DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01363R000200310004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 5, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of 0 ~l
Tntalliannnn TA~~,+roti~
Developments in Afghanistan
5 September 1986
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Developments in Afghanistan
1 Perspective-Afghanistan: Competing Diplomatic Offensives
INESA
The Afghan regime, under Moscow's tutelage, has embarked on a more aggressive
diplomatic campaign to improve its international image in preparation for the
Nonaligned Movement summit and the United Nations General Assembly session
this fall. This effort not only reflects longstanding Soviet-Afghan sensitivities to
world public opinion but also is a response to the Afghan insurgents' diplomatic
ventures
9 The Insurgency This Summer
Insurgent activity in urban areas and along key lines of communication increased
this summer. The Afghan resistance is concerned about its ability to sustain the
high level of activity into the autumn months in the face of Soviet and Afghan
regime countermeasures.
15 Sibghatullah Mojadedi: Spokesman of the Resistance Alliance
LDA
Sibghatullah Mojadedi, leader of the traditionalist Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli
Afghanistan, is unlikely to make significant headway in achieving the goals he has
set during his three-month tenure as spokesman of the resistance alliance. These
goals include opening alliance offices abroad.
19 Bonn Unlikely To Make Major Changes in Policy on Afghan Issud
EURA, and LDA
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West Germany is openly critical of the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan 25X1
and provides some humanitarian aid to Afghan insurgents. Bonn's overriding
concern with East-West rapprochement, however, will continue to be a significant
brake on the activities it is willing to undertake on the resistance's behalf. ~~ 25X1
This document is published monthly by the Directorate oJ'Intelligence. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor,
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Developments in Afghanistan
Perspective Afghanistan: Competing Diplomatic Offensives) 25X1
Kabul, under Moscow's tutelage, has embarked on a more aggressive diplomatic
campaign to improve its international image in preparation for the Nonaligned
Movement (NAM) summit in Zimbabwe and the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) session this fall. We believe this campaign reflects not only
longstanding Soviet-Afghan sensitivities to world public opinion but also concerns
about stepped-up Afghan resistance diplomacy in recent months. Although the
insurgent alliance's tour of the United States and Europe this summer fell short of
its goals, we believe it raised the diplomatic costs of the war for Moscow.
Kabul Promises Diplomatic Campaign
In his July address to the Central Committe of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, General Secretary Najibullah urged that propaganda and
counterpropaganda activities be intensified. Saying that "this task has special
importance on the eve of the conference ... in Harare and ...the next session of
the UNGA," Najibullah said Afghan offiicials had been instructed to cultivate
relations between Afghanistan and the developing countries soon.
As part of this diplomatic initiative, a delegation led by Afghan Deputy Foreign
Minister Sarwar Yurish traveled in July to Zimbabwe-the NAM chairman for
the next three years-to establish diplomatic relations. Yurish obtained Prime
Minister Mugabe's agreement in principle-a development Kabul media
immediately announced with great fanfare. According to the US Embassy in
Islamabad, however, Zimbabwean officials told the Pakistanis that they have no
intention of opening an embassy in Kabul, will not allow Kabul to open one in
Harare soon, and will delay diplomatic relations until a political solution to the
Afghan conflict is reached. The Zimbabweans promised no change in their support
for the proposed NAM summit's or UNGA's language on Afghanistan)
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We believe Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's announcement in July that
Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is
partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative at the UNGA. Gorbachev
may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in
Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on the Afghan issue.
According to the US Mission to the UN, the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen-Moscow's client-proposed in a surprise move in June that the UNGA's
Asian Group endorse Afghanistan's candidacy for one of the vice-presidencies of
the 41st UNGA. The candidacy has virtually no chance of success, however.n
The Resistance Grand Tour
The Soviet-Afghan diplomatic offensive probably is, in part, a reaction to the more
active diplomacy of the Afghan resistance alliance this year. In early June,
members of the alliance began a tour to gain international recognition for the
organization, enhance its legitimacy, and increase the diplomatic costs of the war
for the Soviets. Although the visit failed to gain the alliance official US diplomatic
recognition, the resistance leaders' well-publicized meeting with President Reagan
was immediately condemned by Soviet and Afghan media, which accused the US
of supporting "hired killers."
The Soviets may also have been disturbed by the high-level reception that
Burhandudin Rabbani, then alliance spokesman, received in Saudi Arabia, where
he met with King Fahd, and in France, where he met with French Prime Minister
Chirac and Foreign Minister Raimond. Initially reluctant, the Saudis
ublicly
acknowledged Riyadh's contribution to the resistance war chest. In France,
Rabbani received the highest official reception accorded any Afghan resistance
leader to date he French gestures
probably were particularly galling to Moscow because they came just before
French President Mitterrand was to meet Soviet leader Gorbachev.
Prospects
The Afghan regime's efforts will have little chance of significantly eroding support
for the resolutions on Afghanistan at the UN and the NAM summit. These
resolutions are in fact anodyne, falling short of condemning the Soviets by name
and calling only for an end to foreign interference in Afghanistan and for peaceful
resolution of the dispute. Nevertheless, we believe the regime will look for
opportunities to keep the resistance and its external supporters on the defensive.
Such surprises as seeking a UNGA vice-presidency are likely to be repeated.
The Soviet-Afghan response to the resistance's increased politicking is, in our view,
disproportionate to the alliance's real gains internationally but is, in itself, an
indication that the resistance can-and did-raise the diplomatic costs of the war
for the Soviets. Still, the resistance remains hamstrung by internal divisions over
its international diplomacy and Pakistani disinterest in pushing stronger language
for the resolutions.
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Soviet and Afghan Forces React
to Insurgent Activity ~~
Combat activity remained at fairly high levels during the past month as Soviet and
regime forces responded to mounting insurgent pressure.
Despite tough new draft laws and increased efforts at conscription, the Afghan
Army has made little progress in resolving its serious manpower shortages. The US
Embassy reports that regime conscription teams have patrolled Kabul since the
mid-June draft decree to round up all draft-eligible men, and similar activities are
occurring elsewhere. The new conscription regulations are designed, in part, to
provide 19,500 men for three new infantry divisions to be formed by October,
Continuing desertions from the armed forces are
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According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Pakistanis will press
Soviet South Asian expert Valkov, who is visiting Pakistan this month, on
Moscow's views on creating a more representative government in Kabul.
Islamabad expects Moscow to continue efforts to foment unrest in tribal areas
along the border with Afghanistan.
Vladivostok Speech
Beijing initially reacted to Soviet leader Gorbachev's speech of 28 July in
Vladivostok, in which he pledged withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from
Afghanistan, by issuing a Foreign Ministry statement reiterating a call for prompt
and complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops. In our view, Beijing addressed the
question of Afghanistan so quickly-it initially ignored Gorbachev's other
proposals in its comments on 30 July-because the UN-sponsored proximity talks
were about to begin in Geneva. China wanted to keep Islamabad from seeking a
separate peace with Moscow during the negotiations.
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In our opinion, the Chinese response indicates that Beijing will maintain a hardline
stance against the Soviet occupation. According to the US Embassy in Beijing,
China sees the Gorbachev speech as a masterful presentation of concepts and
gestures heavy on rhetoric and containing only minimal, low-cost Soviet
concessions. In a meeting with US Embassy officials, Chinese Vice Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen remarked that "it only took four days (for Soviet troops) to
enter Afghanistan and now they are talking about afour-year timetable to remove
them." We believe it is unlikely that the Chinese and the Soviets will hold secret
talks on the Afghan problem.
Facilities Vulnerable
A series of explosions in Jul dama ed the Soviet ammunition storage facility at
Bagram airfield An estimated 3,000 metric tons of 25X1
ammunition were destroyed. Insurgent rocket fire evidently initiated the
explosions.~~ 25X1
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Soviet ammunition stora a and handlin facilities routinely violate safety
regulation ammunition revetments and storage 25X1
buildings are too c ose toget er, wit t e open ends of some revetments facing one
another. In addition, the Soviets store excessive amounts of ammunition in depots.
Under such conditions, the effects of a detonation are likely to be greatly
magnified, and even a minor accident could threaten destruction of an entire
depot. 25X1
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The Insurgency This Summer
Insurgent attacks in Afghanistan's urban areas
escalated this summer, and the insurgent threat to key
lines of communication prompted Soviet and Afghan
regime forces to mount at least two sizable operations.
Guerrilla forces have also expanded activity in the
northern border provinces, an area that has been a
relative backwater of the war, and have maintained a
fairly high level of activity in the eastern border
region that has been a key target of government
pacification efforts.
Urban Areas Are a Key Target
The guerrillas battled regime and Soviet forces this
summer in and around three major cities-Kabul,
Herat, and Qandahar. It is unclear to what degree
insurgent groups coordinated planning for those
Sustaining combat activity in key urban areas served
another important purpose for the resistance; it
refuted regime assertions that these areas are
"without fighting" and under government control.
Especially in Kabul, the guerrillas wanted to
challenge the appearance of normalcy that the Soviets
and Afghans have gone to great lengths to maintain.
by combat aircraft were noticeably greater.
Although the US Embassy reported sporadic rocket
attacks and explosions in the capital during the
spring, the frequency and extent of such activity
increased sharply beginning in early July. By mid-
month, the US Embassy said that the activity had
demonstrably brought the war a little closer to Kabul.
At month's end, there were almost daily rocket
attacks and explosions, and the movement of Soviet
and Afghan convoys in and out of the city and flights
Guerrilla operations on the periphery of the capital
have also increased this summer. The most dramatic
attacks occurred when insurgents caused extensive
damage to a Soviet ammunition storage facility at
Bagram Airfield in the second week of July, and
damaged an Afghan missile facility in Kabul on 26
August. West of Kabul, in the hilly Paghman area,
the insurgents evidently succeeded in overrunning
about a half dozen security outposts that the Soviets
and Afghans set up last winter to hamper rocket and
mortar attacks. According to the US Embassy in
Kabul, the resurgence of guerrilla activity in
Paghman is attributable, in part, to the close
cooperation of local insurgent commanders, who have
coordinated attacks and shared intelligence. South of
the city, the guerrillas have conducted several
ambushes; in one instance in late July, a Soviet
convoy en route to Paktia Province was forced to turn
back by an attack.
Qandahar-the country's second-largest city-has
been the site of several battles this summer. In late
July, the US Embassy commented that the insurgents
were stronger in the city than at any time in the past
two years. Sources of the US Embassy have said that
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Soviet and regime forces have succeeded only in
controlling the airport outside the city as well as the
guerrilla forces in the area continue to have trouble
coordinating operations because of often crippling
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road into town.
Nevertheless, the creation of security rings around
Qandahar city is creating increased problems for the
guerrillas in infiltrating men and materiel.
the defensive perimeter is
orcmg t e insurgents to make changes in tactics, and
a number of guerrillas have relocated from the city to
outlying areas. Because the fighting has interrupted
basic services in the city, the logistic burden of the
insurgents has increased. In early August, the US
Embassy reported that even water supplies had been
cut off for several days. Despite these new challenges,
differences of opinion.
Fighting in the vicinity of the western city of Herat
has been intense at times this summer. Insurgents
there have withstood repeated Soviet and Afghan
regime attempts to clear them out of the city. After
three weeks of combat in July-that the US Embassy
in Kabul says caused extensive damage in the old
quarter-the insurgents mounted a successful attack
in the city. Frustration at their inability to crush the
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begin razing wide swaths around the old quarter
mayor ~omt operation was initiate in mid-August,
probably in response to continuing guerrilla activity.
The guerrillas also have been active in and around
several smaller urban areas. Although an Afghan
Army officer told the US Embassy in Kabul in late
July that downtown Jalalabad is safe during the day
and night, he commented that the surrounding
countryside is not safe at any time.
the US Embassy in August that insurgent activity was
making life in town "very difficult." ~~
Expanding the War in the North
The month-long multiregimental offensive by Soviet
and Afghan forces during June and July in the
Konduz-Eshkamesh-Talogan area of Konduz and
Takhar Provinces suggests that insurgent activity
close to the USSR border had reached a level that the
Soviets considered unacceptable
several convoys a month were being hit by
insurgent forces. The offensive evidently failed to
stem guerrilla attacks, however. A press statement by
Hizbi Islami guerrillas in early August admitted they
had incurred some 55 casualties during an ambush in
Badakhshan Province of a large Soviet and Afghan
The War in the East
In the eastern border provinces this summer,
insurgent groups have engaged in what an official of
the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs called a
return to "classical guerrilla warfare." The resistance
has continued harassment of selected Soviet and
Afghan regime installations and conducted ambushes
of enemy convoys, even on heavily guarded roads. For
example, there have been numerous clashes in
Nangarhar Province centered around regime outposts,
such as at Nazian and Towr Kham, and in Paktia, a
government garrison at `Ali Kheyl remains under
insurgent pressure, despite the offensive in May to
end those attacks. Barikowt, in the upper reaches of
the Konar Valley, has been besieged by the guerrillas,
Gulbuddin
plans to "seal" guerrilla infiltration routes.
Hekmatyar told the US Consulate in Peshawar in
early August that insurgents in Lowgar Province had
recently attacked several enemy outposts and
established new bases of their own to offset Soviet
Clouds on the Horizon
The guerrillas have sustained a relatively high level of
combat activity this summer despite concerted efforts
by Soviet and Afghan regime forces to weaken the
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underpinnings of the insurgency. Even so, resistance
fighters are concerned about their future operational
capabilities. Several developments are particularly
worrisome to them:
? The regime's policy of "shielding the borders. "One ?
of its features is keeping up fairly steady pressure on
key insurgent supply lines. Resistance alliance
spokesman Mojadedi recently admitted to US
officials that the Soviets and Afghan regime have
made "progress" in closing some of the border entry
points from Pakistan. Their efforts have interrupted
and caused the rerouting of some insurgent
shipments, which drive up the costs to the guerrillas
of transporting materiel and result in spot shortages.
But we are uncertain if these efforts have caused a
net reduction in the overall amount of insurgent
arms, equipment, and food delivered to
Afghanistan. Supplies expended in the fighting this
summer will need replacement and add to the
burden of what must be carried in to support
combat this fall.
Retaliation against guerrilla supporters. The
Soviets and the Afghan regime have long engaged in
retaliatory acts against villages that provide
assistance to the resistance, but there are now more
reports of selective crop destruction. Insurgent
commanders in some cases have sought to
compensate for the damage suffered by providing
food to their supporters, but most have only a
limited capability to do so. Some local inhabitants
have responded to the retaliation by withdrawing
their support for the insurgents altogether or by
leaving the area.
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? Growth in militia forces. The insurgents are
increasingly concerned about the militia forces that
the regime is creating through the use of bribes and
pledges to spare collaborators' areas from combat.
Expansion of these forces along key lines of
communication, in particular, poses potential
obstacles for transiting guerrilla forces.
? Prol(1eration ojsecurity zones and outposts. The
Soviets and Afghan regime have expanded their
program this summer for creating no man's lands,
manned defensive perimeters, and strategically
placed outposts to restrict the guerrillas' freedom of
movement around important targets. These security
measures, if fully implemented, have the potential
to be significantly disruptive to insurgent operations
and will force the guerrillas to rely less on
traditional rocket and mortar attacks.
? Recruitment ojir~formers by the Afghan
intelligence service
resistance commander Masood believe
that government agents were a primary factor in the
increasing interdiction of guerrilla supply caravans.
The insurgents' counterintelligence efforts have
exposed a number of informers, but others remain
undetected.
The Fighting This Fall
The insurgents' show of strength this summer is likely
to cause the Soviets and Afghan regime to redouble
their counterinsurgency efforts. A key target of these
efforts almost certainly will continue to be the
guerrillas' logistic system. Guerrillas in a number of
areas are likely to require more supplies to keep
fighting even at current levels because their forces
and the remaining populace have a diminished ability
to support themselves locally. Some commanders
probably are concerned about the effect of shortages
on the morale of their forces.
systems. At the same time, Soviet and Afghan regime
forces are likely to intensify attempts to limit
insurgent activity within the defense perimeters. The
practice in Kabul of arresting the entire family of
anyone who is discovered assisting a guerrilla
operation is one such technique.
The continuing guerrilla attacks in key urban areas,
on important lines of communication, and in the
northern provinces almost certainly are an unwelcome
development to Moscow. Consequently, the scheduled
removal of two motorized rifle regiments may be more
costly to counterinsurgency capabilities than Moscow
originally anticipated. The Afghan armed forces-
undermanned, demoralized, faction-ridden, and ill-
equipped-remain an unreliable ally, unable to
undertake major operations on their own in the war
against the guerrillas, and Soviet forces will continue
to be the core elements of counterinsurgent
operations. Moscow probably will seek to offset its
reduced ground strength, in part, by ordering heavier
use of airpower and air assaults-a new helicopter
squadron was deployed to Afghanistan in July.
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The surge in guerrilla activity in recent months also
probably will stimulate the expansion of static Soviet
and Afghan regime defenses around the major urban
areas and important military installations. The
Soviets' and the Afghan regime's forces want to keep
insurgent groups at distances from their installations
that exceed the range of the guerrillas' weapons
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Sibghatullah Mojadedi:
Spokesman of the
Resistance Alliance ~
fundamentalists of the alliance.
Sibghatullah Mojadedi, the leader of the traditionalist
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan (the Afghanistan
National Liberation Front or ANLF), began athree-
month term as spokesman of the Afghan resistance
alliance in July. Mojadedi advocates insurgent unity
and the convening of a Loya Jirga (grand tribal
council) to form a resistance government-in-exile.
While spokesman, he would like to establish alliance
offices abroad-especially in New York and
Jeddah-and streamline the alliance bureaucracy.
Mojadedi's accomplishments, however, will probably
be limited by his lack of political and administrative
skills, his forces' minor role in the fighting, and an
antagonistic relationship with two key
Copenhagen
A Mullah, Not a Soldier
According to Western scholars, Mojadedi, who is 60
years old, is a leading Islamic philosopher and scholar.
He holds a graduate degree in Islamic law from the
prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo. During the
1950s, he taught theology at two secondary schools in
Kabul and was a professor of Islamic jurisprudence at
Kabul University. From 1974 until 1978, Mojadedi
headed the Islamic Center of Scandinavia in
Mojadedi studied the Nagshbandi order of Sufism,
which his family has headed for over a century. The
nearly 3 million Afghan sect members regard
Mojadedi as the leader of a revered dynasty. (Some
laim that Mojadedi is a direct descendant of
Umar, the second caliph). In addition, his father and
great uncle, both religious scholars, were honored for
their efforts in fighting the British in 1919. As a
result, the family added prestige and, through a royal
reward, great wealth to its religious credentials. ~
Small and Ineffective Forces
The ANLF is probably the smallest and least
effective of the Peshawar-based resistance groups.
Although Mojadedi's family claims to lead up to
40,000 armed men operating from bases in Kabul city
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Sibghatullah Mojadedi:
leader, Jahba-i-Najat-i-Milli
Afghanistan since 1978.. .
tenure as spokesman oj'alliance
ends 1 September ... /slamic
scholar and philosopher .. .
traditional political outlook .. .
many family rnembers
imprisoned by regime ...quiet
and unassuming with sense of
humor ...speaks Jiuent Arabic
and English, some Urdu,
German, and Russian .. .
married twic t least
seven childre
and in Lowgar, Nangarhar, Qandahar, and Konarha 25X1
Provinces, we believe that the ANLF has relatively
few supporters scattered in the immediate area of the
Pakistani border. the ANLF 25X1
has often claimed credit for other groups' military
successes. 25X1
Most of the ANLF's troubles in the field can be
traced to poor administration and organization in its
headquarters in Peshawar. Logistic snarls keep many
supplies from reaching the battlefield. In addition,
Mojadedi's family, which
o~ ecisionmaking power within the
organization, has been accused of questionable
financial dealings and selling weapons for personal
profit, although Mojadedi has not been personally
implicated in any wrongdoing
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Just About AnytWng
But Communism
Mojadedi has a long history of anti-Communist and
anti-Soviet activities. In 1959 he was arrested for
allegedly plotting to assassinate Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev, who was on an official visit to Kabul. He
subsequently served afour-year prison term-three
years of which he spent in solitary confinement. From
his release until 1974, when he fled the country for
Denmark, he served as a translator at the Saudi
Arabian Embassy and actively organized street
demonstrations against Communism. In 1972 he
formed the secret Jamiat al-Ulami Mohammadi as an
Islamic counterweight to growing Communist
influence in Kabul. While in self-imposed exile,
Mojadedi traveled around the Middle East trying to
mobilize opposition to the leftist regime of
Mohammad Daoud.
Although Mojadedi has never hesitated to use Islam
as a political tool, he opposes the establishment in
Afghanistan of an Islamic republic modeled after
Iran. According to US officials in Peshawar, he has
labeled Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of a Hizbi
Islami faction, and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the head of
the Ittihad-i-Islami Barai Azadi Afghanistan (the
Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan), as
fanatics for their support of a Khomeini-style
government. He personally favors a nonaligned
democracy based on Islamic and traditional Afghan
values and advocates convening a Loya Jirga-a
traditional form of self-rule based on popular
representation-to establish the future government of
Afghanistan.
Mojadedi is ambivalent about a future role for former
King Zahir Shah, to whom he is distantly related
through his second wife. In 1984, Mojadedi told US
officials that the King's past mistakes had led to the
present political chaos and that the monarchy was an
anachronism. Mojadedi has since said that the King is
still popular among his former subjects and could
serve as a rallying point for the rivalry-plagued
resistance)
The Spokesman: Promoting Unity
Mojadedi stresses the need for unity within the
resistance. Since the beginning of the war, he has
participated in every alliance created by the moderate
factions, and from 1982 until 1985 served as
chairman of the three-party moderate alliance
(Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedin). Although
Mojadedi insists that without solidarity the cause may
be lost, we believe that he realizes an alliance is also
in his best interests. In view of the ANLF's poor
military and financial condition, the unity group
provides Mojadedi with more exposure and power
than he would otherwise have and gives him increased
access to funding and logistic aid.
However, working with the alliance's fundamentalists,
particularly Gulbuddin and Sayyaf, has not been easy
for Mojadedi. In addition to their differences over the
form of apost-Communist government in
Afghanistan, they are at odds over the nature of the
present coalition. Mojadedi maintains that Gulbuddin
and Sayyaf have little regard for unity and are a
hindrance by refusing to cooperate with it. He blames
their arrogance and intransigence upon their allegedly
close ties to Khomeini and Libyan leader Qadhafi.
Mojadedi is especially hostile toward Gulbuddin,
whom he branded as the "world's biggest terrorist"
and accused of assassinating fellow resistance
commanders. He may also be jealous of the military
prowess of Gulbuddin's forces and Sayyaf's financial
support from the Saudis.
Pro-US Attitude
Mojadedi looks favorably upon the United States. He
wants the United States to provide more
humanitarian and military aid to the resistance in
general, and the ANLF specifically, and to increase
diplomatic pressure upon the Soviet Union to pull out
of Afghanistan. After his trip to Washington, in June
1986, Mojadedi commented that he appreciated
meeting President Reagan and was impressed with his
knowledge of the resistance effort. He also has said
that as spokesman he intends to maintain close
contact with the United States.
Mojadedi, however, is not as positive about relations
with Pakistan. He has complained bitterly of
Pakistani interference in resistance affairs and
refused initially to accept his turn as spokesman to
emphasize his dissatisfaction
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As Spokesman:
A Look into the Crystal Ball
Mojadedi, no stranger to the limelight, will probably
stress public relations during his tenure as spokesman.
He is fluent in English and Arabic and speaks some
German and Urdu. He is an experienced public
speaker and on occasion has delivered powerful and
moving speeches. A personable man, he enjoys giving
press interviews; he even appeared in 1982 on the US
evangelical television program The 700 Club.
Mojadedi's goals of opening offices abroad,
consolidating the work of alliance committees, and
promoting an assembly to create agovernment-
in-exile will probably be unfulfilled. According to the
US Embassy in Islamabad, Sayyaf and Gulbuddin
are opposed to opening an alliance office in Jeddah.
They also disagree with Mojadedi and the
traditionalists over the method of selecting
representatives for the Loya Jirga and relations with
the United States. More important, Mojadedi lacks
the political power~to influence the other
alliance leaders. Therefore, Mojadedi will probably
move slowly toward his objectives while preserving the
facade of alliance unity. He will also work behind the
scenes to enlist US aid in weakening Gulbuddin's and
Sayyaf's veto power over alliance decisionmaking.
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Bonn Unlikely To Make
Major Changes in Policy
on Afghan Issue'
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
has repeatedly criticized Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan over the past six years, and public and
private funds from West Germany support
humanitarian aid programs for the Afghan resistance.
We believe, however, that the West Germans' desire
for East-West rapprochement limits the degree to
which Bonn is willing to expand aid to insurgents.
This restraint is reinforced by widespread public
apathy on the issue.
Words Are the Weapon of Choice
The invasion of Afghanistan was unsettling to the
West Germans, but the desire of the Social
Democrat-led coalition government under Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt not to jeopardize gains made from
detente confined Bonn's response to the invasion to
rhetoric. Left-of-center members of the coalition,
while condemning the invasion, argued that Islamic
states bordering Afghanistan should take the lead in
responding to Soviet actions.
Although opposition conservatives said the Soviet
aggression should not be ignored and insisted that
Soviet actions in other parts of the world could not be
severed from their intentions toward Western Europe,
the accession to power in 1983 of the Christian
Democrats did not change the basic tenor of West
German policy on the Afghan issue. Instead, the main
facet of this policy has continued to comprise
censuring the Soviets for their continued occupation
of Afghanistan.
Bundestag hearings-the most recent held in March
1986-and periodic government-supported rallies
have consistently called for the withdrawal of Soviet
troops. Juergen Todenhoefer, a Christian Democrat
deputy in the Bundestag and a prominent spokesman
for the resistance, has worked to keep the issue in the
forefront. Hans-Gert Poettering, also a Christian
Democrat, has authored two proresistance resolutions
in the European Parliament during the past 12
months. The resolutions condemned the Soviet
Juergen TodenhoeJer:
Bundestag ... widely regarded as
one of the rising stars in the
Christian Democratic Union
(CDUJ...disarmament
spokesman jor the CDU/CSU
(Christian Social Union)
parliamentary caucus and a
member of the Bundestag
Foreign Affairs
Committee...has twice visited
Afghanistan.. founder oJ'the
Action Focus on Afghan-
Reporters for Peace, an
organization that trains young
Afghan rebels in media
techniques to better publicize
what Todenhoefer has called
"the forgotten war.'~~
occupation of Afghanistan, called for the immediate
and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops, and
requested that the European Community step up
economic and financial aid to the Afghan people.
The Afghan issue, however, is of low priority for most
West Germans. According to the US Embassy in
Bonn, the sixth anniversary in 1985 of the Soviet
invasion was scarcely remembered. A poll taken
around the time of that anniversary showed that West
Germans ranked Afghanistan well below the issues of
nuclear arms, the Middle East, and South Africa.
Similarly, one-third of those polled had no opinion
about what Bonn should do about the presence of
Soviet troops. A year earlier, only 11 percent had no 25X1
opinion. The Bundestag hearings in March of this
year were held, in part, to combat this growing public
apathy.
Modest Aid Programs
In line with its preference for emphasizing the social
and moral consequences of the Soviet aggression in
Afghanistan, the West German Government is
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5 September 1986
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unwilling to provide much more than humanitarian
aid and public relations assistance to the Afghan
resistance. Official assistance to the refugees seems to
have peaked in 1984, when it amounted to about 60
million deutsche marks-roughly $30 million. In
1985, aid levels had declined to an estimated 45
million deutsche marks-about $22 million.
According to the US Embassy in Bonn, a West
German Foreign Ministry official recently suggested
that Bonn is considering participation in the US-
sponsored McCollum program that provides medical
treatment in Western Europe and the United States
for Afghan war-wounded. Several private West
German organizations, some of which are directed by
Afghans, currently provide medical assistance both to
the resistance and refugees.
A privately funded media project was initiated in
1985. Under the auspices of Verein Fuer
Afghanistanische Fluehtlingshilfe (VAF~the Aid
Association for Afghan Refugees-the program seeks
to train resistance cameramen to use donated video
equipment to produce documentary footage upon their
return to Afghanistan. As of June 1986, 20 insurgent
veterans, who were chosen by the resistance alliance
from as many different provinces and organizations as
possible, had completed an intensive four-week
training course. Another 40 men have been selected
for the program and some 3 million deutsche marks
raised to cover expenses, although the US Embassy in
Bonn says that the West Germans want to see the
results of the first contingent before proceeding with
the training of the second group.
Outlook
The West German Government will continue to be
openly critical of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan
and supportive of the resistance; Foreign Minister
Genscher even agreed to a proposed meeting with an
insurgent alliance spokesman earlier this summer. But
we believe that it is unlikely to significantly increase
its aid to the guerrillas. Afghanistan is clearly not an
issue for which the government would be willing to
risk complicating its relations with the Soviet Union.
German skepticism about Moscow's willingness to
change its policies on Afghanistan will remain a
strong constraint on what Bonn will do to aid the
resistance. A West German analysis in early 1986 of
Soviet Afghan policy concluded that the Soviet
obsession with secure borders was an overriding
concern that would shut out any real movement on the
Germans probably view Soviet leader Gorbachev's
treatment of Afghanistan at Vladivostok in July 1986
probably as little more than skillful propaganda.
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