the United States of "using international Zionism as a
key weapon in its attempts to change the existing
military balance through an intensified arms race and
to conduct psychological warfare."
25X6
The Anti-Zionist Committee stage-managed a tour of
the Soviet Union by American Jewish "leaders," as
reported in the Soviet publication New Times, in May
1986. Committee Chairman Dragunskiy led the group
on a tour of many major Soviet cities, visiting, among
other sites, the Babi Yar Memorial in Kiev. Of this
visit, New Times reports: "'As a Jewish supporter of 25X1
the peace movement', (an American participant) ob-
served, `I want to end the shame of Israel behaving
like the murderers in Babi Yar. As an American, I
pledge all my energy to changing the policies of my
government to one of peace.' "
At the same time Moscow propagandists have in-
creased domestic anti-Zionist rhetoric. Zionism, pub-
lished in June 1986 by Aleksandr Z. Romanenko in 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 : CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
secret
Leningrad, contains an explicit call for "struggle
against the Jewish religion." The author calls for
Soviet writers to "carry out uncompromising criticism
of Judaism despite the efforts of the clergy of this
aggressively anti-Communist religion to pursue their
activities under the mask of loyalty (to the Soviet
Union)." "Official" Soviet Judaism apparently retains
some usefulness in Moscow's estimation, however. In
October 1986, an American Nobel Peace Prize win-
ner of Jewish descent traveled to the Soviet Union as
a guest of the state. During his stay he met with
Rabbi Shayevich and attended services at the Moscow
Choral Synagogue.
Soviet policymakers appear to be divided among
themselves as to the extent to which discussion and
debate on Soviet Judaism should be permitted. In
debate fell through.
February 1987, a prominent American television talk
show host traveled to the Soviet Union to conduct
"random" interviews with representatives of various
segments of society. He was originally promised ac-
cess to both official Soviet Jewish spokesmen and the
Jewish refusenik community. His intention was to
stage a debate between representatives of each fac-
tion. After his arrival in the USSR, however, the
Anti-Zionist Committee reneged and the on-camera
Central Asian Muslims
In publications intended for foreign consumption,
Soviet officials claim to be most deferential to the
cultural and religious practices of Central Asian
Muslims. One Soviet propagandist, writing in English,
gives an "official" description of life in the Central
Asian republics in this manner:
These people (older Soviet Muslims) believe in
Allah and have performed their religious rites
for five or six decades within the Soviet system.
Muslim communities have the right to build
mosques or rent prayer houses, and they have
every opportunity to make use of this right.
An article for domestic consumption, appearing in the
less accessible Azeri language, however, is far less
indulgent toward the vestiges of Muslim religion and
culture in Soviet Central Asia:
Our ideological opponents, by fighting against
Communism under the banner of Islam, are
trying to describe the cultural and historical
heritage of the peoples of the Soviet East as a
religious heritage.... The progress of socialist
nations is constantly eliminating the religious
influence from peoples' traditions and customs.
The regime thus attempts to separate national (ethnic)
customs and traditions from religious beliefs and to
deny any link between them. This is an important
propaganda theme not only for Muslims but also for
all ethnicities and religious communities in the Soviet
Union.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
Secret
A recently published article in Sovetskaya kul'tura,
however, suggests that even rhetorical deference to
social customs rooted in Islamic religious culture may
be declining. Attacking what he perceives as "Muslim
exclusivity" within the "Soviet multination state,"
Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences academician Yusu-
pov argues against retaining traditional Muslim prac-
tices such as praying five times daily and fasting
during Ramadan, the month of penitence. He writes
that even when such practices are justified by "mod-
ern science" as beneficial-bowing during prayer as
physical exercise, and fasting as a means of weight
loss-they are "reactionary" and should be aban-
doned. Yusupov advocates interethnic marriage (be-
tween Muslims and non-Muslims) as one method of
eradicating Islamic cultural practices.
Despite such harsh rhetoric, Moscow is not unaware
of the cultural-religious sensitivities of its indigenous
Muslims. Whenever possible, concessions to the reli-
gious needs of Soviet Central Asians are arranged to
include some propaganda benefit vis-a-vis the non-
Soviet Muslim world. In the early 1980s, for instance,
the Soviets signed an agreement permitting the World
Muslim League (WML)-a conservative, Saudi-sup-
ported Islamic organization headquartered in Mec-
ca-to publish the Koran in the Uzbek language,
using Cyrillic characters, and providing for the estab-
lishment of an Islamic University in Soviet Central
Asia.
Like their Christian counterparts, Muslim religious
leaders understand and adhere to the confines of the
Soviet church-state relationship. Soviet Islamic clerics
invariably seek to project a "Potemkin village" image
of Muslim believers coexisting with non-Muslim Sovi-
ets in a harmonious "multiethnic" nation-state. In an
interview with the Arabic publication al 'Awdah in
September 1986, Soviet Mufti Tal'gat Tadzhuddin
emphasized the vitality of Islam in Soviet Central
Asia, the excellent condition of mosques, and the
printing of the Koran in the various languages of
Soviet Central Asia. Fulfilling his other role of unoffi-
cial goodwill ambassador for the Soviet Government,
Tadzhuddin recited the standard litany of Soviet
"peace" proposals, observances to mark 1986 as the
International Year of Peace, and the "struggle" of the
state to establish and maintain "world peace."
Soviet Muslim religious leaders, in conjunction with
the Council for Religious Affairs, have hosted confer-
ences on various Islamic themes in the Soviet Union.
Speeches and concluding resolutions invariably ad-
here to official Soviet propaganda. The presence in
the Soviet Union of as many as 50 million Muslims is
a strong attraction for Arabic and other predominant-
ly Islamic nations. Yet Soviet propaganda organs did
not begin to exploit this .advantage until 1962, when a
Department of Foreign Relations With Muslims
Abroad-under the central Council for Religious
Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers-was
established. Parallel foreign relations departments
were set up under each of the four Muslim adminis-
trative districts within the Soviet Union. Until this
time, contacts with foreign Muslims had been limited
to pilgrimages (hajj) to Mecca, made by Soviet dele-
gations in extremely limited numbers. In the 1960s,
invitations were extended to Muslims in certain coun-
tries to visit their counterparts in the USSR, largely
for the purpose of creating the impression that Soviet
Muslims enjoyed religious freedom and other (partic-
ularly economic) advantages of Soviet society.
It thus became a primary task of the four Soviet 25X1
Muslim spiritual directorates to support Moscow in
fostering favorable impressions of the state of Islam in
the Soviet Union among visiting foreign delegations.
The idea of hosting "all-Muslim conferences" to help
the Soviet Government appear sympathetic to certain 25X1
causes shared by the world Islamic community was
first realized in 1970 in Tashkent. Following the
Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in
1979-80, however, the WML called on all Islamic
nations to boycott the 1980 Soviet-hosted conference,
scheduled to take place in Tashkent. Soviet propagan-
dists were stung when, after considerable preparatory
fanfare, attendance at the 1980 conference fell far
short of their goals. Moreover, many Muslim dele-
gates who did attend publicly chastised their hosts
over the Afghan situation, as well as for restrictions
on the practice of Islam in the Soviet Union. The few,
terse references to the conference in the Soviet press
bear witness to what must have been an acrimonious
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
secret
25X6
2bAb
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
Secret
meeting. Soviet propagandists considered the 1980
conference such.a disaster that no similar gatherings
Pashazade himself is an unusual figure. He acceded
to his present position at the age of 29 (apparently
causing a sensation in the Soviet Islamic community
in light of traditional Muslim deference to seniority).
His appointment to the post of chairman of one of the,
four Muslim spiritual directorates is illustrative of
were attempted in the next six years.
Contacts with foreign Muslims, however, did not
cease during this period. The four Soviet religious
boards continued extending invitations to foreign del-
egations from individual countries to visit the USSR.
Many visits involved repeat tours by long-term foreign
friends of the official Soviet Muslim establishment,
who were led over the well-worn paths of historical
Islamic sites in Soviet Central Asia. At the most
recent Soviet-hosted Islamic conference, which took
place in early October 1986 in Baku, Azerbaijan, as
many as 60 nations sent delegations, including both
Iran and Iraq. But WML Secretary General Dr.
Abdullah Omar Naseef, speaking with officials of the
US Embassy in Cairo, claimed that he attended the
conference only to protest the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. He claimed that many, if not most, of
the non-Soviet delegates "endorsed" his presentation,
and only the Palestine Liberation Organization repre-
sentative took issue with his speech. Although allow-
ing that many Islamic nations were represented at the
conference, he described the overall attendance as
"spotty," especially from the Gulf states.
The Soviets, nonetheless, achieved certain tangible
results from the Baku conference. By delaying its
announcement until just before the actual event,
Soviet propagandists were able to ensure against the
presence of the sort of contingent of Western news
correspondents who attended the 1980 Tashkent con-
ference and replayed its negative consequences. As a
result, the conference became a successful media
event that was replayed to Soviet advantage through-
out the Third World.
One of the official actions of the Baku conference was
to set up a preparatory committee to organize further
international conferences to which the representatives
of Arab and other Islamic nations will be invited. This
committee is to be chaired by Allashukur Pashazade
(Pashayev), Chairman of the Spiritual Directorate of
Soviet Muslims of the Transcaucasus, whose adminis-
trative office is in Baku. This move not only institu-
tionalizes the holding of these conferences but also
ensures that they will be under Soviet control.
Moscow's recent efforts to rejuvenate and revitalize
its apparatus for conducting relations with foreign
Muslims. He is a skilled representative of "official"
Soviet Islam, a former student of Ayatollah Khomeini
at Qom, and chief representative of the Soviet minor-
ity (approximately 10 percent) Shiite community.
In this connection, and in choosing the predominantly
Shiite city of Baku as the site for the 1986 all-
Muslim conference, Moscow may have decided to
shift its focus in foreign Muslim relations toward the
heretofore neglected Shiite branch of Islam. Shi'as
generally comprise a disgruntled minority in many
Islamic nations, one that Moscow may see as ripe for
exploitation, especially to counterbalance the largely.
conservative Sunni establishment. Moreover, Shi'as
constitute the majority in Iran, long regarded by the
Soviets as the primary strategic objective among
countries of the northern-tier states bordering the
USSR. Pashazade has been involved in broadcasting
radio propaganda to Iran.
Visits of Muslim notables to the Soviet Union are
generally on the rise. WML Secretary General Na-
seef has indicated to the US Consul in Jeddah that an
"unofficial, low level" WML delegation might travel
to the USSR on a "factfinding mission," but he
offered no tentative dates or travel itinerary. Apart
from the WML, the head of another Islamic organi-
zation broke precedent by traveling to the USSR in
November 1986. Islamic Conference Organization
(OIC) Secretary General Pirzada was received in
Moscow by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other
high MFA officials. Pirzada made a follow-on visit in
February 1987, ostensibly to participate in a February
peace conference in Moscow. The two visits seemed
timed to fall on either side of an OIC Summit, which
took place in January 1987 in Kuwait. Pirzada,-a
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
Secret
Pakistani, communicated to Consul Jeddah his inten-
tion to use these invitations to the USSR as opportu-
nities to confront the Soviets with the OIC's undimin-
ished ire over the situation in Afghanistan. The OIC
Secretary General felt that the opportunity to raise
the issue of Afghanistan yet again was worth risking
whatever propaganda benefit the Soviet Government
may have realized from his presence at a Soviet-
sponsored peace assembly. Furthermore, he expressed
the hope that his actions would encourage other
Muslim leaders to step up their criticism of the
in the Soviet-controlled October 1986 World Peace
Congress in Copenhagen as a member of the Russian
Orthodox Church delegatiori.
The Christian Peace Conference
The Christian Peace Conference (CPC) is a textbook
Soviet front organization, formed on the initiative of
the CPSU propaganda apparatus for the express
purpose of insinuating Soviet foreign policy positions
and propaganda into Western religious circles. In the
West, its heyday has for the most part long passed,
but it still operates as a gathering place for the
already converted. The less sophisticated audiences of
the Third World nonetheless remain fertile ground for
the CPC and its subsidiary organizations. Founded in
1958, the CPC holds All-Christian Peace Assemblies
every five to seven years. These assemblies are always
held in Prague, where the CPC is headquartered.
continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Soviet foreign policy goals and propaganda themes
are also advanced on a worldwide basis through the
foreign travels of Soviet religious figures. Such ap-
pearances range from one-time attendances at ecu-
menical gatherings to longstanding associations with
international religious organizations. Rather than
generally aiming to convey the goodwill of Soviet
coreligionists, the goals of Soviet participants in inter-
national religious forums are quite specific and fine
tuned to advance Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, the
behavior of Soviet participants at international reli-
gious gatherings can be hardnosed and even obstrep-
erous in pursuit of their policy goals.
Participation in international ecumenical activities
,provides an opportunity for Soviet officials to interact
with the religious elites of Western and Third World
nations. For example,
Sergey Gordeyev, a member of the permanent staff of
the Moscow Patriarchate's Department of Interna-
tional Relations, often accompanies high-level Soviet
religious delegations abroad. As an interpreter he is
far from competent, and he has often been observed
giving curt instructions to ostensible superiors. He
routinely engages non-Soviets, especially from the
West, in conversations on matters of foreign policy,
arms control, national security, and related subjects,
and seems to be well informed in these matters. He
can be: extremely friendly and outgoing, demonstrat-
ing a special interest in making contacts with Western
churchmen and other officials. Gordeyev participated
Meetings of the CPC are dominated by the headquar-
ters staff, as is the case with all Soviet front groups.
Decisions and resolutions are generally prepared in
advance of meetings, and the international member-
ship serves largely as a rubberstamp.
The Moscow Patriarchate provides most members of
the CPC Working Committee with prepaid airline
tickets for travel to and from meetings, thereby
greatly reducing the CPC's operating costs.
Russian Orthodox Metro-
politan Filaret of Kiev is treated with "great
deference" by other CPC officials, and that he con-
trols the flow of funds from the Russian Orthodox
Church-by far the largest contributor-to the CPC.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
25X6
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
At the March 1986 Working Committee meeting, the
British participants proposed that a congratulatory
telegram be sent to Cardinal Sin, leader of the
Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines, com-
mending him on the constructive role the church
played in effecting a peaceful change of government in
that country. Bishop
Karoly Toth, president of the CPC and a Hungarian,
expressed enthusiasm for the idea, as did others in
attendance. The Soviet delegation disagreed, howev-
er, claiming that such a gesture would be "prema-
ture. " In subsequent private conversations, the Soviet
churchmen explained their grounds for disapproval:
the new regime in the Philippines is viewed by the
Soviet Government as having been installed by the
United States chiefly to ensure the security and
permanence of American military bases in that coun-
try. The Aquino administration is viewed as a crea-
ture of Washington and therefore hostile to Soviet
interests, more so than the Marcos regime because of
President Aquino's apparently broad political sup-
port base and popularity. The idea of a telegram to
Cardinal Sin was subsequently dropped.
Expressions of dissent from official Soviet propaganda
are never reflected in CPC organizational minutes or
resolutions. at the June
1984 meeting of the International Commission of the
CPC, a typically one-sided, anti-Western communi-
que was approved. Afterward, an American clergy-
man took the floor to disassociate himself and his
church from the communique and the entire content
of the meeting. His remarks were ignored and were
not recorded in either the minutes of the Commission
meeting or in any subsequent CPC document.
The CPC invariably reflects current propaganda
themes as promulgated by such Soviet propaganda
organs as the International Department and the
World Peace Council. Soon after the Soviet propagan-
da apparatus launched its anti-SDI campaign, the
Figure 3. Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and
Belorussia, Head of the Department of External
Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate,
reading out the message from His Holiness Pa-
triarch Pimen to the participants at the 1985
CPC, meeting in December 1984, focused its atten-
tion on "The Movement Toward the Militarization of
Outer Space Glamorized by the Star Wars' Mentali-
ty." The theme chosen for the 1985 All-Christian
Peace Assembly was "God's call to choose life-the
hour is late: Christians in resistance to the powers of
death-(and) on the path to peace and justice for All."
In 1986 the CPC, like other Soviet fronts, organized
all its activities around the general theme of the UN
International Year of Peace, largely a Soviet-spon-
sored and -controlled observance. The various region-
al CPC affiliates (The African Christian Peace Con-
ference, The Latin American Christian Peace
Conference, and The Asian Christian Peace Confer-
ence) scheduled assemblies, for which the CPC pro-
vided financial support. The Moscow. Patriarchate
supplied prepaid tickets for travel to and from many
of these events via Aeroflot, the Soviet civil airline.
Aware of the CPC's diminished effectiveness among
its traditional Western constituency, Soviet propagan-
da policymakers have shifted the front's focus away
from traditional East-West peace activism and toward
25X1
25X1
225X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
propaganda policymakers
a posture of asserting the solidarity of Soviet Bloc
Christians with coreligionists in the Third World.
CPC leaders have begun to echo the rhetoric of Latin
American liberation theologians, emphasizing a com-
mon commitment to struggle against Western "imper-
ialism" (see "Liberation Theology," p. 20). In addi-
tion, the CPC declared 15 February 1987 as a
"Special Prayer Sunday" dedicated to the "bleeding
and suffering people" of Latin America and the
Caribbean. The letter announcing the CPC's intended
observance of the occasion recalls the "martyrdoms"
of many Christian missionaries in various anti-Soviet
Latin American countries, but fails to address reli-
gious persecution by Marxist regimes in the region.
the CPC continues to receive ample funding from
such sources as the Russian Orthodox Church and
in the International Department remain satisfied with
the front, notwithstanding its apparent decline in
effectiveness. the absence
of significant changes in the CPC's top leadership in
almost 10 years as further evidence of Moscow's
continuing approval of the organization's activities.
took up policy positions consonant with Soviet "anti-
imperialist" (anti-Western) rhetoric. The organiza-
tion's present General Secretary, Emilio Castro, typi-
fies these trends. A prominent advocate of liberation
theology, Castro was exiled from Uruguay for his
links to several leftist organizations, including the
terrorist Tupamaros.
The WCC's constituency-especially in the Third
World-often overlaps with those of Soviet fronts.
Demographically, many Third World countries have
small, disproportionately influential cultural and reli-
gious elites who seek to enhance their nations' inter-
national standing through participation in as many
international organizations as possible. They see no
contradiction in maintaining relations with both a
"legitimate" ecumenical organization such as the
WCC and a Soviet front such as the Christian Peace
Conference. Soviet churchmen have been increasingly
successful in co-opting this well-meaning organization
for their specific propaganda purposes. Soviet propa-
gandists are most eager to co-opt the WCC precisely
because it is not an alter ego front organization. Pro-
Soviet policy pronouncements are considered more
effective when issued by the WCC than by a readily
recognized front such as the CPC because of the
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
The World Council of Churches
The World Council of Churches (WCC) is an ecu-
menical organization of more than 300 Protestant,
Anglican, and Orthodox churches whose denomina-
tional constituencies comprise more than 400 million
Christians worldwide. Headquartered in Geneva, the
WCC has an executive committee that takes stands
on political and other international issues. During the
1960s and 1970s, the WCC's focus shifted away from
traditional ecumenical dialogue toward such "Third
World issues" as "Western colonialism" and the
"economic disparity between nations of the First and
Third Worlds." The WCC leadership increasingly
WCC's ostensible neutrality.
its activities with Soviet front organizations.
the WCC is a major source
of funds for the Indonesian-based Asian Cultural
Forum on Development (ACFOD), a Soviet front.
Moreover, the WCC and ACFOD jointly direct the
activities of two otherwise unaffiliated umbrella orga-
nizations, the Asia Regional Fellowship and the Asia
Partnership for Human Development. Also, the WCC
and the CPC sent a joint delegation to the Philippines
in May 1986 to pressure the Aquino government to
remove American military bases.
The Christian Peace Conference is often successful at
manipulating WCC rhetoric and actions (see "Chris-
tian Peace Conference," p. 14). In preparation for the
1983 WCC General Assembly in Vancouver, Canada,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
on messages from persecuted East European Chris-
tians at the same gathering.
The current WCC/IA direc-
CPC.
WCC representatives also have shown themselves
particularly willing to cooperate with the Soviet front
World Peace Council (WPC). The WPC hosted a
nongovernmental organization symposium on "World
Peace and the Liberation of South Africa and Nami-
bia" at the WCC headquarters in Geneva in June
In addition, the WCC supports nonallied radical
leftist and some violent elements in the Third World.
a conference of "Christian women" was held in Kiev
in April 1983. The group was instructed on how to
coordinate their activities in Vancouver with the CPC
and the Russian Orthodox Church delegation. The
result was the defeat of a pending resolution demand-
ing an immediate Soviet withdrawal from Afghani-
stan. The Russian Orthodox and CPC representatives
argued successfully that, if the General Assembly
voted to condemn the Soviet invasion, the East Euro-
pean women and Soviet clergymen would not be
permitted to attend future WCC meetings. For simi-
lar reasons, the WCC declined to take note of or act
the Revolutionary Left (MIR), dedicated to fomenting
a guerrilla uprising among the rural peasants and
Mapuche Indians of southern Chile. Because at the
time the MIR publicly identified itself as part of the
Christian Left Party, however, it obtained a grant of
$20,000 from the WCC for agrarian development
projects. These funds were used instead for the MIR's
political agitation and paramilitary preparations.
The WCC also openly funds such organizations as
South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO)
in Namibia and the South African African National
Congress (ANC).
25X1x1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
secret
Berlin Conference of European Catholics
Headquartered in East Berlin, the Berlin Conference
of European Catholics (BCEC) has the same functions
with respect to Catholics as the Christian Peace
Conference (CPC) has with Protestant, Anglican, and
Orthodox communions. Vatican policy does not per-
mit representative organizations of the Roman Catho-
lic Church to join ecumenical organizations. Catholic
organizations, however, have sought and are often
granted observer status in such bodies. It is Roman
Catholic Church policy to discourage its clergy and
laity from maintaining continuing relations with semi-
official Soviet Bloc organizations such as the BCEC,
but the Church Curia apparently does not wish to risk
a public confrontation with a potentially vociferous
segment of its West European constituency by disal-
lowing participation in BCEC.
Various other ecumenical organizations, including the
World Council of Churches, consider themselves sis-
ter organizations of BCEC and work closely with it.
BCEC works most closely with the CPC, however,
and participates alongside the CPC in such interna-
tional forums as UN nongovernmental organizations
meetings and conferences.
Pax Christi International
This is an organization of prominent, left-of-center
Roman Catholic activists throughout the world (pri-
marily Western Europe) who seek to enhance contacts
with Christians of Eastern Europe (primarily the
Russian Orthodox Church). Although headquartered
in Antwerp, Belgium, Pax Christi International's
rhetoric frequently reflects many Soviet propaganda
themes largely because its Western constituency val-
ues the maintenance of East-West links over the
content or result of such dialogue. Meetings, there-
fore, often result in diplomatically worded agreements
to disagree. Pax Christi International was among the
few Western religious groups to attend the Soviet-
controlled World Peace Congress in Copenhagen. The
October 1986 Congress has been widely exposed in
the Western press as a Soviet propaganda forum.
Soviet-Vatican Relations
Beginning with the reception of Khrushchev's son-in-
law Aleksey Adzhubei by Pope John XXIII in 1963,
Vatican-Kremlin contacts have slowly broadened. The
ascendancy of Pope John Paul II initially brought on
a confrontational period including two trips to Poland,
but the Pope has apparently set his sights on a
rapprochement with Moscow. For both political and
theological reasons, the Vatican has set about making
public and private overtures to both the Soviet Gov-
The attempt on the Pope's life in 1981 precipitated a
heated East-West war of words. Soviet propaganda
organs chose to treat allegations of Soviet Bloc com-
plicity as a preposterous provocation calculated to
sour East-West relations. Subsequently, the CPSU
Central Committee ordered the Soviet media to in-
crease criticism of the Vatican in response to what it
perceived as increasing Catholic anti-Sovietism.
Moscow authorities be-
lieved that the Catholic Church, and the Pope person-
ally, were attacking Marxist-Leninist ideology more
harshly. The Soviets reportedly also felt that the
Vatican was attempting to foment religious activism
within the USSR.
In general, the Moscow Patriarchate has been careful
to maintain correct, if not always cordial, relations
with the Vatican. The Russian Orthodox Church is
always represented at continuing Orthodox-Catholic
ecumenical dialogues and at Vatican functions when-
ever invited. Most recently, Metropolitan Filaret of
Kiev participated in the Vatican-sponsored World
Day of Prayer for Peace in Assisi, in October 1986.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
John Paul II is seeking to negotiate a visit to the
USSR to participate in commemorations of the estab-
lishment of Christianity in Lithuania and Russia. We
believe the Pope is unlikely to succeed in this, howev-
er, because the Soviet Government remains apprehen-
sive that the Vatican might foment internal religious
dissent, especially in Lithuania and the Ukraine,
where Catholicism has remained influential. More-
over, age-old denominational and nationalist antago-
nisms persist; both the predominantly Russian Soviet
Government and the Russian Orthodox Church hier-
archy remain distrustful of Vatican overtures.
Nonetheless, I (John Paul II
has not abandoned his efforts to broaden and stabilize
Catholic Church relations with Moscow both politi-
cally and ecumenically. Most recently, we have seen a
significant increase in Soviet contacts with represen-
tatives of the Catholic Church: Cardinal Sin of the
Philippines and Mother Teresa were permitted to visit
traditionally Catholic regions of the USSR, prompt-
ing widespread speculation that a breakthrough of
some sort was imminent. Before Cardinal Sin's trip to
Lithuania, the Council for Religious Affairs permit-
ted the Catholic cathedral in Klaipeda to be restored,
and the aging Cardinal Stepanavicius was officially
recognized as Primate of Lithuanian Catholics. The
Soviet Government, however, appears to be offering
cosmetic gestures to garner favorable media coverage,
rather than addressing substantive and longstanding
Vatican conditions for better relations. The Soviet
Government has not shown any willingness to recon-
sider permitting a papal visit to Lithuania. Similarly,
Mother Teresa's stated purpose for visiting was to
establish a chapter of her charitable order in Cherno-
byl' to minister to radiation victims, but this wish
intelligence services and propaganda apparatus may
decide to begin exploring such options more seriously.
Soviet propaganda has endorsed aspects of liberation
theology rhetoric. At the March 1986 meeting of the
Working Committee of the Christian Peace Confer-
ence, CPC President Bishop Karoly Toth condemned
the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Nicaragua for its
opposition to the totalitarian consolidation of power
by the Sandinista government. Soviet Doctor of Philo-
sophical Sciences M. P. Mchedlov, addressing the
interaction of religion and politics in the modern
world, asserted that clergymen have played a "posi-
tive role" in countries engaged in "anticolonialist
liberation struggles." Speaking before the Znaniye
Society in Moscow in October 1986, Mchedlov spoke
favorably about "the growth of leftist trends within
religious groups, including armed resistance," espe-
cially in Latin America-a clear reference to the
liberation theology movement. While condemning
clergymen who "use bourgeois society's institutions to
preserve and advance the church's interests and to
combat communism," he praised individual clerics
who have taken up arms alongside Communist rebels
in Cuba and Nicaragua, and elsewhere in Latin
America. The merits of liberation theology as a
political ideology, however, do not yet seem to have
25X1
25X1
appears to have been denied.
Liberation Theology
The present Soviet policy regarding the liberation
theology movement appears to be one of tacit approv-
al. Among the Soviet-allied nations, Cuba has taken
the lead in exploring the potentials for propaganda
exploitation and, ultimately, political use via the
indigenous liberation theology movements in Latin
America and elsewhere. If Cuba or any of its client
states such as Nicaragua can show success at manipu-
lating and co-opting this phenomenon, the Soviet
been addressed directly by Soviet ideologues.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
secret
At least one Soviet cleric has established relations
with the indigenous Central American liberation the-
ology movement. In May 1986, Father Izadors Upen-
ieks, a Soviet Latvian Franciscan priest, traveled to
Nicaragua as a member of the Soviet Peace Commit-
tee. During his stay, he concelebrated mass in a
"Popular" (that is, Sandinista) Church, and endorsed
liberation theology in his sermons and in a newspaper
The Asian Buddhist Council for Peace
The Asian Buddhist Council for Peace (ABCP) is the
Soviet front responsible for maintaining and improv-
ing ties to Buddhists worldwide. It claims 15 affiliates
in 12 countries. With the exception of China, which
was intentionally excluded, Burma and South Korea
are the only countries with significant Buddhist popu-
lations that maintain no relations with ABCP. Osten-
sibly, the organization is dominated by Mongolia: its
headquarters is in Ulan Bator, and its leadership-the
president, the secretary general, and deputy secretary
general-is entirely Mongolian. Following the usual
pattern for Soviet fronts, however, the Soviet mem-
bership-coreligionists from the central Siberian Bur-
yat Autonomous SSR-reportedly sets the organiza-
tion's policy.
Like all other Soviet fronts, ABCP holds frequent
international conferences controlled and funded by
the International Department. The latest gathering,
in Vientiane in February 1986, featured demonstra-
tions and resolutions condemning the US Strategic
Defense Initiative. Other official proclamations com-
mended "the political courage of the USSR in extend-
ing a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing"; re-
called and condemned "the sufferings of our brothers
in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea caused by chemi-
cal genocide"; and endorsed the Soviet-backed Asian-
Pacific Zone of Peace (APZP) initiative. APZP, like
other zone-of-peace initiatives, is part of the Soviet
effort to remove American and allied military bases in
a given region-in this instance, primarily the US
naval bases and airbases in the Philippines. Represen-
tatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, the World
Council of Churches, and the World Peace Council
were among the non-Buddhist attendees.
ABCP and Buddhism in general.
The ABCP appears to have more members on the
World Peace Council than any other member organi-
zation. In addition, both the ABCP's president and its
secretary general sit on the WPC's Presidential Com-
mittee; no international organization holds more than
two slots on this body, and only four other Soviet
fronts have this maximum representation. Despite its
recent setbacks, the WPC remains the most important
Soviet-controlled front organization, and the steady 25X1
increase of ABCP representation therein reflects the 25X1
emphasis Soviet propagandists are placing on the
Soviet propagandists have been quite successful in
tasking the ABCP with spreading anti-American
rhetoric in Sri Lanka. Several prominent Buddhist
monks there have sponsored events designed to in-
crease popular support for the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace. The monks hold important positions in such
pro-Soviet fronts as the Ceylon Peace Council (the
national affiliate of the World Peace Council) and the
Sri Lankan-Soviet Friendship League.
the Communist Party
of Sri Lanka (CPSL) decided in late 1986 to make use
of left-leaning Buddhist clerics to promote Soviet
peace movement propaganda. CPSL leader Pieter
Keuneman reportedly announced this policy decision
after returning from a visit to Moscow. Subsequently,
six public meetings were sponsored by the CPSL on
various peace-related subjects during the remaining
months of 1986. At three of these sessions, members
of the Buddhist clergy were among the main speakers.
The Soviet Government pays for exchange visits
between Soviet and Sri Lankan monks and sponsors
university scholarships for monks to study in the
USSR. The Sri Lankan chairman of the Sri Lankan-
Soviet Bhikkus (Buddhist Monks) Association trav-
eled to the USSR in 1983, and his Soviet counterpart
visited Sri Lanka in 1986.
Soviet propagandists seem to achieve more mixed
results elsewhere in the Buddhist world, however. At
the 15th Conference of the World Buddhist Federa-
tion, held in Kathmandu in 1986, a Soviet-sponsored
resolution calling for world nuclear disarmament was
passed only after language attacking the US SDI
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
Secret
program was removed. Moreover, a resolution ex-
pressing concern over the persecution of Buddhists in
Vietnam was passed over the objections of the Soviet
and Bloc delegations, although the standard Soviet-
backed resolution calling for the creation of an Indian
Ocean Zone of Peace was approved.
The Tibetan exile Dalai Lama, the spiritual and
temporal leader of Lamaism, is affiliated with ABCP.
He maintains cordial relations with both the Soviet
Government and its Buddhist front organization as a
means of leveraging pressure against the Chinese
Government. The Dalai Lama has visited the Soviet
Union three times, most recently in 1986, to attend an
ABCP event in Ulan Ude, the capital city of the
Buryat SSR. During the Moscow portion of his visit
he was received by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Pi-
men at the Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery, where the
two religious leaders held a press conference high-
lighting joint Christian-Buddhist efforts to secure
world peace. The Dalai Lama, however, seems to have
taken pains to avoid the appearance of embracing
wholeheartedly Soviet religious peace propaganda. He
uses Soviet-sponsored religious events mainly as con-
venient forums to decry the continuing plight of
Tibetan exiles.
The Soviets and World Islam
Soviet foreign policy and propaganda organs have
worked assiduously-and with little success-to re-
cover what influence Moscow had with governments
in the Muslim world before the 1979-80 invasion of
Afghanistan. Relying primarily on the resumed "all-
Muslim" conferences hosted periodically in Soviet
Central Asia, Soviet strategy appears to be to task
"official" Soviet Muslim clerics with the dissemina-
tion of propaganda throughout the Islamic world (see
"Central Asian Muslims," p. 10). Moscow has met
with little success beyond Soviet borders, however,
because of the Muslim world's preoccupation with
Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Whenever possible,
Soviet propagandists look to non-Soviet Muslim
spokesmen to echo Moscow's policies in an effort to
enhance the propaganda's credibility. For example,
Maulawi Abdul Aziz Sadeq, head of the Afghan
Religious Council, asserted in an interview that the
Soviet Union is not interfering in Afghan religious
affairs. Such measures are indicative of how Moscow
has largely been on the propaganda defensive
throughout the 1980s. Muslim clergymen seen as
working at the behest of the Soviet-sponsored Afghan
regime are considered traitors to their religion and
their countrymen.
Moscow has failed to win support at a number of
international conferences. For example, the Fifth
Islamic Conference Organization conference, held in
Kuwait in January 1987, approved a resolution calling
explicitly for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan; the statement was worded more harshly
than previous resolutions on the same subject. The
OIC statement represented yet another setback in the
Soviet campaign to convince member nations of Mos-
cow's purportedly earnest efforts to restore an "Islam-
ic and nonaligned Afghanistan." In addition, Afghan-
istan was represented at the OIC gathering by a rebel
mujahedin alliance delegation, and not by Soviet-
backed government representatives. Finally, the OIC
continues to deny admission to Moscow's "official"
Soviet Muslims, a sign of the Islamic world's unabat-
ed disdain for the religious envoys of an "atheist
regime."
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has made progress in
establishing diplomatic relations with Islamic Gulf
states. Once diplomatic relations with an Arab or
otherwise Islamic nation have been established, the
Soviet Foreign Ministry is careful to ensure that
several members of its diplomatic mission-beginning
with, if at all possible, the ambassador-are ethnic
Muslims. Few non-Slavs have been accepted into the
privileged elite of the Soviet diplomatic corps, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs occasionally has been
embarrassed by what it perceived as instances of
incompetence by its Muslim envoys.
Soviet restrictions on would-be pilgrims to Mecca
have been an additional source of friction with Mus-
lim religious leaders. Saudi Arabia remains a denied-
access area to Soviet diplomatic and intelligence
personnel. Soviet Muslims chosen for the annual hajj
reportedly are carefully selected and often tasked with
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
secret
propagandizing and probably also intelligence-gather-
ing on the USSR's behalf. Sources of the US Embas-
sy in Moscow report that the Soviets have been
pressing Riyadh to permit the placement of a Soviet
"mission" in Mecca to "support" Central Asian Mus-
lims making the hajj. This initiative has to some
degree backfired, however; every time the issue is
raised by the Soviet side, the Saudis take the opportu-
nity to chastise the Soviet regime for permitting so
few Central Asians to travel to Mecca. For instance,
World Muslim League head Naseef is reported to
have taken the Soviet Government to task at the
October 1986 "all-Muslim" conference in Baku,
Azerbaijan, noting that only 15 individuals out of an
estimated 50 million Soviet Muslims were permitted
to make the hajj in 1986.
A Soviet Muslim source of the US Embassy in
Moscow claims that there has been an increase in the
number of Soviet Central Asian Muslims who travel
to Afghanistan and Pakistan and then make the hajj
without the prior permission or approval of either the
The Soviet Government uses church facilities as
intelligence-gathering stations mainly in closed-access
areas such as Israel. The payoff has always been of
marginal significance, however, and the risk of com-
promising the ostensible independence of the Russian
Orthodox Church is an important consideration.
church-based intel- 25X1 1
ligence gathering has been scaled back in recent
years. This is probably the result of negative cost-
benefit evaluations and concern that the potential
harm to the ostensible independence of the Russian
Orthodox Church is not merited; this is especially
significant because exploitation of the church for
propaganda dissemination appears to be steadily in-
creasing. Were the church to be exposed as a cover
mechanism for intelligence activities, the damage to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89T01451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
secret
overall Soviet foreign policy interests would be com-
mensurately significant. Moreover, the number of
countries that remain denied-access areas to Soviet
nationals has diminished sharply in the 1970s and
1980s. Many nations unwilling to accord full diplo-
matic recognition to the Soviet Government nonethe-
less have opened their borders to such paradiplomatic
Soviet officials as trade representatives and journal-
ists, thereby reducing the KGB's need for church
cover.
Emigre and other lobby groups in the West have
occasionally raised security as an issue in their efforts
to leverage pressure against Soviet religious delega-
tions. For example, the French Government has re-
peatedly denied the entry visa applications of Arch-
bishop Kirill (Vladimir Mikhaylovich Gundyayev)-
currently of Smolensk, formerly of the Leningrad
suburb-of Vyborg-for security reasons, and has
indicated to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
that it will refuse all further applications of the
Archbishop on the same grounds. The French Gov-
ernment may have irrefutable evidence that Kirill has
engaged in espionage, but it is possible that his visa
denials are the result of domestic pressure exerted by
the relatively sizable and influential Russian emigre
community in France. The French branch of the
Russian Orthodox Church predates the Russian Rev-
olution and is not subordinate to the Moscow Patri-
archate.
Soviet foreign policy propagandists appear to be
adopting more modest goals for religious active mea-
sures and adjusting to longer timetables. The content
of Soviet religious propaganda for foreign consump-
tion has become more subtle and audience-specific.
Nonetheless, the general content of Soviet foreign
policy positions and propaganda remains largely the
same; only the methodology has changed from "hard
sell" to "soft sell."
The focus often appears to be less on disseminating
propaganda than on developing long-term personal
and professional relations with Western and Third
World clergymen. In a recent lecture restricted to
party propagandists, Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy of
the International Department, reportedly encouraged
closer ties to non-Communist and religious peace
activists. "Christians play an important role in Com-
munist Parties in many countries," he is quoted as
saying. "For example, in France and Italy.... The
overall CPSU approach to religion should not create
obstacles to cooperation with such groups."
There appears to be a realization among Soviet
propagandists that traditional active measures and
propaganda activities have become largely ineffectual
among the more sophisticated target audiences of
ence, the religious component of this older generation
of fronts, may be slated for cutbacks in funding and
tasking. None of these fronts, including the CPC, are
likely to be eliminated entirely, however, as they
remain useful for propagandizing in the Third World.
The International Department appears to be encour-
aging the development of a new generation of interna-
tional organizations known generically as fronts of
fronts. Fronts of fronts are smaller than traditional
front organizations and lack the rigid control struc-
tures that typify older groups: a secretariat headed by
a general secretary answerable to Moscow, an inter-
national presidium of vice presidents, and so forth.
Many of these newer fronts focus on specific issues or
seek to attract members of specific professions. For
example, International Physicians for the Prevention
of Nuclear War focuses its rhetoric on the medical
dangers posed by the threat of thermonuclear war-
fare. New, issue-oriented religious fronts are also
likely to develop.
In light of the perceived decline in effectiveness of
traditional religious fronts, the Soviets are likely to
place greater emphasis on bilateral religious relations.
For instance, Soviet and American churches make
reciprocal exchanges of delegations annually. This
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
secret
approach has the advantage of enabling religious
propagandists to present Soviet society to visiting
clerics in a favorable light as well as ensuring foreign
forums for the dissemination of Soviet propaganda.
In the Third World, we anticipate that Soviet reli-
gious active measures and propaganda activity will
become increasingly refined to reach specific audi-
ences. For example, Soviet propaganda may begin to
endorse and encourage the spread of liberation theol-
ogy in Latin America. This would also reflect a
perceived Soviet policy decision to widen its active
measures and propaganda activity to include issues
and movements not necessarily Marxist or otherwise
pro-Soviet, but inimical to regimes perceived as anti-
Soviet.
The role of religious figures in the foreign dissemina-
tion of Soviet policy positions and propaganda appears
to be increasing under Council for Religious Affairs
Chairman Kharchev. The recent visits of Cardinal Sin
of the Philippines, Mother Teresa, and Ecumenical
Patriarch Demetrios I indicate Moscow's commit-
ment to a higher religious profile, even though the 25X1
Soviet leadership has-at least for the moment-
decided to confine itself to cosmetic gestures.
Finally, the celebration of the Millenium of Christian-
ity in Russia in 1988 will serve as an important
indicator of future trends in Soviet religious policies.
The post-Brezhnev religious propaganda apparatus
has been in place and is able to prepare carefully its
treatment of the event. Although Pope John Paul II's
participation remains unlikely, we can expect a for-
eign media blitz calculated to show both Moscow's
deference to religious conviction and ostensible world-
wide religious support for Soviet peace initiatives.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8
k3CLl Cl
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02: CIA-RDP89TO1451 R000200230001-8