DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -TOP Secret cr ~-`
Intelligence
Developments in Afghanistan
Top Seeret
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Developments in Afghanistan I 25X1
1 Perspective-Pakistan: Afghanistan Policy Post-Martial-Law
and Cabinet support farther down the road.
The lifting of martial law on 30 December probably will not result in early changes
in Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan, but several possible developments-including
more serious problems along the Afghan border, a disappointing US aid package,
or an economic downturn, or a credible Soviet peace overture-could erode public
13 Soviet Influence on Afghan Education
population.
Moscow is using Afghanistan's educational system to refashion society along
Soviet lines and play down the dominating influences of tradition and Islam. Its
efforts, however, will take many years at best to pay off, in our view, because of
ineffective regime control outside the capital, widespread hostility toward the
regime, and a pervasive disinterest in secular education by the largely Muslim
19 Soviet Heliborne Assault Operations in Afghanistan
insurgent casualties or gain decisive victories.
The Soviets are increasing the number and size of heliborne assault operations in
Afghanistan dramatically, but they have been unable to inflict large-scale
Soviet Logistics in Afghanistan
other combat environments.
Soviet logistic operations in Afghanistan suffer greatly from local physical
constraints and poor planning. Some of these problems are likely to reappear in
This document is published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence.
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Developments in Afghanistan
Perspective Pakistan: Afghanistan Policy Post-Martial-Law
The lifting of martial law on 30 December probably will not result in early changes
in Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan, but a number of potential developments-
including more serious problems along the Afghan border, a disappointing US aid
package, an economic downturn, or a credible Soviet peace overture-could make
it more difficult for Islamabad to sustain public and Cabinet support farther down
the road. President Zia and Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, who remain
committed to supporting the resistance, almost certainly will continue to be the
principal architects of policy, while Prime Minister Junejo and the National
Assembly will probably focus more on domestic policy. Although the
extraparliamentary political opposition will continue to target US-Pakistani ties-
and by extension Islamabad's policy towards Afghanistan-we believe it will not
be in a position to challenge seriously Pakistan's current policy supporting the
resistance.
Internal Pressures Manageable
Civilianization probably will mean a change in the style and form of foreign policy
making, if not in the substance. President Zia retains a firm grip on foreign policy
and, according to the US Embassy in Islamabad, his commitment to the Afghan
resistance is unshaken. Nevertheless, Zia will be careful to portray Junejo as
Pakistan's chief executive officer and probably shares the Prime Minister's
conviction that Pakistan must more vocally assert its independence in foreign
affairs. Zia, as well as other members of the civilian Cabinet, are likely to stress
that Pakistan will be the final arbiter of how to implement its policy on
Afghanistan.
We believe Prime Minister Junejo will concentrate on building a government party
and power base, but in so doing he is likely to give at least the appearance of
distancing himself-and Pakistan-from the United States. His main political
vehicle, the Pakistan Muslim League, sets as its goals-albeit largely rhetorical
ones-the achievement of Pakistan's economic independence and nonalignment in
foreign policy. Junejo's foot-dragging on going public with the formation of
Pakistan Welfare International, the organization designed to channel
humanitarian aid inside Afghanistan, probably is early evidence of his concern
that Pakistan's support for the Afghan resistance remain low key.
Although civilianization has reduced the prominence of at least one outspoken and
influential critic of the policy toward Afghanistan-former North-West Frontier
Province Governor Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq-the government almost certainly will
have to contend with other politicians and members of the military who object to
the policy. In discussions between US and Pakistani officials since the end of
martial law, both civilian and military officials have been quite willing to voice
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opinions other than the "party line." Consensus building is likely to quickly
become a part of the political process-a development that we believe will both
slow down the decisionmaking process and, on occasion, send mixed signals on
foreign policy to Washington.
A Weak Opposition
Pakistan's disorganized opposition, having lost its principal rallying point with the
departure of martial law, will continue to see criticism of the US-Pakistani
relationship as one of its more promising issues. It will draw on widespread popular
suspicions about Washington's steadfastness as an ally to argue that Islamabad's
Afghan policy unnecessarily exposes Pakistan to Soviet aggression. More extreme
opponents will charge that the United States is using Pakistan as a pawn for a
confrontation with Moscow. Some also will argue-the current warming trend in
Indo-Pakistani relations notwithstanding-that the real threat to Pakistan's
security is India and that involvement in Afghanistan simply weakens Pakistan's
ability to defend itself along its eastern border.
The opposition, in our view, has its work cut out if it is to mobilize public opinion
against Afghan policy, however. The most recent poll by Gallup Pakistan in
December indicates that most Pakistanis-even supporters of parties that call for
direct talks with the Babrak regime-endorse current policy toward Afghanistan.
According to the poll, two-thirds of the respondents opposed direct talks even
though many had mixed feelings regarding the presence of refugees in Pakistan.
Looking Ahead
As demonstrated in the December debate on foreign policy in the National
Assembly, the government can secure parliamentary support for its Afghan policy
with careful lobbying and should be able to continue to do so over the near term.
We believe, however, that several developments over the longer term could
heighten the Assembly's concerns about Afghan policy:
? A sharp rise in Soviet military pressure-such as cross-border raids and air
violations-could stimulate parliamentary demands that the regime account for
its handling of the Afghan situation.
? A disappointing aid package from Washington. Recent conversations with US
officials indicated that Pakistani officials are beginning to accept that US
budgetary constraints will mean a post-1987 assistance program that falls well
below Islamabad's request. But, unless Islamabad does a thorough job of briefing
the National Assembly and preparing public opinion, Pakistanis' dashed
expectations will be viewed as another indication of Washington's unreliability
as an ally and the folly of current policy toward Afghanistan.
? Economic hardship would result in an outcry against the burden of the Afghan
refugees, heighten economic competition between the refugees and local
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Pakistanis, and probably escalate social violence in the areas where refugee
camps are concentrated. Barring a drought, we believe a sharp economic
downturn is unlikely over the next two years, however.
? A credible Soviet peace overture. Serious efforts by Moscow to find a diplomatic
solution to the war would be received favorably in Islamabad, in our view. To be
acceptable, any peace proposal would have to include at least a partial troop
withdrawal, acceptance of the Durand line as the recognized international
border, and promises to cease interference in the tribal affairs of Pakistan's
border areas.
In our view, any of these developments would make Afghan policy an exploitable
issue for the opposition and potentially erode support for Zia's Afghan policy in the
Cabinet or among the military
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Combat activity across Afghanistan was generally light in late December and
early January. Combined Soviet-Afghan operations
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were carried out both north and southwest of Kabul during late December
January involving several armor, motorized rifle and artillery units,
Additional combat operations in the Bagram Airfield region occurred in late
(Soviet and Afghan tr o s were involved
Ghazni from 13-20 January
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Afghanistan
Boundary reproaentation ig
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the Soviets are rerouting traffic
west of Qandahar city to lessen insurgent pressures on Soviet convoys.
raffic is detouring off Route 1 between Senjaray and a point
approximately 45 kilometers west of the city (see map); no traffic was observed on
the portion of Route 1 being bypassed. A Soviet bivouac site and three road
security positions were established along this well-traveled detour route between
1982 and mid-1984. Major elements of the two motorized rifle companies housed
there were out of garrison probably carrying out road security or
sweep operations. The road security positions, built since late 1984, were also
unocuppied A road security unit was also identified about 34
kilometers southeast of Qandahar, suggesting that insurgent pressure on Soviet
convoys along that route is also a problem.
Crackdown on Insurgent Sympathizers
The Afghan Ministry of State Security (KHAD) and the KGB have arrested L
=military and civilian personnel on suspicion of collaborating with Hizbi
Islami and Jamiat-i-Islami insurgent groups,
The US Embassy reports that Islamabad is delaying the official announcement
and startup of Pakistan Welfare International, a newly formed clearinghouse for
humanitarian assistance inside Afghanistan. In December, the Cabinet voted
against the relief agency, after President Zia had approved the plan. Prime
Minister Junejo is said to favor the establishment of a nongovernmental agency
headed by Afghans that would work with the insurgents and private organizations
without an overt Pakistani connection. major
Western private voluntary organizations have serious reservations about the
official Pakistani organization and may end their humanitarian efforts inside
Afghanistan rather than work through it.
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Islamabad is worried that a program that highlights its support for the insurgents
might increase Soviet pressure on Pakistan. The new Cabinet, named by Junejo in
late January, is expected to reconsider the cross-border relief issue but is unlikely
to approve a program as highly visible as Pakistan Welfare International. Private
voluntary organizations doubt that Pakistan Welfare International will distribute
humanitarian assistance impartially; its new chairman has close ties to
fundamentalist resistance leader Gulbuddin's Hizbi Islami faction and is opposed
to moderate resistance groups.
As part of Kabul's recently intensified campaign to bolster its legitimacy and
portray its leadership as benign reformers anxious for peace, the Afghan regime
invited journalists from Canada, Japan, the United States, and Western Europe to
Kabul in late January. The journalists-the first to be officially invited to Kabul
since the war began-met with various government officials, including Babrak
Karmal, and visited Jalalabad and a showpiece complex of rural villages outside of
Kabul. The government used the visit to display its efforts to broaden popular
support by emphasizing Islam, wooing Pashtun and Baluch tribesmen,
encouraging "national capitalism," and building a ruling "national front"
representing various segments of Afghan society.
According to the US Embassy in Kabul, the Soviet Ambassador to Kabul,
Tabeyev, has also been pushing the "national front" thesis, presumably as part of
Moscow's peace offensive on Afghanistan. Tabeyev said that Afghanistan would
hold parliamentary elections after the Afghan new year (21 March). He claimed
that resistance leaders such as Gailani, Mojadeddi, and Rabbani would be
welcome in the "front," and hinted that the Soviets were in contact with other
resistance figures, without much result.
The Soviet army is introducing several new types of artillery into Afghanistan,
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with long experience in Afghanistan recently provided his 25X1
views on the state of the war and the future course of the insurgency. 25X1
the next two to three years will be critical years for the resistance. I125X1
present trends in the quantity and quality of weapons supplies continue, the
insurgents could be in a position to turn Afghanistan into the Soviet Union's
Vietnam. Moscow would then have to either consider negotiations seriously or
significantly escalate its war effort. In any case, Moscow would be forced to factor
Afghanistan into every other strategic calculation it makes in the world.F____125X1
that would have tremendous military and psychological effect.
The resistance faces formidable obstacles, however, in his view. Key indicators of
insurgent effectiveness over the next two years will be their ability to coordinate
attacks, the assurance of a steady stream of sophisticated weaponry, including
better air defense weapons, and a decision by the resistance alliance in Peshawar-
admittedly difficult-to expand the political and military authority of the most
effective resistance commanders. The resistance should focus its efforts in 1986 on
planning a type of "tet offensive"-a series of coordinated attacks countrywide
the major change in 1985 was the large number of new 25X1
weapons that resistance groups have received in country. With the exception of 25X1
effective ground-to-air missiles, the insurgents are much better supplied than in
the past. At the same time, the escalation in Soviet military activities since 1984
has had its costs for the resistance-travel is more difficult, casualties are up,
civilians are paying a high price, and the resistance has had to move out of many
villages to mountain strongholds, further away from their civilian base of support.
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Afghan Education
largely Muslim Afghan population.
Soviet education programs in Afghanistan are
designed to refashion Afghan society along socialist
lines and reduce significantly the dominating
influences of tradition and Islam. Through education
and other Sovietization measures, the Soviets are
attempting to increase support for an unpopular
regime and ideology and to create a cadre of pro-
Soviet Afghans capable of ruling and maintaining a
stable pro-Communist regime in Kabul. In our view,
however, it will take many years at best for Soviet
indoctrination programs to pay off because of
ineffective regime control outside the capital,
widespread hostility toward the regime, and the
pervasive disinterest in secular education among the
influence Afghan education.
Curriculum Changes
The Soviets have been seeking to influence the
education of Afghans, either directly or through
regime and party programs, since the Marxist
takeover in April 1978. During its first month in
power, the regime changed curricula-adding
material translated directly from Russian texts and
some written by Soviet experts, replaced high school
principals with members of the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and created one new
secondary school with Russian as the language of
instruction. The Soviets have placed continuing
emphasis on curricula, faculty and staff, textbooks,
and new education programs in their effort to
The Soviets have superimposed curricula almost
identical to those used in the Soviet Union. The "new
educational" system, according to the Kabul press,
was needed to accommodate "the need for the sound
mental and physical development of students
according to the altered socioeconomic, political, and
cultural demands of the Afghan society." Afghan
officials, with the aid of Soviet advisers in the
Ministry of Education, developed 10 curricula
designed to implement a unified teaching program,
upgrade the level of sociopolitical consciousness of the
students and teachers, and train the young generation
in a spirit of loyalty to the homeland and the
revolution,
New courses and course content have appeared in
Afghan elementary, middle, and high schools. In
1980, the regime shortened the existing 12-year
preuniversity system to parallel the 10-year system
then in use in the USSR. In April 1983, Russian
became a required subject in primary and secondary
schools. In 1984, the US Embassy in Kabul reported
that an Afghan Ministry of Education document
prescribed that children in the seventh and subsequent
grades study such subjects as "Socialism, The Dream
of the World's Working Class," "The Struggle of the
Two World Systems (Communism and Capitalism),"
and "The Three Principal Forces of the Revolution."
Children were also required to take courses on the
PDPA, the April Revolution, and Afghanistan's
reliance on the support of the USSR.
in 1984 upper elementary
and secondary school classes included such topics as
Communist philosophy, scientific socialism, socialistic
economy, and biographies of Marx and Lenin.F_
Textbooks and Materials
Existing texts have also been substantially revised to
include pro-Soviet and pro-Communist themes.F-
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1979 Soviet advisers began to replace West German
materials with teaching materials translated directly
from Russian texts. Soviet Tajiks and Uzbeks
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translated textbooks into dialects of their respective
languages for their ethnic kin in Afghanistan. 25X1
Soviet scholars have reinterpreted and rewritten
Afghan history to bring it in line with Marxist theory
for new Afghan textbooks.
Soviet scholars drafted a new history of
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To implement their education goals in Afghanistan,
we believe the Soviets are using local languages,
blocking development of Afghan nationalism, and
unde the traditionally strong role of Islam.
Using Language. As they did in Muslim areas of the
Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviets are
encouraging the use of native languages in education
programs. We believe the Soviets expect that the
preservation of ethnic identity through language will
fragment Afghan society, set back the developmeht of
Afghan nationalism, and eventually lead to a wider
use of Russian, easing the path for further
assimilation of Afghans into Soviet culture. Local
languages-including Uzbeki, Turkmen, and
Baluchi-are now languages of instruction from the
first grade. Students learn one of two main Afghan
languages-Dart is favored over Pushtu-later on.
Literacy course materials reportedly are available in
regional languages.
Russian language training is widely incorporated into
all levels of education. Many departments of Kabul
University require students to take Russian. A source
of the US Embassy in Kabul reported that in 1982
Russian language training started in the first grade in
some experimental schools.
other than Russian. Russian has replaced English as
the foreign language taught in elementary schools,
by 1984 English, French, and Turkish
were dropped from the foreign languages department.
A source of the US Embassy in Kabul reported that
the regime dropped the study of Arabic in secondary
schools by 1982.
Playing Down Islam. The Soviets and the regime
have also attempted to reduce the traditionally
strong role of Islam in the schools, although Babrak
and his colleagues pay vigorous lipservice to the
importance of Islam. The regime has closed many
schools operated by mullahs and reduced the number
of hours of Islamic instruction in the secular schools.
An excerpt from a paper presented at a teaching
conference in Kabul in 1983 pointed out that social
science teachers in Afghanistan must overcome Islam
and direct youth to study Marxism-Leninism.
Soviet political training has replaced theological
courses in the secondary schools, according to a
source of the US Embassy in Kabul. Theology, once
taught four times per week at the Kabul Military
School, has been decreased to one hour per week and
all Russian language
teachers are Russians, and each student receives religion is being taught in some of the lower grades,
one hour of Russian language instruction each day. but by Communist-trained and -controlled officials.
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The regime has severely curtailed-and in many
schools eliminated-classes in foreign languages
Afghanistan and translated it into several Afghan
languages. This history stresses two themes: that
Afghanistan has been dominated by the struggle of
the working classes against imperialism and that the
country's independence is largely owed to the
"fraternal assistance" of the Soviet Union. An eighth-
grade history book published in 1984 focuses heavily
on the USSR and the April Revolution, giving only
passing and mostly unfavorable attention to earlier
periods of Afghan history.
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Faculty and Staff
Since April 1978, the Soviets have rapidly moved
reliable personnel into the educational system in
Afghanistan. A large number of Soviet advisers
initially took posts in the Ministry of Education and,
following the 1979 invasion, were assigned to the
Ministry's Curriculum and Textbook Department,
according to press accounts. Soviet personnel in the
Ministry approve all important policies and help
design and implement new curricula. A Soviet Uzbek
heads the recently created Uzbek Department of the
Afghan Ministry of Education, according to a
Western journalist
Soviet teachers, instructors, and advisers now play key
roles in Afghan education. We believe several
hundred Soviets are advising or teaching in Afghan
schools.
----Soviets teach most of the Russian
language courses and head political and social
education departments in secondary schools, ensuring
that instruction is based on Marxist-Leninist theory.
New Programs for Children
The Babrak Karmal regime has initiated new
education programs in day-care centers, nurseries,
and kindergartens, most of them built in Kabul since
the Communist takeover, according to jounalistic
accounts. Many are associated with workplaces, such
as the Kabul bus institute where the regime
established a nursery for children below three years of
age and a kindergarten for three- to six-year-olds.C
he Soviet-
children amount to brainwashing.
Low enrollments in areas where regime schools exist
reduce the impact of the indoctrination program, in
our view. In Kabul, probably the most secure city, we
estimate that less than 25 percent of eligible first
graders are enrolled. The hundreds of thousands of
rural Afghans who have migrated to Kabul usually do
not send their children to school. Some parents who
view education favorably are reluctant to enroll
children because they fear insurgent reprisals; others
resent the regime's indoctrination efforts.
Afghan Students in the Soviet Union
In our judgment, extensive Soviet programs to train
and indoctrinate Afghans by sending them to the
USSR for schooling have produced limited, and
sometimes counterproductive, results
relations
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between Soviet citizens and Afghans have
deteriorated since 1978;
US Embassy sources indicate
that most Afghans, like other Third World students
trained in the USSR, are antagonized by Soviet
prejudices against non-Europeans and the boorishness
of many Soviet officials.
we
administrators, and foreign trade officials,
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members, midlevel regime officials, teachers, 25X1
estimate that some 10,000 Afghans, including some
2,000 military personnel, annually attend Soviet
institutions for training and education. The Soviets
also emphasize political training courses for party
that Afghans were attending 66 educational
institutions in 24 locations in the Soviet Union.
the majority of facilities are in
Tashkent, Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev.
Approximately 20 percent of the Afghans studying in
the USSR are developed into informants of the
Afghan intelligence service (KHAD),
The Soviets and regime have recently emphasized
sending Afghans who are very young-seven to nine
years old-for up to a decade of instruction in the
USSR. Babrak Karmal cited the need for sending
thousands of youth to obtain training abroad,
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particularly in "friendly countries," in 1985. 25X1
during the last four 2bA1
months of 1984, more than 700 youths departed
Kabul for Tashkent, and another
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ICIII IIIIIIIJ ,.:
The above photo, taken in 1981, shows Afghan children at the
Kabul Airport awaiting their departure to the Soviet Union for
300 left for the USSR the following August.
Most of these students come from Kabol and
Nangarhar Province and are children of party
members or come from the regime-controlled
orphanages.
The regime, probably realizing the need for greater
influence in the rural areas, approved a plan in early
1985 to send to the USSR some 600 youth from
Afghan tribes near the Pakistani border and Shia
minority groups in central Afghanistan,
More than 15 percent of Afghan students enrolled in
higher and technical education attended schools in the
USSR in 1982, according to regime statistics and our
estimates. Most of these seek higher and technical
education in the USSR to escape military service and
insurgent reprisals; a smaller number go because they
are party members and expect better jobs and salaries
when they return, They
receive a higher quality education-especially in
medical and technical fields, and enjoy a higher
standard of living than in Afghanistan.
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Afghan Students in the USSR, 1972-84a
education and indoctrination. Lack of security in most
of the country limits both the extent and effectiveness
of the Soviet and regime education effort to a few
areas, mainly the largest cities. Many, if not most,
Afghans who are being trained in the USSR will
probably reject Soviet values either because of bad
personal experiences with Soviet citizens or simply
o Post-secondary and technical
o Military
? 7-9 year oldsb
a The figures for post-secondary and technical students are an estimate of full-time
students in the USSR at the end of each year. The figures for military students are
reported departures for training in the USSR.
b The seven to nine year olds left in 1984 for 10 years of schooling in the USSR.
each year for study in the USSR.
The regime has more than enough applicants for the
approximately 3,000 scholarships reportedly available
'afghans complain that only students well
probably grant several hundred each year.
connected to the regime get the eagerly sought
scholarships to Eastern Europe, mainly
Czechoslovakia and Poland. The East Europeans
A Long Road Ahead
In our view, it will take many years, perhaps more
than a generation, for the Soviet effort to produce
significant changes in Afghan attitudes through
because iet values conflict with Afghan traditions.
In our view, the Soviets expect significant results from
their efforts only after the generation that is now
training begins functioning in the middle and upper
echelons of the Afghan Government. Accordingly,
they will continue to pursue their indoctrination of
Afghans through education-either directly or
through the regime and party apparatus. The Soviets
almost certainly realize they are currently making
little progress toward their goal of building an
ideologically motivated and effective cadre. We
believe Soviet experience in Central Asia, Eastern
Europe, and Mongolia gives the current leadership
hope that it can in the long term attract and train a
core of opportunists and ideologues willing to do their
bidding.
We expect the regime to increase its efforts to entice
and bribe tribes and local groups in rural areas to
participate in education/ indoctrination programs. It
is our view that any gains in these rural areas would
only be temporary, however. Traditional Afghan
values-including the predominance of local and
tribal concerns, distrust of any central government,
Islamic faith, deep-seated anti-Communism, and the
importance of vengeance-all work against Soviet
and regime success.
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Soviet Heliborne Assault
Operations in Afghanistan
insurgent supplies coming from Pakistan.
Heliborne assaults play a significant role in Soviet
operations in Afghanistan. The mobility and
versatility of helicopters allow Soviet and Afghan
forces to achieve surprise, improve mobility, and
overcome some of the obstacles caused by difficult
terrain. The Soviets, moreover, are improving their
tactical proficiency and-particularly this past year-
have been increasing the number and size of heliborne
assault operations. Raids by smaller heliborne teams,
often composed of Special Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz),
are also now a key part of Soviet attempts to interdict
have to add more helicopters and troops.
Heliborne assaults have succeeded in keeping the
insurgents off balance, but have not allowed the
Soviets to inflict large-scale insurgent casualties or
gain decisive victories. Although effective air assault
operations in a guerrilla warfare environment are
difficult under the best of circumstances, the
development of effective air assault tactics in
Afghanistan is hampered by a standard Soviet
doctrine for assault operations-designed for a war in
Europe-that places more emphasis on air support for
ground forces than independent air assaults. We
believe better results would also require overcoming
longstanding problems with intelligence and
command and control, increasing the tempo of
combined air assault and ground force operations, and
more sophisticated tactics (including night assaults)
from smaller units. If the increased level of air assault
activity is to be sustained, moreover, the Soviets may
Air Assault Operations
The Soviets use MI-8 helicopters to transport air
assault troops and MI-24 attack helicopters to provide
fire support before and during assault landings.
Helicopter regiments and squadrons are based at six
major airfields throughout Afghanistan-Konduz,
Bagram, Kabul, Jalalabad, Qandahar, and
Shindand-with permanent detachments at Feyzabad
and Ghazni. When required to conduct a larger
under the operational control of one commander.
Elements of all Soviet ground force units in
Afghanistan have taken part in helicopter assaults.
However, the majority of air assaults are conducted
by specialized units trained and equipped for air
assault operations, rather than by regular motorized-
rifle units. These specialized forces constitute over
12,000 men out of the estimated 42,000 combat
troops in Afghanistan and include airborne, air
assault, and Spetsnaz units.
At the start of the war, the Soviets clearly faced
problems in arriving at successful assault tactics and
in command and control. The insurgents were
nevertheless often impressed with the quality of
assault forces, who they distinguished from run-of-
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NESA DA 86-002JX
SOV DA 86-002JX
February I
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MI-8 (Hip): Primary troop
transport for air assaults ...
also used for search-and-
rescue, logistic support,
artillery spotting ... usually
carries guns and rocket
pods ... can carry up to 24
troops, but during assaults
typically carries 5 to 15
... currently over 130 in
MI-24 (Hind): Provides fire
support before and during air
assaults ... also escorts
logistic and search-and-rescue
flights ... can carry troops but
rarely does ... armament
includes mixture of 12.7-mm
and 30-mm gun, 57- and
80-mm rockets, AT-3 and
A T-6 antitank missiles ...
modifications for Afghanistan
include infrared
countermeasures, heavier
armor ... currently almost 120
MI-6 (Hook): Largest
helicopter in
Afghanistan ... size and poor
maneuverability make it easy
target ... vulnerability plus
poor performance at higher
altitudes and temperatures
keep it from being used in
assaults ... follow-on MI-26
more capable, but not deployed
in Afghanistan ... currently 50
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The Konar Offensive. Fighting in the Konar Valley in
May-June 1985 demonstrated a new level of Soviet
proficiency in conducting air assaults
allows armor and support vehicles wider scope than in
the mountainous east, and may account for the lower
level of air assault operations.
In eastern and southern Afghanistan, the increase and
redeployment of Spetsnaz battalions early in 1985
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While ground units moved up the main
valley, the assault forces swept the ridges and
tributary valleys in an effort to trap the insurgents. A
key feature of the assault operations,
was the use of SU-25s and
minefields to prevent insurgents from escaping.
tactical successes into a decisive victory.
the insurgents took only
light casualties and were able to reassert their control
over the valley quickly after the Soviets withdrew.
The Soviet advance was characterized as slow and
methodical,
some heliborne units dropped
onto exposed positions were surrounded and killed,
and even Spetsnaz troops reportedly took heavy
casualties.
The Panjsher. Soviet use of heliborne assaults in the
Panjsher Valley had mixed success last year. They
showed they can launch air assaults in the Valley with
little warning but, as in the Konar, have not solved the
problem of forcing the insurgents to stand and fight.
The Soviets, moreover, were unable to mount
successful air assaults to rescue prisoners, following
the insurgent capture of the Afghan garrison at
Peshghowr last June.
Elsewhere. Air assaults in other parts of the country
have continued at varying levels of intensity. In
western Afghanistan, assault operations appear to be
smaller and less frequent than in the east. There is
only a single helicopter squadron based in the Farah-
Herat region: we believe the low and flat terrain
insurgent convoys and other targets of opportunity.
Spetsnaz groups typically operate in small teams,
from 20 to 25 men, to conduct ambushes and raids
and collect intelligence.
the Soviets have been conducting more
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Problems With Air Assault Operations
Although the nature of guerrilla operations makes air
assault operations difficult under the best of 25X1
circumstances, we believe the overriding reason for 25X1
the mixed results of Soviet air assault operations is the 25X1
absence of a well-developed Soviet counterinsurgency
strategy. Soviet heliborne assault units are trained
and organized primarily to seize key enemy positions
and terrain features, such as river crossings, in 25X1
Europe, but the most important aim of air assault 25X1
operations is to find, fix, and destroy insurgent groups 25X1
and their leaders. The Soviets have made only minor
adjustments to tactics and force structure in
Afghanistan, moreover, and have failed to develop a
strategy emphasizing independent heliborne assault
operations. Consequently, Soviet commanders are
unwilling to use large air assault forces without direct
support by ground units, and air operations develop
too slowly to catch the insurgents by surprise. In
addition, air assault units-despite their elite
nature-are not trained for night attacks and do not
have the intimate knowledge of local terrain and
insurgent tactics needed to exploit fully their mobility
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These basic deficiencies are compounded by a host of
other problems that plague the Soviet military in
Afghanistan:
? Command and control failures, many due to
equipment problems, especially the lack of
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compatibility between different radios; heavy
centralization of control also sometimes leads to
conflicting commands and detailed tactical
direction by officers not on the scene.
? Poor leadership. A desire to avoid casualties inhibits
aggressive leadership. Junior officers often fail to
concentrate units or maintain vigilance in the field.
? Lack of heavy lift prevents artillery firebases from
relocating quickly and restricts their use to positions
on or near major roads. Operations tend to be
limited to areas already within artillery range, and
airpower must be employed even more intensively to
make up for lack of organic firepower.
? Inadequate reconnaissance and intelligence. Delays
in processing and disseminating intelligence reduce
the surprise capability of assault forces.
Prospects
We believe the increase in Soviet air assaults is part of
a general increase in operations, prompted by a
combination of more aggressive leadership from the
new commander of the Southern Theatre of Military
Operations, Soviet Army General Zaytsev, and more
insurgent activity. The Soviets probably view air
assaults, usually in conjunction with ground forces, as
the most effective way to keep the insurgents off
balance and maximize the utility of their limited
number of combat troops. Soviet satisfaction with the
Konar operation, moreover, suggests that they will
continue to perform large-scale air assault operations
of this type, most likely in areas where the
concentration of insurgent forces is high, such as the
Panjsher and Konar Valleys, in Paktia Province
between Gardeyz, Ali Kheyl, and Khowst, or possibly
in the Helmand Valley.
A substantial increase in air assault activity would
require augmenting Soviet assault forces. We believe
more transport and attack helicopters would be
needed. The Soviets may also choose to add air
assault units or employ regular motorized rifle troops
more often in assault landings.
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Soviet Logistics
in Afghanistan
control.
Soviet logistic operations in Afghanistan suffer
greatly from local physical constraints and poor
planning. Increased Soviet activity combined with
Afghanistan's limited road network and the absence
of a railroad produce considerable congestion on
existing roads and make supply convoys vulnerable to
resistance attacks. The Kowtal-e Salang (Salang Pass)
and the Tunel-e Salang (Salang Tunnel), in particular,
are major bottlenecks on the only ground line of
communication between the transshipment facilities
at Kheyrabad and the majority of Soviet forces. But
we believe many of the Soviet logistic deficiencies
observed in Afghanistan would reappear in other
combat environments, even those with a much better
logistic infrastructure, because of poor command and
northwestern Afghanistan.
Constructing Logistic Facilities
To facilitate the movement of supplies into
Afghanistan after the invasion, the Soviets began
constructing permanent bridges across the Amu
Darya river, and transshipment points at Kheyrabad
and Towraghondi. Construction of a railroad/high-
way bridge across the Amu Darya river from
Ayvadzh to a point north of Kholm was completed in
May 1980. A preexisting railroad/highway bridge
also crosses the Kushka river near Kushka, providing
access to the Towraghondi transshipment point in
Between 1980 and 1981, the Soviet and Afghan
regime engaged in extensive construction of logistic
facilities along the main roads. The major Soviet
supply depot was built at Pol-e Khomri and divisional
depots were established at Kabul, Bagram, Konduz,
and Shindand. Supply depots were also established at
the major airfields in Kabul, Bagram, Qandahar,
Shindand, and Herat. Storage facilities were built at
most regiment and brigade headquarters, and
ammunition and petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL)
storage facilities at major airfields in the Turkestan
Military District were expanded. Along the eastern
route, two tactical pipelines, probably for aviation and
diesel fuel, were completed between Termez and Pol-e
Khomri by mid-1980; an extension to Bagram was
completed in 1982. In western Afghanistan a pipeline
carrying both aviation and diesel fuel was completed
from Kushka to Shindand by late 1984. Other
facilities vital to the logistic effort-such as helipads,
runways, and airfields-were upgraded or built
Hard surface roads in Afghanistan are few in number
and low in capacity. The main Soviet lines of 25X1
communication were built by the Soviets in the late
1970s. In western Afghanistan, a paved road leads
from the Towraghondi transshipment point south to
Herat, Shindand, and Qandahar. In eastern
Afghanistan, a paved road leads from the Kheyrabad
transshipment point south to Pol-e Khomri, then over
the Salang Pass to Kabul- and Qandahar (see table).
Until the Soviet surface logistic system became well
established, most supplies were transported to
Afghanistan and in country by Military Transport
Aviation (VTA). Prior to the invasion, in June 1979,
VTA deployed eight AN-12 medium transports to
Bagram Airfield; these remain the core of an in-
country net linking the major airbases in Afghanistan.
Today both ground and air transport assets are
utilized extensively for transporting supplies into and
within Afghanistan. Many supplies from the USSR
are delivered to the transshipment points by rail and
transported to various depots and units by ground
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NESA DA 86-002JX
SOV DA 86-002JX
7 Februar ' " '
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Distance
(kilometers)
Surface
Type/
Condition
Surface
Width
(meters)
Shoulder
Width
(meters)
Terrain
Jeyretan-Na'ebabad
55
Bituminous/
good
7.3
1-2
Undulating
Na'ebabad-Pol-e Khomri
200
Bituminous/
fair
7.3
1-2
Mountainous
Shir Khan-Kabul
Shir Khan/Pol-e Khomri
Pol-e Khomri/Kabul
425
248
177
Bituminous/
fair
6-7
1-2
Mountainous
Kabul-Pakistan border near
Towr Kham
Kabul/Sarowbi
Sarowbi/border
275
71
204
Bituminous/
good
6.4-7.2
1-2
Undulating to
mountainous
Kabul-Qandahar
525
Bituminous/
fair
6.4-7.2
1-2
Hilly
Konduz-Kholm
110
Earth/poor
4.2-9.1
None
Undulating to
hilly
Towraghondi-Qandahar
Towraghondi/Herat
Herat/Qandahar
715
115
600
Bituminous
concrete/good
Concrete/
good
Over 7.2
6.4-7.2
0-1
1-2
Hilly
Hilly to flat
Remarks
800-meter hwy/RR bridge
across the Amu Darya
river. Route serves the
Kheyrabad rail-to-road
transshipment point.
Ferry across Amu Darya
river between USSR border
and Shir Khan. Forty-five
bridges, one tunnel, and 20
galleries on this route.
Longest bridge, 145 m; the
Salang Tunnel is 2.67 km
long.
Route leads to Khyber Pass;
seven tunnels along route.
convoys. Some supplies reportedly are trucked in from
Ayvadzh, USSR, along the eastern route.F_
Because airlift is limited in capacity and is more
expensive than ground resupply, we believe it ha:
made a much smaller quantitative contribution t
ground transport to the overall logistic picture.
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and fixed-wing airlift assets to tactical requirements
has made them vital to the Soviet logistic effort. 25X1.1
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Bottlenecks
The construction of the major 40th Army supply
depot at Pol-e Khomri was a major error on the part
of Soviet logisticians, in our view. Most supplies both
from the USSR to Kabul and to areas of major Soviet
combat operations in eastern Afghanistan must pass
through bottlenecks that leave supply convoys
vulnerable to insurgent ambush:
? The roads leading south from Jeyretan and Shir
Khan join just north of Pol-e Khomri and a single
road continues south to Kabul.
? The route from Shir Khan to Kabul has 45 bridges,
20 galleries, and the important tunnel at the Salang
Pass.
The Salang Tunnel is the major choke point along this
route and has been the site of numerous insurgent
ambushes. Soviet and Afghan regime security
measures, moreover, limit traffic to a one-way flow,
alternating direction daily.
The Soviets apparently recognize the problems
associated with locating their major supply depot at
Pol-e Khomri. They have been taking steps, for
example, to locate ammunition stocks elsewhere.
As the number of ground convoys increased, logistic
routes became congested. By mid-1982, road traffic
throughout Afghanistan averaged between 30 and 35
columns daily, totaling 1,350 to 1,500 vehicles. Choke
points along the Kabul-Termez highway, like the
Salang Tunnel, rapidly became even more of a
problem.
To control the stepped-up flow, in 1982 the Soviets
established nine traffic control posts along the main
highway routes leading from Kabul to Termez,
Feyzabad, Gardeyz, Jalalabad, and probably Ghazni
but these have had little success, in our view. I
Successful rebel attacks against supply convoys have
been a serious problem for the Soviets, who have had
to allocate more and more resources to convoy
security. Convoys are not allowed to move without an
escort and are sometimes delayed for days. Security
measures have generally consisted of the use of troop
trucks, armored personnel vehicles carrying security
forces, and tanks dispersed throughout the line, but,
wheeled vehicles, which are more effective against
ambushes and generally permit the convoy to travel
at greater speeds, are being employed more frequently
in place of tanks and tracked vehicles. In addition,
helicopters arefrequently used for added security
and reconnaissance.
Beginning in late 1981, the Soviets added
independent security battalions to their forces in
convoy security duties.
Afghanistan in an effort to relieve combat elements
from road and installation security duties. The role
of the security battalions, however, has been
generally limited to securing fixed installations.
Motorized rifle battalions continue to be assigned to
The Supply Scorecard
Ammunition. Overall the supply of munitions is
adequate, despite spot shortages. Much of the
ammunition for ground forces is delivered to
Afghanistan by rail and then transported to depots
However, helicopters and transport aircraft frequently
are used for resupply within the country, especially to
alleviate spot shortages. The Soviets maintain
munitions depots at the two main transshipment
points, the major airfields, the 40th Army logistic
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The Salang Pass and Tunnel:
A Key Link in the Logistic Chain
The Do Shaka Highway Tunnel Kowtal-e Salang,
"The Salang Pass Tunnel, "is located on the strategic
north-south route that connects the ferry crossing at
Shir Khan and the major Soviet transshipment center
at Jeyretan with the Afghan capital of Kabul. This
highway is a vital link between the Soviet Union and
its forces and bases in eastern Afghanistan, including
the headquarters of the 40th Army in Kabul. The
tunnel, for which there is no bypass, sits midway on
the only route leading to the hub of all Soviet
military operations in the area. The Soviet tactical
POL pipeline, extended in 1982 from Pol-e Khomri to
Bagram, parallels the route through the tunnelF_
The tunnel is a single-bore, stone-lined structure,
approximately 2,675 meters long, 7.6 meters wide,
facility in Pol-e Khomri,
and 5.2 meters high, with footpaths on each side of
the roadway. The extreme weather conditions and its
high elevation required the construction of a 410-
meter-long gallery at the tunnel's south entrance for
protection against avalanches, rockslides, and
snowstorms. Nineteen other galleries, including one
1,975 meters long immediately north of the tunnel,
are located along this primary highway.
Keeping the tunnel and pass open has been a major
challenge to both the Soviet forces and the members
of the conscripted Afghan Labor Corps. Blizzards and
snowstorms that may occur at any time during the
year, severe flooding in the spring, and rock and
debris slides are the main natural obstacles to
keeping the route open year round. Soviet convoys in
the area, moreover, have been a favorite target of the
insurgents. The rugged mountainous terrain affords
the attackers ideal protection while the convoys are
extremely vulnerable.
Destruction or closure of the tunnel for an extended
period would halt all ground transport of forces and
supplies from the northeast. This would include POL
because of the pipeline running through the tunnel.
There are no railroads in Afghanistan and, with the
closure of the Salang Tunnel, the Soviets would have
to rely on air transport-a more expensive and less
efficient method.
POL. POL supplies have been a serious problem for
the Soviets and the Afghan regime, with shortages
occasionally affecting combat operations. Resistance
sabotage is the major problem effecting smooth
operation of the pipelines. Insurgent attacks to obtain
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fuel supplies and disrupt the fuel flow have caused the
loss of thousands of gallons of fuel and rendered the
pipelines inoperative for short periods of time. They
occasionally cause a curtailment of air operations and
make fuel resupply to both air and ground units more
cumbersome. After destroying a section of the
pipeline, the resistance frequently withdraws to
positions from which they can ambush Soviet repair
teams
Medical and Sanitation Supplies. The Soviets are
also experiencing some problems with medical
supplies. The patient load in Afghanistan is straining
medical supply levels and there have been serious
shortages of surgical materials and pharmaceuticals,
as well as spot shortages of bed linens and clothing.
The Soviets maintain at least seven field hospitals in
Afghanistan at airfields and major deployment areas
and they have continued to expand and upgrade these
facilities. They also maintain a medical supply depot
in Pol-e Khomri.
The combined Soviet-Afghan offensive in the Konar
Valley in May-June 1985 demonstrates poor Soviet
logistic planning and operation during a period of
sustained combat.
wartime conditions.
Conclusion
The Soviet logistic system in Afghanistan has
experienced recurring deficiencies, limiting the
number and scope of military operations that the
Soviets can conduct. Major problems have been the
result of mismanagement, shortage of motor
transport, and difficulties in maintaining route
security. Such logistic difficulties have not shown up
in exercises or rear-service training, probably because
these activities do not adequately simulate real
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